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MAJOR SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

An Introduction

BY CONSTANTINE PANUNZIO
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

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To
V. M., P. S. P., W. O. S.
L. M. S., J. H. U.

DEVOTED PUPILS
UNSPARING CRITICS
BEST OF TEACHERS

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University of California,
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GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii

LIST OF TABLES xi

LIST OF FIGURES xii

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3

PART I. THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ORDER

CHAPTER

1. THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ORDER 7

PART II. THE FACTORS

INTRODUCTION 30

2. PHYSICAL NATURE AS FACTOR 31
3. BIOLOGICAL NATURE AS FACTOR 44
4. THE RÔLE OF MAN 51
5. THE MIND OF MAN 70
6. THE RACES OF MAN 80
7. CULTURE 103
8. CULTURE AS CONDITIONER 115
9. URBANIZATION OF CULTURE 121
10. CULTURE HERITAGE IN THE WEST 130

PART III. THE INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION 142

11. ORIGIN OF INSTITUTIONS 143
12. THE MARRIAGE SYSTEM 147
13. THE FAMILY 183
14. RISE OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 198
15. THE CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC SYSTEM 223
16. THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION 242
17. THE RECREATIONAL INSTITUTION 265
18. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION 286

CHAPTER PAGE
19. The Contemporary Religious Institution 305
20. Science—A Nascent Institution 321
21. Government 340
22. Persistent Problems of Government 365

PART IV. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

Introduction 392
23. Emergence of Institutions 393
24. Development 399
25. Change 411
26. Struggle 425
27. Maladjustment 443
28. Control 458
29. Persistence 468
30. Teleology or Pursuit of Goals 479

PART V. FUTURE OF WESTERN CULTURE

Introduction 492
31. Future of Western Culture 493

Suggestions to Students and Teachers 515
Glossary 522
Index of Names 577
Index of Subjects 587

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

1. Sex Distribution of the Population 62
2. Proportion of Males to Females in United States by Divisions and by Certain States, 1920 and 1930 63
3. Percentage Age Distribution in the United States and Certain Other Countries 64
4. Sociological Age Division in United States and Certain Other Countries 65
5. Principal External Characteristics of the Main Races . 87
6. Cephalic Index of Living European Males 88
7. The Skull of Modern and Fossil Man, Summarized Averages 88
8. Skeletal Characteristics of the Main Races 90
9. Mental Characteristics of the Main Races 91
10. Characteristics of Caucasoid Subraces 93
11. Population of the World according to Pigmentation . . 97
12. Permissible Age of Marriage in Various European Countries, 1928 155
13. Legal Minimum Ages of Marriage in the United States, 1928 156
14. Age of Marriage in Various European Countries . . . 158
15. Median Age at Marriage by Sex, Color, and Nativity for the United States, 1930 158
16. Average Marriage Age of Women in the United States according to Social Class of Husband 161
17. Successful Marrying Age 165
18. Legal Grounds for Divorce in the United States and Proportion of Divorces Attributed to Each, 1932 179
19. Marriages and Divorces in United States, 1922 to 1935 . 179
20. Average Number of Births per Marriage for Various European Countries for Different Periods 186
21. Average Number of Children per Wife in America . . . 187
22. Average Size of Families in the United States, 1890–1930 188
23. Divorces Classified by Number of Children in Families Dissolved by Divorce 193
24. Indexes for Population, Wage-Earners, and Production in the United States, 1899–1935 224

TABLE PAGE
25. GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL MACHINE POWER 225
26. COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 248
27. COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE IN THE UNITED STATES BY STATES, DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT, AND AGE 249
28. ILLITERACY RATES IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN WORLD 251
29. SEX DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS IN AMERICA, 1900–1930 . . 255
30. MAIN CONCEPTS OF POWER GOVERNING UNIVERSE 289
31. BELIEFS CONCERNING GOD'S RELATION TO MAN 290
32. CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE WESTERN WORLD, 1931, 1938 . 309
33. RELIGIOUS POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1926 . . . 313
34. NUMBER OF IMPORTANT SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGIC, AND GEOGRAPHIC DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS BY 10-YEAR PERIODS, 1401–1900 335

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE
1. MAIN HUMAN STEMS OR RACES AND THEIR SUBDIVISIONS . . . 85
2. CEPHALIC INDEX 86
3. CALVARIAL INDEX 89
4. THE RISK OF DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES 164

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3

PART I. THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ORDER

CHAPTER

1. THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ORDER 7

General View of the Institutional Order, 7 ff.: the master institutions and their primary functions, 7; four component subsystems of institutions, 8; Subsystem of Concepts, 8 ff.: do concepts precede usages?, 8; concepts and associated living, 9; Subsystem of Usages and Rules, 9 ff.: the folkways, 9; the mores, 10; Subsystem of Associations, 12 ff.: associations distinguished from institutions, 12; classification of associations, 13; single and mixed bonds in associations, 15; life cycle of associations, 16; activities of associations, 17; Subsystem of Instruments, 18 ff.: habitat, 18; utilitarian and symbolic instruments, 19; other instruments, 19; General and Functional Characteristics, 19 ff.: time and spatial generality of institutions, 19; variability, 20; generality among classes and in stages of culture, 20; automatic functioning, 21; interpenetrative functioning, 21; triplane functioning, 21; Institutions Distinguished from Related Systems, 22 ff.: concept "institution" distinguished, 22; institutions distinguished from society, 23; institutions distinguished from culture, 25; Summary, 27.

PART II. THE FACTORS

INTRODUCTION 30

2. PHYSICAL NATURE AS FACTOR 31

Nature and the Character of Its Influence, 31 ff.: dynamic character of physical nature, 31; is nature determinant or conditioner?, 31; specific character of nature's conditioning, 32; Nature as General Determinant, 33 ff.: nature as source and sustainer of life, 33; nature as determinant of cycle of activity, 34; nature and the continuity of human activity, 35; nature and unchangeableness of institutions, 35; Nature and Spatial Delimitations of Human Activity, 36 ff.: nature sets spatial limits, 36; nature and human migration, 37; location and concentration of populations, 38; Nature, Race, and Culture, 39 ff.: does nature set a racial stamp?, 39; does nature produce culture?, 39; does nature produce specific cultural patterns?, 40; Resistive and Hostile Nature and Man's Counteractivity, 41 ff.: nature's hostility, 41; effect of culture on nature, 42; Conclusion, 42.

3. BIOLOGICAL NATURE AS FACTOR 44

Biological Nature as Resource, 44 ff.: biological nature as basis of life, 44; rôle of microörganisms, 44; biological nature as power, 45; experi-

CHAPTER PAGE

ments on animals, 45; Social Services of Biological Nature, 46 ff.: animals as companions, 46; rôle of flora, 46; Inimical Biological Nature, 47 ff.: microörganic enemies, 47; insects, 47; food-attacking organisms, 48; Biological Nature and Man's Activity, 48 ff.: directive activity, 48; control activity, 49; man destroys his natural collaborators, 49; Summary, 50.

4. THE RÔLE OF MAN 51

Has Man Any Distinguishing Traits?, 51 ff.: religion's answer, 51; science's answer, 51; Anatomical Characteristics as Factors, 52 ff.: complex brain, 53; erect position, 53; position and structure of eyes, 53; movable fingers and apposable thumbs, 53; Physiological Traits, 54 ff.: constancy of sex drive, 54; adaptive fertility, 55; longevity and plasticity, 55; Sex and Society, 56 ff.: sex divisions, 56; differences between men and women, 57; sex and performance, 58; sex and division of labor, 59; sex and achievement, 59; achievement of woman in her own sphere, 60; sex distribution and cultural phenomena, 61; sex and social cohesion, 62; Age Divisions and Human Society, 63 ff.: age divisions of population, 63; sociological age distribution, 64; age distribution and population fluctuation, 65; social functions of age-groups, 65; age-groups and culture interaction, 67; Biological Unity and Divisiveness, 67 ff.: general biological unity, 67; general biological diversity, 68; Summary, 68.

5. THE MIND OF MAN 70

Mind, Man's Master Characteristic, 70 ff.: nature of man's mind, 70; origin and evolution of mind, 71; phases of mind, 72; Simpler Aspects of Mind as Factors, 72 ff.: functions of sensation and reflex, 72; the drives, 72; social meaning of emotion, 73; Intelligence and Human Society, 74 ff.: meaning of intelligence, 74; man a time-binding creature, 75; man a space-binding creature, 76; man's communicativeness, 76; man's adjustability, 77; mind and morality, 77; Summary, 78.

6. THE RACES OF MAN 80

Nature of Race and Origins of Races, 80 ff.: meaning of race, 80; theories of race origins, 80; probable factors in raciation, 83; gist of the matter, 84; Main Racial Divisions of Mankind, 84 ff.: early observations and first classifications, 84; contemporary classification and bases of classification, 86; skeletal traits, 86; mental characteristics, 89; Subdivisions of the White Race, 92 ff.: Caucasoid subraces, 92; traits marking White subraces, 94; Racial Similarities and Dissimilarities, 94 ff.: nature of racial similarities, 95; racial "superiority," 96; Race Contact and Its Immediate Results, 97 ff.: location and numerical strength of races, 97; contact of races and amalgamation, 97; mental and social consequences, 99; Modern Race Conflicts, 100 ff.: societal consequences, 100; importance of external dissimilarities, 100; race as political material, 101; Conclusion, 101.

7. CULTURE 103

Nature and Characteristics of Culture, 103 ff.: meaning of term, 103; culture a superorganic order, 103; a spontaneous order, 103; a dynamic

CHAPTER PAGE

order, 104; culture a system of patterns, 104; culture an objective entity, 105; culture a utilitarian order, 105; culture cumulative and self-perpetuating, 106; summary definition, 106; Genesis of Culture, 106 ff.: originating factors, 106; generality of culture creation, 107; culture and race, 108; Content and Structure of Culture, 109 ff.: culture traits and trait complexes, 109; spatial arrangement of culture, 109; Culture Variation, 110 ff.: geography, race, and culture variations, 110; variations due to new complexes, 111; variations due to internal elaboration, 111; variations due to historical or other accident, 111; differing cultures, 112; Accumulation of Culture, 112 ff.: how culture accumulates, 112; rate of accumulation, 113; culture base, 114.

8. CULTURE AS CONDITIONER 115

General Influence of Culture Base, 115 ff.: culture the matrix of associated living, 115; accumulated culture and control over nature, 116; lessened time-span, 116; Culture Contact and Conflict, 117 ff.: contributive culture contacts, 117; culture conflict, 117; culture-conflict path, 118; end result of culture contact, 119.

9. URBANIZATION OF CULTURE 121

Urbanization of Culture, 121 ff.: what is civilization?, 121; characteristics of civilization centers, 122; Rise of Civilization Centers and Their Influence, 123 ff.: factors in the rise of civilization centers, 123; ancient and modern civilization centers, 124; results of urbanization of culture, 125; Fall of Civilizations, 126 ff.: decline and fall of civilizations, 126; why civilizations fall, 126; perpetuity of culture, 128.

10. CULTURE HERITAGE IN THE WEST 130

Time and Place Origin of Western Culture, 130: beginnings of Western culture, 130; original habitat, 130; Prehistoric Accumulation, 130 ff.: spoken language, 130; controlled fire, 131; domestication of animals and plants, 131; Contributions of Early Historical Times, 132 ff.: written language, 132; agriculture, 132; ship-building, navigation, astronomy, 133; slavery, 133; monotheism, 133; Additions in Classical Times, 134 ff.: beginnings of democracy, 134; education, 135; the arts and philosophy, 135; science, 136; Roman contributions to political structure, 136; religion, 136; slavery extended, 137; Contribution of Middle Ages and Renaissance, 137 ff.; Summary, 138.

PART III. THE INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION 142

11. ORIGIN OF INSTITUTIONS 143

Divine origin, 143; “instinct” as cause, 143; man’s intelligence, 144; experience deposits, 144.

12. THE MARRIAGE SYSTEM 147

Nature of the Marriage-Family System, 147 ff.: basic character of the marriage-family system, 147; marriage distinguished from the family,

CHAPTER PAGE

147; Origin and Development of Marriage, 148: originating factor, 148; has mating always been regulated?, 148; Marriage Folkways, 149 ff.: instructing the young concerning sex, 149; parental mate choosing, 149; spontaneous mate choosing, 150; problem of mate choosing, 150; advantages and disadvantages of spontaneous mate choosing, 150; possible solution, 151; betrothal and prenuptial practices, 152; Marriage Mores, 153 ff.: Permissible, Actual, and Successful Marriage Age, 154 ff.: permissible age of marriage, 154; age folkways, 155; actual age of marriage, 157; factors in age of marriage, 158; present trend toward earlier marriage age, 162; postponing or foregoing marriage, 162; age and success in marriage, 163; Sources of Mates, 166 ff.: exogamy, 166; reasons for exogamy, 167; endogamy, 168; reasons for endogamy, 170; Rules as to Number of Mates, 172 ff.: mores of plural marriages, 172; polygamy, 172; plural mating, 174; mores of monogamy, 174; Rights and Duties in Marriage, 176 ff.: actual initiation of marriage, 176; the right of cohabitation, 177; right and duty to have children, 177; economic and social rights and duties, 177; Termination of Marriage, 178 ff.: provisions for termination of marriage, 178; conditions contributing to termination of marriage, 178; legal grounds for divorce, 178; actual rates of divorce, 180; Functions and Future of Marriage, 180 ff.: functions of marriage, 180; future of marriage, 180.

13. THE FAMILY 183

Nature of the Family, 183; Originating Factors, 184 ff.: dependence theory, 184; "parental instinct" theory, 184; bodily intimacy theory, 185; societal requirements, 185; Familial Folkways, 185 ff.: size of family, 185; cultural significance of trend in family size, 188; age of mother, 189; Family Mores, 190 ff.: care of offspring, 190; economic obligations, 190; authority in the family, 191; Dissolution of the Family, 193; Functions and Duties of Modern Family, 194 ff.: individual-plane functions, 194; social functions, 195; societal functions, 196.

14. RISE OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 198

Nature and Functions, 198 ff.: pivotal position of the economic system, 198; compulsive nature of economic activity, 198; disciplinary and self-expression character of economic life, 199; means of dealing with nature and man, 199; Development of Economic Institution, 200 ff.: meaning of "development," 200; direct appropriation method, 201; hunting and fishing, 201; pastoral method, 201; agriculture, 202; commerce, 203; industrialism, 204; Shelter and Clothing, 204 ff.: nature's dwelling places and primitive construction, 204; permanent abodes, 205; elevation and contour location, 205; divisions for various uses, 206; clothing, 207; Development of Tools, 208 ff.: tool-making, 208; materials used, 208; general "aim" in tool-making, 209; Development of Power, 210 ff.: muscular power, 210; water and wind power, 210; power of inorganic substances, 210; Development of Economic Organization, 211 ff.: early organization, 211; commercial organizations, 211; production associations, 212; labor organizations, 213; significance of economic organization, 214; Economic Folkways, 214 ff.: self-reliance, 214; familial interdependence and provision for crises, 214; prestige and obligations of wealth, 215; Ownership or Property Usages, 215 ff.: explanations of property,

CHAPTER PAGE

215; ownership practices, 217; ownership of land, 217; group property, 218; personal property, 219; corporate ownership, 219; inheritance, 220; Conclusion, 220.

15. THE CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC SYSTEM 223

Dominance of the Machine, 223 ff.: nature of machine, 223; advantages of the machine, 224; disadvantages of the machine, 226; Capitalism, 228 ff.: nature of capitalism, 228; contributions of capitalism, 228; problems arising from capitalism, 229; Profit-Making Pattern, 232 ff.: meaning of "profit-making," 232; advantages of profit-making, 232; problems arising from profit-making, 232; Economic Interdependence, 235 ff.: nature of interdependence, 235; advantages of interdependence, 235; disadvantages of interdependence, 236; Steering the Economic System, 237 ff.: future of economic life, 237; proposed ways out, 237; individualism as a way out, 237; syndicalism, 238; socialism, 238; communism, 239; which doctrine will prevail?, 239.

16. THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION 242

Nature of Educational Institution, 242 ff.: nature of education, 242; distinguished from science, 242; what lies at the root of education?, 242; social impulses in education, 243; societal purpose in education, 243; Purpose of Education in Various Periods, 244 ff.: primitive people's education, 244; education in ancient times, 244; education for state service, 245; education for practical efficiency, 245; education for the Church, 245; humanistic and utilitarian education, 246; nationalistic education, 247; Educational Folkways and Mores, 247 ff.: folkways of education, 247; compulsory attendance, 247; compulsory attendance in practice, 248; the literacy pattern, 250; Organization of Modern Education, 252 ff.: communal organization, 252; reach of modern school, 252; classless schooling, 253; professional teaching group, 254; the woman teacher, 254; standardization, 255; Educational Instruments and Their Significance, 256 ff.: early writing, 256; the printed page, 257; the textbook evil, 258; Educational Ideals and Reality, 259 ff.: individual self-discovery, 259; liberation from societal fears, 260; rational control, 261; training for societal endeavor, 261; synthesis of knowledge, 262; Conclusion, 262.

17. THE RECREATIONAL INSTITUTION 265

Nature of Recreation, 265 ff.: importance of recreation, 265; social and cultural aspects, 265; explanations as to origin, 266, relaxation-substitution explanation, 266; Types and Media of Recreation, 267 ff.: types of recreation, 267; bodily movement, 268; use of ornaments, 268; objects of art as media, 269; music as medium, 269; literature as recreational means, 269; drama as recreational medium, 270; Development of Recreation, 270 ff.: primitive recreation, 270; recreation among the ancients, 271; Greeks at play, 271; Roman recreation, 272; recreation in the Middle Ages, 272; Contemporary Recreational Patterns and Trends, 273 ff.: modern recreation, 273; democratization of recreation, 273; extension of facilities, 274; community direction, 274; extension of organization, 275; professionalization and standardization, 276; Usages Governing Recreation, 277 ff.: recreational folkways, 277; recreational

CHAPTER PAGE

mores, 279; Contemporary Problems, 279 ff.: financing and administration, 279; standardization and mechanization, 279; professionalized leadership, 280; commercialization, 280; Functions of Recreation, 281 ff.: individual functions, 281; group and societal uses, 282; recreation as part of the whole of life, 282; recreation in work, 283; Conclusion, 284.

18. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION . . 286

Nature of Religious Institution, 286 ff.: the religious institution, 286; origin of religion, 286; religion as product of experience, 287; Concepts of Power Governing Universe, 288 ff.: nature of power governing universe, 288; number of gods, 289; God's relation to man, 289; creeds, 290; Religious Ceremonials, 291 ff.: nature of religious ceremonials, 291; compulsory character of religious usages, 291; human objective in worship, 292; life-cycle rituals, 292; sustenance rites, 294; Development of the Religious Organization, 294 ff.: rise of priesthood, 294; familial, clan, and tribal religious organization, 296; ethnic religious organization, 296; Christendom, 296; Religion the Unifying System of the Middle Ages, 298 ff.: central factor in subsequent development, 298; organizational structure and procedure, 299; trained leadership, 300; monasticism and its societal function, 301; aesthetic teleological appeal, 302; Conclusion, 302.

19. THE CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION . . . 305

Factors of Decadence, 305 ff.: seeds of division, 305; priestly domination, 305; separation from "reality," 306; the Renaissance (XIV to XVI Centuries), 306; the Reformation, 307; Salient Features of Contemporary Religion, 307 ff.: a divided Christendom, 307; weakened religious authority, 308; humanism, 308; freedom of belief and worship, 309; church membership in the West, 309; Contemporary Religion in the United States, 310 ff.: heterogeneity and heterodoxy, 310; wide variety of practices, 311; social gospel, 312; membership in the United States, 312; sentiment for church union?, 313; Maladjustments Related to Institutionalized Religion, 314 ff.: is religion an opiate?, 314; conservatism and obscurantism of religion, 314; the enemy of science, 315; Constructive Functions of the Religious Institution, 316 ff.: source of personal and social security, 316; philanthropic agency, 317; agent of reform, 317; instrument of societal control, 318; a unifying power, 319; Conclusion, 319.

20. SCIENCE—A NASCENT INSTITUTION 321

Nature of Science, 321 ff.: late rise of science, 321; characteristics of science, 322; science distinguished from education, 323; Originating Factors, 323 ff.: is there an "instinct" underlying science?, 323; craving for knowledge and other "drives," 324; Concepts of Universe Underlying Science, 324 ff.: concepts of magic, 325; metaphysical cosmos, 326; the mystical order of the Middle Ages, 327; the heroic age of science, 328; modern science natural and useful, 330; The Ways of Science, 331 ff.: the individual scientist, 331; the scientific method, 332; Scientific Organizations, 333 ff.: first organizations, 333; number of members, 333;

CHAPTER PAGE

characteristics of scientific associations, 334; scientific achievements, 334; Social Meaning of Science, 336 ff.: science and liberation from fear, 336; science and material well-being, 336; results of doubtful value, 337; dogmatism and obscurantism of science, 337; amorality of science, 338.

21. GOVERNMENT 340

Nature and Function, 340 ff.: government the supersocial system, 340; theories as to origin of government, 341; development of culture as factor, 342; Salient Aspects of Development of Government, 343 ff.: aspects of development, 343; population and territorial reach, 344; differentiation and autonomy of government, 344; internal distribution of authority, 345; basis of authority, 346; basis of governmental union, 347; multiplication of state functions, 348; sociological significance of this development, 350; Salient Governmental Ways, 351 ff.: legalization of basic usages, 351; physical coercion, 352; compulsory financial support of government, 353; compulsory military service, 353; other compulsions, 354; noncompulsive aspects of government, 355; other activities, 355; Governmental Associations, 356 ff.: the state, 356; territorial subdivisions, 357; functional associations, 358; political associations, 359; nonpartisan organizations, 362; Conclusion, 363.

22. PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT 365

Control of power, 365; Democracy as Distribution of Power, 365 ff.: democracy as societal struggle, 365; the democratic trend, 366; is democracy adequate?, 367; inadequacies of democracy, 369; Meaning of Revolution, 370 ff.: nature of revolution, 370; course of revolution, 370; results of revolution, 373; War as Cultural Phenomenon, 374 ff.: nature of war, 374; periods in history of war, 374; products of war, 376; is war a necessity?, 378; Problem of Internationalism, 379 ff.: nature of internationalism, 379; rise of internationalism, 379; the League of Nations, 381; the "interpeople" movement, 382; The Ideal Government in Theory and Practice, 384 ff.: anarchism, 384; individualism, 385; communism, 386; socialism, 387; Present-Day Trends in Government, 387.

PART IV. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

INTRODUCTION 392

23. EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONS 393

The Problem of Origins, 393: enigma of origins, 393; character of available information, 393; Early Emergence, 394 ff.: primary factors in origination, 394; semi-instinctive activity, 394; acquisition of transmission ability, 395; Time and Place Origins, 395 ff.: time origins, 395; original habitat of human culture, 396; single or multiple origin?, 397; Unitary Origin, 397.

24. DEVELOPMENT 399

Meaning of Development, 399 ff.: definition, 399; distinguished from evolution, 399; development distinguished from "progress" and "social

CHAPTER PAGE

planning," 400; development illustrated, 401; Aspects of Development, 402 ff.: development of separate institutions, 402; autonomy, 403; internal elaboration, 404; organizational spread and centralization, 405; results of development in marriage and the family, 405; Cultural Correlatives of Development, 405 ff.: development and cultural variations, 405; urban-rural variations in culture, 406; deterioration of functions, 408; extension of cohesion, 409; communization, 409; Conclusion, 410.

25. CHANGE 411

Meaning and Prevalence of Change, 411; Sources of Change, 412 ff.: physical nature as source of change, 412; population as source of change, 412; discovery, 413; invention and change, 414; concepts as sources of change, 415; societal catastrophes as sources of change, 416; man's deliberate effort, 417; change as source of change, 417; Morphology of Change, 417 ff.: changes in material objects, 417; change in associations, 417; change in locus of function, 419; change in concepts, 420; change in usages, 420; Variations in Rate and Degree of Change, 421 ff.: spatial variations, 421; societal strata and change, 421; stages of culture in relation to change, 422; Conclusion, 423.

26. STRUGGLE 425

Nature and Scope of Struggle, 425 ff.: nature of struggle, 425; generality of struggle, 425; the ends of struggle, 426; spheres of struggle, 426; Modes or Forms of Struggle, 426 ff.: aggressive struggle, 427; obstructive struggle, 427; competitive struggle, 427; conflict, 428; Struggle Between Segments of Society, 429 ff.: struggle between the sexes, 429; struggle between young and aged, 430; struggle between the classes, 431; Intrainstitutional Struggle, 431 ff.: struggle within and between associations, 431; contest of ideas, 432; contest centering about instruments, 433; Interinstitutional Struggle, 433 ff.: religion vs. other institutions, 434; government vs. other institutions, 434; science's struggle, 435; struggle of educational institution, 435; economic struggle, 436; familial struggle, 436; Cultural Struggle, 437 ff.: contests of cultures, 437; contest between established and nascent complexes, 437; struggle between conservatism and liberalism, 438; ruralism vs. urbanism, 438; Products of Struggle, 439 ff.: cultural stimulation, 439; change, 439; cohesion, 439; maladjustment, 440; domination and its consequence, 440; Conclusion, 441.

27. MALADJUSTMENT 443

The Condition and Process Defined, 443 ff.: nature of maladjustment, 443; naturalness of maladjustment, 443; fractional nature of maladjustment, 444; reach of maladjustment, 444; Sources of Maladjustment, 445 ff.: general causes of maladjustment, 445; physical nature as cause, 446; inherent deficiencies and disease as cause, 446; demographic causes, 447; struggle for survival and maladjustment, 447; cultural change and maladjustment, 449; culture conflict as source of maladjustment, 449; development as source of maladjustment, 450; Major Contemporary Maladjustments, 451 ff.: increase of maladjustments in our times, 451; principal present-day maladjustments, 451; Efforts to Eliminate Pronounced Maladjustments, 452 ff.: "practical social service," 452; phi-

CHAPTER PAGE

lanthropy, 452; social work, 453; reform, 453; reconstruction, 454; societal engineering, 455; is maladjustment ever eliminated?, 455; Conclusion, 456.

28. CONTROL 458

The Process Described, 458 ff.: automatic aspect of control, 458; purposefulness in guidance and control, 459; Means of Guidance, 459 ff.: guidance through custom, 459; associations as means of guidance, 459; concepts as means of guidance, 460; other means of guidance, 461; Societal Control, 462 ff.: general means of control, 462; coercive means of control, 462; effectiveness of coercion, 462; Control by Institutions, 463 ff.: control by whole institutions, 463; methods of governmental control, 464; effectiveness of institutional control, 465.

29. PERSISTENCE 468

Nature and Universality of Persistence, 468 ff.: persistence described, 468; persistence contrasted with cultural lag, 469; Extent and Phases of Persistence, 469 ff.: persistence of major institutions, 469; continuity of subphases, 470; persistence in minutiae, 470; vestigial persistence, 471; limits of persistence, 471; Factors in Persistence, 472 ff.: physical nature and persistence, 472; human nature, 472; accumulated culture and persistence, 473; functional continuity, 473; persistence through sentiment, 474; utility of the established, 475; Products or Concomitants of Persistence, 475 ff.: stability, 475; cultural inertia, 475; conservatism, 476; obscurantism, 477; maladjustment, 477; Conclusion, 477.

30. TELEOLOGY OR PURSUIT OF GOALS 479

Meaning of Societal Teleology, 479 ff.: societal teleology, 479; characteristics of goals, 480; Main Teleological Objectives, 480 ff.: teleology in primitive times, 480; teleology in ancient times, 481; messianism of the Hebrews, 481; the cosmic cycle of the Greeks, 482; the Providential Plan, 482; The Idea of Progress, 483 ff.: origins of idea of progress, 483; content and prevalence of the idea of progress, 484; Nationalistic Goals, 485 ff.: national messianism, 485; the white man's burden, 485; manifest destiny, 485; German kultur, 486; other national messianisms, 486; Racial and Class Goals, 487 ff.: racial messianism, 487; Nazi racial ideals, 487; Marxism as goal, 488; Endeavors Prompted by Societal Goals, 488 ff.; Conclusion, 489.

PART V. FUTURE OF WESTERN CULTURE

INTRODUCTION 492

31. FUTURE OF WESTERN CULTURE 493

Major Patterns and Trends, 493 ff.: dominant factors, 493; salient economic forms, 494; marriage and the family, 496; educational and recreational patterns, 497; main religious patterns, 498; governmental features, 499; Major Cultural Procedures, 499 ff.: mobility, 499; communication and the "mass mind," 500; specialism, 500; humanism, 501; interdependence, 501; Urbanization in Our Time, 502 ff.: growth of

CHAPTER PAGE

cities, 502; characteristics of urban centers, 502; distant and contractual relationships, 503; Major Dilemmas of Our Time, 504 ff.: science at the crossroads, 504; capitalism or socialism?, 505; international organization, 506; can the West resolve this dilemma?, 507; What of the Future?, 507 ff.: cyclical prediction, 507; linear prediction, 508; new culture for old, 508; cataclysmic meaning of civilization, 509; civilization's fall and culture's continuity, 510.

SUGGESTIONS TO STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 515

Arrangement of materials in this volume, 515; suggestions as to conduct of course, 516; suggested books, 518; encyclopaedias and yearbooks, 519; periodicals, 519.

GLOSSARY 522

INDEX OF NAMES 577

INDEX OF SUBJECTS 587

MAJOR SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Sociology started as a moral philosophy, gradually developed its theoretical bases and categories, and for a time tended to become a reformist discipline. In recent decades, however, it has increasingly turned its attention to scientific fact-finding; it has developed or is in the process of developing specialized, analytical disciplines, such as the sociology of marriage and the family, educational sociology, the sociologies of religion and government. The serious sociologist has found it necessary to subject the component parts of society to scrutiny in order to understand the wholeness of social phenomena, just as the natural scientist is obliged to subdivide the physical cosmos and to subject the parts to detailed study in order to comprehend the physical world. This book is in keeping with this development.

Specialization, however, has its short-comings. The specialist tends to lose sight of the forest because of the proximity of the trees. Accordingly, this book aims to make a synthesis: it pulls together, classifies, unifies the salient data, tries to show the gaps in the data, and draws up a frame of reference for further work.

This study also focuses attention upon the major institutions, that is, those complexes of thought and activity which are more or less timeless, universal, and which are directed to the satisfaction of basic human needs. The emphasis is also mainly on the institutions as found in our time. Origins and developments, former structures and status, are of necessity examined, but only for the purpose of understanding the contemporary scene, much as the portrait painter uses the background to make his central figure stand out.

Further, stress is laid on the institutions as found in the Western world. This is done, first, because that is the world in which we live and therefore the world which we presumably wish and most need to understand. Second, we wish to delimit our study. The West is in itself a vast complex, but it presents fairly coherent patterns of thought and action and its records are quite adequate for our purposes; whereas non-Western cultures rest on so different geographical and biological bases, have culture patterns so different from those of the West, and the records available to us are so fragmentary, that it would have made for confusion to consider them in a noncomparative work such as this.

This book aims to be empirical in the broad sense of that term. While not all the data here presented have been experimentally derived or are wholly substantiated, every effort has been made to avoid sheer nominalism, to present reliable data, to exclude prejudgments, to give contrary points of view and interpretations, and to use caution in arriving at conclusions.

Moreover, this is a study of "normal" and not of pathological phenomena. This does not mean that we do not or should not deal with the problem of improvement. The essence of history and of science represents the determination of the human race to improve its lot. Sociology would indeed be sterile were it to avoid inquiring into the ways and means of improving society. However, this work aims to examine the wholeness of associated living; it considers maladjustments only as they constitute parts of the totality of human ongoing; and thereby hopes to avoid the warped point of view inevitable in reformist investigations.

The book is divided into five parts. Part I introduces the concept "social institution," describes the social institutional order, and gives a schematic view of the entire work; Part II discusses the originating and conditioning factors; Part III presents a detailed analysis of eight institutions; Part IV considers the social institutional or cultural processes; Part V depicts the salient features of modern Western culture and briefly considers the various theories as to its future.

At the end of each chapter will be found a set of references for supplementary reading. On pages 515–520 will be found a statement entitled "Suggestions for students and teachers" which also contains bibliographical as well as other suggestions.

At the end a glossary of the principal terms used in this volume is provided as an aid to the reader in keeping before him the meaning we assign to those terms. The terms recommended by the American Sociological Society as necessary for the mastery of the elements of sociology are marked by an asterisk.

PART I

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Chapter 1

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ORDER

If we were viewing human society as if we had been suddenly thrust among men for the first time, we should probably be impressed with what appears to be an utter lack of order in human ongoing. We should be struck with the almost incessant physical movement of people: with their going in and out of houses, workshops, stores, schools, recreational centers, churches, and governmental buildings. If we chanced to be making our first observations in a large city, we should hear the roar of traffic; see people jamming into and pouring out of street cars or subway trains like so many ants in and out of ant hills; note the ceaseless criss-cross movement. And if we could read or listen to the radio we should learn something of delinquency and crime, of social and political scandals, and hear of revolutions, of wars, and rumors of wars.

I. GENERAL VIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The Master Institutions and Their Primary Functions. This almost incessant coming and going, these various physical movements, seemingly chaotic on first view, reveal a considerable degree of order when examined closely.

There are at least eight of these fairly well integrated clusters or systems of human activities: the marital, familial, economic, educational, recreational, religious, scientific, and governmental systems. These we call the major institutions. Each performs a primary function: marriage and the family integrate and regulate the sex and reproduction activities of mankind; the economic system orders physical-sustenance labors; the educational system transmits knowledge and guides especially the life of the young into cultural conformity; the recreational system integrates and canalizes the activities which renew mind and body; religion aims to satisfy the human craving for an understanding of the inexplicable aspects of life and for the sense of continuity; the scientific system extends knowledge; the governmental institution carries on the broadly regulative activities. In their totality these systems embody the age-long and universal experience of mankind in dealing with physical, biological, and human nature toward the satisfaction of essential needs.

Four Component Subsystems of Institutions. Closer examination reveals that each of these systems consists of subsystems of concepts, usages and rules, associations, and instruments. First and most obvious is the subsystem of instruments. Related to each institution is a body of objects necessary to its functioning, such as houses, factories, automobiles, weights and measures, flags, insignia, and wedding rings. Second, each institution contains organized groups of people, such as labor unions, school boards, athletic associations, religious congregations, political parties. These systematically united groups are known as associations or organizations. Third, each institution has a subsystem of usages and rules, such as the marriage ceremony, compulsory school attendance, church attendance, and the holding of elections. Fourth, each major institution has its own subsystem of concepts, such as the belief in the fatherhood of God or in political democracy.

II. SUBSYSTEM OF CONCEPTS

Do Concepts Precede Usages? As these subsystems are a vital part of this entire study, they call for further examination. First, the subsystem of concepts. The question whether concepts precede usages or whether they are merely the rationalizations of usages, is important in that it throws light upon whether people act mainly in response to ideas or blindly follow custom.

That there are instances of systems of concepts which have had vast influence in shaping the actions of men may be seen from the history of Christianity. The central concepts of Christianity, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, were well defined long before any widespread system of usages corresponding to those concepts was established. Likewise, the Marxian concepts and objectives were well formulated and clearly set forth long before they produced a body of usages, such as those prevailing in Russia today.

On the other hand, practice often precedes the concept. Thus the marital system in all likelihood arose out of the experience of mankind that unregulated mating gives rise to serious biological, psychological, and social difficulties. Likewise, the actual practice of owning things probably antedated the formulation of that practice into the concept of private property.[1]

Concepts and Associated Living. In any event, it is an axiom that ideas, beliefs, and ideals play important rôles in associated living. The ideas regarding the nature of the universe or of man; the belief in God as the creator of the world and in His power to guide human destiny; the ideals of happiness in marriage, of political democracy, of universal peace—have played and play a great part in the life of society. Often stated in brief and readily repeated formulas—such as the phrase, "the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," or the Apostles' Creed and the Passover Prayer, or the pledge in the marriage-ritual to be faithful in sickness and in health as long as the twain shall live—they have a profound influence in the lives of whole peoples. They constitute the very framework of associated living, the guide-posts of successive generations. Concepts cling tenaciously, often more tenaciously than physical objects, and frequently long after their validity is disproved. So all-embracing is the influence of concepts that there are whole ages which are characterized as ideational (in contradistinction to sensate), in which ideas, beliefs, and ideals are so dominant as to subordinate the immediately necessary activities of men.[2]

III. SUBSYSTEM OF USAGES AND RULES

The Folkways. The institutions also comprise usages and rules, that is, standardized and easily recognized patterns of actions, which carry with them the approval or the commands of society.

Usages or customs consist of two main classes, the folkways and the mores.[3] Folkways are those usages which have to do with casual and surface relationships, such as the custom of eating vegetables with the fork. They are regarded as the proper ways of doing things. Our everyday life teems with customs, manners, rules of courtesy. It is proper in certain sections of the country that young people's house parties be chaperoned, and ordinarily by a married woman, as a man, married or unmarried, young or old, will not do; it is proper that men wear "dress" suits at formal functions, that an unmarried woman be addressed as "Miss" and a married one as "Mrs."

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[1] See chap. 14 below, subchap. viii on "Ownership or property usages."

[2] See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics* (New York 1937) *passim*, esp. i, chap. 2.

[3] The ideas embodied in the terms "folkways" and "mores" were familiar since the days of Montaigne (1533–1592), who expounded their legal meaning in his *Essays* (1580–1588). The terms themselves were first introduced into American sociology and given their sociological connotations by Professor William Graham Sumner in his *Folkways* (Boston 1906).

The folkways emphasize propriety and not right and wrong. As such they do not entail rewards for observance or punishment—at least not legal punishment—for violation. A man may refuse to take off his hat to a woman or to address an administrative superior respectfully; yet he cannot be legally punished for it. In the United States in recent decades, it has been a social compulsion, "the proper thing," for the children of the middle and upper economic classes to go to college, to have a college degree, to join fraternities or sororities; and a person without a degree and its connections ordinarily feels humiliated among his friends. Yet he cannot be punished for not going to college, nor is he ordinarily subjected even to serious social inconveniences. In short, folkways are ways of acting which, though more or less "compulsory," are not rigidly enforced and if violated do not give rise to serious difficulties.

Folkways undergo frequent changes and vary from place to place, age to age, and from class to class. Thus, it was once the rule for a gentleman to walk only on the street side when accompanying a lady; now, if young men and women walk at all, it is not so important which side the man walks on. The reason is obvious. But folkways often change without apparent rhyme or reason, as in the length or shape of women's skirts or the way of handling a knife and fork. There are different folkways for various seasons, occasions, places, classes. In warm regions a dark coat and light trousers are substituted for formal evening clothes; in some circles it would be improper for a man to sit down at table without his coat; in a lumber camp such formality would be ridiculous.

The Mores. The mores, on the other hand, are those usages and rules which in the main govern life-giving and life-taking activities. They are those customs which *must* be obeyed because they are regarded as positively essential to the welfare of a society. They include "the philosophical and ethical generalizations," the "faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living."[4] Almost wholly in the form of taboos, negative edicts or prohibitions, they carry strong pressure from one's intimate group and from society at large; their punctilious observance is believed to ward off ill fortune from the group; they are almost invariably reinforced by religious sanction and ghost-fear; [5] and they form the substratum of many laws.

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[4] William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston 1906) 30, 59.

Mores, however, must not be confused with morals. Morals do not rest upon the collective will as do mores, nor upon coercion as do laws, nor upon the fear of the gods as do most religious acts; rather, morals rest upon the individual's awareness of his common humanity with his fellows and upon his "conscience" or voluntary choice to deal with his fellows as he would have his fellows deal with him. Thus we speak of observing a social rule of conduct punctiliously and yet of violating the spirit of humanity, of being legally free and yet of being morally bound, of scrupulously obeying the mandates of religion and yet of ignoring the voice of conscience.

The mores have at least five characteristics. First, they order and regulate all activity which directly or indirectly involves the giving, maintaining, or taking of life. They apply to the relations between the sexes; to child-bearing and child-rearing; to the injuring or destroying of life; the acquisition, ownership, and transmission of wealth; fair-play in games.

Second, the mores bear the meaning of "right" and "wrong." They rigidly prescribe the ways people in their social relationships must or must not act; they set the seal of ethical approval on observance and of strong disapproval on nonobservance. Thus in the West monogamy is the "right" form of marriage, while polygamy is "wrong"; the bringing up of offspring is "right," the destruction of them by infanticide or even by abortion is "wrong"; private property is "right," communism is "wrong." So strong is this ethical content that he who does not observe the mores is characterized as a transgressor, violator, law-breaker, traitor. Moreover, the mores of one's own culture are considered altogether right and inevitable, while those of other cultures are deemed entirely as error. Most people in the West regard the mores of the non-Christian world as heathenish; democratic countries tend to regard nondemocratic countries as having a "wrong" form of government; a nation following *laissez-faire* practices regards those practicing socialism as diabolical.

Third, it follows that the mores are highly authoritative. They are enforced by the pressure of social approval or disapproval; they take on religious sanction or condemnation; they carry earthly or heavenly reward for observance, and punishment here and in the hereafter for nonobservance; they constitute the roots of much canonical and civil law; and they are often coercively enforced.

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[5] See A. G. Keller, *Man's rough road* (New York 1932) 34.

Fourth, for all these reasons, the mores are the more persistent of the usages. They take the form of taboos, proverbs, aphorisms, epigrams, philosophies, and sacred writings and evince tenacity; they are automatic, often irrational; they are transmitted by imitation, indoctrination, and intimidation. The mores change very slowly, almost imperceptibly, and apply to all classes alike; even wars or revolutions may produce very few permanent changes in them. They do undergo local or time variations, but only in the minutae; they remain practically the same from generation to generation. All of which is due to the fact that the basic urges, the activities and tendencies the mores govern remain the same, age in and age out.

Lastly, the mores are no respecters of persons. They reach the young and the old, the rich and the poor, the learned and the ignorant, the mighty and the powerless. Whatever the age, wealth, or position of a person, the mores stretch out their arms and hold him in their grip at all times and in all places. He may appear for a time or under certain circumstances to be able to violate them, but sooner or later "murder will out." Even the achievers cannot escape their power, and many are the mighty that fall low. Nor does society ever forgive. Once a violator, always a "sinner," regardless of attenuating circumstances; and even though a person may have made a great contribution to the welfare of mankind, if he has violated any of the mores the memory of that nonobservance will not only follow him throughout life, but it may affect his progeny and may even become part of the folklore of future generations.

IV. SUBSYSTEM OF ASSOCIATIONS

Associations Distinguished from Institutions. The third subsystem of institutions is that of associations, known also as organizations. Associations are groups of persons united by common interests, formally organized, having specific objectives, and usually bestowing rights and duties upon their members.

The terms "association" and "institution" are often used synonymously, and so they may well be, since associations also consist of systems of concepts, usages, organized groups, and instruments.

According to our concept, however, associations are but the organized parts of institutions and not the institutions themselves. Systems of ideas and usages often antedate organizations, and organizations only give more specific or peculiar expression to them. The essential concept of science, for example, was formulated as early as Grecian times, centuries before specific organizations putting them into definite operation had come into being; and since concepts are essential bases of institutions, the scientific institution may properly be said to have long antedated the scientific associations. Again, organizations never embrace within themselves all the persons functioning in a given institution. There are probably millions of workers who do not belong to labor unions; millions entertain religious beliefs who do not belong to churches; and large numbers of children are born outside the marital system and reared outside of the family proper. Yet all these function within the totality of the respective institutions. Further, associations or organizations come into and go out of existence in endless succession, whereas an institution is a *continuum:* thousands of business organizations come into being in "good times" and thousands disband in depression periods, but the economic institution as a whole goes on continually, performing its basic function of supplying the means of sustenance.

Of course, by definition we may include or exclude anything we wish. To identify associations with institutions, however, would be to say that the part is equal to the whole, or that a tree consists of nothing more than its well-integrated parts, the trunk and branches. Institutions have a long genetic heritage, deep roots, undergo growth, and have many other intangible features; whereas associations are the organized groups of human beings within the institutions, created and held together by specific bonds and purposes, and claiming distinct rights and duties.[6]

Classification of Associations. Associations may be classified according to the time or place where they originate, the number of members and their spatial reach, the simplicity or complexity of structure, the directness or distance of the members, their purpose, or in other ways.

For sociological purposes the classification according to the type of relationship, rapport, or ligament that holds people together, is one of the more useful. According to this classification, there are familistic, contractual, and compulsory associations.[7] Familistic associations are those in which the relationships are more or less face-to-face and mutualistic. In such associations almost all of life's interests and activities are involved, personalities are merged, and mutual aid, care, and sympathy prevail between the members. What affects one party affects the others, and sometimes just as strongly. Separations are felt keenly. Rights and duties are implied rather than clearly defined, each member giving as occasion demands and according to ability, without especially calculating on the reward involved. The members have freedom within the group, although the obligations which they undertake give the outward appearance of limitation. These associations live as long as the members do and even after only one survives. A well-knit family, close friendships, partnerships, and other small groups are typical of this kind of association.

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[6] It needs to be noted, however, that competent scholars sometimes use the term "institution" for association. See Professor John R. Commons, *Institutional economics* (New York 1934) *passim.*

The contractual associations are bound by legal or other specific bonds. Ordinarily they involve only one sector of life or interest, such as the economic, the religious, or the political. The members, though united in the pursuit of a specific objective, may even oppose one another in other fields. Also each, though coöperating, seeks his own ends first. Rights and duties are specifically defined, but there is no assurance that each party will observe the terms of the contract, or that he will not take advantage of the other outside those terms, or that he will not even twist them to his own advantage. The parties often remain strangers to one another. The contractual associations are not durable unless the duration is expressly stated in the contract. Business corporations, the larger religious, educational, and political associations are of this type.

Compulsory associations are even more rigid. They are characterized by the antagonism of the parties involved and may cover all or merely some one phase of life. One party may wish to take advantage of the other, to inflict damage, pain, fine, or other inconvenience upon him. The dominant member seldom seeks the welfare of the subjected. Familistic and contractual elements are often present, however, just as elements of these three types of relationships exist in all associations, even though one predominates. Such organizations may endure for a long or for a short time. Examples are those of master and slave, conqueror and conquered, despotic government and citizens.

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[7] See Sorokin, *op. cit.*, iii, 24–39.

Associations are seldom wholly of one type or another. Mixed types of relationships may prevail in them. There are pseudo-familistic associations, in which one party pretends to work for the advantage of the other but really is seeking his own interest. There are pseudo-contractual organizations in which one party is compelled to make a contract under coercion by the other party, through hunger or some other force. There are pseudo-compulsory associations in which contractual and even familistic relationships prevail. "As a matter of fact, the totality of interrelations within practically all the social groups represents usually a combination of these main forms. . . . But the proportion of each type in the totality of the network . . . is not the same. It varies from group to group; and, in the course of time, changes even within the same group." [8]

Single and Mixed Bonds in Associations. Associations, then, come into existence as expressions of specific interests, purposes, or bonds. Thus the consanguineous bond gives rise to familial, tribal, or racial associations; the economic interest underlies organizations of workers and capitalists, or of professional people, such as lawyers, physicians, teachers; the desire to transmit knowledge and the cultural heritage gives rise to local or state school boards, college and university boards of trustees and regents; the desire for recreational outlets underlies local, state, national, or international organizations related to athletics, the theater, the fine arts, and museums; the religious bond expresses itself in a local, national, or international religious association; the scientific interest gives rise to an association for the advancement of science; the political bond finds embodiment in a patriotic organization, a political party, or a national state.

Each association is mainly held together by one primary bond, essential to its existence and functioning, though it may and almost invariably does have secondary interests. Moreover, an association ordinarily disintegrates and often disbands whenever the primary bond ceases to exist. A business organization which no longer serves the original purpose of making profits for its members ordinarily breaks up; a specific marriage which no longer performs the expected functions frequently dissolves by separation or divorce.

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[8] Sorokin, *op. cit.*, iii, 38–39. By permission of American Book Company.

In daily life, however, these interests or bonds seldom act independently of one another; associations rarely come into existence or are held together by a single interest. A given family is bound together by economic, educational, and recreational interests, as well as by consanguineous bonds.

Life Cycle of Associations. Associations are created by specific acts. Unlike concepts, folkways, and mores, which are the product of spontaneous, automatic, slow accretions, associations come into being by the definite, more or less purposeful and voluntary acts of groups of individuals. Thus a given state comes into being through a declaration of independence and the adoption of a constitution; an industrial firm through the securing of incorporation papers; a specific marriage by taking out the marriage license and going through the marriage ceremony; a church through the drawing up of a creed or a covenant. Associations have specific inception dates, places, and personnel; and ordinarily are based on some kind of instrument, such as a license, a contract, an act of incorporation, a charter, a creed, or a constitution.

Membership in an organization is acquired through the act of joining. An individual belongs by birth to the Negro race, but joins the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; every person nominally belongs to a given state, but he joins the Republican or the Democratic party, and in fact he may go into another country and be naturalized; by nature man is probably endowed with religious cravings, but he joins a church; and he even marries of his own volition. These acts of joining, moreover, are usually signalized by some ritual, such as baptism, the first communion, the marriage ceremony, an initiation, or the swearing of allegiance to a state.

Membership involves rights and duties, which are either explicitly stated or are implied. Entering a political party, joining a church, entering into the state of matrimony, entail specific duties, rights, and privileges. And membership in an association may cease at the will of the individuals or the social unit involved, either by definite act or by default.

Associations also come to an end through an act, the death of members, or by sheer default. A marriage is dissolved either by the death of one of the mates, or by divorce, or sociologically speaking by the mere disappearance of one of the parties; a business corporation, a church organization, and even a state may cease to exist upon the withdrawal of members, upon a public act, or through sheer lack of participation by a sufficient number of members.

Consequently, associations are relatively short-lived. Marriages, families, business organizations, schools and colleges, recreational, religious, and even political organizations come into and go out of existence in relatively short times. The master institutions have existed from time immemorial, in all places, among all classes of society, and in the various stages of cultural development; associations, even national states or world-wide churches which interlink the successive generations and sometimes reach considerable age, have a comparatively short life; they come and go in endless succession, carry on their work, and pass out of existence. There is hardly an association that is more than a thousand years old.

Activities of Associations. Associations or organizations carry on two main types of activities, the promotive and the regulative. Some business organizations are centers of "booming," "boosting," business propaganda; educational organizations frequently give the impression that education is the very essence of life; recreational organizations promote football and baseball; religious denominations and political parties have been known from early times as sources of the great waves of propaganda which sometimes sweep over a whole nation. In this way, the main ideas governing the life of society, and the principal rules of conduct, the beliefs and ideals of a given culture, are kept alive.

Organizations carry on a regulative function. Within each institution there are special organizations, and within each organization there are persons or groups whose function is to govern. In the economic system there are boards of directors, Chambers of Commerce, labor unions; in the educational institution, boards of trustees, teachers' organizations; in the recreational institution there are authoritative bodies which codify and enforce game rules, prescribe what entertainments are or are not fit for public consumption; in the religious institution there are whole hierarchies of boards and "colleges," from boards of laymen, Sunday School Boards, Christian Endeavor Boards, up to the boards of Episcopacy in the various Protestant denominations and the College of Cardinals in the Roman Catholic Church.

The most inclusive of these organizations in the modern West is the state. The state has at certain times been regarded as having superhuman or divine authority and at other times and places as simply constituting an agency endowed by the citizens with power to rule. In either case, the state has from very early times to the present exercised great power over the government of society. It codifies, promulgates, and enforces the rules governing practically every aspect of associated living: marriage and the family, the economic, educational, recreational, and to an extent religious life. The doctrine of sovereignty has given authority even over the very lives of the citizens. By means of its highly organized divisions or branches (judicial, legislative, or executive), it reaches nearly every geographic subunit, such as provincial, communal, urban, and rural units, and even the remote, sparsely populated areas.

Thus associations are the framework within which a considerable part of social living goes on; they are the guardians of the ideas, beliefs, and ideals of the people; they are the watchers of the rules which govern the more important phases of associated living. So crucial are associations in these respects, so surely do they draw every web of group life into themselves, that when they become too numerous and complex, and especially when they become too rigid and predatory—as they seem to do when civilizations reach their full expressions—they inject such complexity into an entire culture, produce such a plethora of impingements and forms, become so interlocked and self-centered, that they disintegrate; and their decadence seems to be associated with, if it does not actually lead to, the decadence and downfall of whole civilizations.[9]

V. SUBSYSTEM OF INSTRUMENTS

Habitat. Besides concepts, usages, and associations, institutions consist of or employ instruments, objects, skills, or other devices.

One set of these instruments consists of the peculiar habitat which each institution employs. Thus the sex and reproduction activities of mankind go on mainly in the home; the physical-sustenance labors on farm and in factory, shop and market place; the transmitting of knowledge, mainly in school and college; the renewal of physical and mental energy goes on chiefly in playground and gymnasium, museum and theater; the activities directed toward achieving a sense of cosmic security center principally in church and synagogue; scientific work, mainly in laboratories; and the broadly regulative phases of human ongoing mainly in legislative hall, court room, police station, and other governmental buildings.

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[9] See chap. 9 below for further discussion of this topic.

Utilitarian and Symbolic Instruments. Some of these are physical and immediately utilitarian, such as houses, furniture, culinary and other equipment in the family; factories, machinery, and stores in the economic system; school buildings and books in education; gymnasia and play fields in the recreational institution; churches, altars, and pews in religion; administrative buildings, court houses, and police stations in government. Such instruments are more or less peculiar to the given institution and necessary to its primary function.

Other instruments are symbolic objects and are employed to give expression to ideas, beliefs, and ideals. Engagement and wedding rings, money and trade marks, caps and gowns and diplomas, pennants and insignia, the seven-branched candlestick, the cross and the crescent, flags, coats of arms, and seals—all are examples of symbolic objects.

Other Instruments. Still other instruments are nonphysical, such as systems of weights and measures, the calendar and the whole time system, credits, and patents; curricula and degrees; game rules; the mass, prayer, hymn singing; national anthems, party slogans, and laws.

Finally, there are instruments which though of primary use in one institution are employed secondarily in other institutions; while others are used in all the social systems. Weights and measures are of primary use in economic life, but they are also employed in health activities, in education, recreation, and science. There are instruments which are used more or less by all institutions. Language is probably the most universal of these. The time-keeping system, communication devices such as the telephone and telegraph, and patents and copyrights are employed more or less commonly in all institutions.

In short, "Every institution centers around a fundamental need, permanently unites a group of people in a cooperative task and has its particular body of doctrine and its technique of craft." [10]

VI. GENERAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Time and Spatial Generality of Institutions. First, the master institutions are age-long systems. Some of them, such as marriage and the economic order, appear to have been well formed in prehistory; others, such as the educational, religious, and political systems were present as functions in the family or tribal systems. Whether we examine the development of concepts, of folkways and mores, of associations, or of instruments, we are impressed with the fact that institutions are the growth of millenniums. Originating in the remote past, growing over long periods of time, making countless slow accretions, having become deeply ingrained in the habits of mankind, the social institutions seem to possess an everlasting life. This longevity seems to have some relation to the fact that they subserve basic human needs.

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[10] Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 626.

Likewise, the major social institutions have existed and do exist throughout the world. Everywhere we find some form of marriage and the family, of economic, educational, religious, and political systems, and even some aspects of science.[11]

Variability. Although everywhere present, it must not be inferred that institutions are the same everywhere. Actually they develop differently in various localities. The reasons for this are not as yet fully explained, but the fact remains that Eastern culture has, for example, produced polygamy in marriage and polytheism in religion, while the West has developed monogamy and monotheism. Within each major culture area, also, we find variations: within Western culture we have the subforms of Judaism and Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism, monarchy and democracy, capitalism and communism. Nor do the variations stop here. The items of culture also vary from community to community and even from neighborhood to neighborhood.

Generality among Classes and in Stages of Culture. In addition to universality in time and space, social institutions function among all classes of people, among the poor and the rich, the single and the married, the learned and the unlearned, the healthy and the ill, the religious and the irreligious. Here also we find variations; for example, the family is probably more cohesive among the poor than among the rich, and economic activity much more absorbing among the former than among the latter. But in their totality the institutions are among all classes of people.

The same is true of the stages of culture. Even among the most primitive tribes we find all the major institutions, at least in their embryonic forms. Originally they all seem to have been parts of the familial institution and gradually, with social development, to have split off. Sometimes they have functioned more intensively or cohesively than at other times, but they have been actively present in each stage of development of human society.

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[11] Professor Clark Wissler speaks of "the universal culture patterns" in much the same sense, although he includes different items. See his *Man and culture* (New York 1923) 73–97.

Social institutions, therefore, have a wide generality. That is to say, they are systems of concepts, usages, associations, and instruments, which in varying degrees and extent have prevailed from early times to this, among all peoples and classes of people, and have existed among the most primitive as well as among the most advanced of peoples.

Automatic Functioning. In addition, social institutions evince what may be called functional characteristics. First, they function automatically; that is, they arise and develop as products of man's free interaction with physical, biological, and human nature in associated living. These actions and interactions do contain elements of awareness, but are in the main undeliberate, spontaneous, and automatic.

Interpenetrative Functioning. Institutions are further characterized by interpenetration; that is, they are interwoven in origins, development, structures, functioning, in concepts, usages, associations, instruments. Marriage ordinarily produces the family; the family performs economic, educational, recreational, as well as reproductive, child-rearing, and affectional functions; marriage, the family, and the economic system are closely interwoven with the educational institution; and so on through the entire range of activity. In fact, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a distinct social institution; each, to some degree, is bound up with every other. A true picture of the entire institutional system would show a constant mixing and intermixing of functions.

Triplane Functioning. Social institutions, moreover, function on three planes, that is, on the individual, the social, and the societal planes. The institutions in the last analysis are made up of individuals, who constitute, as it were, the atoms of the entire structures. Institutions, therefore, operate as the result of the numberless activities of the component individuals. More than this, the institutions in the totality of their operations affect individuals as individuals. The family, for example, sets a stamp on a person which may influence his life quite apart from his social actions;

may give him a mental set which he may not even be conscious of, but which affects his own inner life, his modes of looking at things, his belief in self or in others, his hopes and aspirations. The fear of original sin or of hell, inculcated by the religious institution, has no doubt made lasting deposits on the lives of millions of individuals throughout the Western world for centuries, conditioning their thought life, their behavior toward the actualities of this world, and possibly affecting even their physiological functioning.

Social institutions function also on the social plane. The social plane is made up of face-to-face, repetitive, intimate relationships and functionings. On this plane the institutions produce an individual-to-individual reaction: the give and take that goes on in specific families, local churches or recreational centers, or the bickerings that go on within small industrial or business firms. Moreover, social functioning is ordinarily intensive and vital; the ties are relatively short-lived, passing out of existence on the parting of the individuals.

But the master institutions go beyond this. Although for the sake of brevity we term these systems "social," they function on a societal plane as well. By the societal plane we mean those aspects or relationships which are more or less distant, impersonal, indirect, formal, more lasting than the social. The total behavior of given families, for instance, will affect other families without their coming into direct relationships, until the whole family matrix is influenced, each unit by the others. The practices of one business firm will affect another, of one school system another, and so on. These societal interrelationships and functionings interlock the successive generations and go on for prolonged periods. Groups influence groups, regions and nations other regions and nations. Even whole cultures influence each other, as is seen in the rapid industrialization of contemporary Japan. The influence is distant, impersonal, and indirect, yet profound.

VII. INSTITUTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM RELATED SYSTEMS

Concept "Institution" Distinguished. According to our concept then, institutions consist of concepts, usages, associations, and instruments; arise out of man's basic needs and interaction with his environment; have long-time and wide reach, time and place variations; operate among all classes and in all stages of culture;

and function automatically, interpenetratively, and on three planes.

The term "institution," however, is employed in so many different meanings that it is essential to examine these in order further to clarify our concept. Sometimes the term institution is employed to mean a specific building or set of buildings, as when we speak of a court house or a group of university edifices as an institution; it is often applied to clusters of usages and rules, as when we call private property, credit, competition, inheritance, institutions; it is applied to instrumental systems, as when we speak of money and of language as institutions; and perhaps most frequently institutions are identified with associations, as when we refer to the American Association for the Advancement of Science or the American Federation of Labor as an institution.

Upon analysis, however, it is found that these are but component parts of social institutions and not the institutions themselves. Buildings are but instruments by means of which institutional activity goes on, not institutions; to classify buildings as institutions would be like saying that the observatory and the telescope constitute the whole science of astronomy. Likewise, the property system is but a set of ideas and rules of action functioning as part of the economic institution, and not the institution itself. It could not be said that the economic institution would cease to exist if private property, or inheritance, or competition, or the credit system, or all of them, should cease to function; hundreds of other items would still remain, and the economic order would continue to function. Money and language are clearly instruments. Associations, as we have indicated, cannot be regarded as institutions if for no other reason than that organizations come and go in endless succession, now embodying one set of modes or ideas and now another; whereas institutions seem to go on forever. Associations are only organizations giving specific expression to concepts and pursuing specific objectives.

Institutions Distinguished from Society. Likewise, institutions are not identical with society. As used in this work, the term "society" denotes the whole complex of human interrelationships in action. By interrelationships we mean the juxtaposition and interaction of persons, groups, organizations, the influence which that juxtaposition and interaction have on the persons or groups involved, and the products thereof. Or, society is the whole complex of human individuals so related to one another that they directly or indirectly influence one another.

In the original sense of the Latin term *societas*, society connoted mainly, if not wholly, partnership or companionship relationships; and this is the meaning that is ordinarily emphasized in definitions of society. Society is said to be any group of persons living and working together as partners or in companionship; a group of human beings ". . . living in a coöperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species . . ."; [12] or "any group or number of human individuals who cultivate acquaintance and mental agreement, and who, knowing and enjoying their own like-mindedness, are able to work together for common ends"; [13] or "any group of sentient beings who are more or less alike, who recognize more or less clearly that fact, and who have recognized common interests in their social relationships." [14]

The attributes of proximity and relative intimacy, acquaintance, mental agreement, and collaboration emphasized in all these definitions are indeed present in human society. But they may be assigned more properly to specific associations such as the Society of Friends and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, or more especially to a local division of such organizations; for in such associations a degree of proximity, intimacy, acquaintance, mental agreement, and coöperative effort does prevail. But human society includes people in distant as well as in proximate relationships, involves unacquaintance as well as acquaintance, mental disagreement as well as agreement, competition and even conflict as well as collaboration; and society is engaged in far more than the reproduction and the sustenance of the human species. Even in a specific organization, such as the Society of Friends, there are individuals, cliques, and whole local units that are relatively distant, dissimilar, do not know each other, may even be antagonistic, yet be members of the society. An early sociologist came nearer to an all-embracing definition when he stated that society is not a "fixed species of some sort—a definite arrangement of quantity, size, and structure . . .", but simply a body of human beings in relationship.[15]

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[12] Keller, *op. cit.*, 13.

[13] Franklin Henry Giddings, *Inductive sociology* (New York 1901) 6.

[14] John Lewis Gillin and Frank W. Blackmar, *Outlines of sociology* (3d ed. New York 1930) 8; see also Charles A. Ellwood, *Sociology and modern social problems* (New York 1924) 10; and Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 97.

[15] Albion W. Small, *General sociology* (Chicago 1905) 183.

Society is the complex whole of human relationships; it includes proximate and distant relationships, acquaintance and unacquaintance, mental agreement and disagreement, coöperation and antagonism, common and divergent purpose. It involves, for instance, the relationship of parent to child, of master to slave, of employer to wage-earner, of teacher to pupil, of actor to audience, of ruler to subject. Some of the relationships, ties, or juxtapositions may be familistic, some contractual, some coercive, some voluntary, some relatively independent; some are organized, others unorganized; some bind individuals to individuals, others groups to groups. There are relationships which are civil and religious, differentiated and integrated, predatory and mutual, concessive and rigid, sympathetic and antipathetic, prejudiced and rational, and so on. In short, society includes the entire range of the positions which human beings hold with respect to one another and the reciprocal influences and actions which those relationships involve.

Relating this concept of society to that of institutions, we may say that institutions constitute the focusing of all the relationships existing in society on particular functions. In the economic system, for example, all the relationships mentioned may and ordinarily do obtain. But it is not the relationships themselves that make up the economic institution; it is rather the relationships canalized toward the supplying of the goods that go to sustain life that make up the economic system. This entails the relationships of dominant and subordinate, of those relatively intimate and of those who know of each other only through correspondence, of contact, of voluntary and of coercive activity, and so on; but all of these relationships are focused on the activity which supplies economic goods. If we may use a somewhat inadequate analogy, we might say that as water is water wherever found (H_2O), so are relationships wherever they are present and at work; but as water directed into a canal and over a dam performs a definite function, such as generating electricity, so human relationships when operating within a given framework perform specific functions and become institutions. An institution is a complex in and through which human relationships function toward given ends; it is a canalized or grooved operation of social relationships as these are directed toward and find embodiment in particular functions.

Institutions Distinguished from Culture. Another term and concept we shall frequently use is that of "culture." Here again we encounter wide variation in the use of the term. In our terminology, culture is simply the sum of the institutions--the totality of all the patterns of thought, usages, organizations, instruments, and skills; the complex whole of the institutions as these prevail in a given time or in a given place. For instance, we speak of primitive culture by which we mean the total configuration of the concepts, usages, associations, and instruments prevailing among primitives. In primitive times the family was patriarchal; economic activity consisted mainly of fishing and hunting, herding and tillage; education was informal and was carried on mainly in the home; recreation was part and parcel of life in the compound; religion consisted mainly in animism and ancestor worship; the governmental function was vested in the family and in the tribal community. The totality of these institutions, in the special configuration of the time, made up primitive culture.

Again, culture is the complex whole of the institutions as these form special configurations in given places or areas. Thus we speak of Eastern and Western cultures, of Latin, Teutonic, Amerind, and other cultures. While the social institutions prevail everywhere, it is their spatial expressions that set the stamp upon a given region. The East is principally polygamic, mainly agricultural, hand labor is used in economic activity, there is little book-education, recreation is relatively simple, science is practically absent, and government is largely local. The West, on the other hand, has its own peculiar patterns, forms, and expressions of the various institutions.

It is these peculiar configurations or patterns that constitute a culture. If we were to take as many threads as there are institutions, color each to represent a given institution, pass them through a loom so as to produce one pattern, and then weaving the threads a second time in different position, obtain a different pattern, we should get a rough idea of differing spatial configurations of culture. This, of course, oversimplifies the matter, since we should need to change the composition and thickness of the threads, the tautness, the dimensions, and the depth of the weave, to represent more closely the spatial differences in culture; but the analogy, rough and imperfect though it is, will convey the idea we have in mind. In other words, all the institutions are present everywhere; but the forms they take, the degrees of organization or disorganization, the locus of authority, their simplicity or complexity, and many other aspects make up the peculiarities which mark one culture in contrast with another.

Likewise, the institutions function differently among the various classes of society; as among the peasants and among the nobility, among the ignorant and the learned, the laborers and the professional people. And finally, the institutions differ in the different stages of cultural development, as for example, in early colonial America and present-day American society. When we speak of early or late culture, of Eastern or Western culture, of the culture of the poor or the rich, of contemporary European or American culture, we have in mind the totality of the institutions as they manifest themselves in distinctive combinations.

VIII. SUMMARY

Recapitulating our inquiry thus far, we may define social institutions as those systems of concepts, usages, associations, and instruments which, arising from the experiences of mankind, order and regulate the activities of human beings which are necessary to the satisfaction of basic needs. They are the basic systems of human activities, having considerable permanence, universality, and interpenetrative independence.

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PART II

THE FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

Following the definition of the foregoing pages we are now logically confronted with the question as to how social institutions originate. The question of genetic origin will be discussed in Chapter 11, preceding the analysis of the separate institutions. In this Part we consider the immediate resources on which man has drawn in building the social institutions, namely, physical and biological nature, and previous culture.

Chapter 2

PHYSICAL NATURE AS FACTOR

I. NATURE AND THE CHARACTER OF ITS INFLUENCE

The first set of resources man draws on is that of physical nature. By physical nature we mean the substances and the intangible forces of the cosmos. Among these are the physical features of the earth, such as contour, surface configuration, isolated areas, bodies of water; climate, including rainfall, humidity, and temperature; substances such as soils, minerals, and metals; and forces such as those of the sun's heat, the tides, winds, electricity, and flowing waters.[1]

Dynamic Character of Physical Nature. The totality of these elements of physical nature is ordinarily referred to as "environment," as "the stage on which man plays his part," as if it were inert, lying passive under man's feet, and as if man were the only actor. Physical nature is far more than this, far more than a mere stage for the drama of life; it is rather a set of dynamic, active, never dormant entities, always affecting man's activities, conditioning the ongoing and every aspect of every society. Existing long before man appeared on earth, it has operated independently of man, its "sleepless ministers their tasks in silence perfecting," the prime sources of all living things: now aiding, now hindering man, now calling for redirection and now for control, but at all times active, dynamic.

Is Nature Determinant or Conditioner? The question as to whether physical nature determines or merely conditions man's actions has been a source of debate ever since Ratzel published his *Anthropogeographie* in 1882–1891. Ratzel, with the enthusiasm of the discoverer, tended to exaggerate the causal connections between physical nature and culture; while his followers arrived at wild, extravagant, and unwarranted generalizations. Some anthropogeographers came to believe, for example, that a causal relationship exists between physical conditions and rates of birth, death, and marriage, physical health and energy, economic organization, food, clothing, and shelter, mental efficiency and temperament, and governmental forms and organization. In short, physical nature was made the originating or conditioning factor in nearly the entire range of biological and cultural phenomena.

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[1] See L. L. Bernard, "A classification of environment" in *American journal of sociology*, xxxi (Chicago 1925) 318–332; see also J. W. Bews, *Human ecology* (London 1935) 64–75.

Scientific investigators have discovered that correlations between physical nature and social phenomena do not always exist and that, whenever they do exist, are seldom, if ever, complete. Identical or closely similar environments are often associated with a variety of cultural forms; dissimilar physical conditions often are associated with uniform or closely resembling cultures; and cultural forms often migrate from one set of physical conditions to another without appreciable modifications. The influence of environment on man and culture is not, as a rule, specific or rigid, but only conditioning.[2]

Specific Character of Nature's Conditioning. The most tenable position seems to be, first, that nature's influence is permissive rather than determining. The absence of fertile soil, of forests, or minerals does, to be sure, almost completely prevent the development of certain industries, but their presence does not *ipso facto* lead to the development of them. In the Sahara desert, for example, absence of soil and humidity does prevent agriculture or forestry; but in numerous areas natural conditions are favorable to these activities, but they do not develop.[3] The North American continent had all the resources necessary for the development of varied industries; but the American Indian, though inhabiting that continent perhaps four or five thousand years, did not even initiate the culture that the European colonists later established in the course of two or three centuries. Likewise Mexico, though possessing large mineral deposits, has not greatly developed mechanized industry, but has remained an agricultural region.

Second, nature rarely, if ever, acts singly in producing given cultural types. It is at most only a cofactor, as for example, in the influence of climate on racial types. If climate does influence the formation of racial types at all, that influence is very slow; it is modified by migration into given regions and by the intermixture of different racial types; it is limited by the wide range of toleration to climate on the part of the subraces; and finally it is frequently neutralized by the varying degrees of adaptability on the part of different individuals in any race.[4] So interwoven, then, are these and other factors that it is usually impossible to ascribe a particular biological or cultural feature to specific physical factors.

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[2] See Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories* (New York 1928) 106–193.

[3] See Ray H. Whitbeck and Olive J. Thomas, *Geographic factor* (New York 1932) 12.

Third, physical nature is susceptible to human "control." The increase in the knowledge of nature and its working, the advance in technological skills, the improvement in organization, may, for instance, make formerly unknown or little used minerals of sudden importance; may make once unproductive land productive; may overcome geographic barriers such as mountains and oceans by means of roads, tunnels, aerial routes, and other communication systems; may offset the severities of nature by protective devices such as houses, heating and cooling systems, water- and food-storing systems; and may even neutralize other aspects of nature by concentrations of people, as in the mammoth apartment houses of our times.

Fourth, in other words, man often transcends nature. Nature does set limits; it does force upon man a variety of activities; but it does not act alone in causing or even, always, in conditioning cultural phenomena or in producing specific forms, structures, procedures, or modifications; "geographical environment is passive or permissive, not mandatory; . . . man's doings are influenced, not determined, by his geographical environment." [5] Physical nature is itself so manifold and complex that to ascribe this or the other cultural phenomenon to this or the other geographical condition is scientifically hazardous if not always erroneous. In all probability more than one set of forces are at work in producing a given complex of human phenomena; while the intervention of culture often neutralizes or at least mitigates the influence of physical nature.[6]

II. NATURE AS GENERAL DETERMINANT

Nature as Source and Sustainer of Life. And yet, while the above qualifications are true, it is also true that nature does determine several of the broad features of man's life. First, physical nature is the primary source and sustainer of life. Take the obvious example of the sun's heat and its influence on life. "It is owing to this energy that men are able to do things, to move things; they make this energy their own, part of themselves, because they eat bread made from wheat or other grain grown by the light and heat of the *sun:* the flour is ground by means of coal compacted from vegetation, grown by the *sun's* heat. . . . Or men may derive part of their energy from the flesh of animals which have first eaten vegetation grown by the *sun's* rays . . . and heat themselves by fires of vegetable matter—coal or wood or oil—which have acquired their latent energy from the *sun.* . . . In all these very fundamental cases . . . it is easy to see that the energy controlled by man comes directly from the sun; while a little reflection will show that the vastly greater portion of the energy required for the multitudinous details of daily life is derived originally from the sun." [7] It is well established that the energy of the sun is absorbed and employed by all living matter and is probably responsible for most of the activity of living things, so much so that if through some cosmic accident the sun should be extinguished, all living things would sooner or later die.

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[4] See Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 176–180.

[5] Whitbeck and Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

[6] See Ellen Churchill Semple, *Influences of geographic environment* (New York 1911) 1–31; and Sorokin, *op. cit.*, 102–106.

While not every aspect of physical nature is as essential as the sun's heat, the fact remains that physical nature as a whole is the prime resource of life. Man's body itself is a combination of chemical elements found in nature, elements which require replenishing. From nature man obtains air, sunshine, food, water, and all the other elements necessary to sustain his life. From it he rises. Like the plant, he is part of the soil from which he springs; and to it he returns at death—"earth to earth, dust to dust."

Nature as Determinant of Cycle of Activity. Not only is nature the basis of man's life, it also imposes on him a definite round of activity. The rotation of the earth, with the consequent round of day and night, determines man's alternating periods of work and rest, by far the greater proportion of man's labor going on during the day and his recuperation at night. The rotation of the earth is the basis of our concept of time and the time system, items of tremendous regulative importance in most societies. The orbital movement of the earth produces the seasonal alterations, with the consequent variations in human activity, giving rise to the time of sowing and the time of reaping, to the festivals of summer, the Thanksgiving feasts of autumn, the Easter and Passover festivals. The earth's rotation has an influence on the prevailing winds, on ocean currents, on the distribution of rainfall and of vegetation, and these in turn on man's culture; so much so that were the rotation to be reversed, the West would probably have a markedly different climate and correspondingly a different culture than it now has.[8]

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[7] James Fairgrieve, *Geography and world power* (New York 1917) 11. By permission of E. P. Dutton & Company. See also George Crile, *Phenomena of life* (New York 1936) *passim.*

Nature and the Continuity of Human Activity. Less apparent is the fact that nature is the prime determinant of the continuity of human affairs. Far more basic than and transcending the diurnal and seasonal cycles, is nature's never broken continuity. The daily and seasonal shiftings are themselves part of the totality of nature's continuity; they come and go in endless repetitive succession, with definite, never failing recurrence.

This continuity gives associated living its sets of routines, links generation with generation, makes man a part of the cosmic process, leads men to "look before and after," prompts them to deposit their experience and more or less vaguely to plan for the future. It is not unlikely also that man derives the sense of and the craving for immortality, so large a part of religion, from nature's continuity. Man does resist nature; he does turn night into day and day into night; and yet underlying and transcending these activities is nature's continuity.

Nature and the Unchangeableness of Institutions. Moreover, nature is relatively immutable. Days, months, seasons, and longer cycles do come and go; but in its totality nature goes on relatively unchanged. This does not mean absolute fixity; for during the eons of geologic time the physical world has changed. But these changes come so slowly as to be almost imperceptible to the successive generations, century in and century out. Furthermore, the basic features of nature are unalterable by human activity. Climate, diurnal and seasonal cycles, the round of the sun in its orbit, the rotation of the earth and its inclination on its axis—all are beyond the power of man to alter.

Nature's immutability seems to have a distinct bearing on the stability of institutions. Since the basic natural conditions are practically the same age in and age out, since man is basically dependent on them, and since many of his activities are conditioned by them, it follows that institutions perforce remain relatively the same. This must not be interpreted as an argument for holding institutions static, even if this were possible; it only emphasizes that if social institutions do not undergo rapid change it is due in part to the fact that their roots are in immutable nature.

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[8] See Whitbeck and Thomas, *op. cit.*, 50–56 for further examples of the effect of the earth's rotation and its inclination upon its axis.

III. NATURE AND SPATIAL DELIMITATIONS OF HUMAN ACTIVITY

Nature Sets Spatial Limits. Nor are these broad influences the only effects nature has on man; it determines or at least conditions man's life in more specific ways, which, though subject to the qualifications set forth above, are relatively clear and definite.[9]

First, nature sets the broad boundaries within which man is forced to carry on his activities. When we survey the vast proportions of the earth, the oceans, and the siderial system, nature appears to be boundless. But when we examine the portions of these available to man, nature is indeed limited. For one thing, the zone of soil fertility, water supply, temperate climate, vegetation, and mineral resources is definitely limited. Nine-tenths of the earth's surface, in fact, is unsuitable for human living: large parts lie under water, considerable portions rise to high altitudes, still others lack fertile soil, water, or other resources, while other sections of the earth have climates in which man can survive but not at the maximum comfort and efficiency. Since man derives nearly everything he needs for physical sustenance through plant life, which is dependent on natural resources, it follows that nature sets definite limits to man's zone of habitation. And even within that zone man's sphere of activity is further restricted by soil fertility: it is estimated that only 16.7 per cent of the earth's surface is fertile, and that only 5 per cent of all land is usable for crop raising.[10] Likewise, the known supply of minerals, and especially those metals on which modern civilization so greatly depends, is so limited in quantity and quality and so localized as to lead to further restriction on man's activity.

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[9] For a recent scholarly treatment of this subject, especially of the relation of climate to culture, see Rolf Reissman, "Importanza culturale e storica del fattore clima" in *Minerva*, xlvii (Torino 1937) 684–686. Based on article in *Die Woche* (Berlin 1937).

[10] See Thomas Forsyth Hunt, "Food supply and the land area in relation to the population" in Institute of International Relations, *Proceedings*, i (Los Angeles 1927) 169–175; and *World almanac* (New York 1939) 861.

Man does counteract these limitations by artificial fertilizers, by irrigation, by heating and cooling devices, and synthetic minerals, but these are themselves limited. Artificial fertilization depends on nitrogen deposits; irrigation is economically feasible only to a comparatively small extent; heating and cooling devices are markedly dependent upon other resources; while the production of synthetic minerals is like bailing out water with a bottomless bucket. In other words, man does overcome some of the limits set by nature, but only to a small extent, because these extensions are themselves bounded by nature.

The influence of the scanty supply of original resources can hardly be exaggerated. In modern times especially, the possession of resources by some nations and the struggle by others to gain what they consider to be a legitimate share—the struggle over minerals and other raw materials and over lands capable of supplying food; the protective tariffs and the efforts to batter them down—are the primary causes of national disturbances and maladjustments, of international trade contests, of war and rumors of wars. The scant supply of petroleum, for example, has had a marked influence on foreign policy in Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy; the attempt of other nations to acquire the great pools of oil in Mexico is probably the chief cause of the political upheavals which have marked life in that country.[11]

Nature and Human Migration. Second, there is some correlation between contour and migration. Migrations ordinarily follow paths well marked by valleys and mountain passes. The Mesopotamian-Persian Gulf depression, the Red Sea rift, and the Nile valley were the natural routes over which the prehistoric migrations took place and the sites on which the earliest known civilizations developed.[12] The river valleys of the Ganges, the Yellow River, and the Yangtse-kiang were also centers of early civilizations. There are valleys, such as the amazingly fertile Amazon Valley, in which civilizations have not developed, but in this case excessive rainfall, terrific heat, the presence of injurious insects and wild animals, the density of the tropical forests, and man's inability to withstand tropical disease have made civilization impossible.[13]

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[11] See Parker Thomas Moon, *Syllabus on international relations* (New York 1925) 156–200; and Ernest Minor Patterson, *World's economic dilemma* (New York 1930) *passim.*

[12] See John Kirtland Wright, *Geographical basis of European history* (New York 1928) 13–19.

Physical nature often actually produces migrations. Exhaustion of food has always pushed people on in search of fresh pastures. Climatic changes have also played a part. The comparatively recent and rapid desiccation of western, southwestern, and central Asia probably started migrations of far-reaching significance.[14] No less than four great migrations from the Arabian desert are attributed to climatic change. The migrations which seem not to be due to climatic changes are clearly and definitely accounted for by political circumstances, such as the breakdown of a government.[15]

Location and Concentration of Populations. Nature seems to have an even more definite influence on the location and concentration of populations. Four-fifths of the population of the earth today lives on one-fifth of the land area. Within this area all the great historic civilizations have been located.[16] Climate appears to have been an especially important conditioning factor. Population centers have arisen almost invariably in climates which favor intensive agriculture, stimulate industry, or promote commerce. The industrial regions of Europe and of northeastern United States, and agricultural China are all located in the north temperate zone. The rich farming regions of Java and agricultural India lie partly in the temperate zone and partly in the tropics. In each case the population centers dependent on agriculture lie within the region of the monsoons, which bring abundant rainfall in the warm growing period.[17] Conversely, aridity and extreme cold repel settlers. Large centers of population ordinarily develop around or in proximity to bodies of water: ancient cities, such as Athens, Alexandria, Constantinople, and modern centers, such as Paris, London, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, like most of the larger cities, have arisen at points where nature offers advantages to commerce.[18]

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[13] See Emory S. Bogardus, *Introduction to sociology* (5th ed. Los Angeles 1932) 40. The same may be said of African and Negro culture. See Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 84

[14] See Whitbeck and Thomas, *op. cit.*, 103; Ellsworth Huntington, *Pulse of Asia* (Boston 1907) 106–132; Raphael Pumpelly (ed.), *Explorations in Turkestan*, i (Washington, D. C. 1908) 13, 16.

[15] See J. L. Myers, *Dawn of history* (New York 1911) 104–106; and Arnold J. Toynbee, *Study of history*, iii (London 1934) 15, 395–454.

[16] See Edward Cary Hayes, *Sociology* (New York 1930) 41.

[17] See Whitbeck and Thomas, *op. cit.*, 103–104.

[18] See Wright, *op. cit.*, 29–34; and Whitbeck and Thomas, *op. cit.*, 152–171, esp. 166.

IV. NATURE, RACE, AND CULTURE

Does Nature Set a Racial Stamp? All attempts to establish a correlation between physical nature and race have met with serious difficulties. Racial characteristics are biological and seem not to be affected by physical nature, at least in the immediate sense. Given races have lived in the most diverse physical environments, while the most diverse of races have lived in the same natural surroundings.[19]

Yet there seems to be some relation between environment and race. Even though we do not know precisely how geographic influences operate or to what extent they are independent of culture, the fact remains that large bodies of men, with special characteristics, seem either to originate in, or to gravitate into, given broad areas: the Negroid in Africa and its littorals, the Mongoloid in Asia, and the Caucasoid in Europe and the Americas. The correlation is very broad and partial, and yet it seems to exist.

Racial subdivisions also are located within well-demarked regions. In southeastern Europe, for example, lives a population in the main small in stature, dark-complexioned, and dark-eyed; whereas in the northwest is a people characteristically tall, light-skinned, and blue-eyed or gray-eyed. Corresponding differences of temperament, such as the alleged energy, self-reliance, initiative, and independence of northerners and the easy-going lassitude of southerners are often ascribed to these different people; but these are merely interesting guesses, tenuous and unsubstantiated, and cannot be attributed to geography.

And yet it remains true that physical nature, plus climate, plus food, plus culture are responsible. Whatever it is, nature does seem to set a certain stamp on the pigmentation, the emotions, and the behavior of whole groups of men. The influence is probably selective rather than creative, there being no authenticated examples of the origination or alteration of racial traits through a change in environment.[20] Yet the influence is there.

Does Nature Produce Culture? A very broad correlation seems also to exist between geographical environment and the development of culture and of particular culture types. Culture seems to generate primarily in regions where large, varied, and concentrated populations occur; where people are numerous and somewhat heterogeneous; where contact and contest of ideas and usages are sufficiently intensive and continuous to produce selection; and where man deals with nature in large groups and builds protective devices such as cities, harbors, viaducts, roads, shelters.

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[19] See Sorokin, *op. cit.*, 129–137.

[20] See Semple, *op. cit.*, 607, 608, 620 ff.

Physical conditions, particularly contours and natural boundaries, are conditioners. The ancient concentrations of population in Crete, Egypt, Greece, and Italy, for example, took place chiefly by or near large bodies of water; in regions rich in fauna, flora, and other natural resources; at the great migration crossroads; and in temperate climatic zones. The absence of water and other resources or extremes of heat and cold repel men, prevent the assemblage of dense populations, and make unlikely, if not impossible, cultural developments.

Does Nature Produce Specific Cultural Patterns? Geographical conditions seem to have some influence on other aspects of culture. Isolating contours and their confining boundaries seem to produce intensity of culture. The relationship between geography and specific cultural patterns, however, is far from definitive. The hypothesis which finds the rise of democracies in small, compact geographical areas and of autocracies in large, diversified areas is not supported by facts. Greece developed democracy, but Italy, except for the brief period of the Roman Republic, has not had a country-wide democracy; and the Balkan Peninsula with contours and climate not greatly dissimilar from those of Greece, has at no time produced that form of political organization. A sprawling country like Russia has produced dictatorships of the first order, while the United States has to the moment maintained a fair degree of democracy. Likewise, the assertion that the dominance of Protestantism among northern, and of Catholicism among southern peoples, is attributable to differences in physical environment, has not been established. Physical environment may have some influence on language,[21] but even in this the relations are not clear.

Yet the forms of religion, art, and literature seem to be remotely influenced by the natural phenomena. Professor Sorokin, who severely criticizes geographic determinism, still admits "That the art, the literature, and the beliefs of a people are somewhat 'colored' with images, figures, and forms most often taken from the geographical environment in which such a people live." [22] The relationship between natural conditions and religion seems particularly striking. This seems to be due to the fact that ". . . any system of religious belief, in order to grow into acceptance as a belief, must be in some sort of harmony with the mode of life, the economic interests, and the geographical environment of the people." [23] Thus, the river is dominant in the theology of Egypt, the ocean in that of Greece, Rome, and Scandinavia, and the seasonal rains in India. The Satan of Egypt was Typhon, a malevolent deity who caused the drying up of the land; that of India was Vitra who held back the rains; in Norway the evil deities were the frost giants. Heaven and Paradise, in religions recognizing a future life, represent what for each people would be happiness and security: the ancient Hebrews living in a pastoral land raided by desert tribes envisioned heaven as a walled city; the Arabs of the desert as an oasis or garden with streams of cool water, shade, and fruit; for the Mohammedans heaven was as the spring and rain; the Norse described heaven as a warm and sunny place. Hell for the Norse is cold and mist, and for the Arab, heat.[24] Friedrich Ratzel explains the rise of the three great monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedism—in the desert plateaus east of the Red Sea by stating that the monotonous and unvaried landscape may produce the concept of a single God and a monotheistic religion.[25]

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[21] See *ibid.*, 41.

[22] Sorokin, *op. cit.*, 170.

"Similar correlations may be observed in folklore, in songs, fairy tales, poems and other literary products of different peoples during the earlier stages of their history. The character of the geographic environment which forms the background, the kinds of trees, plants and animals which are depicted, and the general scenery of the *Thousand and One Nights*, or the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, or the Norse *Edda*, or the Hindu *Mahabharata* are quite different from each other and each is marked by the characteristics typical of the locality in which its creator lived." [26]

V. RESISTIVE AND HOSTILE NATURE AND MAN'S COUNTERACTIVITY

Nature's Hostility. Physical nature presses many activities upon man by its resistance and attacks. Nature resists man at every turn, exacting arduous toil before it yields him its fruits; and to survive at all man must be ever sowing, reaping, storing, and protecting food.

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[23] R. H. Whitbeck, "Influence of geographical environment upon religious beliefs" in *Geographical review*, v (1918) 317.

[24] *Ibid.*, 316–324.

[25] See J. Russell Smith, "Desert's edge" in *Bulletin of American geographical society of New York*, xlvii (1915) 831.

[26] Sorokin, *op. cit.*, 171. By permission of Harper and Brothers.

Nature often attacks man violently without warning, placing him at the mercy of droughts and floods, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. One summer alone a drought spread over thirteen of the United States, causing an average of 300 deaths a day and a damage to property, livestock, and grain amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.[27] So man is obliged to keep always repairing the ravages of nature's caprices and building to protect himself against the next catastrophe or against the next stretch of lean years.

Effect of Culture on Nature. Nor is the battle ever won. Nature never lays down its sword; and man's culture is in no small measure but a systematized effort to deal with this never resting hostility of nature. In economic life especially mankind devotes a not inconsiderable amount of time and energy to the creation of protective devices, such as dwellings, clothing, storage warehouses, and dikes; to the building of roads or boring of tunnels; to redirecting river courses or draining marshes. One of man's never solved problems is not that of changing or conquering nature, a thing he cannot do, but of building devices which mitigate the resistance and hostility of nature. Man builds across various natural barriers; carries the same institutions over wide areas; works to overcome climates, altitudes, or other physical conditions; builds subcultures amid physical conditions which would seem unfavorable; and in a multitude of other ways labors to overcome and does overcome disadvantageous environment.[28] He cannot fundamentally alter or control nature, but he does counteract some of its influence. Primitive man seems to have been almost entirely at the mercy of nature; but as man has built culture he has not only developed protective devices but has also carried on a positive utilization of nature. The influence of geographic factors upon human society has consequently become less direct and immediate.

VI. CONCLUSION

Yet, though man is able increasingly to exploit nature and turn it to his advantage, still nature remains one of the ultimate factors in generating, conditioning, and modifying man's entire existence.

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[27] "Fighting the drought" in *New York times* (July 19, 1936) IV, 1.

[28] See Robert H. Lowie, *Culture and ethnology* (New York 1929) 61–66.

It is the source and sustainer of life; a conditioning if not a determining influence in the cycle of human activity; the controlling agent in the continuity of human activity and the relative unchangeableness of society. Nature sets spatial limitations on human habitation and endeavor; lays down the paths of human migration; marks the places for large human concentrations; it has some bearing, remote and little known though it may be, on race and culture formation and on the production of specific culture patterns. Now by resistance and hostility and now by collaboration, it surrounds man with a mass of fluid, ever changing, dynamic influences which, though increasingly controlled, are ever present in the life of whole societies.

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Chapter 3

BIOLOGICAL NATURE AS FACTOR

I. BIOLOGICAL NATURE AS RESOURCE

In addition to physical factors, discussed in the preceding chapter, there are in nature numerous living organisms which create or condition associated living. All living things, whether they be simple or complex, visible or invisible, large or small, affect the life of man. They include plant life, microörganisms, insects, fishes, birds, and mammals. These organic entities contribute in various ways to man's life.

Biological Nature as Basis of Life. First, these living things are the agents of sustenance: they transmute the elements which physical nature provides into items needed for human life. It is an impressive fact that all the elements that go to maintain life, except air, water, and salt, are made available to man mainly through the transmutation or metamorphosis carried on by plant life.[1] Plants transmute physical elements into forms which provide man with food, shelter, heat, clothing, medicines, tools, and weapons; fishes, birds, and mammals furnish him with other types of food, shelter, clothing, heat, and decoration. Many insects, reptiles, birds, and mammals also collaborate with man by destroying injurious fellow creatures, thus maintaining or restoring the natural balance which man himself often destroys.

Rôle of Microörganisms. The contributive function of microorganisms, though not as obvious as that of plant and animal life, is in some respects as great. Microbes take dying or dead forms, absorb the original elements into their bodies, and prepare them, like so many master workmen, for the rebirth of plant life; they even take human waste and turn it into fructifying substances. Thus every decaying tree and plant is but the workshop of millions of bacteria which, working unseen, take the dying life and prepare the elements for and carry them to some new life.

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[1] Even air is, in part at least, the result of the expiration of plants, i.e., plants break up and use carbon dioxide, leaving free oxygen.

Microörganisms are important in the preparation of food. Leaven or yeast has been used in the preparation of "the staff of life" from ancient time to this. Microörganisms are of great use in tanning leather. In these and perhaps in many ways still unknown, microbes are the silent and unseen collaborators of man. "Science has scarcely crossed the threshold of a new era in which a multitude of unseen but willing microscopic toilers will be drawn from the great living earth to work in the interest of mankind as agriculturists, artisans, and chemists of extraordinary skill. They will perform analyses and syntheses as a matter of routine that would be regarded, and justly regarded, at the present time as miracles."[2]

Biological Nature as Power. Not only does biological nature supply man with the necessities of life, it has also contributed practically all the power that man has used for thousands of years. The term "horse power," used even in our mechanized world, suggests one great debt of man to the animal world. There was a time not far distant when animals such as the dog, the horse, the ox, and the mule supplied man with nearly all the power needed for his activities. From time immemorial and everywhere these beasts have carried man in his migrations; have borne the brunt of opening and clearing forests, of establishing settlements, of building shelters, of preparing and planting the ground, of harvesting and storing the crops. They have been, and in many parts of the world still are, the burden-bearers and chief allies of man in his struggle for existence.

Experiments on Animals. Animals have been used from classic to our time as materials for experiments of great importance to man. These experiments, which could not always be made on human beings, have been of inestimable value in the study of anatomy and physiology, of physical and mental disease, and even of social behavior. Anaxagoras, in the fifth century B.C., experimented with mammals and fishes, gaining some insight into the anatomy of the brain and the respiratory system; Aristotle studied the structure and functions of the organs of the human body by means of animal observation and vivisection; Erasistratus in Alexandria gleaned important knowledge regarding the brain, the nervous system, and the circulatory system from experiments on animals; Galen in the second century A.D. unearthed many new facts in anatomy, physiology, pathology, and therapeutics by means of animal dissection; William Harvey (1578–1657) contributed knowledge with respect to the circulation of human blood by observing the pulsation of the chick's heart and experimenting on other living creatures; John Mayow (1643–1679) threw light upon the respiratory system and functioning; de Réamur and Spallanzani in the eighteenth century gained new insight into the digestive system and digestion, Stephen Hales into blood pressure, Albert von Haller into the structure and functioning of the nervous system in the same way; and in the nineteenth century Claude Bernard made important discoveries regarding the liver by experimenting on dogs. Koch, Jenner, and Pasteur discovered the functions of microörganisms, the principles of fermentation and putrefaction, of vaccination and immunity, by experimenting on various living creatures.

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[2] Arthur Isaac Kendall, *Civilization and the microbe* (Boston 1923) 224, also 124–125. By permission of the author. See also Paul W. Allen, *Industrial fermentations* (New York 1926) 130.

There is scarcely a phase of human life that has not been investigated by experiments on animals. In recent decades controlled breeding of animals has thrown some light upon the processes of reproduction and the principles of eugenics.

II. SOCIAL SERVICES OF BIOLOGICAL NATURE

Animals as Companions. Aside from furnishing food and serving man in the ways just mentioned, biological nature performs other important functions, not ordinarily perceived. Living creatures afford man intimate companionship and protection. As man develops civilization, his life seems to become artificialized, hard, and cruel; and sympathy, or at least the expression of it, seems to decrease. So he turns to animal life. He brings into his home dogs, cats, parrots, canaries, even monkeys, and from them he derives a silent companionship and a fidelity, sometimes a protection, which human beings may deny him. As early as Plutarch's time people seem to have realized this fact; in "Pericles" Plutarch describes how the people of his time employed animals in this way. The pet population of any period has a significance that is scarcely realized; it reflects the extent to which human sympathy is or is not alive and expressed.

Rôle of Flora. Nor are animals alone in performing this function. As man builds his civilization he creates artificial conditions which, whatever the advantages they confer, shut off nature and much of the renewing power which it yields. So, in seemingly instinctive quest for what he has lost, he goes back to nature and brings into his habitat or surroundings the very elements he has shut off.

The function which plant life performs in this connection is almost wholly overlooked. In flowers and trees man finds silent companions, the agents which relieve the mind of monotony or sorrow. In some respects these are of wider use than animals; for while animals are expensive to support, or for sanitary or other reasons cannot be kept by all, few indeed are the people who cannot and do not gather or cultivate grass, flowers, or trees. In these man finds emotional satisfaction and serenity.

Nor is this direct function the only one which the flora world performs. The beauty and ugliness, the gentleness and terrors of nature have been a boundless source of inspiration to man in his reaching out toward self-expression through the arts. Along with human love, it is one of the chief themes of enduring literature, painting, and music. Moreover, nature has colored the culture of primitive and "civilized" man alike. His folklore, philosophy, religion, art—particularly architecture, sculpture, and painting—his music, poetry and other forms of literature all bear the impressions it has made.[3]

III. INIMICAL BIOLOGICAL NATURE

Microörganic Enemies. While some living organisms are friendly and coöperative, others are harmful or hostile. Various microörganisms are constantly assailing man, directly and indirectly. Bacteria are the active agents in producing many diseases, including tuberculosis, diphtheria, typhoid fever, cholera, plague, and pneumonia; and fungi cause other diseases. Protozoa and other lower forms of life are the sources of some of the most troublesome, widespread, and persistent diseases, such as syphilis and amoebic dysentery. For ages man has had to wage a constant battle against these organisms. The "plague," malaria, yellow fever, sleeping sickness, and the like, all caused by microörganisms, have destroyed untold numbers of the human species.[4]

Insects. Moreover, there are over one hundred different insects, such as the flea or the louse, which unremittingly attack man to his great discomfort and often to his danger. Many insects carry germs and so spread infection and disease. The fly and the mosquito are dangerous carriers even in relatively sanitary regions such as the United States. Malaria had as recently as 1920 a death rate of 0.9 per 100,000 population in cities and 5.9 in the country districts. The body louse and the rat flea are still menacing. In the rural counties of California the flea is a danger. Some unidentified carrier is responsible for the wide prevalence of typhus in the small town and the rural districts of Georgia and Alabama.[5] Plague, malaria, and influenza, largely resulting from an imbalance between man and his parasites, have been known to produce enormous loss of life; in the Punjab, during a twenty-year period, they caused the death of over 6,000,000 persons.[6]

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[3] J. W. Bews, *Human ecology* (London 1935) 291.

[4] See *ibid.*, 75 ff.

Food-Attacking Organisms. There are also parasites and insects which attack crops, forests, and livestock, thus nullifying man's labor and often endangering the food supply. Plant lice, which reproduce at an incredible rate, often ruin whole crops of fruit, hops, corn, and other plants. Wireworms, which live and multiply underground virtually beyond the reach of man, cause widespread destruction to the roots of plants; the boll weevil often destroys whole cotton crops. It is estimated that in food supply alone the United States suffers an annual loss of $800,000,000 from the activities of insects and parasites.[7] In England the ox warble fly causes a loss of about $2,000,000 annually by attacking cattle; in France it attacks the vine, resulting in a loss of half a billion dollars a year.[8]

IV. BIOLOGICAL NATURE AND MAN'S ACTIVITY

Directive Activity. Biological nature, therefore, calls for a vast amount of man's promotive and protective effort. On the promotive side, a considerable proportion of economic activity is directed toward agriculture and horticulture, forestry, and private and public beautification. The amount of labor and time devoted to these activities, while not measurable, is enormous. From primitive man's domestication of animals to the scientific stock-breeding of our times, from the pastoral activity of early man to the present-day nurture of pets, humanity, both individually and collectively, has bestowed considerable labor, time, and money on this phase of associated life.

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[5] Haven Emerson and Earle B. Phelps, "Influence of urban and rural environment" in Edmund V. Cowdry (ed.), *Human biology and racial welfare* (New York 1930) 372; see also Hans Zinsser, *Rats, lice and history* (Boston 1934) *passim.*

[6] C. A. Gill, "Epidemics" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 571.

[7] See S. J. Holmes, "Biology" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 556.

[8] A. D. Imms, "Entomology, economic" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 8 (14th ed. 1929) 622–623.

Control Activity. Mankind has also had to devote its labor to the control of inimical biological nature. It has had to protect itself against rapacious animals, to transform various organisms from enemies to collaborators, to control pests and microörganisms. Eternal vigilance has been the price of even a modicum of security.

Take the effort that man has had to direct to medicine alone; from the magical practices of primitive man to the building of the vast medical system of our time, mankind has devoted untold labor to this aspect of life. In the United States alone there were in 1929, 1,100,000 persons directly employed in medical services, in caring for 2,885,790 persons, at an expense of $3,656,000,000 annually.[9]

Man Destroys His Natural Collaborators. Moreover, man often increases his own labor by unwittingly destroying nature's balance. The thoughtless throwing away of a piece of Canadian water-weed blocked the waterways of Britain for a decade; a well-intentioned gesture led to the spread of the omnivorous prickly pear through the eastern section of Australia and to great damage; the destruction of forests on the Adriatic coasts and in parts of Northern Africa turned vast tracts of land into semidesert.[10] The overbreeding of cattle often weakens the stock and sometimes results in infertility. The killing of predatory birds, like the hawk, permits the ravages of field mice and other destructive rodents to go on unhindered.

Recent increases in means of communication have increased this imbalance. Diseases which develop in civilized areas are spread among peoples who lack the compensating resistance; measles have been carried to Oceania, malaria to Greece, sleeping sickness to East Africa. "We must not assume that another great plague could never be. Remember that a man can now travel from New York to Chicago in 4 hours and he might unwittingly carry an infected flea." [11] Furthermore, the high concentration of populations in cities also destroys nature's balance and forces man to develop an artificial balance, which can be maintained only by unceasing labor.[12]

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[9] Lewis Webster Jones and Barbara Jones, "Medicine, economic organization" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 292–299.

[10] See Julian Huxley, "Biology and our future world" in *Harper's magazine*, 163 (1931) 403–411; and H. G. Wells, Julian S. Huxley, and G. P. Wells, *Science of life*, ii (New York 1929) 1012–1022.

[11] C. C. Furnas, *Next hundred years* (New York 1936) 114.

V. SUMMARY

In these ways, then, biological nature contributes to, detracts from, or otherwise influences associated living. It transmutes essential substances, furnishes food and power, provides the means for experimentation. Through its attacks nature compels numerous activities upon man. There is scarcely one aspect of associated life which is not in one way or another, directly or indirectly, influenced by biological nature.

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[12] See Wells, Huxley, and Wells, *op. cit.*, ii, 1012–1022.

Chapter 4

THE RÔLE OF MAN

I. HAS MAN ANY DISTINGUISHING TRAITS?

Although nature is the source and sustainer of all life, although it variously conditions man's life, still man has adapted himself to nature and in part adapted nature to his uses. Culture, man's own creation, is the product of his peculiar capacities.

How man came to possess the special capacities which enable him to build culture is a question which has always held the interest of the seer and the poet, the philosopher and the religionist. The Psalmist's query, "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?"[1] has doubtless been asked over and over from earliest ages to our own. Did man achieve his commanding position through the creative act of a superior being, through biological evolution, by accident, or through the chance accumulation of his experience? Two main answers have been made to this question, that of religion and that of science.

Religion's Answer. Nearly all religious systems pose man as the product of special creation. Particularly Judaism and Christianity, though at times characterizing man as a "worm," vile and polluted, generally set him on a pedestal and declare him the highest and noblest of creatures, the apex of all creation. The Psalmist's answer to his own question reflects this doctrine: "Thou hast made him but little lower than God, and crownest him with glory and honor."[2]

Science's Answer. Natural science, on the other hand, simply identifies man with other living things. It points out that nature gives man no special consideration; that it bestows or withholds its bounty, its pleasures and pains on man and beast alike and that nature's catastrophes sweep human as well as nonhuman creatures before them without distinction.

Natural science finds that man is but part of the evolutionary process; that, like all other animals, he has evolved through eons of time; that it was some biological accident that separated man from the primates; that man is probably a late-comer in the evolutionary process.[3]

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[1] Psalms viii:4.

[2] *Ibid.*

Nor has man changed greatly since he first appeared. Such changes as he has undergone are mainly skeletal, and even these are comparatively unimportant. Man's body has also changed in a number of other aspects, such as in the disappearance of the vermiform appendix, the loss of eyebrow ridges, of hairy covering, of vertebrae at the end of the vertebral column, the disappearance of skin-twitching, the increase in head size—but all of these, with the exception of head size, are of no great social significance.[4] Moreover, for the period when his bodily form is definitely traceable—roughly, the last ten thousand years—he has shown no substantial improvement. It is believed that "man's physical evolution has virtually ceased," and in so far as any change is occurring it is retrogressive. If man is undergoing any progressive changes they are mental, "the logical conclusion of the marvelous results of organic evolution." [5]

Man is essentially the same as the higher mammals in anatomical structure and in the life processes. "The anatomical features which distinguish men from apes are comparatively few. Bone for bone, muscle for muscle, organ for organ, almost every feature of the ape is repeated in the human body. The differences are almost entirely differences in proportions and relations of parts; the structures are almost identical." [6] In the fundamental processes of digestion, respiration, circulation, excretion, and reproduction; in the simple reflexes, in sensation, and to some extent in perception; in the emotional processes of fear, anger, exaltation, and love, man is one with the animal kingdom. And, finally, man is subject to the same cycle of birth, growth, and decay as other creatures; though he lives longer than most other animals, his lamp of life, like theirs, gradually burns lower and lower and finally goes out.

II. ANATOMICAL CHARACTERISTICS AS FACTORS

Though man is nearly one with the higher mammals, he has special characteristics which set him apart and enable him to build culture. These are of three main types: the anatomical, the physiological, and the mental.

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[3] See Richard Swann Lull, "Pulse of life" in George Alfred Baitsell (ed.), *Evolution of earth and man* (New Haven 1929) 138–145.

[4] See Alfred Sherwood Romer, *Man and the vertebrates* (2d ed. Chicago 1937) chap. xi.

[5] Richard Swann Lull, *Organic evolution* (New York 1917) 685.

[6] Romer, *op. cit.*, 230.

Complex Brain. Man's physical characteristics which have a bearing on culture building include his large and complex brain, erect posture, scope of vision, and movable fingers. The most important of these is his brain. Though man's brain does not differ materially in structure from that of other manlike creatures, yet it does differ "in size, and the great development of certain areas which are presumed to be the seat of the higher mental faculties." [7] This greater size, complexity, and development of brain constitute probably the most important factor. We shall return to this topic in the next chapter.

Erect Position. Man, more than any other creature, bears himself in erect position. This trait has a twofold significance. First, it frees man's forelimbs from the activities of locomotion and so permits him to use them in food-getting, in shelter-building, in defending himself against other creatures, and in making tools and other devices. Second, erect posture and the freedom of his mouth from the food-getting and defense activities have probably contributed toward the development of spoken language (the use of his *lingua* or tongue) as a master means of communication, and thereby possibly to the development of his brain.

Position and Structure of Eyes. The frontal position and the complex structure of man's eyes are also important. This, together with his erect position, gives man a power of vision, which enables him to see farther than other creatures except giraffes and birds.[8] This in turn has a bearing on his actions and mental life. Greater ability to see things excites his curiosity, and in turn leads him to more complex experiences, to discoveries, and to more intensive manipulation of things.[9] Moreover, this greater power to see endows man with superior powers of defense and so liberates him from many fears. All in all man is less apprehensive of other creatures, or more sustainedly courageous than any other living thing.

Movable Fingers and Apposable Thumbs. Man's ability to move his fingers freely and to clasp with his thumbs are also important in culture making. Coupled with his erect position and brain development, this trait has given man pronounced dexterity and skill. The very use of the term dexterity (Latin *dexter* = right hand) reflects the fact that man has chiefly used his right hand; but he has increasingly come to use both hands in the making and manipulating of things.[10] The free use of the hands enables man to develop many skills which other creatures do not have. Other living things do have specialized skills such as climbing, running, boring, or flying, in some of which they excel man; but all in all man can manipulate his surroundings in a uniquely skilful manner. In construction he is notably superior: he can make things of greater fineness and durability, of more lasting beauty, than any other creature. Of greater significance still, man's hand is itself an efficient tool which makes other tools and thus multiplies man's ability to shape nature.

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[7] *Ibid.*, 231.

[8] It is believed that arboreal life was responsible for the development of this feature also. See *ibid.*, 214.

[9] The monkey also has this characteristic. See *ibid.*, 219–220.

III. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAITS

Constancy of Sex Drive. Man possesses physiological traits which have a wide bearing on his associated living. These include the constancy of the sex drive, adaptive fertility, longevity, prolonged youth, age-group and sex-group differences, and general biological similarity and dissimilarity.

Of these various traits none perhaps is more intertwined with the whole range of social life than that of sex. The sex drive, though present in most creatures of the higher order, is particularly significant in human beings chiefly because of the relatively continuous urgency it assumes in man. While in most mammals the drive is active only during the comparatively brief periods of the mating seasons, lying dormant the rest of the time, in man it is awake at nearly all times from the age of puberty until well into old age. Not only is it continuously awake, but it is so positive, so tumultuous in its insistence for satisfaction that it often produces serious biological and social disturbances when left even partly unsatisfied or uncontrolled. Moreover, activities related to sex command a greater proportion of the life span than those related to any other phase of life, with the possible exception of the economic; they reach a larger proportion of the population than any other phase of human activity; while some poverty, insanity, delinquency, and crime are but offshoots of the phenomena of sex.

So universal, continuous, and disturbing is this drive that from earliest times mankind has been compelled rigidly to regulate and control its activity—marriage and the family being among the earliest institutions to appear and among the most austere of the social systems. This general question will be considered further in the chapters on marriage and the family.

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[10] For the origin of handedness, see Roy M. Dorcus and G. Wilson Shaffer, *Textbook of abnormal psychology* (Baltimore 1934) 71–72.

Adaptive Fertility. Although constantly under the impact of the sex urge, mankind has developed what may be called adaptive fertility. By this is meant that though man has an enormous fecundity or power of reproduction, he keeps his fertility or actual reproduction more or less under control. Man's fecundity is so great that starting even with a single couple it would take but a few centuries to produce a population equal to that of the world today. "It has been calculated, for example, that the descendants of a single pair of human beings increasing at the rate of 1 per cent. per annum would amount in a little more than 2,000 years to 1,700 millions, that is to say, to a total equal to that of the present population of the world." [11] Man's fecundity, therefore, is very great; it is said to be something like four times as great as that needed to maintain his numbers and three times as great as his ability to increase his food supply.[12] While plants and animals are numerically controlled mainly by the food supply and by the natural limitations on their reproductive season, man controls his numbers in part by controlling his fertility. That man has employed some degree of choice in the matter may be seen in part from the history of contraception.[13] This control has not always or everywhere been firm, as may be seen from the prolific begetting of some people; [14] still, as a whole, mankind seems at all times to have controlled its reproduction power to a marked degree and to have balanced population with the supply of the available resources. By these means mankind has multiplied itself not too rapidly.

Longevity and Plasticity. Man's longevity is also of considerable significance. Very few plants or creatures live longer than man, while most creatures have a shorter life. Some giant trees do live for thousands of years; the giant tortoise can live as long as two hundred years; the elephant about one hundred years. But the average age of all living creatures is much less than that of man. The horse and the dog live less than twenty years, the rabbit and the rat from two to five years, insects from a matter of hours to a year.[15]

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[11] A. M. Carr-Saunders, *Population* (London 1925) 12.

[12] See Edward Alsworth Ross, *Principles of sociology* (New York 1920) 32. It should be noted, however, that while fertility decreases as civilization advances, there is no evidence that fecundity decreases.

[13] See Norman E. Himes, *Medical history of contraception* (Baltimore 1936) *passim.*

[14] This is especially true of Eastern peoples, such as the Chinese, Egyptian, Javanese, and Hindus, who are at or near the point of overpopulation.

Man's longevity has differed from time to time and in different regions. At the end of the seventeenth century, as far back as reliable records go, the average life expectancy in Europe was approximately 30 years; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it increased; by the present century it has reached in parts of the Western world as high as 58 years. In 1901–1910 the average expectancy ranged from 57 years in Australia to between 56 and 52 in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland, 51 in the United States, and under 51 in Switzerland, England, and Italy. In the United States at present the average expectancy is 56 years, 55.33 for men and 57.52 for women.[16] One hundred years is the approximate maximum everywhere.

This longer life span gives human beings a relatively long period of youthful plasticity and maturing and for transferring the cultural accumulation to the successive generations. Plasticity, or the condition of youthful immaturity, keeps the young free from rigid structure and instinct fixation longer than other creatures, with the result that most reflexes remain modifiable, and inherent capacities can be shaped and directed. The learning capacity, for example, increases up to 20 years of age and retains its zenith until about 25 years; it declines very slowly after that; but older persons still can learn as well as when they were younger if not better in some respects, though they learn more slowly.[17] Longevity and plasticity, therefore, make it possible for man phylogenetically to accumulate and transfer cultural gains at a far greater rate than other creatures.

IV. SEX AND SOCIETY

Sex Divisions. The differences between and the distribution of the two sexes and of the various ages of the population also belong to the category of physiological traits. They are related to so many phenomena that it will be necessary to devote a subchapter to each.

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[15] See Frederick A. Cleveland (ed.), *Modern scientific knowledge of nature, man, and society* (New York 1929) 291–292.

[16] See Harry H. Moore, *Public health in the United States* (New York 1923) 11–12; also Louis I. Dublin and Alfred J. Lotka, *Length of life* (New York 1936) Table 9, p. 48; Table 12, p. 68; Table 13, p. 74; p. 76.

[17] See Edward L. Thorndike, *et al.*, *Adult learning* (New York 1928) 129–131.

First, as to sex differences. Nature's division into males and females, though not unique with the human species, constitutes with the latter a factor of major importance. The two sexes are marked with striking distinguishing characteristics, some of which are strictly biological, or morphological and functional; others are biocultural, that is, they are rooted in biological character but are variously modified by culture.

Differences between Men and Women. The two sexes differ from each other in size and weight. Woman is on an average one-sixteenth shorter in stature; her body weighs on the average less than man's; woman's brain weighs less than man's (43 ounces for woman and 48 for man); and the female organism is in some respects more elaborate and possibly more delicate.

Men and women differ in growth, energy, and decay. Maturity occurs earlier in the female than in the male; that is, woman attains ossification, the ability to walk, and muscular control earlier than man. The female has also a greater rate of anabolism; that is, the rate at which the female organism generates energy to make good her physiological losses is twice as great as in the male, and in the case of child-bearing females three times as great.[18] This total storing-up of energy, necessary to the functioning of the female organism, seems to give the female a greater weight relative to her size; this in turn possibly contributes to making woman less inclined to engage in energy-expending and hazardous activities; and, again, may have a bearing on the fact that on the average women live longer than men.

Men and women are said to differ in mentality. There seems to be some emotional and cognitive difference, the female being more easily excited and the male quicker in apprehension in the early periods of life; but these do not seem to have any general bearing. "At least, it is worth noting that most of these differences which are rather clear in childhood and early adolescence begin to disappear when the two sexes work under conditions of approximately equal intellectual stimuli, as in senior high school and college. It may be, of course, that there are intellectual sex differences even on this level, but they have not been discovered by any reliable techniques."[19]

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[18] See Olga Knopf, *Art of being a woman* (Boston 1932) 23.

Men and women differ in the basic function of reproduction. Child-bearing imposes on the female serious hardships and inconveniences. It subjects her to the periodicity of menstruation, which reduces her efficiency; to the physical disability and possible peril of childbirth; and to the conflict which she sometimes experiences between motherhood and other work and which probably retards achievement.[20] Men and women are also said to differ in internal gland secretion and in the "unstriped" muscles on which emotions depend. But culture conditioning is so powerful that even identical constitutional types often produce varied cultural patterns and reactions, so that visible expressions of constitutional traits may contain so great an element of cultural conditioning as to make the separation of the biological from the cultural difficult if not impossible.[21]

Sex and Performance. Whether the differences are constitutional or cultural, or a mixture of both, the important fact is that men and women do differ in the actualities of life. First, they show marked divergencies in performance. Men have greater strength and ability to put energy into motion quickly; they are superior in the performance of mechanical tasks and all work calling for ingenuity; they seem to be more efficient in integral and continuous types of performance, that is, in tasks which have many parts fusing into a whole and demanding a long time to complete. The explanation of this is somewhat obscure.[22]

Woman appears to have relatively less speed and precision of movement, less strength and ability to mobilize energy quickly; but she has greater endurance in routine action than man;[23] and when free from the nervous strain of the menstrual period, the female seems to work under less tension and at a more even rate. But this applies to fractional, phasic, and multiple-stimuli tasks; that is, the female seems to excel in tasks in which there are two or more parts or two or more phases each complete in itself, or in which the stimuli are frequently changing and rapid perception is needed. This is believed to be due to the terminal structures or free nerve-endings in women, which make adaptation to stimulation and recovery from fatigue more rapid.

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[19] Gardner Murphy, *General social psychology* (New York 1933) 447. By permission of Harper & Brothers.

[20] See William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, i (New Haven 1927) 112.

[21] See Murphy, *op. cit.*, 340.

[22] However, see Hannah M. Book, "Psychophysiological analysis of sex differences" in *Journal of social psychology*, iii (1932) 434–462.

[23] See Gardner Murphy and Lois Barclay Murphy, *Experimental social psychology* (New York 1931) 121.

All in all, the female seems to work by spurts, to discharge toxins more rapidly and frequently by outbursts of neurasthenia and hysteria, to "think with her emotions," to rely on so-called "intuition," to live a more sustainedly passive life than man, all of which may contribute to her greater longevity. But these traits, though rooted in biology, are probably partly due to culture. The female has for centuries if not millenniums been subjected to the fractional, phasic, and multi-stimuli influences of domestic work, and this may have conditioned her behavior. This, however, cannot explain it all; for, the factors which originally led her to subject herself to those influences and which fixed the culture pattern upon her would still remain to be accounted for; and these factors seem to lie in the structure and functions of the human female organism.

Sex and Division of Labor. Quite apart from the origin of sex differences, the fact is that historically sex has produced or at least has been a concomitant of various cultural phenomena. Sex has from very early time been the basis of the division of labor. Man has engaged chiefly in primary productive activities, activities demanding greater strength and sustained energy; woman has been occupied in the less arduous and the semiroutine tasks of the household. "Men fight and go to sea, and women engage in more circumscribed occupations!" Man has gained and held the dominant, authoritative, executive positions; women the subordinate, uninfluential, administrative ones. The male in the West has been the keystone of the social structure, possessing the power to rule the family, to own and transmit property, to control group life. The female has been and still is more or less dependent on the male.

Sex and Achievement. Sex seems also to have a bearing on achievement. Nearly all of the world's geniuses have been men. This applies to all fields of human endeavor: in economic life, education, religion, the arts, science, government. Woman has distinguished herself in some of the arts, but only to a secondary degree. In music women have achieved distinction as performers and interpreters but not as creators; in sculpture and painting scarcely a female has achieved first rank; in literature women have attained a high position, but most of the immortal authors have been men; in science woman's work has consisted almost wholly in experimenting with or interpreting the work of man, rather than in making major discoveries and inventions of her own; in politics, religion, war, industry and business, education, the same thing holds true—the outstanding leaders have been men. This difference in achievement, as in the case of performance, is probably due in part to culture. But, here again, we have to account for the factor that started the male on the path of greater achievement; and once more the inescapable conclusion seems to be that the root lies in biology.[24]

Achievement of Woman in Her Own Sphere. Woman, however, has her peculiar sphere of achievement. She not only bears within her body the men who achieve these various types of distinction, but in most cases she nurses, cares for, inspires, or stimulates the achiever; she often bears the brunt of toil, of disappointment, of privation.

Again, woman is the main contributor to the creation of the private order to which man's success is sometimes due. ". . . The *success of any man's service depends on the state of mind which the private order keeps alive.*" Not simply recreation and rest, though this is part of it, but "confidence, independence, and originality of mind. . . . Success in the public order presupposes a state of mind given by the private order." [25] Woman does not always create peace or contentment; common knowledge shows that she often causes disturbance and distress; nevertheless she is the main element in the private order which, directly or indirectly, by collaboration or contest, breeds confidence, independence, and originality.

Woman's lack of achievement in the public order, therefore, is partly due to the fact that she has devoted herself, as nature seems to require, to biological and domestic activities. To them she devotes most of her time and energy during her mature years, and in the performance of them she seems content. She seems to turn to the public order principally when mismating, maladjustment, or other factors suppress her creative activity and compel her to sublimate her energies and avoid neuroses.[26]

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[24] For a different view, see Mary R. Beard, "Test for modern women" in *Current history*, xxxvii (1932) 179–183; Emil Ludwig, "Ten greatest women" in *American magazine*, 108 (1929) 11–13, 115–130; and Olga Knopf, *Art of being a woman* (Boston 1932) *passim*. See also Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) 89–90.

[25] William Ernest Hocking, *Human nature and its remaking* (new and rev. ed. New Haven 1923) 310. Chapter 34 of this book contains idealistic depictions of the family. See also Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, iii (New York 1937) chap. i, for another idealistic description of the family and its function.

In our time, however, the making of a home has become a problem. The mechanization of domestic tasks, the separation of economic activity from the home, the proximity of store and market place, the taking over of education by the community, the commercialization of recreation, and the striking reduction in birth rates, have all robbed the home of much of its creativeness. Industrialism has uprooted woman from her work, has robbed her of status, and has blown her into the public order.[27]

Sex Distribution and Cultural Phenomena. Apart from the differences in achievement, the numerical distribution of the sexes produces significant cultural phenomena. At birth the two sexes are approximately equal in number, the proportion of males to females being almost 1:1, with a tendency for the males to have a slightly larger proportion. But as they grow older the females survive at a greater rate and have a greater longevity. This is due to the factors already mentioned. Men are far more active than women as explorers, sailors, pioneers, migrants, warriors, and workers at hazardous tasks. As a result, in nearly all countries for which records are available the number of women in the population is greater than that of men, as may be seen from table 1.

The sexes also produce or are associated with other cultural phenomena. The age of a given locality, the type of activity carried on, the degree of security or hazard, comfort or discomfort, tend to draw a greater proportion of one sex or the other and to produce important social phenomena. Older and well-settled communities, for example, tend to draw a larger proportion of women, perhaps because of the greater inertia of women and because educational facilities for children and recreation facilities for all are more available. On the other hand, colonial, pioneer, mining, forestry, fishing, and sparsely-settled localities of all kinds tend to draw a larger proportion of men mainly because these activities demand greater energy and because women are more loath or are unable to pull up roots and move to newer regions. About 75 per cent of all immigrants who came to the United States during the periods for which records are available were men. Thus older and

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[26] See Margaret Lawrence, *School of femininity* (New York 1936) *passim.*

[27] See Mary van Kleeck, "Women in industry: general principles" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 15 (New York 1934) 453.

Table 1. Sex Distribution of the Population[28]

(Number of males per 1000 females)

Country	According to the Census Taken Approximately in the Years Indicated				
	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920
Austria	955	958	966	965	919
Belgium	999	995	987	984	969
Bulgaria	....	1036	1041	1038	998
Denmark	965	951	950	943	949
Finland	958	969	979	986	974
France	995	993	969	966	916
Germany	963	961	969	975	915
Greece	1071	1104	1085	1019	988
England and Wales	948	940	936	936	912
Ireland	959	971	974	997	....
Italy	1005	....	990	964	973
Norway	943	916	924	910	949
Holland	977	977	976	975	987
Portugal	916	928	915	903	899
Roumania	....	1037	1033	1021	1016
Russia	....	....	963	....	810
Scotland	930	933	946	942	926
Serbia	1048	1055	1058	1067	962
Spain	957	961	954	946	942
Sweden	942	939	953	956	964
Switzerland	961	946	964	968	931
Hungary	970	985	991	981	942
Argentina	....	....	1119	1155	....
Brazil	1068	1020	1040	1049	1017
Canada	1025	1037	1050	1129	1061
Chile	....	1000	979	999	988
United States	1036	1049	1044	1060	1040
Japan	1030	1021	1018	1021	1021
British Indies	1048	....	1038	1049	1058
Australia	1173	....	1101	1079	1034
New Zealand	1223	....	1107	1116	1046

new communities have different proportions of the sexes. The differences between Massachusetts and Washington, or between the District of Columbia and Rhode Island, on the one hand, and California, Nevada, and Wyoming, on the other, are brought out in table 2.

Sex and Social Cohesion. Finally, the sexes constitute a powerful, if not the most powerful, source of social interaction and cohesion. The root of this lies in the sex drive. The activities arising from or related to sex are, with the possible exception of those related to hunger, the most universal, continuous, repetitive, and binding. Involving, as these activities do, intimacy, interdepend-

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[28] Adapted from Corrado Gini, *et al.*, *Demografia* (Torino 1930) 49.

TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF MALES TO FEMALES IN UNITED STATES BY DIVISIONS AND BY CERTAIN STATES, 1920 AND 1930 [29]

Locality	All Classes		White	Negro	Mexican
	Sex Ratio [a]		Sex Ratio	Sex Ratio	Sex Ratio
	1930	1920	1930	1930	1930
United States	102.5	104.0	102.7	97.0	114.2
Massachusetts	95.1	96.3	96.0	99.3	.....
Washington	112.1	118.1	111.2	124.8	.....
The North	102.2	103.4	102.1	101.0	165.6
The South	100.9	102.6	102.5	95.9	106.1
The West	109.5	114.4	107.8	104.1	116.9
California	107.6	112.4	104.7	97.7	118.0
Nevada	140.3	148.4	138.6	115.9	255.6
Wyoming	123.8	131.3	122.1	124.3	176.8
District of Columbia	90.9	87.0	91.4	89.1	.....
Rhode Island	95.2	97.0	95.2	96.3	.....

[a] Sex Ratio—number of males per 100 females. Sex ratio not shown where number of females is less than 100.

ency, delicacy, sympathy, collaboration, they attract and bind together the male and female segments of mankind in a wide range and continuity of functioning.[30]

It must not be inferred that sex attraction is the only impulse which produces cohesion even in the male-female relationships. Other elements are no doubt at work, such as the desire for response and for recognition. The two sexes, for all their differences, are in varying degrees complementary to each other: in response, sociability, patience, endurance, strength, and skill; and as life advances, the fortunately mated become more and more mutually helpful, so much so that separations are attended with physiological and psychological disturbances, and often the death of one mate precipitates that of the other.

V. AGE DIVISIONS AND HUMAN SOCIETY

Age Divisions of Population. Birth, death, and survival rates, the age-distribution, and similar phenomena also produce or are associated with important features of associated living.

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[29] United States Bureau of the Census, *United States Census, 1930*, vol. iii, *Population*, table 40.

[30] The male-female cohesion mentioned here must not be confused with general social cohesion which arises from psychological traits, such as "gregariousness," "parental feelings," "love and aggression," "social interest," and others. See Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) chap. iv.

First, as to age distribution. Political units usually divide population into five age groups, those under 10 years of age, between 10 and 19, 20 and 29, 30 and 39, 40 and 49, 50 and over. The following table indicates the percentages falling in each age segment in the United States and certain European countries for the specified dates.

TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE AGE DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES [31]

LOCALITY	DATE	UNDER 10	10 TO 19	20 TO 29	30 TO 39	40 TO 49	OVER 50
United States	1880	26.7	21.4	18.2	12.7	9.1	11.8
	1930	19.6	19.2	16.9	14.9	12.2	17.2
England and Wales	1881	25.7	20.6	17.0	12.6	9.8	14.4
	1927	16.9	17.7	16.7	14.3	13.2	21.2
France	1881	18.3	17.1	15.8	13.8	12.4	22.5
	1926	14.8	16.2	16.5	13.9	13.3	25.2
Germany	1880	25.1	19.7	15.9	13.0	10.4	15.8
	1925	15.8	20.4	18.4	14.2	12.4	18.8
Italy	1880	22.7	20.5	14.4	13.4	11.2	17.8
	1921	20.1	21.0	16.2	12.9	10.6	19.1

Sociological Age Distribution. The distribution usually followed, though quite old, is based neither on the military nor on the tax needs of the state, nor on citizenship requirements, nor on the death rates of the various segments of the population. The so-called population pyramid has great uses in predicting increases or decreases in population, in forecasting business or school population, but since the records made public are usually by ten years it is difficult to discover many social phenomena of importance.

For sociological purposes population may be divided into youth, middle age, and old age. The significance of such a classification is obvious: these three periods are biologically significant in that they represent the prereproduction, the reproduction, and the postreproduction segments of life; they have also an economic significance in that they represent roughly the preproduction, the production, and the postproduction ages. Thus they are related to sex and to hunger, probably the two greatest driving forces in society. Since in most instances no figures are available on which to base such a division, we use the usual figures as the nearest approximation and divide the population into three age groups, namely, the youthful or those falling under twenty, the middle-age group or those between twenty and fifty, and the old-age or those above fifty. The table below shows the youthful group ranged between 31 per cent in France (1926) to 38.8 per cent in the United States (1930); the middle-age group 43.7 in France and 44 in the United States; and the old-age group from 25.2 in France to 17.2 in the United States.

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[31] Based on tables in Warren S. Thompson, *Population problems* (2d ed. New York 1935) 98.

TABLE 4. SOCIOLOGICAL AGE DIVISION IN UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES [32]

Age Group	United States		England & Wales		France		Germany		Italy	
	1880	*1930*	*1881*	*1927*	*1881*	*1926*	*1880*	*1925*	*1880*	*1921*
Youthful (Under 20)	48.1	38.8	46.3	34.6	35.4	31.0	44.8	36.2	43.2	41.1
Middle age (20 to 50)	40.0	44.0	39.4	44.2	42.0	43.7	39.3	45.0	39.0	39.7
Old age (Above 50)	11.8	17.2	14.4	21.2	22.5	25.2	15.8	18.8	17.8	19.1

Age Distribution and Population Fluctuation. The age distribution of population, first of all, determines whether a people is rapidly increasing, is increasing normally, is becoming stationary, or is decreasing. Generally speaking, whenever the portion of the population under ten years is considerably larger than the over-fifty portion, as was the case in the United States in 1920 (21.7 and 15.4 per cent respectively), the population is still increasing at a fairly high rate; when these two portions are approximately equal, as in England and Wales in 1921 (18.1 and 19.1), the population is maintaining a balance; whenever the old-age portion is considerably larger than the under-ten division, as in France in 1921 (13.9 and 25.2), the population is stationary, if not declining. The crucial factor consists of the proportion of females from 15 to 50 years of age.

Social Functions of Age-Groups. These age segments evince peculiar characteristics and perform special functions. The youthful bloc is possibly more physically active and has more idealism than the other groups, but it is the automatic, conservative element.

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[32] Based on table in Thompson, *op. cit.*, 98.

Being in the grip of the early expressions of sex, its activity is socially disorientated; lacking experience, it accepts for the most part what the elders dictate without questioning; and being economically dependent upon the elders, it is unable to depart from the established. Thus youth is, astonishing though it seems upon first thought, culturally conservative. Easily indoctrinated, youth is the backbone of demagogic and emotional movements. Youth has never, so far as is known, produced a great movement, or made an outstanding discovery, invention, or a notable contribution of any kind. There are, however, exceptions, such as those of La Fayette who led the American revolutionary armies when he was under twenty; Mendelssohn who composed the "Midsummer Night's Dream" at seventeen; and Shostokovitch who composed his "First Symphony" at twenty.[33]

The middle-age group is the pivot around which cultural phenomena revolve. During this period of life mankind reaches the initial stages of achievement, it being fairly well-established that few ever achieve distinction before forty years of age, except in times of war, revolution, and prolonged economic disturbance, when "the cake of custom" is broken, subcultures contact, and vigor is renewed. The middle-age group has control of most industry and business, educational, religious, and governmental activity. It is the group which reproduces and supports the population, that transmits the gains and the losses of the past, and initiates and carries out new movements.

The old-age group, those above fifty, is the consciously conservative group. Habituation to the established, the slowing down of bodily activity and functioning, dissolution and frustration, and perhaps the awareness of the futility of human effort in the cosmos, all contribute to conservatism. The older group owns or controls the funded wealth; holds the positions of influence and power; tends to manipulate the young and the middle-aged so as to serve its own interests; it takes little or no chance in progressive undertakings; and holds property as the keystone of its social order. The old-age group, on the other hand, furnishes a share if not most of the more radical thought and action. Many of the really great and definitive culture achievements—definitive because they are not superseded and because they become permanent deposits in culture—are the product of men and women of advanced age. This is probably due to the fact that in old age, men and women of imagination and perception grow aware of being in the cosmic swing; they realize that they have not much more to lose and possibly something to gain for themselves and society by taking a last fling at courageous action; and, conscious of the fast-approaching end, they intensify their activity in order to bring to fruition their labors. Heaven lies about us at the sunset of life, as once it did in infancy. Old-age, then, produces not only profound conservatism, passivity, and fatalism, but also daring activity and faith in the future of mankind.

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[33] See "La Fayette" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 13 (14th ed. 1929) 587–588; also Donald Francis Tovey, "Mendelssohn" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, xviii (11th ed. 1911) 121–124; also "Dmitri Shostokovitch" in David Ewen (ed.), *Composers of today* (New York 1934) 247–249.

Age-Groups and Culture Interaction. The age-groups constitute a culture factor in another way, by providing sharp contacts, interactions, and contests among the three major segments of the population. This process is probably one of the major factors in the advance of culture. What is true of bisexual interaction is also true of age divisions: they produce division of labor, varying types and degrees of achievement, and domination-subjection patterns. Their differences in bodily and mental movement contribute to the intensification of culture. They inevitably come into contact with one another continuously and insistently, and interact, dispute, and conflict with one another. In this manner they produce a balance of the different elements, bring out the various capacities, and test the accumulated culture.

VI. BIOLOGICAL UNITY AND DIVISIVENESS

General Biological Unity. Another biological trait of cultural importance is man's biological unity or the essential biological oneness of mankind. Whether we adhere to the monogenetic (sprung from one root) or the polygenetic (sprung from several roots) theory, the fact remains that in all basic respects mankind is one: in the alimentary, reproductive, cardiac, respiratory, and other systems all mankind is practically alike. This has made possible universal miscibility among mankind, that is, man has been able biologically to intermix and to produce hybrid offspring, which in turn have been able to perpetuate themselves indefinitely. The round of birth, survival, struggle, maturity, decay, and death, the instincts, emotions, and other phases of mind have probably had some bearing on culture diffusion. This biological unity, then, and this miscibility and actual interbreeding have acted as an endless chain in binding families, tribes, nations, and cultures in common systems of concepts and practices.

General Biological Diversity. But mankind is also exceedingly diverse. Individual diversity is obvious; it is believed no two individuals are identical. But the universality of diversity is perhaps, particularly in its cultural significance, not often perceived. Diversity is important in its merely physical aspects, especially in that it produces differing blocs of races and subraces. Mental diversity is probably even more significant in that it makes for blocs of temperaments; diversity tends to produce ethnic cohesion on the one hand and intercultural contest and friction on the other. We shall return to these topics in the discussion of race and culture.

VII. SUMMARY

These, then, are man's biological characteristics which produce or have a bearing on various institutional phenomena. Man's complex brain, erect posture, frontally placed eyes, movable fingers, and apposable thumb; the constancy of the sex drive, the ability to control fertility, longevity and plasticity; the differing sex traits, together with the divisions, conditions, and interactions which they produce; sex and age-group distributions; general biological unity and divisiveness—all make man not only unique among living creatures but contribute to making him the institution builder that he is.

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Chapter 5

THE MIND OF MAN

I. MIND, MAN'S MASTER CHARACTERISTIC

The traits described above do not, however, fully account for man's capacity to build and maintain culture. Man's hand is a wonderful tool, his eye a far-seeing instrument, his erect posture, and other traits do give him advantage; but we still have to account for the directing power. That directing power is man's mind. It is mind that charges man's hand and makes it the tool it is; it is mind that feels and thinks, evolves and organizes experience, guides man's activity, produces, accumulates, transmits, and applies knowledge. In short, mind is man's master characteristic and above all else makes him unique.[1]

Nature of Man's Mind. But what is mind? Mind is not an object or an entity; "not a kind of *being* but a kind of *doing;*" [2] it is a going-on in the nervous system.

Mind, though essentially of the same general order wherever found, in man exhibits a greater degree of development and activity. This appears to be due to certain peculiarities of man's nervous system, particularly of his brain. First, man's nervous system is relatively larger in proportion to the size of his body and of the spinal column than that of most other animals. "The highest cranial capacity in the apes amounts, at the utmost, to about 600 cubic centimeters, in men it is at the lowest 950 and rises to 1,700 and more." [3]

Again, man's brain is more complex in structure and development; or, more exactly, it has larger and more complex centers, notably the cerebrum, in which mental processes go on. The cerebrum has various unspecialized areas. These areas afford a wide range of plasticity, variability, and adjustability, greater retentive and associative powers, greater powers of attention, inhibition, and impulsion; and at the same time, the cerebrum seems to have a more definite localization of certain foci where specialized functions, such as that of articulate speech, are possibly centered.[4] Moreover, the cortex, the outer layer of gray matter of the cerebrum and cerebellum, is so constituted that man's brain is capable of making enduring structural records of experiences and of reactivating these in useful combinations. Further, the animal is born with a practically or approximately finished nervous system; man is born with an unfinished nervous system which structurally undergoes various transformations, and in the white man the nervous system matures only at about 18 years of age. Finally, man has a well-developed receptor or sensory system, motor or efferent neurons, and adjustors or internuncial nerve cells, which give him a wider range of experience. "The lower animals have relatively few alternatives in their behavior. Given a stimulus to a starfish, you can often predict the reaction that will follow; but you cannot tell how the cat will jump. The more the adjustors increase, the more alternatives there are. Man has the maximum of adjustors and most freedom, or unpredictability." [5]

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[1] See Edna Heidbreder, *Seven psychologies* (New York 1933) 219–233.

[2] George T. W. Patrick, *What is the mind?* (New York 1929) 40.

[3] Wilhelm Schmidt, "Primitive man" in Edward Eyre (ed.), *European civilization,* i (New York 1934) 13.

Origin and Evolution of Mind. How this greater degree of mentality in man originated cannot be said, in the light of present knowledge. The generally accepted theory is that man's mind, like his general biological constitution of which it is a part, is the product of a million years of evolution, some fortuitous circumstance having started it on the path of special development. It is also fairly well established that the development of man's mind is the product of cultural as well as of biological evolution. Instinctive behavior, habit, trial and error, language, the slow rise of self-consciousness, reason and reflection—have all contributed to making man's mind what we know it to be today.[6]

However, there is practically no evidence that man's mind has increased in capacity during the last 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 years, the period during which he has lived more or less as a separate species. Primitive man's mentality seems to have been of the first order, judging from his domestication of fire, animals and plants, the development of rudimentary tillage and other procedures.

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[4] There is disagreement among anatomists and psychologists on this point and, if specialization foci do exist, on their significance.

[5] J. Arthur Thomson, *What is man?* (New York 1924) 79–80. By permission of G. P. Putnam's Sons.

[6] Patrick, *op. cit.*, 134.

Our "contemporary ancestors," the primitive people of our time, have as acute a sense, as high an emotional tone and quality, have every whit as much control of their passion, and as great a knowledge of the skills necessary to carry on at their stage of culture, as sophisticated man has for his.[7]

Phases of Mind. Man's mind has several phases or aspects, each of which seems to contribute in peculiar ways to culture construction. There have been many classifications of the phases of mind. For our purposes we may distinguish sensation and reflex, drives, emotion, and that group of faculties usually designated by the term "intelligence." These phases of mind are not separate or independent of each other; they are rather a continuum, like the colors in the spectrum; and yet they have different bearings on the creation and operation of culture.

II. SIMPLER ASPECTS OF MIND AS FACTORS

Functions of Sensation and Reflex. Sensation and reflex, the simplest aspects of mind, are probably the most common possessions of human beings. By sensation (the sensing without idea or objective) man carries on many primary activities automatically.[8] The body senses heat and cold, wetness and dryness; in a measure man senses hunger, prompting him to act accordingly. Reflex likewise carries on such bodily activities as swallowing, dilation or contraction of the pupil of the eye, and digestion and respiration without calling for conscious direction. Reflex is probably the master conditioner of man to the culture matrix; it makes possible automatic and nonvoluntary adaptations; by it he learns to walk or to talk, to sleep or to wake, to respond to sounds and light, to objects and persons, and other stimuli automatically.

The Drives. The drives, formerly called instincts, are dynamically-charged, unthinking urges, unlearned mental activity, which produce relatively fixed responses to fixed stimuli. They are the "musts" of life. Reflex passively receives the stimulus and only acts in return; a drive is active, itself seeking or producing the stimulus,[9] as when hunger drives the individual in a quest for satisfaction.

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[7] Alfred Marston Tozzer, *Social origins and social continuities* (New York 1925) 81–83; see also Schmidt, *op. cit.*, 13.

[8] See Robert S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (3d ed. New York 1934) 361, 389; also Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) 92–103.

[9] See K. Koffka, *Growth of the mind* (2d ed. rev. trans. by Robert Morris Ogden, New York 1925) 103.

The drives have been variously classified.[16] For the present purpose we adopt the classification which finds two principal types of drives: the appetites, such as are represented by food-hunger, sex-hunger, and contact-hunger; and the aversions, such as find expression in avoidance of pain or injury, or of persons or situations that have brought or may bring harm or distress.

The hunger-drives play an important part in culture. Sex-hunger is at the basis of marriage and the family; food-hunger constitutes the foundation of the economic institution.

Contact-hunger, sometimes called "gregariousness," is interwoven in the whole fabric of human society. Man seems scarcely able to live or to carry on his activities in isolation for any length of time. In ordinary times he seeks contact with others for sheer bodily comfort and for mental release and stimulation. In times of need or danger he seeks contact with his fellows for security. Group life supplies fellow-knowledge and fellow-feeling, security in economic goods, and protection against inimical nature. Group life draws persons of like interests into more or less permanent relationships, brings about social selection, cohesion, and contact and interaction of groups which are the bases of culture. These products, in turn, intensify "gregariousness" and produce the recurrence of the original stimuli.

The aversion drives are also potent in associated living. The craving to avoid persons or situations which have brought or may bring pain or injury produces positive as well as negative results. Positively, in order to avoid pain or injury society builds protective devices, such as health organizations, government and police systems, banks, granaries, dams, and dykes. On the other hand, aversion produces negative phenomena, such as divorce and family disorganization, professional competition, class and race conflict, segregation, war, and other contests for dominance.

Social Meaning of Emotion. Emotion also is of far-reaching significance in associated life. Emotion, or the awareness of something perceived, involving intense feeling and little reason, is often interrelated with the drives. Intense fellow-feeling for one's kin or friends, deep attachment to countrymen or people of the same party, and class and professional loyalty are the products of emotion. Fear, hunger, and hate often are awakened by the craving for security.

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[16] The Freudians recognize only two drives. William Trotter in *Instincts of the herd in peace and war* (rev. ed. New York 1926) names thirty of them. Edward Chace Tolman, *Purposive behavior in animals and men* (New York 1932) 271–302, mentions two main types. See also E. C. Wilm, *Theories of instinct* (New Haven 1925) 30–41, 99–118.

Emotions are present in those cohesions which we call sympathy, kindliness, loyalty, and patriotism; in collective symbols such as flags or religious rituals, in heirlooms, houses, places, and in the folkways and mores. They are pronouncedly present in leadership. Religious, political, and educational leaders are as a rule highly emotional individuals and they sway large segments of society by appealing to emotions or sentiments. Emotions also constitute the source of philanthropy, social reform, religious revivals, and political movements.

On the other hand, emotions generate much that is destructive in human society. Emotions turn casual or accidental situations into grounds for preconceptions; and conditioned emotionally by some experience or event, whole peoples become possessed of prejudgments and, acting as if they were insane, often engage in antagonistic movements, as in the anti-Semitism of the Middle Ages and of modern times. Emotions are thus the source of contentious political and religious behavior, of class agitation, and even of vastly destructive activities, such as revolutions and wars.

Emotions and their reactions, then, generate or condition the noblest as well as the meanest of group activity; they influence the most intellectually conceived plans and the most automatic reactions, the constructions as well as the distortions in human society. Thus culture becomes essentially emotional.[11]

III. INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN SOCIETY

Meaning of Intelligence. In all the aspects of mind just mentioned man is essentially one with other animals, save that in man they are conditioned by culture. But man differs sharply from his fellow creatures in intelligence. Intelligence is the faculty of reflecting, of knowing, understanding, remembering; of reasoning, judging, and selecting; of integrating responses, discriminating, and evaluating; of choosing and setting forth propositions; of discovering and inventing; and of adapting means to ends. This complex of powers, not different in order from the other phases of mind mentioned, entails more physiological connections and operation than the simpler phases.[12]

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[11] See Floyd Henry Allport, *Social psychology* (Boston 1924) 99–125; John B. Watson, *Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist* (2d ed. Philadelphia 1924) 214; Heidbreder, *op. cit.*, 152–200, 223, 247, 308; Shepherd Ivory Franz and Kate Gordon, *Psychology* (New York 1933) 77–108; Carrel, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

The relationship between intelligence and human culture is too manifold for detailed discussion here. Reflection, or the mental consideration of some suggested action for the purpose of previsioning the probable consequence, has some bearing upon social life. It leads individuals to seek adjustment to immediate or distant reality; produces imaginings, hopes, and fears; underlies spoken and written language, the systems of numbers, of weights and measures, and communication. Reason, or the ability to weigh, reckon, or establish ratios between contemplated actions and probable consequences, enables man in a measure to foresee the consequences of his actions, to plan for the near and the distant future, and to build projective and protective devices. The power to discover and invent underlies every step man has taken out of his crude and primitive living.

Man a Time-Binding Creature. Intelligence is more specifically significant, first, in that it makes man a time-binding creature; a characteristic regarded by some as crucial and comprehensive, the one idiosyncracy or peculiar kind of energy that makes man the culture builder.[13] In this, man is quite unique. Plant life is time-imprisoned; it arises, grows, passes through its life cycle, and dies, not knowing past and present, deriving no advantage from the experience of plants that have gone before. Most animals, too, seem unable to utilize past group experience or to deposit their own experiences for future use in the form of records or systems of usages.[14]

Man's time-sense, his memory, and his reason bind the past with the present, enable man to remember his own past sensations and in a measure to anticipate others and to build on this remembrance and anticipation. This capacity, together with his greater longevity and his power to produce articulate speech and written language, enables man to reach back in time, to record his present, to accumulate experience, and to pass it on. All along the course of history man has profited from past experience; has eliminated culture patterns, such as slavery, when they were no longer of use; has foreseen new needs; predicted the probable vagaries of nature; and built systems of protective devices, such as dykes, dams, and means of fire protection. And by projecting this time sense, he makes provision for and perhaps actually influences the generations yet unborn.[15] This capacity, however, is limited by other factors; societally, man is an idiot, as may be seen from his inability to profit from past wars or economic depressions.

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[12] Rudolph Pintner, *Intelligence testing* (new ed. New York 1931) 69–70.

[13] See Cassius J. Keyser, *Mathematical philosophy* (New York 1922) chap. xx and *passim*, esp. 442–443; and Lancelot Hogben, *Mathematics for the million* (New York 1937) 19.

[14] James Harvey Robinson in *Mind in the making* (New York 1921) facetiously remarks that "The monkey learns by monkeying but never learns to ape."

Man a Space-Binding Creature. Intelligence also makes man a space-binding creature, that is, enables him to utilize, in a measure at least, the experiences and achievements of his fellows living in other regions. Plants are cell-bound; they arise, grow, pass through the life cycle, and die in the very spot where they come into existence; they cannot know the experiences of plants living even in nearby places. Animals, though not bound to the same extent as plants, live for the most part in a limited territory, seldom go very far from the region of their birth, even more seldom undertake long-distance and permanent migration. Therefore, they cannot contact or profit from the experience of others of their kind in far-off places.[16]

Man, on the other hand, has far greater freedom of movement; he is able to leave his original habitat and to go into far-off regions. In the last century alone, some fifty million persons have moved from continent to continent, and unnumbered millions have moved within the continents and within national boundaries. "Man is not destined, like plants and most animals, to remain in the soil in which he was born; an instinct, an inborn urge, uniting in some with a spirit of adventure and curiosity, drives him forth in search of wealth and well-being, and to extend his activity and influence to the farthest bounds of his power." [17] Thus he is able to exchange experience by direct contact and observation.

Man's Communicativeness. Further, intelligence enables man to build systems of communication, to gather information from various sources, and to exchange his knowledge with peoples of different regions. By means of written language and numbers, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, and the photograph, man is able to communicate with his fellows far beyond the limits of face-to-face contacts and interactions; to communicate at long distance, to accumulate, permanently store, transmit, and utilize the gains of other peoples. Through extensive communication man spreads his culture, brings about interchange and cross-fertilization of cultural elements, and undergoes world-wide experience.

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[15] See Thomas Nixon Carver and Henry Bass Hall, *Human relations* (Boston 1923) 5.

[16] Long-distance movements of birds as a rule are temporary; contacts, therefore, are superficial.

[17] Calvo, quoted from Constantine Panunzio, *Immigration crossroads* (New York 1927) 271.

Man's Adjustability. Moreover, intelligence enables man to adjust himself to the physical, biological, and cultural factors. Animals are obliged to submit to such imperceptible and long-term adaptive changes as nature imposes on them, as when it makes their fur thicker or thinner with the change of seasons. Man also undergoes adaptive changes. But he goes beyond adaptation. He carries on an active, more or less conscious process of adjustment. He alters or "controls" aspects of physical nature, makes himself clothing, houses, heating and cooling devices; manipulates nature so as to increase his supplies; fertilizes, irrigates, plows the soil, thus increasing nature's yield. And what is perhaps even more significant is that he is able to pass on these adjustments, and that in a measure he is even able to make anticipatory adjustments, as when he stores and preserves food, builds reservoirs, and stores away fuel. In these ways, man is able to make numerous adjustments to nature, and to shape, control, and redirect nature.

Mind and Morality. Finally, man's mentality lies at the basis of his morality. Morality, which sociologically may be described as the awareness on the part of individuals and groups that other individuals or groups possess the same characteristics as themselves and the actions in accordance with that awareness, is largely the product of perception, reflection, reason, and of man's power to identify himself with others and to conceive the "common good." Perception and, to an extent, reflection underlie man's sense of obligation to his fellow, his calm joy in the fulfilment of duty, his disturbing fear, remorse, or shame over obligation unfulfilled or wrong done, his sense of satisfaction from doing good. Emotions underlie various aspects of morality. Fear prompts the more or less conscious acceptance of the established, prevents the doing of the forbidden, fosters obedience to authority, leads to conformity. Sympathy leads people to transcend the boundaries of mere kinship and to show varying degrees of loyalty to classes, nations, religions, and races other than those to which they belong. The mitigation of class and race antagonisms, the raising of the position of women, the humane treatment of criminals, the protection of the rights of minorities, the promotion of religious and political liberty and equality, international, humanitarian movements which aim at mitigating or reducing the violent expressions of man's cruelty—all are rooted in intelligence. Some measure of reflection and of reason lies at the basis of moral judgment, the mores, and laws; while the ability to conceive that which as yet is not, is at the basis of the projective morality of the seer and the revolutionary leader. In fact, the whole moral system is to one degree or another based on man's power to think, reflect, reason, and invent. On the other hand, much that is destructive in human society is also based on these same capacities.[18]

IV. SUMMARY

There are numerous ways, therefore, in which both the simpler and the more complex aspects of mind produce or are interwoven with culture, and particularly with those complex systems we have called social institutions. Mind enables man to utilize past group-experiences and to pass on his own; to relegate phases of life to the automatic and subconscious; and to build a whole matrix of interrelationships and activities.

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Chapter 6

THE RACES OF MAN

I. NATURE OF RACE AND ORIGINS OF RACES

Meaning of Race. One other feature, also rooted in biology, remains to be examined, namely, race. The term "race," used loosely in common speech, refers only to physical characteristics. A human race is a species or a grand division of the *genus homo* having physical traits sufficiently fixed and biologically transmissible to distinguish it permanently from all other such divisions. Race is often identified with tribe, nation, groupings, or cultures; but race connotes none of these. A tribe or nation usually does contain two or more racial strains, but tribes and nations are primarily political units; and cultures are complex configurations of ideas and usages, of organizations, of instruments and skills, and though often associated with race, cultures are social entities, not biological. Race *per se* is a biological fact.

Theories of Race Origins. Whether the races of man sprang from a single root or were originally distinct cannot be scientifically ascertained; their origin is buried so remotely in the past as not to permit fruitful inquiry. And yet the question is so closely related to far-reaching movements in the Western world today that it cannot be ignored. The controversy itself, quite apart from the ideas expressed, constitutes a cultural phenomenon of the first order.

Three main theories, all highly speculative, have been advanced as to the origin of the races, namely, the monogenetic, the polygenetic, and what we call the monovariant. The monogenetic theory, quite generally accepted at present, holds that the human race was originally one; that it developed in one locality, usually believed to have been the plateaus of Asia; that as it gradually increased numerically, it expanded in three main directions, into what are now called Asia, Africa, and Europe; and that, due to factors as yet unexplained, it acquired over long ages the peculiar traits which mark the races.

Two fairly well-established facts support this theory, namely, miscibility and the course of human migrations. Miscibility denotes the fact that the different races of man, even the most distant and diverse, can mate and produce offspring and that the offspring are in turn fertile and indefinitely self-perpetuating. Since only within a given species, whether of flora or fauna, does mixture take place spontaneously,[1] and since the races of man can and do mix naturally, it follows, by inference, that mankind must be one species.

The course of human migrations also lends some support to the monogenetic theory. Though there exists some doubt in the matter, such archeological, anthropological, and historical evidences as we have seem to indicate that all the streams of human migration started from the plateaus of southeastern Asia. Also, the discovery of *Pithecanthropus erectus* in Java and the finding of nearly all the remains of primitive man around the edges of Asia support the contention that the race was originally one, with Asia its original habitat.

The monogenetic hypothesis, however, is not without flaws. It postulates that geographic environment is a prime factor in producing racial characteristics, in fixing and making them heritable. This supposition is flatly denied by competent biologists, who point out that wide racial varieties are actually found in the same geographic setting, notably the Negroes and the Abyssinians, the Finns and the Laplanders. The monogenetic explanation cannot, therefore, be unconditionally accepted.[2]

The polygenetic theory, on the other hand, holds that the races were originally diverse, that they arose in several localities, and that the original differences became pronounced, fixed, and transmissible in the different geographic settings. Count de Gobineau (1816–1882), one of the first to advance this theory, claimed that there were originally three pure, principal races, the White, the Yellow, and the Black, the White being the "superior" of the three, the Nordic branch the supreme; and that all the other races, or the subraces, are mixtures of the original three.[3]

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[1] Crossings are produced artificially in both fauna and flora; but these are of very limited scope and importance, and even then they are ordinarily unfecund, as in the well-known case of the mule.

[2] See Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories* (New York 1928) 131; and Franklin Thomas, *Environmental basis of society* (New York 1925) 269–275.

[3] See Arthur Joseph de Gobineau, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (1853–1855)

Ludwig Gumplowicz, one of the ablest advocates of the polygenetic hypothesis, concurred with de Gobineau. He first refuted the monogenetic theory, maintaining that it is based on ethical considerations rather than on fact, and that it rests on the Biblical story which, aiming to establish the moral ideal of human equality, constructs the belief of the unity of mankind. He further argued that the existence of isolated and evidently unrelated parallel legends regarding the creation does not prove that man actually arose out of one stock, but that it is a coincidence which merely shows that the mind of man works in the same way the world over.

Gumplowicz next advanced the argument upholding the polygenetic hypothesis. He pointed out that since it is the general "law" of nature, in both the vegetable and the animal kingdom, to provide many germs and few matured organisms, it is unreasonable to assume that nature should have made an exception in the case of man by providing a single racial stock. Moreover, the presence of man in early times in widely distant areas supports the polygenetic hypothesis; for how could man, save by a miracle (which he rejects), have populated the earth from any single source within the span of time we know about and with the means of transportation which existed in primitive times. Furthermore, the actual racial trend during the historical period has been not one from homogeneity to heterogeneity but one "from a multiplicity and variety of stocks and social elements to an ever greater unity and homogeneity . . .; until today it is difficult to find a people on earth which is not a result of such a process of amalgamation." Since this trend has been in operation during the historical period, it must also, by logical inference, have been at work in prehistoric times. Therefore, it is in keeping with the known facts and reasonable to believe that in the beginning mankind was not of one stock but of several stocks. Numerous heterogeneous human swarms appeared in the various portions of the earth and gradually blended into the few races we know today.[4]

The third hypothesis may be called the monovariant theory. This theory, closely resembling the monogenetic hypothesis, differs from the latter in that it holds that man was one not in actual but

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vol. i, trans. by Adrian Collins as *Inequality of human races* (London 1915) chaps. vi, x, xi, xvi. See also Gottfried Salomon, "Gobineau" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 6 (New York 1931) 683.

[4] Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf* (unpublished MS. of trans. by Harold Hadley Story from rev. ed. Wagner, Innsbruck 1909) 46–63.

in potential variability or in the capacity to produce offspring with differing traits. As these traits unfolded, they led to the formation of racial groupings possessing the same traits; each grouping in time drifted into the particular geographic settings most suited to its survival; and in those geographic settings each in time further developed its original traits which, again in time, became fixed and transmissible; thus giving rise to the different races as we know them now.

Keane supports this theory. He claims that original man arose somewhere in southeastern Asia in Pliocene times; that he possessed potential variability; that the variants, intensified to some extent by geographical conditions, particularly by isolation, developed fixed and transmissible variabilities.[5] Haddon adds that man, being able to travel long distances, wandered far and wide in prehistoric times and that he settled in the midst of climatic conditions which "have indirectly become impressed on the germ-plasm so that definite responses have become heritable. In any case, natural selection, or rather elimination, has always been at work and, combined with isolation areas, has produced stocks with certain associated characters. . . ." [6]

Probable Factors in Raciation. More recently scientific investigation has been directed toward discovering the factors which underlie what Professor Hrdlička calls raciation or the process by which the races come to possess distinct characters. Competent anthropologists generally agree that several factors, rather than a single one, seem to have been at work in race formation. These include potential variability, geographical environment, race mixture, and gland functioning.

It is well established that the human genes have potential variability, or the capacity to produce various combinations. Possessing that capacity from the very first, the human race naturally produced, over long periods, variations, which in time developed the human races. Precisely how it happened that large bodies of people having the same traits assembled in given areas, the theory does not explain.

Geographic environment, particularly climate, isolation, the type of soil, minerals, or water, may have had something to do with fixing racial characteristics in man. Isolation is regarded as particularly important, for, it is believed, as racial groups were cut off from one another and hemmed in among particular geographic conditions, their original potential characteristics were accentuated by those conditions. The Mestizo of present-day Mexico, for example, is said to be developing distinct racial traits through a blending of two racial streams in comparative geographic isolation.

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[5] A. H. Keane, *Man, past and present* (Cambridge 1899) chap. i.

[6] A. C. Haddon, *Races of man* (New York 1925) 150. By permission of The Macmillan Company. See also pp. 150–169 for elaboration and defense of the theory.

The mixture of diverse racial types, having gone on for ages, is believed to have produced variants and those combinations of traits which mark the races of man. Lastly, raciation may have occurred through the alteration of gland activity, the thyroid, pituitary, adrenal, and gonad glands being particularly significant; the functioning of the glands, influenced by geographic conditions, changed from time to time and place to place and produced the races. However, while glands are influenced chiefly by the chemical constituents of food and drink, only a relatively few of these chemical elements affect them; and so far as known there is no positive correlation between geographic conditions and food.[7]

Gist of the Matter. These theories regarding the origin and the formation of the races, like all theories regarding origins, offer no opportunity for empirical testing; therefore they leave the inquirer at the point from which he started. All that can be said with a degree of certainty is that distinct races probably existed among the primates, that these stems or races apparently developed along several distinct branches or lines concomitantly; that mankind seems to have been undergoing a process of racial differentiation from the earliest times; and that various factors, not clearly determined, have been at work in producing the racial variations we now know. None of these theories, therefore, is conclusive.

II. MAIN RACIAL DIVISIONS OF MANKIND

Early Observations and First Classifications. Whatever the origin and the factors producing them, races of mankind, possessing fairly clearcut differences, do exist; and these differences, interpreted as conferring superiority to some and inferiority to others, are at the very heart of important phenomena in modern Western society. Therefore, the whole question calls for analysis.

When it was first noticed that men are marked by differences, the records do not show. It is relatively clear that the ancients had no biological concept of race. The Egyptians, Jews, Phoenicians, Chinese, Greeks, and Romans seem vaguely to have recognized that there were differences, but they noted chiefly those of color. Aristotle referred to the peoples of northern Europe and of Asia as being different from the Greeks, but Aristotle's remarks do not indicate that he had the biological concept of race as we have. The people of the Middle Ages paid no attention whatever to the matter. "The Christian era was not favorable to studies of man. . . ."[8]

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[7] Particular significance is attached to the thyroid, the pituitary, the adrenal, and gonad glands. For a convenient summary, see Otto Klineberg, *Race differences* (New York 1935) 46–54.



FIGURE 1. MAIN HUMAN STEMS OR RACES AND THEIR SUBDIVISIONS[9]

The first systematic attempts to classify the races were made in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Linnaeus (1707–1778), a Swedish botanist, classified mankind into *homo sapiens*, knowing man; *homo ferus*, wild man; and *homo monstruosis*, monstrous man. Blumenbach (1752–1840), a German botanist, divided man into Caucasians, Mongolians, Ethiopians, American Indians, and Malays—a classification which has served as the basis of subsequent classifications and has been adhered to until recently.[10]

[8] Aleš Hrdlička, "Human races" in Edmund V. Cowdry (ed.), *Human biology and racial welfare* (New York 1930) 164.

[9] Based on Hrdlička, *op. cit.*, 173–175.

[10] Bernier was really the first to classify the races, but his work was not influential. For other early classifiers see Jacques Barzun, *Race* (New York 1937) 51–58.

Contemporary Classifications and Bases of Classification. The classification commonly accepted at present divides man into three main races, namely, the Caucasoid or White, the Mongoloid or Yellow-Brown, and the Negroid or Black; and subdivides these into twelve subraces, as indicated in the graph as shown on page 85.

This classification, like all others, rests on arbitrarily selected characters, such as the color of skin, shape and color of eyes, stature, texture and color of hair, body hairiness, nose shape, and bone protrusions. If other traits were to be selected, we should have other classifications.[11] Further, the classification rests on the measurement of a very small proportion of mankind and that not scientifically selected; and since racial specimens which are even relatively "pure" are so few, any classification must perforce contain many errors due to race mixture.

Despite these shortcomings, the classification is relatively accurate, and under it a body of fairly reliable data has been gathered. The findings show, first, that the three main races are marked by different external characteristics, as shown in table 5, on page 87.

Skeletal Traits. The races are also marked by fairly distinct skeletal traits. Of these perhaps the most important are the longitudinal and the frontal-elevation shape of the head, as these determine the size of the brain enclosure and possibly the size and the development of the brain itself.



Dolichocephalic Mesocephalic Brachycephalic

$$\text{Equation: } \frac{\text{width of head} \times 100}{\text{length of head}}$$

Figure 2. Cephalic Index[12]

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[11] For the confusion which prevails in regard to classification of races see Corrado Gini, *et al.*, *Demografia* (Torino 1930) 22–29; Klineberg, *op. cit.*, 20–25; and Barzun, *op. cit.*, *passim*, esp. chap. iii. The psychological classification is particularly arbitrary and must be taken with great reservation.

[12] Edward Burnett Tylor, *Anthropology* (1881) (New York 1913) 61.

TABLE 5. PRINCIPAL EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAIN RACES[13]

TRAITS	CAUCASOIDS OR WHITES	MONGOLOIDS OR YELLOW-BROWNS	NEGROIDS OR BLACKS
Color of skin (in the living)	Essentially "white" (bluish or pinkish white, to tan, brown and even near black)	Essentially "yellow-brown" (near white, to leather yellow and all shades of brown)	Essentially "black" (yellowish brown, to various shades of brown, to full shiny black)
Color of hair	Lightest flax to golden, or red, through all shades of brown, to coal black	Dark reddish black to coal black	Coal black to greyish black
Color of eyes (iris)	Pale blue to deep blue, greenish, grey, and all grades of brown	Medium to very dark brown	Dark brown to black
Conjunctiva	Bluish white to pearly white	Yellowish white to reddish dirty yellow	Yellowish white to very reddish dirty yellow
Hair of head	Rich, long, medium to fine, straight to wavy, to curly. Cross-section oval. In males tendency to baldness (under normal conditions). Tendency, both sexes, to early greying, and greyness often extreme (pure white)	Rich, long, medium to somewhat coarse, straight to slightly wavy. Cross-section roundish. Slight tendency to baldness. Greyness but moderate and later (than in whites), and greyness generally incomplete (yellowish grey)	Bushy to scant, medium to somewhat coarse, thick curls to scattered spirals. Cross-section elliptic. None or slight tendency to baldness. Greyness but moderate and later (than in whites), and greyness generally incomplete (iron-grey or yellowish grey)
Beard	Moderate to rich and long, slightly wavy to loosely curly, grows plentifully on sides of face	Scanty to moderate, strait to slightly wavy, no beard on sides of face	Moderate to fair, loosely to closely curly, grown moderately on sides of face
Hair over body	Moderate to pronounced	None or slight	Slight to pronounced
Hair in axillae and on pubis	Moderate to pronounced	None to moderate	Moderate

[13] Based on Hrdlička, *op. cit.*, 167.

The longitudinal shape of the head is determined by what is known as the cephalic index. This measures the width of the head, multiplies it by one hundred, and divides the product by the length of the head, as shown in the figure and equation on page 86. If the result of this equation is seventy-five or less, the head is said to be dolichocephalic or long, if eighty or more, brachycephalic or broad, and if between seventy-five and eighty, it is called mesocephalic or medium-shaped.[14]

The cephalic index of both the Caucasoids and the Mongoloids ranges from moderate dolichocephaly or long head to marked brachycephaly or broad head, while that of the Negroids ranges between dolichocephaly to mesocephaly or medium and is rarely brachycephalic. The following table shows the cephalic index for living males of certain European populations.

TABLE 6. CEPHALIC INDEX OF LIVING EUROPEAN MALES [15]

Spain in general	78.2
Flemish Belgium	79.5
Bulgaria	79.8
Greece	82.2
White Russia	82.4
Italy in general	82.7
Britain	82.7
Roumania	82.9
France in general	83.6
Magyar in general	84.5
Little Russia of Kiev	84.6
Hebrew of the Caucasia	85.2

The calvarial index is also important because it may indicate the degree to which the frontal part of the brain is developed. The calvarial index is arrived at by the measurement of the upper portion of the skull, or the calvarium, as shown in figure 3.

TABLE 7. THE SKULL OF MODERN AND FOSSIL MAN
SUMMARIZED AVERAGES [16]

	CALVARIAL HEIGHT INDEX	BREGMA ANGLE	BREGMA POSITION INDEX	FRONTAL ANGLE
Modern races	59	58	31	90
Cro-Magnon race	54	57	33	..
Brünn race	49	52	..	77
Neanderthal man	42	48	35	66
Pithecanthropus	34	38	42	52
Anthropoid apes	26	30	45	..

[14] Some anthropologists suggest seventy-seven and eighty-one as more appropriate limits for dolicho- and brachycephaly, respectively. See Klineberg, *op. cit.*, 21–22.

[15] Adapted from Gini, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 303.

[16] From table in Kroeber, *op. cit.*, 32. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company.



G = Glabella, slight swelling situated between eyebrows and above root of nose.
I = Inion, most rearward point on skull.
B = Bregma, point of intersection of sutures which divide frontal from parietal bones. The bregma falls at or very near highest point of skull.
X = Point where a vertical dropped from B cuts GI.
FG = Line from glabella tangent to most protruding part of frontal bone.

The calvarial height index is calculated by dropping a line from B perpendicular to the line GI, X being the point of intersection. The ratio of BX to GI indicates the relative highness or lowness of the vault of the brain case. The bregma position index indicates the location of the bregma. On a high, nearly vertical forehead, the bregma is located foreward, and the length of the line GX shortens; whereas on a retreating forehead, the bregma is relatively rearward, lengthening the GX portion of the GI line. A line GF drawn from the glabella tangent to the most protruding part of the frontal bone with the line GI forms the "frontal angle" FGI indicating the amount of recession of the forehead.[17]

FIGURE 3. CALVARIAL INDEX

Stature, size, nasal depression, the shape of the face, the shape of the eyeball, the height and width of the nose, the protrusion of the cheek and jaw bones (prognathism), the thickness of lips, the prominence of the chin—are the main features used for classificatory purposes. The main skeletal differences marking the three principal races are shown in the table on page 90.

Mental Characteristics. The races are also said to have different mental characteristics. Here, however, we enter a field still rife with sheer speculation. That there are differences in nervous stability, vivacity, the degree of ambition, the depth of the passions, seems to be true; but the measurement of these is exceedingly difficult, while it is at present impossible to determine the extent to which the differences are due to genetic or to environmental conditions. It follows that practically no reliable information on the

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[17] Abstracted from A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 30–33. Figure from same source by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company.

TABLE 8. SKELETAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MAIN RACES [18]

TRAITS	CAUCASOIDS OR WHITES	MONGOLOIDS OR YELLOW-BROWNS	NEGROIDS OR BLACKS
Stature	Moderate to tall (no pygmies)	Short to tall (occasional approach to pygmies)	Very short to very tall (pygmies)
Head (and skull) cephalic index	Moderate dolichocephaly to marked brachycephaly	Moderate dolichocephaly to marked brachycephaly	Pronounced dolichocephaly to mesocephaly, rarely brachycephaly
Shape (aside of cephalic index)	Great variation	Considerable variation	Form characteristic, variation limited
Size (relative to stature)	Small to very large	Small to large (in many groups somewhat smaller than in Whites)	Small to moderate (smaller than in Whites)
Forehead	Medium to high	Low to above medium	Low to medium
Frontal eminences	Generally double, lateral	Generally double, lateral, but mostly less marked than in Whites	Generally singles, median (especially marked in children)
Nasion depression (in males)	None to deep, mostly well defined	Shallow to medium, now and then ill-defined	Submedium to deep "line" depression
Eyes: Fissures	Horizontal to slightly oblique	Slightly to markedly oblique	Horizontal to somewhat oblique
Eyes: Visible part of eyeballs	Oblong, more or less spindle-shaped	Oblong, spindle- to almond-shaped	More rounded (than in Whites or Yellow-browns)
Nose: Height (prominence of bridge)	Medium to high	Submedium to above medium	Low to submedium
Nose: Breadth	Medium to narrow	Medium	Broad
Facial prognathism	None	None to slight	Slight to very marked
Lips	Medium to thin	Medium to slightly above	Thick to very thick and more or less everted
Teeth	Small to medium	Medium to large	Medium to large
Chin	Moderate to prominent	Medium	Medium to subdued

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[18] Hrdlička, *op. cit.*, 167–168. By permission of Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. [Title mine.]

Table 9. Mental Characteristics of the Main Races[19]
(To be taken with very great reservation, until more scientifically determined)

Caucasoids or Whites	Mongoloids or Yellow-Browns	Negroids or Blacks
Nervous as well as physical vivacity; temperamental	Mostly less vivacious and temperamental	Active and jolly, rather than nervously vivacious; not very temperamental
Strong ambitions and passions; idealism highly developed	Ambitiousness less developed; emotions and passions less apparent, even when strong; idealism in general moderate to good	Not very ambitious; emotions and passions strong but less rational; idealism rather weak
Love all amusements; love of sport, exploration, and adventure	Love of sport, less so of exploration and adventure	Love of amusement and sport strong, of exploration weak, of adventure moderate
Artistic	Artistic	Artistic qualities above moderate in few lines only, mainly in pictorial, decorative, and industrial
Music highly developed	Music subdeveloped	Music ability well represented, but not of high intellectual order
Poetry highly developed	Poetry subdeveloped	Poetry of lower order
Egoism and individuality strong	Egoism and individuality less pronounced	Egoism and individuality not strong
Subject to cares and worries	Less, in general, subject to cares and worries	Rather careless and free from lasting worries, but ridden by superstitious fears
Industrious	Very industrious	Not very or steadily industrious
Religious life highly varied and developed	Less varied or intense	Little variety or development
Much subject to psychosis and other brain affections	Moderately subject to psychosis and brain affections	Moderately subject to psychosis

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[19] Hrdlička, *op. cit.*, 169–170. By permission of Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. [Title mine.]

matter exists. Therefore, the table on page 91, listing the mental characteristics of the races, is to be taken not only with reservation, but with *a great deal of reservation.* It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the classification contains so much subjective evaluation and therefore so great a possible margin of error that the very presentation of the table is scientifically hazardous. And yet, it will be observed that Professor Hrdlička has objectified most of these items listed to a considerable degree, so that his table may be used as a working hypothesis in further investigation.

III. SUBDIVISIONS OF THE WHITE RACE

Caucasoid Subraces. The differences mentioned above apply to the three major races, namely the Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. The subdivisions of the Mongoloid and the Negroid need not occupy our attention because this study is concerned with Western culture. An examination of the racial characteristics of the subraces of the Caucasoids or the White race is important because the "race problem" affects the relations of the White subraces to such an extent as to constitute one of the principal cultural phenomena of our times.

The Caucasoids or the Whites are ordinarily divided into five principal subraces, the Hamitic, Semitic, Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic. The Hamitic subrace, represented chiefly by the ancient Egyptians, is believed to have originated in Africa and to have been cognate to the Semites. In our times it is represented by the Berbers, Somali, Ethiopians, and many modern Egyptians.

The Semites, represented mainly by the Arabs and the Hebrews, are probably the oldest extant subrace. The Arabs are estimated to number 5,000,000 or more, and, as their name indicates, are located mainly in Arabia. The Hebrews number between fifteen and seventeen millions. As a result of the Diaspora they are scattered over the entire world, but are located chiefly in Europe and North America; in the United States alone they are estimated to number 3,500,000 to 4,000,000. They constitute an important element in Western culture; it is not impossible that the Hebrews have contributed more to Western culture than any other race or subrace.

The Mediterraneans are the next oldest extant subrace. They appear to have been well formed as a subrace in ancient times; they constituted a main element in the culture of ancient Greece and Rome and ultimately settled along the shores of various seas

TABLE 10. CHARACTERISTICS OF CAUCASOID SUBRACES[20]
(To be taken with reservations, until more scientifically determined)

RACE	HAMITIC [a]	SEMITES	MEDITERRANEAN	ALPINE	NORDIC
History	Practically extinct	Probably oldest	Probably next oldest	Last to appear in Europe (in Eastern France) 2500 B.C.	Origin unknown
Stature	Medium to high	Medium 63¾–65¼ inches	Medium, average 63–64 inches	Medium to tall average 64–67 inches	Tall, average 68 inches
Body			Slender	Strong, stocky	Strong, rugged
Head shape	Medium to long Cephalic index, 75	Long, Cephalic index 75–79	Long, Cephalic index 72–75	Broad, Cephalic index 85–87	Long, Cephalic index 76–79
Face	Long, oval	Elliptical	Long, often oval	Broad and round to long and oval	Long
Prognathism	None	Medium			Prominent chin
Nose	Well shaped, prominent, long, and moderately broad to narrow	Straight or convex-prominent	Straight and long, but fairly broad	Prominent, long, fairly broad to narrow; may be concave, straight or aquiline	Usually straight and narrow
Complexion	Olive to dark brown	Olive	Tawny-white	Sallow, or tawny, and rosy white or bronzed	Clear, fair, or ruddy
Hair	Wavy to curly; dark brown to black	Black, smooth	Wavy to curly; dark brown to black	Wavy or curly; abundant, light to dark brown or black	Wavy to curly; blond to light brown or reddish
Eyes	Dark	Dark brown to black	Dark brown to black	Hazel-grey to dark brown; occasionally light blue	Blue or grey

[a] Term refers to language. Characters of Hamitic peoples as here given are hypothetical, as no comprehensive findings are available regarding them.

[20] Based mainly on data in Haddon, *op. cit.*, 22–30 and other sources.

in Europe. At present they are represented by the Greeks, the Italians, and by elements of the French, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the Irish, and the Welsh. They are located, as their names indicate, mainly along the littorals of Europe. They are also found in considerable numbers in the Americas, particularly in South America, where they have migrated during the last two centuries.

The Alpines, next to the Mediterraneans in age, are found, as their name indicates, along the main mountain dorsos of Europe; specifically in the Balkan peninsula, in France, some parts of Germany, and in Great Britain. The Alpines include the Poles and the Russians. A comparatively small number of them are found outside of these regions.

The Nordics are of unknown origin and seem to have been the latest to form as a subrace. They are found mainly in the Scandinavian countries, the northern parts of Germany, Great Britain, parts of Ireland, and in North America, where they probably outnumber all other European racial groups.

Traits Marking White Subraces. The main known characteristics of these subraces are set forth in table 10 above. These, however, must be taken with reservations as great if not greater than those applied to the mother races. That there are striking differences between Greeks and French, Italians and Scandinavians goes without saying, but these are markedly if not wholly cultural traits; the characteristics attributed to these peoples as races are highly hypothetical. All these subraces—with the exception of the Arabic segment of the Semitic, which has remained strikingly segregated—have so greatly intermingled with other parent and daughter races that it is virtually impossible to isolate any appreciable number of them for the purpose of trait measurement. All the subraces, therefore, particularly the Mediterranean and to a lesser extent the Alpine and the Nordic, have also so greatly intermingled that the table on page 93 can be considered only as a distant approximation to what seems to be the facts, and can be used principally as an hypothesis to be tested rather than as proof of fact.

IV. RACIAL SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES

These then are the generally accepted racial and subracial divisions of mankind and the principal characteristics attributed to them. It is a striking fact that anthropological, psychological, and other findings almost invariably stress the differences and almost wholly ignore the similarities which mark the races and the profound significance of these. This may be because similarities are obvious; but their significance is not so apparent.

Nature of Racial Similarities. It is a matter of general knowledge that underlying the physical and external characteristics which differentiate the races and subraces, there are basal, internal, organic, and functional similarities which are common to all humankind. That is, the races are similar if not identical in their reproductive, respiratory, cardiac, alimentary, and other systems; they reproduce their kind and maintain life; they see, hear, smell, taste, touch, breathe, live, and die in an identical manner. Shakespeare (though confusing the elements), with that intuitive penetration which often leads the poet to arrive at generalizations it takes science scores of years to reach, apparently perceived this fact.

Shylock cried out in anger:

> I am a Jew! Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is? if you prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? [21]

More specifically, miscibility points to the essential oneness of the human race. That is, all human races, both the major stems and substems, can mix and produce fecund offspring, capable in turn of reproducing themselves indefinitely; ". . . barring cases due to purely individual causes, there are no instances of sterility, weakness of the offspring, or eventual extinction of the mixed bloods." [22] Further, the races are similar in that they all present wide variations within each major stem and substem. There is no "true type" for any race. The overlapping between races is such that it is impossible to determine to which race this or the other specimen belongs or that the limits of achievement differ with different races, or that the median of one race is higher than that of another, or that "superior races" have produced exceptional men and women. There is little or no scientific evidence supporting the theory of innate differences between the races.[23]

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[21] William Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice,* act iii, scene i.

[22] Hrdlička, *op. cit.*, 176.

The differences between the extremes within any one race seem to be as great if not greater than the differences represented by the mean or the average of any two racial or subracial groups. The differences, for example, between the darkest and the lightest, the shortest and the tallest, the most intelligent and the imbecile within any one race, are greater than the difference between the average pigmentation, height, and intelligence of any two races or subraces. In addition, there is so much gradation, as in pigmentation, that marked differences can be seen only in the extremes.

Taking all the elements into consideration, it would seem safe to conclude that: (1) for every characteristic which differentiates the races from one another there are at least several characteristics which are common to them all; (2) that the similarities are probably more numerous, marked, and certainly more profound than the dissimilarities; and (3) that, therefore, the similarities more or less completely cancel the dissimilarities.

Racial "Superiority." Although there is no such a thing as racial superiority or inferiority but only racial differences, and though these differences do not necessarily make one race superior to another, people usually claim "superiority" for the race to which they belong or believe to belong. It may be that every people is forced by nature to believe itself superior in order to bolster up its spirit and psychologically to survive. "The argument of race in cultural conflicts is always self-praise"; it is but an attempt to raise one's race above that of others, at the expense of others.[24]

The only possible objective criterion for superiority is that of survival. That is, given a specific set of physiconatural, bionatural, and cultural conditions and given two or more races as more or less equally under the influence of those conditions, that race may be deemed "superior" which by adaptation and adjustment masters the conditions and survives. By that criterion all the extant races are "superior" by the very fact that they have survived. But survival does not necessarily mean that those who survive are the "superior"; it simply means that those who survive are able, either through original capacity or fortuitous circumstances, to accommodate themselves to the environment.[25] The extinct Cro-Magnons, with their tall stature, broad, high foreheads, large brains, ruggedness, and attractive appearance seem to have been equal if not superior to any race that has survived.[26] All in all, then, we can correctly speak of biological differences and degrees of adaptation and adjustment, but not of inferiority or superiority.

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[23] See J. B. S. Haldane, "Human genetics and human ideals" in Sir James Jeans, *et al.*, *Scientific progress* (New York 1936) 166–170.

[24] J. Huizinga, *In the shadow of tomorrow* (New York 1936) 87.

V. RACE CONTACT AND ITS IMMEDIATE RESULTS

Location and Numerical Strength of Races. Whatever the racial differences, the fact of importance is that they do produce notable effects. The races are located in certain territories which they claim as their own; there they have developed peculiar cultures which they associate with race; and they resist the incoming of other ethnic groups, as the Romans resisted the invasion of the Huns or as the people of Spain resisted the incoming of the Moors.

The three major races have settled in definite regions: the Caucasoids chiefly in Europe, Asia, and the Americas; the Mongoloids principally in eastern Asia, the Malay archipelago, and the Americas; and the Negroids chiefly in Africa and Australia. These races appear to have been in these regions for thousands of years, more or less separated from each other and developing their peculiar cultures. At present it is estimated that the Caucasoid constitutes approximately 50.5 per cent of the total population of the world, the Mongoloid and hybrids 39.3 per cent, the Negroid 6.4 per cent, and other groups 3.9 per cent.

TABLE 11. POPULATION OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO PIGMENTATION [27]

GROUP	MILLION	PER CENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE WORLD
White	920	50.5
Mongolian	615	33.8
Malayan	60	3.3
Indian and Mestizo of America	40	2.2
Negro	116	6.4
Other groups	70	3.9

Contact of Races and Amalgamation. We often speak of the contact and conflict of races as if whole races met *en masse*. Actually only comparatively few persons ever contact, as a result of territorial proximity, migration, invasion, commerce, and colonial expansion. Perhaps the races have come into relationships with each other at a greater rate in the habitat of the Caucasoids than anywhere else: all over Europe there are evidences of the presence of non-Caucasoid blood.

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[25] See glossary; also chap. 5 above, subchap. iii on "Intelligence and human society." For qualifications see Alfred Marston Tozzer, *Social origins and social continuities* (New York 1925); and Haldane, *op. cit.*, 166 ff.

[26] See A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 27–28.

[27] Gini, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 305.

Yet individuals in sufficient numbers do meet to produce amalgamation on a relatively large scale. Amalgamation, the biological fusion of previously distinct or nearly distinct racial strains, almost inevitably follows; and by cross-breeding, isolation, and selective adaptation, they gradually develop, over several generations, a stock possessing new distinctive traits, that is, a nascent race.[28] Whenever, wherever, and under whatever circumstances they meet, they produce some degree of fusion. From prehistoric time to the present, members of the most diverse races have interbred. Most historical peoples have had an intermixture of blood; nearly all contemporary ethnic groups are mixtures. The Italians, for example, are made up of twenty different racial strains, the French of thirteen, the Spanish of six, and the British of at least three. Even in our times cross-races are being formed; for example, the mulatto of the United States, South America, and South Africa, or the Mestizo of Mexico.[29]

Precisely what are the biological effects of race mixture, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in the light of present scientific knowledge. The multiplicity and complexity of race characters and the extensive hybridity of modern races are such, and the scientific data are as yet so fragmentary and inconclusive, that it is impossible to draw sound conclusions. Both the Darwinian belief that crossing leads to increased vitality and fertility and the opposed view that intermixture produces sterility and racial degeneration rest upon fragmentary evidence and appear to be scientifically unsound.[30]

All in all the biological results of crossing appear to be in accord with genetic principles. That is, crossing produces a marked tendency toward blending; the hybrid in general represents approximately an intermediate type; the hybrid is fertile with no tendency toward extinction; and the quality of the hybrid depends not on the fact of crossing but on the quality of the individuals who cross. In other words, neither inbreeding nor outbreeding is in itself either advantageous or deleterious. If there are recessive characters, inbreeding increases the chance that they will be preserved, if not intensified. But possible disharmonious combinations may be balanced by the vigor of the hybrid and by the mixtures.[31]

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[28] See E. B. Reuter, "Amalgamation" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 16–17.

[29] See Hrdlička, *op. cit.*, 177–178; Tozzer, *op. cit.*, 10–12; William Z. Ripley, *Races of Europe* (New York 1899) *passim;* and Klineberg, *op. cit.*, 24–25.

[30] See Reuter, *op. cit.*, 16–17; Charles B. Davenport, "Mingling of races" in Edmund V. Cowdry (ed.), *Human biology and racial welfare* (New York 1930) 564–565; and Klineberg, *op. cit.*, 211–224.

There are those who hold, however, that racial crossing is not desirable. Though evidence is not complete, it seems that when different animal varieties are crossed, the first cross is generally very vigorous, and little or no harm results if it is repeatedly crossed into one or another race. If hybrids are bred together, however, the progeny is often less vigorous than either of the original races or than the first generation of hybrids. The Cape colored people of South Africa, who are the product of races now mixing, are less healthy than either the whites or the Bantu Negroes. Hence it is possible, if not probable, that crossing may in subsequent generations produce something worse than either of the two crossing races.[32]

Mental and Social Consequences. The tendency seems to be for "mixed" offspring to show improvement mentally over the retarded branch, but only occasionally do the offspring reach the achievement of the more gifted race.[33] This is probably due to the fact that ordinarily it is persons of lower mentality who tend to intermarry. Also prejudice against intermarriage is so great in most societies that the hybrid has little or no opportunity to achieve.

The social consequences of race mixture are also fairly clear. The hybrid race may be, often is, identified with either parent race, or it may form an intermediate caste; adjustment depends on the race and caste prejudices of the dominant race. The hybrid may occupy a strategic position and act as buffer between racial extremes, a cultural mediator and interpreter. But often the hybrid remains culturally stranded, not fully accepted by either race, and subjected to cultural conflict. In this much depends on the dominant culture. There have been races that have lived side by side fairly peaceably.[34]

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[31] See Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (New York 1935) 111–120, 176.

[32] See Haldane, *op. cit.*, 172.

[33] Hrdlička, *op. cit* , 176–177.

[34] See N. S. Shaler, *The neighbor* (Boston 1904) *passim.*

VI. MODERN RACE CONFLICTS

Societal Consequences. Race contact also produces societal phenomena of great importance, especially in modern Western culture. Habituation to geographic environment and to culture produces in people a sense of attachment to particular characteristics—to color of skin and hair, shape and color of eyes, and to other features—and therefore to lead to a certain amount of fellow-feeling among those possessing the same traits and to distance if not antipathy between those possessing different traits. People who look alike also use the same basic foods, carry like bodily odors, employ the same language, usages, and basically have the same religion. The result is that when members of the same racial group come together they tend to react more favorably toward one another, to "feel more at home," than when they encounter members of some other race. Thus race, plus culture, does bind people together and give them a "consciousness of kind."

Importance of External Dissimilarities. In this process, it is the external dissimilarities and not the deeper similarities that are significant. The differences, which are obvious to the senses, seem to be the prime sources of unfavorable and antagonistic reactions. The similarities, biologically more significant though they are, have virtually no importance in associated living; the dissimilarities, superficial though they are, cause divisiveness and prejudicial activity between races. In America, for example, the chief obstacles to assimilation are the external physical characteristics; the Negro, though acquiring the language, the usages, and the religion of the dominant race, has not been fully incorporated, even after three hundred years in America—chiefly because of his black skin.[35]

However, race prejudice merely attaches itself to biological differences and does not originate in them. "The real bases of prejudice . . . are not biological but social and cultural. Prejudice rests upon the formation of attitudes and habits. . . . Prejudice is found only where there is a customary group-accepted set of stereotypes or ideas and emotions about another group thought of as a unit. The individual member of the other group is always seen through the veil of the group-stereotype." [36]

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[35] See Robert E. Park, "Assimilation, social" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 282.

[36] Kimball Young, "Social psychology of Oriental-Occidental prejudices" in *Pacific affairs*, 2 (1929) 773.

Race as Political Material. Race contact does not *per se* produce any profound results. People left to live their own lives ordinarily get along well, even though they differ racially. Race becomes significant when used for political purposes. As such it has become one of the great superstitions of our times. It has been used by the Nazi régime in its persecution of the Jews; it has recently made its appearance in Italy; while in the United States it has for decades been used by politicians to foment a tension with Japan which may truly result in "grave consequences." It is not the people that produce tensions, persecutions, or the affronting of other racial groups; neither the "superior" nor the "inferior" people seek trouble; left to themselves they live peaceably side by side. It is when used for political purposes that any race becomes a "danger spot" on the culture map of the world.[37]

VII. CONCLUSION

All in all race is a factor of prime significance in the modern world. Whatever may have been the origin of the races, whatever the factors which produced them or the subraces, the fact is that they are now marked by striking differences which, interpreted as "superiority" and "inferiority" and coupled with culture, give rise to widespread cohesiveness on the part of those who are alike and to divisiveness between those who are unlike; these, though of little influence in themselves, are seized upon and used by various groups, and often produce far-reaching disturbances.

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[37] See Barzun, *op. cit.;* Huizinga, *op. cit.*, 83–89; and Constantine Panunzio, *Immigration crossroads* (New York 1927) *passim.*

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Chapter 7

CULTURE

I. NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CULTURE

Meaning of Term. Up to this point we have considered the ways in which physical and biological nature creates, contributes to, and conditions associated living. We now turn to culture. The term "culture" is frequently used to designate achievement or refinement, as when we speak of persons who are self-disciplined, well-mannered, and well-poised as "cultured." This is not the sense in which the term is employed here. It is used in its descriptive sense, to denote the complex whole of concepts and usages, organizations, skills, and instruments by which man collectively copes with his environment in the satisfaction of his basic needs.[1]

Culture a Superorganic Order. Culture differs from the orders previously considered in that it is man-made. Whereas physical and biological resources are wholly nonhuman in origin and content, form and manifestation, culture is man's own creation; he originates it, develops, accumulates, transmits, and changes it. Culture is based on inorganic and biological resources and forces, but it transcends all these. It is a superorganic order, a system of man's own devising.[2]

A Spontaneous Order. But though culture is man's own creation, it must not be thought of as the result of a preconceived plan. Man's mind is one of the principal creative agents in culture formation but not in the manner in which an architect's mind is at work when he conceives and executes the plan of a building. Culture results from the spontaneous accumulation of man's collective experience in dealing with nature and his fellow men; it forms automatically; it is the result of trial and error and other experience. Mankind did not convene in the distant past and after due deliberation adopt a plan and procedure and set out to build up culture; rather it has given itself to the labor of the day, trying now this and now that procedure, automatically adopting whatever seemed most useful at the moment; and in the continuity of functioning, it has accumulated, systematized, and passed on the totality of concepts, modes, and instruments which constitute culture.

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[1] For various technical definitions of culture see Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (Boston 1932) chap. xv.

[2] See Charles A. Ellwood, *Cultural evolution* (New York 1927) 70; Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 398–399. Some students find aspects of culture among migratory animals. See Walter Heape, *Emigration, migration and nomadism* (Cambridge, England 1931) 28–74, 335. Other students maintain that animals have no culture whatever. See Carl J. Warden, *Emergence of human culture* (New York 1936) chap. ii.

A Dynamic Order. Culture is a living, not a fixed or static entity. Culture, like physical and biological nature, is often referred to as environment, as if it were something merely enveloping man. In reality, culture is a living, dynamic entity, constantly in process of formation, always shaping man's actions and being reshaped by man, now more and now less active, but always and everywhere dynamic. Culture is always in flux; new items are being constantly created, developed, or diffused; other items are falling into disuse.

Culture a System of Patterns. Again, culture is essentially a system of patterns, modes, or types. For purposes of analysis culture is usually described as having two main aspects, the material and the nonmaterial. The material aspect is said to include such items as food, clothing, buildings, tools, and other articles; the nonmaterial includes bodies of concepts, beliefs, ideals, loyalties and venerations, proverbs and aphorisms, knowledge, philosophy and ethics, systems of usages, folkways and mores, laws, manners and etiquette, canons of conventionality, rituals and symbolic acts, and associations.[3] Basically, however, culture is wholly nonmaterial.[4] Both in its material and its nonmaterial aspect, culture consists of types rather than of specific items.[5]

In its material aspects, what constitutes the essential element of culture is not the actual food a people uses, the tools it employs, the buildings it erects, or the power it uses, but rather the patterns or types into which these fall and the knowledge of how to make and use the material things. The food may be chiefly vegetarian or of the animal-flesh type; the tools may be made of stone, bronze, or steel; the buildings Romanesque, Gothic, or Baroque; the power used may be mainly animal or human, or it may be produced by flowing nature, or by such substances as wood, coal, or oil. So we speak of the maize culture, the Old Stone Age, of Romanesque and Gothic periods in architecture, or of the steam or the electrical age. It is the type that matters. The articles themselves are made and destroyed, crumble or decay; but their type or style is passed on. For example, probably millions of Roman arches have been built, crumbled, or been destroyed since the first Roman arches were built at the turn of our era, but the Roman arch as a style or type has remained to this day part of Western culture.

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[3] See Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive culture*, i (3d ed. New York 1889) 1; Mark Sullivan, *Our times*, ii (New York 1927) 1; and Alexander A. Goldenweiser, *Early civilization* (New York 1922) 15.

[4] See Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 621–645.

[5] This concept of culture is as old as Plato; see *Dialogues*, ii (trans. by B. Jowett, New York 1897) 426–427.

The same holds true of the nonmaterial aspects of culture. It is not a given religious body that constitutes the essential element of culture but the type of belief it follows, whether it is animistic or spiritualistic, polytheistic or monotheistic; it is not the actual ownership of a piece of land but rather the type, whether communal or private; it is not a given state, but the kind of government, whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic; it is not the particular school, college, or university, but rather the prevailing type of education, whether private or public, coeducational or otherwise, compulsory or voluntary, free or paid for.

Culture an Objective Entity. Yet culture is an objective entity. Culture is often defined, in the words of Professor Tylor, as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." [6] The use of the terms "capabilities" and "habits," however, is unfortunate. Man's capacities are endowments of nature; they are factors in culture formation but not in themselves part of culture. Likewise, habits are individual modes of action which may or may not be part of culture. Culture is a complex of patterns, modes, or types as they prevail in a given time and place.[7]

Culture a Utilitarian Order. Moreover, all culture, both in its material and nonmaterial aspects, is basically utilitarian. Some authors class the material aspects of culture as utilitarian and the nonmaterial as nonutilitarian. This position does not seem tenable. The religious and educational systems, for example, are nonmaterial, and yet they certainly are no less useful than man's tools, clothing, and buildings. Religion, education, and recreation may be less immediately useful than an automobile or a typewriter, but they have profound utility. Two authors, for example, in discussing the professions, state, "The functions remaining to the Church are spiritual, and we are only concerned with the professions in their relation to the ordinary business of life," [8] as if the "spiritual" did not constitute, for millions, a part, and a very important part, of "the ordinary business of life."

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[6] Tylor, *op. cit.*, i, 1.

[7] See Malinowski, *op. cit.*, 621–645.

Culture Cumulative and Self-Perpetuating. Finally, culture is a cumulative and self-perpetuating order. Though culture traits may arise in the remotest corner of the world, by diffusion or through convergence they become the common heritage of mankind and accumulate. All the essential elements are perpetuated. Controlled fire, domesticated animals and plants, agriculture, the handicraft and manufacturing systems, to mention only illustrative items, have originated in different times and places, but they have become the common heritage, available in differing degrees to all peoples, and permanent items in culture. The totality of culture is an accumulation which is passed on from generation to generation, place to place, people to people.

Summary Definition. In summary we may say, then, that culture is a man-made or superorganic order, self-generating and dynamic in its operation, a pattern-creating order, objective, humanly useful, cumulative, and self-perpetuating. It is the complex whole of the systems of concepts and usages, organizations, skills, and instruments by means of which mankind deals with physical, biological, and human nature in the satisfaction of its needs.

II. GENESIS OF CULTURE

Originating Factors. The factors which create this superorganic order inhere in man's peculiar physical, physiological, and mental qualities described in the foregoing chapters. Man's erect posture and the freedom of his hands, his prolonged immaturity, his longevity, his "gregariousness," his articulate speech, his ability to reflect and remember, to experiment, discover, and invent, are all at work in culture building. More specifically, culture arises from man's effort to control and put to use the physical, biological, and mental resources provided by nature. Thus the economic institution arises from man's effort to control physical nature and secure physical

[8] A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The professions* (Oxford 1933) 3; see also R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 225–226.

sustenance; marriage and the family arise from man's systemization of the sex and reproductive activities.

Generality of Culture Creation. Whether culture arises in one place and among one people and thence spreads to other regions and peoples, or whether it arises simultaneously and independently in two or more places and among different peoples, authoritative opinions differ. Did the domestication of fire, of animals, and plants, did the systems of slavery, communal or private property, arise in one place and among one people and then spread to other regions and peoples, or did they appear among various peoples and in different regions more or less independently and simultaneously? These questions are of far-reaching human significance, for if culture items have single, more or less accidental origins, it follows that some people are inevitably doomed to dependence on others; whereas if man produces culture wherever he lives or whatever his race or kind, then his lot is creative.

Three principal theories are advanced in answer to these questions: diffusionism, parallelism, and the convergence theory.[9] Diffusionism holds that culture arose in one center and that from that center, by means of migration, travel, trade, and war, and through the process of imitation, it spread to other peoples and places. There is some evidence in support of this theory. For example, the power machine and industrialism were invented in western Europe and from there spread to other regions.

Parallelism maintains that culture had (and has) many independent origins. The practice of circumcision, for example, originated independently in many parts of the world: it was an ancient custom of the Egyptians, the Arabs, the Hebrews, and the Aztecs. The same can be said of other items. Since the basic elements in physical and human nature are identical, the forces at work the same, concurrent evolution uniform, it follows, according to this theory, that all peoples, in different places, must have produced some culture. In fact, similar inventions and discoveries have occurred in widely separated parts of the world, among unconnected peoples.[10] If this has occurred in the historical period, it is reasonable, parallelism contends, to posit that a similar process went on in prehistoric times.

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[9] See Hankins, *op. cit.*, 402–412; James Melvin Reinhardt and G. R. Davies, *Principles and methods of sociology* (New York 1932) 430–432; William O. Brown, "Man and his culture" in George A. Hedger (ed.), *Introduction to Western civilization* (New York 1933) 58–61; and A. L. Kroeber, "Diffusionism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 139–142.

[10] See William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) 90–102; also Bernhard J. Stern, *Social factors in medical progress* (New York 1927) 111–127.

The convergence theory asserts that both diffusionism and parallelism contain valid elements which combined offer a sounder explanation of the origin and development of culture than that offered by either of them. Parallelism explains likenesses in culture but it does not adequately account for the presence of striking differences side by side with the similarities; likenesses and differences arise, not from parallel or diffusional development, but from the partial adoption and later divergent modification of culture according to the culture already prevailing in a given place and time and among a given people. "Every cultural achievement is due to a process or growth in which diffusion and invention have equal shares. As independent entities, neither invention nor diffusion ever takes place in the sense that you could either spontaneously generate an idea or pour it out from one head into another. Diffusion and invention are always mixed, always inseparable." [11] The presence of similarities and dissimilarities at the same time and place are the result of the culture background and the stage of cultural development. Thus culture is itself the most important factor in its own development within a given area. It makes semi-independent discoveries and inventions, sends forth shoots into other areas, and adapts to its own uses items emanating from other sources. According to the degree of its own development, it molds and remolds elements from all sources.

Culture diffuses naturally and by organized means. Natural transmission occurs through random migration, borrowing or imitation, as when one group sees what another does and both consciously and unconsciously imitates it.[12] Organized transmission takes place by such means as trade, colonization, proselytism, war, and conquest. These organized conveyors may not necessarily be aware of the diffusion they are producing, but the diffusion does take place anyway.

Culture and Race. Attempts have been made to correlate culture with race, but race has little or no bearing on culture. At least two of the three mother races, the Caucasoid and the Mongoloid, have developed profound cultures; while varying degrees of culture are found among the Negroid.[13] Attempts to correlate culture and race ordinarily ignore the factor of environment, the second of the two variants of which culture seems to be the result. In any event, the problem of the relation between race and culture still remains to be solved.[14]

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[11] Bronislaw Malinowski, "Life of culture" in G. Elliott Smith, *et al.*, *Culture* (New York 1927) 30. By permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

[12] See Clark Wissler, *Man and culture* (New York 1923) 128–129, 159–180, 189, 205–210.

III. CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF CULTURE

Culture Traits and Trait Complexes. The basic elements of culture are known as culture traits. Culture traits are either material or nonmaterial. Monogamic marriage, mechanized industry, private property, and monotheism are examples of culture traits in contemporary Western culture. Culture traits seldom, if ever, appear or operate singly. In each culture there are some traits which are fundamental and more or less give rise to or are at least interrelated with other traits. The former may be termed master traits and the latter derivative. Science, for example, is a master trait in modern Western culture; the machine and mechanized industry, widespread communication, economic interdependence, and mechanized warfare are derivative traits. The automobile, itself a derivative trait, is interrelated to other subtraits, such as hard-surfaced roads, gasoline industry and stations, and traffic squads. The totality of such clusters of traits, both master and derivative, is known as the trait complex or the culture complex.

Spatial Arrangement of Culture. A geographic region in which a culture complex prevails is known as a culture area. Within such a culture area there is a center or several centers where the master trait either originated or, if imported from some other region, is most deeply at work. This center is called the culture focus or culture center. At the culture center the master trait becomes deeply rooted and greatly elaborated; into it flow the major influences and products of the culture; out of it radiate the great forces. Thus England and the United States, and more particularly London and New York, may be called the master culture foci of the contemporary commercial system. Out of them radiate the deeper influences of the commercial order, in them concentrate the organizations of that order, and into them pour the monetary and other fruits from the four corners of the Western culture area.[15]

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[13] Alfred Marston Tozzer, *Social origins and social continuities* (New York 1925) 40–42.

[14] See Wissler, *op. cit.*, chap. xiii.

[15] See chap. 9 below.

Spreading from the culture foci are what may be called the culture gradation areas, in which the trait complex is at work but to a lesser and lesser degree. The machine complex is at work in the rural district, but not to the extent to which it is in the larger centers of population; it is less at work in the remote or frontier regions, and so on until the marginal area is reached. These marginal areas are important because ordinarily it is in them that new cultural elements often first take root, as in the case of the rooting of science in far-off England in the thirteenth century. Also it is in marginal areas that two or more cultures fuse, often to such an extent as to be indistinguishable from one another. In fact, marginal regions, such as Russia or the Rhine region, are almost like separate culture areas.

A given culture complex, moreover, may be more intensively at work in an area other than the one in which it originated. For example, the science or the machine complex is more intensively active in the New World, perhaps because it *is* a new world, than in the Old World where the complex originated. Again, while gradation and marginal areas are as a rule geographically distant from the foci, they may be in proximity to a culture focus. Not far from, or even in the very heart of, a focus in which the science complex is deeply rooted are localities in which science is scarcely present at all. For example, there are localities close to New York or Boston in which the principal complex is scarcely at work at all.

Spatially, then, a culture contains culture areas, foci or centers, gradation and marginal areas, in which the culture complex operates in varying degrees of intensity.

IV. CULTURE VARIATION

Geography, Race, and Culture Variations. Thus within the larger culture areas marked variations are encountered; and trait complexes are seldom, perhaps never, identical throughout the area. Differences in ideas, language, economic life, education, religion, and political systems are found everywhere.

Precisely what produces these variations we cannot say. In the past it was believed that geography was principally responsible.[16] It is a matter of common knowledge, however, that the same culture often arises and thrives in different geographic conditions, while the same physical setting often harbors different subcultures. Race, likewise, was once thought to be the determinant; but this theory, too, is now rejected. Not all the people of a given race produce or adhere to the same culture, while the most diverse of racial groups will have the same culture. This is the case with contemporary Latin culture. It is dominant among the Mediterraneans in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, among the Mestizos of Mexico, and among the mixed races of South America. In the United States the Negroes have all the essential elements of "American" culture. Geographical and racial determinism, therefore, must be rejected.[17]

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[16] See Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and climate* (3d ed. New Haven 1924) *passim*, and *Character of races* (New York 1924) *passim*.

Variations Due to New Complexes. Variations seem to occur, first, as a result of the appearance of new trait complexes. For example, when primitive nomadism gave way to pastoralism, or pastoralism to agriculture, there naturally developed areas in which the main complexes differed from those prevailing in the areas of the previously established culture. New trait complexes seem everywhere to be applied more quickly and decisively in a region in which a previously established complex is not deeply rooted. It follows that new regions are marked by sharp differences from the older areas. For example, the United States has adopted steel construction much more rapidly than Europe, in part because there were not many buildings to be torn down; whereas in Europe existing stone buildings could not readily be torn down and replaced by steel-frame construction. Thus newer culture areas generally have configurations markedly different from those of older areas.

Variations Due to Internal Elaboration. Variations seem also to result from internal elaboration. Geographic conditions, the appearance of a new people, population concentration, or other conditions produce a greater elaboration of complexes in some regions than in others. Thus early agriculture seems to have developed further in the Nile-Euphrates-Tigris region because of the great concentration of population and the evenness of the climate in that region.

Variations Due to Historical or Other Accident. Variations in culture arise, further, from historical accident, as in the case of the somewhat accidental migration of Christianity into the West. Or they may result from the presence in greater amounts of certain natural resources in some regions than in others, as with mineral deposits in western Europe. Variations may occur as the result of some great invention, such as science which stamps the West with features sharply different from those of the East.

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[17] See Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories* (New York 1928) chap. iii, especially 106–129, 175–193, and 222–233.

Differing Cultures. As a result of some or all of these factors cultures seem to have differed from each other throughout their history. The cultures of Egypt, Palestine, Greece, and Rome were all strikingly different in major aspects: the Egyptians were polytheistic, the Hebrews monotheistic; Greece developed a quasi democratic government, Rome a monarchical, imperialistic state. In modern times, southern Europe is predominantly Roman Catholic, northern Europe chiefly Protestant, the former chiefly agricultural, the latter industrial. And within each culture area there are subcultural diversities, such as those of the North Atlantic and the southern states of the United States.

Each culture tends to develop in-group ideologies, which lead to political distrust, military hostility, religious intolerance, ethnocentrism, and similar patterns of action toward other cultures. The Hebrews, for example, have from early times been imbued with the belief that they were "the chosen people." In our times we have the doctrines of Aryan or Nordic supremacy, of German *Kultur*, of the British "white man's burden," of the American "manifest destiny," which lead people to believe their own culture the superior and all others inferior.

V. ACCUMULATION OF CULTURE

How Culture Accumulates. Though cultures vary, all culture traits and trait complexes of importance, wherever they arise, accumulate and become more or less general. Culture accumulation, like culture itself, occurs as a result of an imperceptible, spontaneous, and unplanned process. It takes place not deliberately, not through retrospective selection of some items and the rejection of others, but rather as a result of continuity of functioning. Sometimes we speak of tradition as the active agent in culture accumulation and transmission, as if society, looking backward, chooses to preserve this or that item and to eliminate others. In reality, it is through the interlocking of experience, the passing on of form and substance, of knowledges and skills in the day-by-day functioning that culture accumulates and is transmitted.

As culture is a set of types and not of objects, so it is not objects which are accumulated and transmitted but the types and systems of types, the knowledges and the skills. Sometimes people possessing an abundance of economic goods are said to be "advanced." But virtually no material objects *per se* become transmissible and cumulative. Objects such as the Egyptian Pyramids, the Acropolis in Athens, the Amphitheater of Syracuse, and the Roman Colosseum are transmitted, but even these are passed on as ruins and not as usable objects. Nearly all material objects rarely last more than a generation or two. What does accumulate is the knowledge of the form, structure, and function of these objects and of the skills necessary to reproduce them.[18] Likewise, in the nonmaterial phases of culture, it is not a specific family or a religious congregation that is passed on, but the form, the type, and the knowledge necessary for reproducing them that become the culture deposits.

Rate of Accumulation. Culture accumulates at different rates. In the early stages of culture or in the early life of a culture complex, accumulation is slow; when the foundation is established, accumulation gains momentum; and in the later stages, it accelerates. "Culture . . . is a matter of exceedingly slow growth until a certain threshold is passed, when it darts forward, gathering momentum at an unexpected rate. For this peculiarity of culture as a whole, many miniature parallels exist in special subdivisions of culture history. Natural science lay dormant until Kepler, Galileo, and Newton stirred it into unexampled activity, and the same holds for applied science until about a century ago." [19] Since earliest times the rapidity of change has grown at an ever increasing rate, though the rate of change is not uniform and though periods of comparative stability are followed by others of rapid modification. In very early times culture must have accumulated almost imperceptibly. Man began to make tools approximately 150,000 years ago, but for 30,000 years or more the stone implements of Paleolithic times underwent no change. But as culture began to accumulate, additions became more frequent and rapid. "Changes which in the beginning required tens of thousands of years, later thousands of years, occurred now in centuries and brought about constantly increasing multiplicity of forms." The historical period saw a further acceleration and "in modern times changes are proceeding with great rapidity. . . ." [20]

[18] See Ogburn, *op. cit.*, 74.

[19] Robert H. Lowie, *Culture and ethnology* (New York 1929) 78–79. By permission of Peter Smith.

[20] Abstracted from Franz Boas, *Anthropology and modern life* (New York 1928) 132–133.

Culture Base. The totality of this accumulation at a given time and place constitutes the culture base. Thus contemporary Western culture encompasses the accumulation of ten thousand or more years. It includes the additions made by men of the Paleolithic, the Neolithic, and the Bronze Age. It embodies the discoveries and inventions of the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans, and the various ethnic groups of the Middle Ages and of modern times. It is the product of the labor of hundreds of generations.

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Chapter 8

CULTURE AS CONDITIONER

I. GENERAL INFLUENCE OF CULTURE BASE

Culture the Matrix of Associated Living. The very mention in the last chapter of the culture base suggests the relation of accumulated culture to the daily ongoing of human society. The culture base is a factor of the first order, ordering and regulating the life of mankind in a multitude of ways. An individual, a group, or a whole society can no more escape the influence of or depart from the culture heritage than he or it can avoid or ignore the working of physical nature or of biological heredity. Moreover, as the culture base deepens it becomes as binding, unpliable, and as resistant to change, as are physical and biological nature. In some respects physical and biological nature are more susceptible to human manipulation than is the cultural heritage. Cultural patterns, such as those of monogamy, private property, and monotheism can no more be suddenly departed from than can aspects of nature.

The experience of Soviet Russia clearly illustrates this fact. Soviet Russia has since 1917 attempted more sweeping social and cultural changes than has perhaps any other nation during recorded history. But Russia has already been forced to shift back to the more conventional Western cultural forms. The folkways and mores of education, of marriage and the family, which early Russian revolutionists considered accidental or the product of capitalism, have been found to be too deeply rooted in culture to be ignored, and have had gradually to be restored. "Even before the murder of Kirof reforms were introduced in the educational system. Pupils were no longer allowed to dictate to their teachers, and in the higher schools there was restored a system of examinations to separate those who were qualified for further instruction from those who were not. Almost simultaneously there began a new cult of the family. Parents were told that they would be held responsible for the conduct of their children out of school hours, . . . and children were ordered to obey their parents. . . . The more extravagant laxities in the divorce law were remedied, and finally in recent weeks there has been proposed the abolition of legal abortion, save in exceptional cases, combined with the strict reminder that fathers must be responsible for the support of their children whether they want them or not. In other words, the early extravagances of the revolutionary period are being replaced by a more normal family life." [1]

Man may and actually does change aspects of culture, but he seems unable, within reasonable time, to free himself from even subphases of culture. It took Western culture two thousand years or more to eliminate slavery even after the undesirability of that system had been clearly set forth,[2] and even then slavery was eliminated only when it proved economically unprofitable. Thus the culture heritage becomes inevitable, binding, and conditioning, perhaps as much so as physical and biological nature.

Accumulated Culture and Control over Nature. On the other hand, as culture accumulates it gives man an increasing control over nature. That accumulation enables man to control fire and water, to extract food, to build shelter, to travel farther and faster, to communicate with his fellows, and to peer into the secrets of nature far more competently than in the earlier stages of culture. It empowers man to create improved plant and animal combinations, to better the preparation and preservation of food, to control pests, and to carry on many more activities than during the early stages of culture. In short, physical and biological nature become more and more subordinated to culture.[3]

Lessened Time-Span. As culture accumulates, it enables man to make major modifications within a briefer space of time. Professor Whitehead has calculated that in prehistoric times it took man a million years to make major accretions; that during the early historical period it took him five thousand years; in the classical period one thousand years; while in the present era man produces major accretions in two hundred years, in some cases even during a lifetime.[4] Although it is doubtful whether the matter is as neat as all that, it appears to be true that as man deepens his culture base he is able to effect major alteration in a relatively shorter time.

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[1] Walter Duranty, "Liberalism advances in Soviet Russia" in *New York times magazine* (July 19, 1936) 3, 19.

[2] See Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of ideas* (New York 1933) chap. i.

[3] See Luther L. Bernard, "Mind—its emergence as a mechanism of adjustment" in Frederick A. Cleveland (ed.), *Modern scientific knowledge of nature, man, and society* (New York 1929) 451; Roland B. Dixon, *Building of cultures* (New York 1928) 284; and Franz Boas, *Anthropology and modern life* (New York 1928) 131.

[4] See Whitehead, *op. cit.*, 116–120.

II. CULTURE CONTACT AND CONFLICT

Contributive Culture Contacts. Within the totality of a culture area, such as Western culture, subcultures come into contact, impinge on, and influence one another. Although whole bodies of people representing subcultures seldom meet *en masse*, and although the contacts of those who do meet are so gradual as to be almost imperceptible, yet such contacts produce phenomena of the first order; they produce stimulation and variety of life as well as contests and conflicts.

In the main, culture contacts are harmonious and contributive. This is especially true when the contacting groups are similar in race, language, folkways and mores, religion, and political forms. In such cases, each culture or subculture tends to contribute to and foster the development or the enrichment of the other. Such contacts introduce new articles and instruments, various food patterns, modes of dress, recreational ways, and religious customs. Even when the foreigners are markedly different, the reaction is relatively harmonious so long as the newcomers are in small numbers. The strangeness in speech, manners, and appearance stimulates interest; the newcomer is sought after, he is exhibited, is taken into the society of the *élite*, is given special immunities, privileges, and opportunities. The newcomer thus becomes a diverting and stimulating element in the dominant culture.

Culture Conflict. On the other hand, culture contact often produces conflict, especially in cases in which the cultures differ sharply from each other. Marked differences in languages build barriers and create misunderstandings; varying food complexes engender prejudice; marked differences in political organization breed distrust and hostility; economic and religious differences produce intolerance, ethnocentrism, and doctrines of superiority and inferiority.[5] As a result, in our times Poles come to be pitched against Russians, Kurds against Armenians, Greeks against Turks, Germans against Czechs, Italians against Austrians, French against Germans, and Americans against Japanese.

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[5] See Paul E. Johnson, "Can East meet West?" in *World tomorrow*, xii (1929) 305–307.

Culture-Conflict Path. This culture conflict becomes even more apparent when bodies of people belonging to one culture enter the territory of another culture in considerable numbers. In such cases the conflict seems to follow a well-marked path.[6] In the first stages, when only a few individuals or small groups representing one culture enter the territory of a different culture, the contact is free from discord. But as the number of foreigners increases, and intimate, functional contact takes place; as newcomers begin to engage in economic, educational, recreational, religious activities in appreciable numbers, competition sets in. In economic activity newcomers ordinarily have an advantage. Having gone into a foreign country to improve their economic condition, they exercise frugality; they work longer hours and at lower wages than will the natives in the same occupations; they put the various members of the family, sometimes including young children, to work; and make other sacrifices to achieve their objective. In addition, migrants are usually males, chiefly single men; they therefore are free of familial responsibilities and have a greater opportunity to devote themselves intensively to economic activity. All of which gives the newcomer a marked advantage.

The indigenous groups affected now try to offset their disadvantage through antagonistic activities, ordinarily promoted by politicians, designed to assure their position. They develop in-group and out-group techniques. They exclude the newcomer from certain occupations, enact laws which prevent aliens from owning land or from being employed on public works, or from participating in social functions. They call the foreigner "inferior"; they generalize individual personal experiences and impute to all the foreigners, both those in immediate contact and those in the foreign country, the characteristics deemed undesirable. In this manner dominant groups build stereotypes, "pictures in the head," and see something "bad" in all that the foreigners are and do. They dub them "Dagoes," "Sheenies," "Chinks," "Greasers," "Niggers," "Japs." Thus they reinforce their folkways and mores, strengthen their culture cohesion, and achieve advantage over the stranger.

The foreigners, on the other hand, being repulsed by the dominant culture group, form cliques of their own in which they emphasize the value of their own culture. They develop communities or neighborhoods of their own, such as the immigrant communities in the United States, in which they lead their own life more or less independently of the larger community, except in its economic aspect. They too develop their own stereotypes, indicated by such terms as "Yankee" and "Uncle Shylock," and consider the indigenous culture inferior.

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[6] The "path" described here is based on observation of the immigrant in the United States. Whether all culture contacts follow the same path remains to be determined by more extensive observation and intensive study. The following statement, therefore, is in the nature of a hypothesis.

Often conflict, now overt and now hidden, sets in. The dominant group attempts to maintain its hold over the foreigner by assimilative (as in Americanization) and incorporative (as in naturalization) activities; it tries to control through technical, financial, or political subgroups; and sometimes it attempts expulsion, as in the driving out of the Jews from various countries in the Renaissance or the exclusion of the Japanese from the United States in the twentieth century.

End Result of Culture Contact. In their totality and in the long run, all culture contacts seem to produce contributive results. In time, the more perceiving people of a dominant culture recognize the desirable elements in the culture of the despised group; or they realize that opposition only strengthens the very traits they seek to eliminate. Also some of the minority group "rise in the world" and come to be accepted by the *élite*. Now the majority group comes to claim the credit for the success of the minority; it adopts certain elements of the culture of the newcomer; and gradually comes to take the minority group for granted. Likewise the minority-culture group takes on many elements of the dominant culture; it comes to speak the language of the country, to use its dress and food; some will change their names; others intermarry; some become as much a part of the cultural *milieu* as to be unrecognizable. The final result is assimilation, by which peoples of diverse cultures, occupying a common territory, achieve some degree of solidarity, or at least combine the two old patterns, and ultimately attain some measure of national and political unity.[7]

The contact of cultures, therefore, seems to have a very vital part in cultural development. Whether contacts and interaction be coöperative or competitive, friendly or antagonistic, the deposits they make seem always to accrue to the advancement of culture. ". . . It is now generally admitted that the most important element in cultural progress is the contact of many cultures, while nothing breeds stagnation like isolation. Hence an environment which invites contact and provides easy access to and from other districts will promote psychic plasticity and cultural advancement, while one which produces isolation must of necessity lead to psychic stagnation and repetition." [8]

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[7] See Robert E. Park, "Assimilation, social" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 281.

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[8] Franklin Thomas, *Environmental basis of society* (New York 1925) 7. By permission of The Century Co. See also James Melvin Reinhardt and G. R. Davies, *Principles and methods of sociology* (New York 1932) 432–433.

Chapter 9

URBANIZATION OF CULTURE

I. URBANIZATION OF CULTURE

Among the variations which culture produces none perhaps is more striking than that which centers in the city. If we examine culture as it operates in the great cities and compare it item by item with culture as it functions in country districts, we are almost warranted to conclude that the two are of fundamentally different types.

By "city" we do not mean merely a large number of people residing in a given place. ". . . The contrast between the city and the country is essentially the contrast between agricultural and other means of livelihood. . . ." [1] The city is the place where people make their living by industry, trade and commerce, and by the professions. It is the place where the high density of population permits a pronounced degree of division of labor, economic surplus, concentration of wealth, leisure, intellectual activity, and development of the arts and sciences. The city ordinarily produces social distance, extremes of poverty as well as wealth, of disease as well as health, of philanthropy and misanthropy. "The bigger the city, the more unsocial it becomes." The city in fact is dominated by secondary rather than primary group relationships. It consists of numerous unlike groups, held together principally by rules and laws rather than by local fundamental attachments.[2]

What Is Civilization? To culture as it prevails in the city we shall apply the term civilization. In giving the term civilization this meaning, we are not being arbitrary, as an analysis of the term and of the process will show. The term civilization is ordinarily used in one of four meanings. It is employed somewhat loosely as a synonym of what we have described as culture; it is used to indicate the most advanced stage in culture, as when we speak of savagery as being the lowest, barbarism the intermediate, and civilization the highest stage of culture; it is used to denote the immediately utilitarian and the material aspects of culture, as when factories and machines, banks, and legal documents are assigned to civilization, and churches, schools, and museums to culture; and, finally, the term civilization is employed to designate the spatial as contrasted with the kinship basis of culture, as when we speak of the civilization of Rome and the culture of a tribe.[3]

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[1] Walter F. Willcox, "Redefinition of 'city' in terms of density of population" in Ernest W. Burgess (ed.), *Urban community* (Chicago 1926) 116.

[2] See Nels Anderson and Eduard C. Lindeman, *Urban sociology* (New York 1928) xxviii; also William B. Munro, "City" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 474–482.

If these various meanings are analyzed, it will be found that the last three resolve themselves into what we term urbanized culture. Civilization does in some respects constitute the highest phases of culture; it does involve a greater emphasis on the material aspects of culture; and finally it does actually designate a territorial rather than a kinship system. Civilization, however, produces the lowest as well as some of the best expressions of culture.[4]

This is precisely the connotation which, when referring to past civilizations, we give to the term. When we speak of the ancient and classical civilizations, it is specifically to culture as embodied in the great cities, such as Memphis and Thebes, Alexandria, Babylon, Nineveh, Carthage, Athens, and Rome, that we refer. And it is to culture as concentrated in the cities that we refer when we speak of the rise and fall of civilizations. We cannot correctly say "the rise and fall of culture." Culture is a continuum; it is the process which accumulates the salient gains and hands them on in continuity; whereas civilizations rise, come into fruition, decay, and die.

Characteristics of Civilization Centers. Civilization as we define it, therefore, consists in those peculiar manifestations of culture which are found in the great centers of population; it is the concentrated, organized, intensified, often artificialized and sophisticated expression and form of culture. Cities are the foci in which concentrate and out of which radiate the main elements of a given culture; in them culture is more highly organized; in them are situated the central organizations of the political system, of industry, of religion, of education, of science, and of recreation. What is generally considered to be the most desirable expression of the nonmaterial as well as of the material aspects of culture is found in cities. There also are encountered profound poverty, social disorganization, widespread inequality, political corruption, vice, crime, and many other conditions, which are considered undesirable and which often spread their influence beyond the confines of the city.

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[3] These various meanings of the term "civilization" are implicitly or explicitly stated in Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient society* (New York 1877); Joseph Kirk Folsom, *Culture and social progress* (New York 1928) chap. i; R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 225–236; Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 398–399; Carl Brinkmann, "Civilization" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 525–527. For a thoughtful brief discussion of these various distinctions see Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 43–52; see also Thomas Nixon Carver, *Essential factors of social evolution* (Cambridge 1935) 280–292.

[4] The use of the term civilization to denote urbanized culture is justified on etymological grounds also. The word derives from the Latin *civilitas,* which denoted the state of residing in a city and being part of the city state.

II. RISE OF CIVILIZATION CENTERS AND THEIR INFLUENCE

Factors in the Rise of Civilization Centers. Precisely what gives rise to these concentrations of culture cannot be stated with certainty. Several factors seem to be at work. First is the factor of time. The length of time during which a given culture has been in operation in a given area seems to have a bearing on the rise of civilization centers. In the early stages of occupancy of a given territory, a people is highly mobile and devotes itself to exploration and the beginnings of settlement. Several potential foci arise, and it is only in time that some one of them eliminates the others and develops into the civilization center.

Centers of civilization ordinarily develop in proximity to abundant resources and particularly around bodies of water. All the early Western civilizations grew up around the lower basin of the Mediterranean: Crete, Egypt, Greece, and Rome formed their civilizations in the valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates and around the Aegean and Tyrrhenean seas. Here richness of soil, evenness of climate, and proximity to the main avenues of population and trade movement were associated with the concentrations of culture.

These geographic conditions draw together large populations and these populations in turn become factors. Large populations contain heterogeneous racial and cultural groups; these produce a testing, intensification, a selection of cultural elements, a dissemination of culture among the various classes, and a consequent cross-fertilization of culture elements.

Contests between these centers also accentuate the process of concentration of culture. The mental stimulus and the inevitable contrasts and conflicts of differing customs which result when two or more centers of civilization are in proximity are in themselves factors in the further elaboration of culture.[5]

Ancient and Modern Civilization Centers. Throughout the history of Western culture there have been numerous cities that have constituted the master foci or the subfoci of that culture. In ancient times there arose the cities of Memphis in Egypt, Ur in Chaldea, Babylon in Babylonia, Nineveh in Assyria, Damascus in Syria, Jerusalem in Palestine, Tyre in Phoenicia, Thebes in Boeotia, Carthage in North Africa, and Troy and Miletus in Asia Minor. In each of these was concentrated the major culture complex of the time and place. Out of them radiated the principal cultural influences; in them the cultures became elaborated. It is from these cities that we derive our knowledge of the cultures they embodied and the deposits they made.

In classical times Athens and Sparta, Alexandria, Carthage, and Rome were the centers of Western culture. In the Middle Ages, Constantinople was the principal civilization center; while several other smaller and less important cities flourished in the regions now occupied by England, Italy, France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Russia. Mecca, Bagdad, Cairo, Vienna, Breslau, Kiev, and Novgorod rose to considerable importance.

In modern times the urbanization of culture has become very intensive and widespread. Due to the mechanization of industry, to the consequent increase in communication, and to related factors older centers have greatly increased in size and influence, while numerous new centers have arisen all over the West. The cities that were already established have experienced a phenomenal growth. Two-thousand-year-old London, for example, has acquired four-fifths of its population during the last century; Odessa, one thousand years old, has added nineteen-twentieths of its population in the same period. In 1850 there were but two cities in the world with a million or more inhabitants: Paris with 1,053,262 and London with 2,363,341; in 1900 there were thirteen cities with a population of a million or more, and four with two million or more. The largest of these was London with over four and a half million. By 1930, there were twenty-seven cities with more than a million, eleven with more than two million, New York being in the lead with a population of 6,930,446.[6] In the newer regions the process has gone on even more intensively. In the United States, for example, only one person out of thirty resided in a town or city in 1790, whereas in 1930, 56.2 per cent of the population was located in urban centers of 2,500 or over.

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[5] See Frederick J. Teggart, *Processes of history* (New Haven 1918) 103, 112.

Results of Urbanization of Culture. The process by which culture becomes concentrated in cities is so complex that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between cause and effect. However, such cultural foci are marked by well-defined traits.

First, culture is pyramided in the great center of population. The highest political authorities, the master nuclei of industry, commerce, and finance, the most influential educational organizations and "institutions" of learning, the most adequate libraries, recreational centers, scientific laboratories, and the most important churches—all center in the great cities.

Second, culture is highly organized in cities. While culture as a whole is more or less spontaneous and automatic, in the urban centers it attains a high degree of organization, with much propaganda, many formal activities, great sophistication, a multiplication of impacts and interactions, and a high speed of communication. Thus it is that in these centers we find the greatest power, wealth, comfort, and diversity of life. But there also is found profound maladjustment. Widespread poverty, marriage and family disorganization, distorted education, artificialized and commercialized recreation, religious heterogeneity, and governmental corruption characterize the great cities; and usually it is in these centers that the seeds of societal catastrophes, such as revolution and war, are sown.

Third, in the great centers of population man is separated from the slow processes of nature and their restorative power, a separation with which man seems unable to cope. "Apparently, there is no adaptation possible to ceaseless agitation, intellectual dispersion, alcoholism, precocious sexual excesses, noise, polluted air, and adulterated foods. If such is the case, we must modify our mode of life and our environment, even at the cost of a destructive revolution. After all, the purpose of civilization is not the progress of science and machines, but the progress of man." [7]

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[6] See Warren S. Thompson, *Population problems* (2d ed. New York 1935) table 121, p. 301; Josiah Strong, *Challenge of the city* (New York 1907) 8.

[7] Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) 233. By permission of Harper & Brothers.

Fourth, one of the marked features of city life is the indirection or distance in human relationships and the dearth of warm human contacts in almost every phase of daily life. There is segregation of both individuals and groups in their interests and activities. The individual is so pressed by the numerous impingements arising from his immediate task that he is obliged, by the limitations of mental and physical strength, more and more to fend off other individuals. Thus, both as an individual and as a member of his group, he becomes self-centered. He does not, cannot care about his neighbor when he is consciously or unconsciously fighting to preserve his own life. Group after group becomes so wrapped up in its special activities as not to see, or even be able to see, the needs of others or the possible consequences of its actions on the rest of society. The financiers of our time are often charged with deliberately driving society into war or wilfully ruining millions with their financial scheming. It is questionable, however, whether any group can deliberately undertake such a task; it is probably the profound indirections, social distances, and artificialization of life in the great cities that are at the basis of societal difficulties.

III. FALL OF CIVILIZATIONS

Decline and Fall of Civilizations. What makes civilization centers of special importance is the fact that after they reach a certain stage of development, they undergo a process of rapid disorganization, disintegration, and "fall." The cultural map of the West is strewn with the wrecks of numerous dead cities. Perhaps there is no more striking contrast in all history than that of Rome during the second century and Rome three or four centuries afterwards. At the first date we see a magnificent city of possibly a million or more inhabitants, the heart of a mighty empire, the center of the best education and the arts, the most spectacular recreational events, the most magnificent buildings—a splendid city, throbbing with countless activities. Three centuries later its population numbered about 40,000 people, many of its proud buildings were in ruins, its streets were covered with *débris.* What is true of Rome had been true of practically all the great cities of antiquity, and was true afterwards of Constantinople and other cities of the Middle Ages.

Why Civilizations Fall. What conditions contribute to the fall of civilizations? Here again no conclusive answer can be given;

the records that have come down to us are meager. Climatic changes appear to have had some bearing on the fall of great cities. Long periods of drought have destroyed great civilization centers. Portions of Asia Minor, for example, are believed to have been subjected to prolonged periods of desiccation, which drove out once flourishing civilizations. The drying up of Sicily, in part the result of deforestation, seems to have had some bearing on the fall of the brilliant Magna Grecia centers that once were the pride of that island.

Natural catastrophes, such as the volcanic eruption which blotted out Herculaneum and Pompeii in 79 A.D., have been a factor in such destruction. Geographic discoveries, such as the early discovery of the upper Mediterranean, of the New World in the fifteenth century, sometimes transferred the center of major interest and activity and resulted in the dwindling of former foci of culture.

Societal catastrophes, such as invasions and wars, seem also to have been a cause. The Gothic invasions apparently contributed to the downfall of Rome. Imperialism, with its overdiffusion of effort, may also have tended to break up cohesion, as in the case of the Roman Empire.

The fall of civilization centers may be due to the aging and the natural death of the foci of culture. According to this doctrine, a civilization center, like an individual, goes through a period of youthful rapid growth, of maturity, of decline, and death. ". . . The rise and fall we have designated is apparently the life cycle of the nation or other type of political organization. Rome, for example, sprang up like a young oak in the forest, pushed and crowded, sent her roots far, and absorbed culture from every side; but at last maturity was reached and she stopped growing. Then began decline and decay until at last one fine day she went down before the tempest. So Rome fell, and there was a gap in the historical horizon and some wreckage below, but the forest still stood." [8]

The very success which some civilization centers attain seems to contribute to their downfall. ". . . The accumulation of the facilities of life, or capital in every form, diminishes the need for striving. There is much the less worth striving for, there is so much more to enjoy without strife. Hence, the easier life is rendered, the more easy is decay and degradation. The maximum of wealth must inevitably lead to the downfall." [9]

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[8] Clark Wissler, *Man and culture* (New York 1923) 40–41. By permission of Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Civilization centers also develop into monstrous growths which sap the very life of the people both within their boundaries and in the rest of the cultural area; the working classes are overworked; the wealthy are dissipated; administrators are worn by the severe strain of governing; the very strength of the whole structure seems to weaken and to produce the downfall.

Other explanations have been given, such as moral and religious decadence, mental disintegration and fatigue, economic or political corruption, as contributive causes to the fall of civilization centers.[10] One thing is clear, various interrelated conditions and a whole train of circumstances may cause or contribute to the downfall of culture foci and to the relegation of a once masterful people to a subordinate position in the family of nations.

Perpetuity of Culture. While civilizations rise and fall, culture goes on and seems in all essentials to go on indefinitely making its accumulation. The great ancient centers mentioned above are no more, but the cultural contribution they made and the wholeness of culture continue. "We frequently hear the expression 'rise and fall of cultures,' which implies that cultures come into existence as if from nowhere and then vanish. From one point of view, this may be true, but the overwhelming evidence . . . indicates that culture grows by accumulation, which implies that little of importance is ever lost . . . Historians tell us that Rome rose and fell and that the latter was a great calamity; and for Rome it certainly was a misfortune, but there is no reason to believe that any of the important elements in Roman culture were lost." [11]

In some respects culture is as enduring as physical and biological nature. Every major gain which man has ever made has probably been deposited in the total fund which we call the cultural heritage. In all probability, nothing of primary importance has ever been lost.

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[9] W. M. Flinders Petrie, *Revolutions of civilisation* (New York 1911) 126. By permission of Harper & Brothers.

[10] See John Strachey, *Coming struggle for power* (rev. ed. New York 1934) 167.

[11] Clark Wissler, *op. cit.*, 40. By permission of Thomas Y. Crowell Company. See also *ibid.*, 223 and Alfred Marston Tozzer, *Social origins and social continuities* (New York 1925) 5.

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Chapter 10

CULTURE HERITAGE IN THE WEST

I. TIME AND PLACE ORIGIN OF WESTERN CULTURE

Beginnings of Western Culture. When and under what conditions the first significant items of culture began to accumulate we cannot say. What we now call Western culture seems to have been forming in prehistoric time. Archeological, ethnological, and anthropological evidence seems to indicate that man had already made major deposits, such as the control of fire and the domestication of plants and animals, in Mesolithic times, at least 12,000 years ago.

Original Habitat. The original habitat of Western culture is likewise unknown. Such fragmentary evidence as we have seems to indicate that the original habitat of the races of man, as well as of human culture, was probably in the plateaus of southeastern Asia. In remote prehistoric times, two major culture streams developed on the same plateaus; these were ultimately severed from each other by the Gobi desert, one stream moving into Euro-Asia and finally becoming what we now call Western culture and the other moving into further Asia and developing into Eastern culture. The movement into what is now Africa seems to have been an offshoot of the main stream. But all this is largely speculative.

One thing is almost certain, that Eastern and Western cultures have a common root, that in their early unfolding they developed many common patterns, and that many aspects of present-day Western culture go back to that common root.

II. PREHISTORIC ACCUMULATION

Spoken Language. One of the first items to be developed seems to have been spoken language, but nothing is known of its origin. In its rudimentary forms it appears before the dawn of history. It may have developed first as sign language, gestures occurring very early among primitive peoples; then as mimicry; then through the association of given signs and sounds with the corresponding experiences; and finally through the generalization of these gestures and sounds into spoken language. The communication by action was and is probably the basic element in the development of culture. In any event, language has been an important factor in the unfolding of culture.[1]

Controlled Fire. Prehistoric times also contributed the controlled use of fire. But the origin of fire and its control are unknown. Fire may have originated spontaneously, may have been started by meteorites or by lightning, or it may have been taken from a volcano, or it may have been produced accidentally by the friction of combustible materials. Whatever its origin, the controlling of fire, from the first seizure, to the careful nursing of embers, to the sharing of it with others, to the storing of it potentially in the head of a match—is one of the remarkable achievements of man. We take fire for granted, but the use of it under control has been of untold value in the development of culture. It has robbed night of its terrors; it has provided means for utilizing hitherto unusable foods and for improving and preserving almost all foods; it has made possible the conquest of aspects of physical nature, such as forests; it has enabled man to move into colder and colder regions, thus affording him the stimulus that comes from pronounced climate changes, an important factor in the development of culture; and in recent centuries, controlled fire has provided man with an incalculable amount of power for industrial activity.[2] On the other hand, man has to this day been unable completely to subdue fire; it remains one of the major forces of destruction and compels man to give considerable time and energy in attempts to control it.

Domestication of Animals and Plants. The domestication of animals and plants was another momentous discovery made by prehistoric man. It probably began in Neolithic times. How the process started, we do not know. As to its results, however, there can be no question. The domestication of animals freed man from utter dependence on what nature provided and made him a food producer; it released man from the necessity of hunting for all his food; it made possible a degree of security in food supply; it provided concentration in food. Besides, it supplied milk, skins for shelter and clothing, bone and horn for implements, and beasts of burden. Domestication of plants further improved the situation in all these regards and made possible permanence of residence, an essential element in the development of culture. The two gave man a higher degree of prosperity and comfort than he had formerly enjoyed.[3]

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[1] See Charles A. Ellwood, *Cultural evolution* (New York 1927) 12, 24; Edward B. Tylor, *Anthropology* (New York 1913) 7–13; Clark Wissler, *Man and culture* (New York 1923) 80–89; Otto Jespersen, *Mankind, nation and individual from a linguistic point of view* (Oslo 1925); Wilson D. Wallis, *Introduction to anthropology* (New York 1926) 427–429.

[2] See William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, i (New Haven 1927) chap. viii.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS OF EARLY HISTORICAL TIMES

Written Language. Early historical times made several important contributions to the fund of Western culture, chiefly through the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, and the Hebrews. Among these contributions none is perhaps more important than written language. It may be said that only with the development of the art of writing did communication begin on a broad scale. By recording history, law, knowledge, and religion, written language linked the past and the future, the near and the far in an unbroken chain.[4]

Among the first peoples of the West known to have employed writing were the Assyrians and the Egyptians. The Assyrians made records on clay tablets, from which we derive much of our knowledge of their history, literature, law, and even their official documents and judicial decisions.[5] They developed written language to the point of having volumes of papyrus or skins or clay tablets and of maintaining libraries. From the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians and the cuneiform of the Babylonians to the alphabet of the Phoenicians was but a step; and from the Phoenician alphabet, through Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, we derive the modern alphabet.[6]

Agriculture. Agriculture, the art of cultivating the soil for the production of food, probably achieved definitive development at the hands of the Egyptians between 4,000 and 3,500 B.C. To the domestication of plants and superficial tillage, which seem to have been employed at least by Neolithic man about 10,000 B.C., now was added the more systematic cultivation of land. A complicated technique gradually grew up for the seasonal preparation of the soil, for irrigation, sowing, cultivation, and reaping, which in substance has come down to our times. Rerouting and storage of water, which prevented the destruction of crops by floods and turned water to constructive ends, also developed.[7] Agriculture became a master culture complex. It made possible a stable food supply, added variety and palatability in food, was a factor in the development of stationary habitat and concentration of population, contributed to the beginnings of the idea and practice of private ownership, and in numerous other ways became the basic factor conditioning all culture for tens of centuries.

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[3] See Tylor, *op. cit.*, 219–220; Wallis, *op. cit.*, 130–141; George Alfred Baitsell (ed.), *Evolution of earth and man* (New Haven 1929) 187, 373–374, 399.

[4] Tylor, *op. cit.*, 24, 167–182.

[5] See G. Maspéro, *Life in ancient Egypt and Assyria* (trans. by A. P. Morton, London 1892) 287–288.

[6] The art of engraving, closely related to writing, was first developed by the Babylonians. See *ibid.* and Archibald Henry Sayce, *Social life among the Assyrians and Babylonians* (New York 1893) 30–39.

Ship-Building, Navigation, Astronomy. Ship-building and navigation also developed in early historical times. These, probably first employed by the Babylonians and later improved by the Egyptians and the Phoenicians, were given forms that lasted well into modern times. The Phoenicians were the seafaring people of ancient times and did a great deal to further navigation. Sea communication opened new worlds. Contacts extended to peoples of diverse races and cultures; commerce developed; and the West initiated those practices in the exchange of goods which play so great a part in economic life today. With the growth of navigation came also early development of astronomy and of the calendar. The Egyptians seem to have been the first people to divide day and night into twelve hours each and to observe the equinoxes, the solstices, and five planets.

Slavery. Compulsory labor in the form of slavery was also probably first developed by the Egyptians. The form lasted for nearly six thousand years. Slavery was of major significance in ancient and classical times because through it leisure was made possible to some segment of the population; and leisure permitted and encouraged the further development of culture. The state, as an agent of organized control, probably appeared among the Egyptians, perhaps as a result of leisure.

Monotheism. The history of early religions is one of widely varying beliefs and customs among many peoples. But the one form which came to prevail in the West is monotheism, or belief in the existence of only one God. Though several peoples had a part in its formation, though it was in Egypt a thousand years before the Hebrews had it, monotheism, as it came down to the modern era, is the product of Hebraic culture. It was the Hebrew people who first elaborated the concept of one God and established it as a dominant pattern in the West. To this central concept was later added the belief in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Monotheism and its derivative concepts so dominate in the Western world that the Hebrews may properly be called the religious teachers of the West.

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[7] See G. Elliot Smith, *Ancient Egyptians and the origin of civilization* (rev. ed. New York 1923) 1–28, 177; A. Bothwell Gosse, *Civilization of the ancient Egyptians* (New York 1916) 112, 117, 155; G. Elliot Smith, *Human history* (New York 1929) chap. vii.

In the development of these major items in ancient times, the Babylonians and Assyrians, the Egyptians and Hebrews made the principal contributions, the latter two peoples being more important than the former two. Egyptian culture has basically influenced European culture, both because of its priority in time and of its relatively high development of unified patterns. The Hebrews transmitted the essential features of the Babylonian and Assyrian cultures and developed a rich culture of their own.

IV. ADDITIONS IN CLASSICAL TIMES

Beginnings of Democracy. During the classical period, the principal additions to the culture of the West were made by the Greeks and the Romans. These peoples became the chief transmitters of older cultural accretions and the builders of important new complexes. The contributions of the Greeks are so numerous, so rich, varied, and important that a brief statement cannot even suggest them. Yet the major additions are clear. The two chief foci of Greek culture were Athens and Alexandria. The more important and permanent contributions they made lay chiefly in four fields: government, education, philosophy, and science.

In government Greece provided the idea and, in limited measure, the practice of democracy (the Greek word *demos* meaning "people"), one of the dominant forms in Western culture. The Hebrews had made a faint beginning of democracy, especially through the prophets and some of the rulers, who were themselves drawn from the people; but the Greeks greatly elaborated the idea, gave it rational content, and in a measure practiced it. The Greeks, particularly the Athenians, developed the middle class and defined its position and functions. They stressed the idea of the equality of woman. The Babylonians had already recognized woman's right to an education and to participation in business activity; [8] but the Greeks extended the idea to other aspects of life. All these democratic or semidemocratic practices, though partly destroyed by Roman civilization, lay as a leaven for nearly two thousand years; and when rediscovered they led to a revolution which became a master pattern in the West.

Education. Greece also made a marked contribution to educational theory and practice. The Egyptians had schools; but they were wholly devoted to the training of the sons of the Pharaoh and the wealthy; later they established community schools for the training of boys for service at court. The Hebrews also had schools; but they were chiefly part of the temple and taught mainly religious lore. The Greeks were the first to adopt educational practices which have become general in the West. In Athens and Sparta schools were established and maintained by the community; they admitted pupils from the entire citizenry; and they trained for service to the community rather than to special groups. The more advanced schools, such as Plato's Academy at Miletus and Aristotle's school in Alexandria, admitted mainly students from the privileged classes; but even in secondary schools the emphasis was on extending educational opportunities to all freemen. Plato proposed, probably for the first time, that every community should establish schools where the young, including women, should be trained for private and public life. Plato's Academy devoted itself precisely to this task. Later, schooling was extended to all classes, including the slaves, thus laying the foundations of modern education.

The Arts and Philosophy. The Greeks laid a foundation in the arts and in philosophy. They achieved such excellence in almost every art, particularly sculpture and architecture, that for centuries Europe has looked back to Greek times as a "Golden Age," and to Greece as the torch bearer. In philosophy, also, the Greeks reached such depths of thought, achieved such perfection of literary style, that we still look up to them for inspiration. Greek philosophy has been the great leavener of thought ever since. The Golden Mean (the idea of a synthesis of beauty, duty, and knowledge or wisdom) whether attainable and practical or not, is immortal.[9]

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[8] See Sayce, *op. cit.*, 18–24.

[9] See Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of ideas* (New York 1933) *passim.*

Science. Greece gathered together the then existing knowledge in science. The developments of Babylonians and Egyptians in this field were indeed notable, but the Greeks expanded them, created, tested, and laid the foundation for modern science in the West. They regarded all natural phenomena as susceptible to objective examination; they adopted the quantitative procedure; they set themselves to the task of discovering "laws." [10] And it was the rediscovery of this early development through the Moors that initiated the unfolding of the scientific institution of our times.

Roman Contributions to Political Structure. Rome's contributions lay chiefly in the field of government and religion. Roman culture was in many respects derivative from that of Greece. Yet Rome made permanent additions of its own. Rome reintroduced monarchy, which dominated the Western world for nearly two thousand years and which has contested the democratic idea and practice from that day to this. Rome developed and established imperialism, which originally aimed to unify the subjugated peoples on a peace basis; and that system, considerably modified, has been applied to other fields and objectives, such as the economic, and has lasted to our times as a dominant pattern.[11]

Religion. In religion Rome developed theocracy, which had existed in Egypt and Babylonia, and established it as a dominant pattern in the West. It made the gods the main agents in the affairs of state and the ruler the representative of God. This system later gave rise to the idea and practice of the Divine Right of Kings, which has had a far-reaching influence on the government of the West down to our time. Theocracy was later applied to the religious institution itself, and it has come down to us in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

The Romans also introduced the element of practicality in religion: religion was not for the masses but for the leaders; it was to be subordinated to the exigencies of the occasion; it was a matter for the here and now—a pattern which, rediscovered by the Renaissance, has become influential in modern times throughout the West. Further, Rome took the first steps toward establishing Christianity. It was also among the first states which adopted the practice of the state care for the needy.

[10] See William A. Heidel, *Heroic age of science* (Baltimore 1933) *passim.*

[11] See H. G. Wells, *Outline of history* (3d ed. New York 1921) 420–421.

Slavery Extended. In economic life the Romans greatly extended the compulsory-labor system known as slavery; it is estimated that in Rome slaves were twice as numerous as freemen. Thus established as a cultural pattern, slavery lingered for nearly two thousand years, down to the recent past, precisely in the form developed by the Romans.

V. CONTRIBUTION OF MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

The Middle Ages, from the fifth to the thirteenth centuries, were once regarded as a period of cultural dormancy. In reality, the period made important additions to the fund of culture. It added the Justinian Code, which became the basis of Western law; it developed feudalism, which lasted until the dawn of the modern age as the dominant social and economic system; it laid a foundation for the scientific development of the Renaissance and modern times; it placed monogamy on a permanent footing; [12] it greatly elaborated the concepts and the organization of Christianity; it established the Papacy; it founded the first universities; it developed constitutional monarchy, the precursor of modern democracy; and it made a beginning of humanism.[13] And it made Christianity a permanent system.

The Renaissance, from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, made several major additions. It rediscovered classical culture; reintroduced classical literature, art, and philosophy; and thereby produced a rebirth and reintegration of Western culture.

The Renaissance produced printing and developed it to such high levels that the fineness of the ink, the beauty and durability of the paper used, and the high craftsmanship in designing, in type founts, printing, and binding still remain as the standards of excellence. Printing became a master means of communication, of acquiring and spreading knowledge, and of aesthetic and recreational activity.

Humanism, which glorifies man, particularly the individual man, and stresses the present rather than the future, grew to a fuller development during the Renaissance. Humanism was the foundation of individualism, which underlies a multitude of economic, political, and other forms in the modern world; particularly, humanism was the very source of Protestantism.

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[12] See Edward Westermarck, *Future of marriage in Western civilisation* (New York 1936) 194–195.

[13] See Carl Stephenson, *Mediaeval history* (New York 1935) *passim*.

The Renaissance further extended the foundation of modern science. Peering into the past, it gathered together the developments in science made by the Greeks; it questioned the speculative way of life which had prevailed for a thousand years or more throughout the West; and it laid the basis for the inquiring way of life which now prevails in the West.[14]

Finally, the Renaissance challenged feudalism, developed the city states, promoted the union of states, developed the theory of the Divine Right of Kings and the theory of sovereignty, established strong monarchies and dynasties, and created centralized states.

VI. SUMMARY

These are the main patterns which, accumulated through ten thousand years or more, constitute the base of modern Western culture. They are the fruit of universal experience in associated living; a stock to which each major age, each principal region and people, has made its contributions. In fact, epochs, places, and peoples are remembered through the lasting contributions they may have made to the totality of the cultural accumulation which constitutes the foundation on which our times are built.

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PART III

THE INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION

In Part II we have considered the bases of the social institutions. In Part III we discuss eight major institutions, namely, marriage, the family, the economic, educational, recreational, religious, scientific, and governmental systems. In each case we consider the specific originating factors, the major conceptual or functional developments, the principal folkways and mores which apply to each, the associations, and the skills and instruments involved.

The discriminating reader will note one great gap, namely, the absence of a discussion of the maintenance institution, the system which serves to maintain the physical well-being of society. This is indeed a major institution, but various circumstances have prevented its inclusion at present. The next edition of this work will contain a consideration of it.

Chapter 11

ORIGIN OF INSTITUTIONS

In the foregoing discussion, consideration was directed to the general operation of originating factors, but no mention was made of precisely how the social institutions come into existence. That is, given the primary resources of physical and biological nature and of culture, by what intermediary means have the institutions come into existence? Were they created by divine fiat? Are they the products of the "instincts"? Are they, perhaps, man's planned constructions? Or are they merely spontaneous growths, embodying the experiences human beings have gathered collectively in their efforts to satisfy their basic needs? This question has appropriately been left to this point, to serve as a connecting link between the discussion of the originating factors and that of the institutions themselves.

Divine Origin. The problem of origins, whether in the primary or intermediate sense, cannot be answered. It may well be, as the poet states it, that "we come from God who is our home," but that proposition cannot be subjected to scientific analysis and therefore must remain a belief. If held, it can be accepted only on faith or on the "evidence" which philosophy or religion may adduce; we can speculate on it, we can argue; but the proposition cannot be tested.

"Instinct" as Cause. The hypothesis which accounts for institutions in terms of "instincts," needs, wishes, and desires does not seem satisfactory. If sex and food hunger, "gregariousness," and the love of self-gratification are regarded as the roots of institutions, we confront the well-established fact that other animals have much the same drives as man, yet none of them builds institutions of corresponding complexity and purposefulness. Some institutional activity is found among insects, such as ants and bees; but "animal society" is wholly instinctive and elementary when compared with the institutions of man.[1]

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[1] See J. Arthur Thomson, *What is man?* (New York 1924) 139–141.

Man's Intelligence. Are the great institutions, then, the products of man's intellect, ideas, interests, purposes, and ideals? This does not seem to be the case, if for no other reason than that there is so much which is utterly unintelligible and devoid of reason in institutions. Man's mind is a factor in institution building. But human institutions are largely spontaneous, automatic, and unpremeditated growths. There is no evidence that institutions are based on "social contract"; social contract, in so far as it obtains at all, is embodied in associations, or the organized phases of the institutions, not in the institutions as wholes.

Experience Deposits. The most reasonable explanation of the origin of social institutions is found in the idea of experience deposits. By experience deposits we do not mean individual experience, but the accumulation of ideas, customs, and habits of mankind as these become deposited in the totality of group behavior and in culture as a whole.[2]

An illustration or two will make this concept clear. It is a well-established fact—one of the few uncontroverted sociological generalizations or "laws"—that man cannot live alone; he cannot survive or even function normally if alone or even in very small groups. His body tends to take on animal characteristics; he does not develop human speech or loses it; his mind is deranged or broken by isolation. The story of feral man and of persons who have wilfully chosen isolation is well known.[3] Alone or even in small groups man cannot protect himself against floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, fires, and other catastrophes of nature. The experience of this fact has over eons of time taught mankind the imperativeness of living in groups; has implanted the practice of collective living; and has made cumulative deposits on the concepts and practices of society as a whole. These concepts and practices are transmitted, not so much individually, but by cultural modes passed on from generation to generation through the continuity of functioning in associated living.[4]

The family affords another illustration of this theory. It is a well-attested fact that the female, because of her biological constitution and function, is subject to inconveniences, hardships, and disabilities from which the male is free. This makes the female more or less dependent on the male. These handicaps are increased when the female is becoming or has become a mother. She then needs the help of the male for physical and psychological security; for several years after the birth of the child, both mother and offspring are subject to special disabilities and need the protection of the male partner. Mankind has experienced the fact that not all males will continue to support and care for females and offspring unless they are required to do so. Consequently it has built up that complex of concepts, mores, and laws, which constitutes the family, with its rights and duties. Painfully worked out, handed down more or less automatically from generation to generation, the family has become deposited in culture.[5]

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[2] Experience deposits must not be confused with Pareto's "residues," which that author defines as sentiments. See Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, ii (New York 1935) 596–646.

[3] For an illustration of the latter see Dora Strauch and Walter Brockman, *Satan came to Eden*, the Galapagos experiment (New York 1936); also Richard E. Byrd, *Alone* (New York 1938) *passim*.

[4] See chap. 29, section on "Functional continuity," p. 473.

What is true of group living and of the family is more or less true of other phases of associated living. The experience and the experiments of man in dealing with nature and with his fellows has made deposits on the concepts, group habits, customs, which have come to be transmitted from age to age, not through a relearning by individuals, but through continuity of functioning. In the process of making these experience-experiment deposits, the "instincts" or drives, such as those of sex and food hunger, have been at work; the intellect, too, has made its contributions, as in the educational and scientific activities. But the group experiences themselves have been deposited, patterned, and ingrained in the very structure of culture and handed down through the actual functioning of mankind as it deals with physical nature, biological nature, and previous culture.

Institutions, therefore, according to this explanation, are mainly the products, the fructifications, or the embodiments of human experience in associated living. In their essentials they consist of the accumulation of the group-experience of the race.

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Chapter 12

THE MARRIAGE SYSTEM

I. NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE-FAMILY SYSTEM

Basic Character of the Marriage-Family System. We begin the detailed discussion of the institutions with that of marriage and the family because of the basic nature of this two-fold system. This institution arises from and rests upon one of the two universal human drives, that of sex; it is the agency through which mankind perpetuates itself; it is one of the oldest and most widespread of institutions; it originally performed nearly all the principal social functions; it demands more time and attention than any other except the economic; it is the smallest and most unified of all social groups; it is highly private and affectional, face-to-face and intimate, unavoidable and incessant in its interactions; it therefore sets a deep and lasting stamp upon each generation; and, finally, it is the system which affords the male and female halves of mankind the means *par excellence* for supplementing one another, for coöperation, and for adjustment each to the other as in no other institution.

Marriage Distinguished from the Family. Though marriage and the family are within a single nexus, they constitute two distinct systems. This is especially true in the contemporary West, where many marriages do not have children for several years or do not have children at all; and therefore do not become families. Marriage, in the Western world, as Westermarck defines it, is simply the formal union of one man and one woman, established according to custom and law and prescribing certain duties and rights. The family is a more complicated and binding system. It binds the husband and wife in a set of more rigid obligations to one another than in marriage; it binds parents to children; it places children, as they grow up, under obligations to parents; it makes it incumbent to care for relatives and, sometimes, for servants; and, finally, the family is of greater concern to society, because of the children, than is marriage. A family, then, is a formal union established according to custom and law, rigidly binding the persons united by marriage, their children by birth or adoption, and all other persons in the same household, by generally recognized and enforced rights and duties.

II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARRIAGE

Originating Factor. The primary basis of human marriage is the erotic impulse or the sex drive. This drive, though present in most creatures of the higher order, is particularly significant in the case of man, chiefly because of the relative continuity and urgency which it evinces in human beings. The sex drive is constantly and universally at work in human beings for a longer period than in most animals; it is so positive in its quest for satisfaction, so tumultuous, that it can produce serious biological and social disturbances if left even partly unsatisfied and uncontrolled. For these reasons, this drive seems always to have called for and developed societal control, regulation, and systematization.[1]

Has Mating Always Been Regulated? Since the erotic drive is universal in human beings, it would seem by inference that some form of regulation must have prevailed among all peoples. The question whether mating has always been regulated, however, has evoked considerable discussion, especially since the middle of the last century. Some students hold to the promiscuity theory and maintain that primitive peoples mated indiscriminately, for short periods, without following a common pattern. The promiscuity theory, however, has been subjected to searching criticism and is now generally rejected. It is now believed that promiscuity, in so far as it did obtain, was a later development rather than a primal form, that it was not a general pattern but was practiced mainly by tribal chiefs. In any event, the question is at best highly speculative and has little if any practical value, since at least throughout the West some form of regulation seems to have prevailed from very early times.[2]

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[1] Economic interest is also ordinarily present in marriage. See William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, iii (New York 1927) 1515–1516.

[2] See W. H. R. Rivers, *Kinship and social organization* (London 1914) 84–86; Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 1–20; Dr. Müller-Lyer, *The family* (1913) (trans. by F. W. Stella Browne, New York 1931). For the contrary view see V. F. Calverton (ed.), *Making of man* (New York 1931) the introduction. Mr. Calverton is a Marxist.

III. MARRIAGE FOLKWAYS

The regulations of marriage as they have prevailed or now prevail in Western culture fall into two main classes: social practices and societal rules. The former are in the nature of folkways, not specifically enforced by the society; they relate more to the preparatory steps for marriage than to marriage itself; they include: (1) the folkways governing the instruction and the guidance of the young concerning sex, (2) the mate-choosing customs, and (3) betrothal and prenuptial usages.

Instructing the Young Concerning Sex. The usages concerning sex instruction have varied considerably. The pristine awakening of the sex urge occurs between the twelfth and the sixteenth year; it occurs approximately two years earlier in girls than in boys, probably earlier in southern than northern climates and in rural than in urban centers. When this awakening occurs, the young often enter into informal and casual activities. This fact seems to have been recognized in early times and to have led the primitives to the practice of instructing, supervising, and guiding the young, a practice which seems to have prevailed down to Roman times and to have been abandoned after the rise of Christianity and its doctrine of the lewdness of sex. In our times there is very little such instruction and guidance; in most communities it is prohibited; consequently the sex activities of the young are largely secretive; and with the growth of population and of the availability of transportation facilities, they are often carried on in places far beyond the reach of parents. In the United States the automobile has, for many young people, displaced the parlor of their forefathers.

Parental Mate Choosing. Mate choosing has had a rich and varied history. Part of mate choosing is a natural process of adaptive selection, by which individuals are naturally drawn to or repelled from one another. In most societies, however, the parents and relatives have intervened, and now by consent and now by disapproval, now directly and now through a match-maker, have assumed or attempted to assume some measure of control and guidance in the choice of mates. In many parts of the West mate selection has customarily been even more formal than this, the parents entering into negotiation and making preliminary choice, even before the offspring have come into maturity. Parents have from very early times selected prospective mates, or by suggestion or direct instruction have less formally guided their young to select mates according to the family's wishes. Nor was this practice confined to the older societies or to any particular time; it prevailed in England, for instance, as late as the nineteenth century.[3] Parental mate choosing, in fact, seems to have prevailed in all stable societies. The system had the advantage of keeping marriages within the same "social class," economic status, profession, or culture in general, and of leaving the parents to do the "calculating," thus enabling the offspring to devote themselves to the romantic or affectional phases of mating.

Spontaneous Mate Choosing. In many parts of the West, however, parental mate choosing has disappeared, and the young do their own choosing. This departure from long-established folkways is probably due indirectly to science and the Industrial Revolution and more immediately to the democratic movement and to coeducation. The high concentration and mobility of population, the relative independence of youth in the towns, and the influence of the doctrine of personal liberty have also contributed toward the almost complete displacement of parental guidance by spontaneous mating, particularly in democratic countries.

Problem of Mate Choosing. Perhaps in spontaneous mate choosing lies the fundamental problem of marriage; for it may be assumed that whenever individuals are properly mated, the chance of success in marriage is greater. But the problem of mate choosing is not an easy one. There are such profound biological and psychological differences between individuals that there is always the chance that two persons having marked dissimilar characteristics will mate. In addition, there are cultural differences which, other things being equal, will tend to make for lack of success in marriage. In a study of divorce among 541 men of the Harvard class of 1911, it was found that "if a college man marries a college woman, he doubles his chance for happiness; or, if you like, he cuts his chances of unhappiness in two when he marries in the college ranks."[4] How to effect a wise choice when so many factors are involved is indeed a problem.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Spontaneous Mate Choosing. Spontaneous mate choosing has its advantages. It places mating above the economic or social calculations of parents or other relatives, who ordinarily tend to consider their own interests first; it gives some measure of self-expression to the choosers and lends greater beauty and romance to mating; and it is free and adventurous.

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[3] See Washington Irving, "Specter bridegroom" in *Collected works,* ii (New York 1880).

[4] John R. Tunis, *Was college worth while?* (New York 1936) 49–50.

On the other hand, spontaneous mate choosing seems disadvantageous in some respects. It is, first of all, scarcely choosing at all. Youthful individuals tend to be drawn to each other by mere accidental propinquity; they do not primarily think but feel; they do not or cannot look ahead; they fail to consider whether they are physically or emotionally fit for one another; often they either do not perceive or ignore their differences in race and culture, in personal habits, in aptitudes, in educational and religious training, and in political background. Consequently, their choice, in so far as they do choose, is largely nondeliberative. In reality, they do not choose at all, but merely "fall" in love and often the fall mars their whole lives. In addition, spontaneous mate choosing, being mainly emotional, tends to build the romantic figment of "perfection," which often adds to the likelihood of failure in marriage. Perfect or nearly perfect marriages have been known, for example that of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett and that described in *An American Idyl.* But these are rare, very rare. Romantic marriages, in which no account is taken of biological and cultural differences and in which practically no preparation has been made for the slow, never ending process of adjustment, seem to have a greater probability of failure.

Although scientific data are not available for a sound generalization, it may be asserted that, all in all, spontaneous mate choosing does not provide a sufficient degree of control of the sex impulse or of guidance in choice. This form of mate choosing may partly account for the disorganization in marriage, as evidenced in the number of divorces, prevailing in parts of Western culture, particularly in democratic nations. Marriage, even at its best, calls for a profound adjustment; man and woman are in many respects natively so different that when to normal, inherent male-female differences, nonrational selection adds other elements of possible discord, marriage becomes so complex as frequently to be doomed to failure from the outset.

Possible Solution. In the United States the trend is toward a balanced spontaneity and deliberation, freedom and guidance, individual choice on the basis of love and social safeguards, thus combining the benefits of spontaneous mate choosing with parental guidance into a coherent system.[5] Such a system involves the giving to the young instruction concerning the basic sex functions and an appreciation of the duties and obligations of marriage. Guidance is increasingly being sought by and given to young people about to embark upon marriage. Family case workers and some physicians, lawyers, and educators are here and there imparting information as part of their professional activities. Courses in marriage and family guidance are being instituted in the universities and colleges and even in senior and junior high schools.[6] Marriage guidance clinics are being organized in connection with the institutions of higher learning; while independent bureaus, such as the Institute of Family Relations in Los Angeles, have been organized and are devoting themselves wholly to helping in problems of marriage and family guidance. This Institute during the first eighteen months of its operation had 1,300 applications for its services, 35 per cent of which were from students and teachers. The Institute publishes a valuable pamphlet, *Premarital conference*, for young couples about to be married or just married.

Betrothal and Prenuptial Practices. The essential function which mate choosing, whether guided or spontaneous, performs or is intended to perform is to suspend the expression of the erotic drive until the validity of the selection has in a measure been tested.

The betrothal carries this testing further. The betrothal system is far more than a set of mere superficialities or pleasantries; in reality it protects the individuals against hasty action. The betrothal, usually consisting of festivities of one kind or another, serves to make public announcement that selection has been made, that the parents have consented, that marriage is definitely planned, and, therefore, that "none other need apply" or disturb the nascent union. Often, even in modern societies, the betrothal involves the payment of, or the promise to pay, a dowry, which is a form of bargain-binding. A ring or some other token is also given by one or the other party as a further preliminary binding of the contract.

The betrothal is usually followed by some form of prenuptial activity. The prenuptial period lasts from a few hours to two or more years, with a recent tendency towards lengthening it, though at the moment the trend seems to be towards shorter engagements. This period of waiting performs important functions. In primitive societies one of the betrothed, either the male or the female, went to live with the family of the other. Here the young were informally subjected to social testing with reference to such matters as quarreling, biological union, dietary and recreational habits, and general likes and dislikes. In some societies the engaged individuals were even compelled by custom actually to "live together" before marriage. In our time, the period of waiting ostensibly permits parents and young people to prepare for the marriage; actually the waiting period and especially the prenuptial activities (whether openly or secretly carried on) perform the much more basic function of suspending final action, of subjecting the nascent union to social approval or disapproval, thereby further testing the validity of the proposed marriage.

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[5] See Niles Carpenter, "Courtship practices and contemporary social change in America" in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 160 (March 1932) 38–44 for an illuminating discussion of courtship practices in the United States.

[6] See M. F. Nimkoff, *The family* (Boston 1934) 503–512.

Most societies have recognized the right of breaking the engagement, without approbrium to the individuals involved, even though the time for the proposed marriage be near. But the engagement is more or less binding, and the breaking of it is somewhat difficult even in the more "progressive" societies. In rural districts and in regions where secret societies are highly organized, as in Sicily, breaking an engagement is sometimes a serious matter, relatives of the female sometimes bodily punishing the male involved. But society implicitly recognizes that the function of the waiting period is to test the suitability of the mating persons to one another, and it therefore permits the breaking off of the engagement without too great difficulty or stigma.

IV. MARRIAGE MORES

The practices just described are for the most part in the nature of folkways, that is, they are generally observed but are not fully compulsory. There are other marriage usages which are almost wholly in the nature of mores, that is, they are rules which govern the more fundamental relations and are strictly, and for the most part legally, enforced. The more rigid of these in Western culture include: (1) the age at which marriage may take place, (2) the sources from which the mates may be chosen, (3) the number of marriages which may be entered into, (4) the legal steps to be taken to consummate marriage, (5) the conditions under which marriage may be dissolved, and (6) the setting forth of rights and duties. The practices involved, more or less uniform throughout the West, constitute the more important items in the Western marital system, and many of them are embodied in laws.

V. PERMISSIBLE, ACTUAL, AND SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE AGE

Permissible Age of Marriage. Western culture has generally specified the age at which marriage may be entered into. It has considered the matter so important that it has made specific provisions in the mores, in canon and civil law.

The factor determining the permissible age seems to be puberty; at least there is a close correlation between the two. In general, maturity begins at about twelve years of age for girls and fourteen for boys; and in most of Western culture the permissible age of marriage is from twelve to sixteen for females and fourteen to eighteen for males.[7] In early Hebrew Talmudic law the permissible age of marriage was fixed at puberty; marriage under the completed twelfth year of the female or under the completed thirteenth year of the male was legally void.[8] Roman law stipulated fourteen for the male and twelve for the female. The Christian church transferred these stipulations into the canon law, and they have been followed by most countries in the Western world.[9] During the last century or more the tendency has been to raise the age limit to as high as twenty-one for men and eighteen for women. The permissible age in certain countries of Europe is shown in the following table.

In the United States the permissible age in the different states ranges between twelve and eighteen for females, and fourteen and twenty-one for males, subdivided into permissible age with consent of parents and without consent. These variations seem to follow no general rule with regard to locality, although the southern states,

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[7] Climate has sometimes been thought to influence permissible age, since southern regions were said to produce an earlier onset of puberty. See Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories* (New York 1928) 169 n.; and Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 46–47. But this idea is discredited now. See p. 159 below. Culture, on the other hand, as it becomes complex, clearly retards marriage by throwing barriers against early marriages.

[8] Willystine Goodsell, *History of marriage and the family* (rev. ed. New York 1934) 63–64.

[9] See Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 46–47.

TABLE 12. PERMISSIBLE AGE OF MARRIAGE IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1928 [10]

COUNTRY	AGE AT WHICH A VALID MARRIAGE COULD BE CONTRACTED		AGE BELOW WHICH PARENT OR GUARDIAN MUST CONSENT	
	Male	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
Austria	14	14	21	21
Belgium	18 [a]	15 [a]		
Czechoslovakia	12	12	21	21
Danzig	21 [b]	16	21 [b]	21 [b]
Denmark	21 [a]	18 [a]		
Estonia	18	16		
Finland	21 [a]	17 [a]		
France	18	15	21	21
Germany	21 [b]	16		
Greece	14	12	21	21
Hungary	12	12	[b]	[b]
Italy	14 [c]	12 [c]	25 [c]	21 [c]
Latvia	18	16		
Luxemburg	18	15		
Monaco	18	15		
Netherlands	18	16		
Norway	20 [a]	18 [a]	21	21
Poland	14	12	21	21
(Terr. formerly Prussian)	7	7		
Roumania	18	15		
Spain (Civil law)	14	12		
(Canon law)	16	14		
Sweden	21 [a]	18 [a]	21	21
Switzerland	18	17	21	21
United Kingdom	14	12	21	21
Turkey	15	15	18	18

[a] Appeal to the Crown or the Court may be made in order to marry earlier.
[b] Majority is usually 21 years but may be set at 18 years.
[c] Legal authority must consent when the male is under 18 and the female under 15; appeal to the court may be made if the parents refuse consent when the male is 25 years and the female 21 years.
Those countries not included above failed to send in information to the League of Nations.

with some exceptions, have a lower limit than the northern, as may be seen from table 13.

Age Folkways. Besides the age set by law, there are customs which, though not followed rigidly, have some affect in determining the age of marriage. In Europe, up to recent times, a girl could not remain unmarried beyond her early twenties without incurring social opprobrium. Everywhere the unmarried woman over thirty is slightingly referred to as an "old maid." With the opening of the economic field to women, however, a recognition of the possibility of a choice between marriage and a career has mitigated

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[10] League of Nations, Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People, Child Welfare Committee, *Age of marriage and the age of consent* (Geneva 1928).

TABLE 13. LEGAL MINIMUM AGES OF MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1928 [11]

States	No. of States	Minimum Age with Consent	States	No. of States	Minimum Age with Consent
		Males			*Females*
Arizona California Delaware[a] Idaho[a] Illinois Indiana Michigan Minnesota Montana Nebraska Nevada New Mexico New York North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon South Carolina South Dakota West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming	22	18	Colorado[a] Idaho[a] Maine[a] Maryland[a] Mississippi[a] Missouri[a] New Jersey[a] New York Vermont[a] Washington[a]	10	18
Colorado[a] Connecticut[a] Maine[a] Maryland[a] Mississippi[a] Missouri[a] New Jersey[a] Rhode Island[a] Vermont[a] Washington[a]	10	21	Connecticut[a] Rhode Island[a]	2	21
Alabama Arkansas Georgia	3	17		0	17
District of Columbia North Carolina Texas Utah	4	16	Arizona Delaware California Illinois Indiana Michigan Montana Nebraska Nevada Ohio W. Virginia Wyoming	12	16
Kansas	1	15	Minnesota New Mexico N. Dakota Oklahoma Oregon S. Dakota Wisconsin	7	15
Florida Iowa Kentucky Louisiana Massachusetts New Hampshire Pennsylvania Tennessee Virginia	9	14	Alabama Arkansas Dis. of Col. Georgia N. Carolina S. Carolina Texas Utah	8	14
			New Hampshire	1	13
			Florida Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Massachusetts Pennsylvania Tennessee Virginia	9	12

[a] Appeal to the Court may be made in order to marry earlier.

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[11] Table based on League of Nations, *Ages of marriage and ages of consent in the various countries* (Geneva 1928). The minimum age is considerably higher in most states when marriage occurs without consent. In nearly all, twenty-one years is the required age for the male and eighteen for the female.

these folkways. Today the unmarried professional woman, with her independent income, often has more varied and numerous activities and social contacts open to her than the married woman. The latter, accordingly, often regards the unmarried woman with envy. It is no longer to be assumed that a woman fails to marry only from the lack of opportunity.

No stigma, as a rule, rests on the unmarried man, since traditionally the male takes the initiative in proposing marriage; and since, in a culture in which women are available, it is unlikely that a man cannot find some mate if he wishes to do so. However, the man who remains unmarried beyond thirty-five or forty is sometimes regarded as selfish, as failing in his "duty" to society. In some states, notably ancient Rome, modern Italy and Germany, bachelors have been or are subjected to special taxes as a form of penalty.

Another social prejudice frowns upon marriage between persons who differ too greatly in age. Disapproval is especially strong of a woman who marries a man greatly her junior.

Actual Age of Marriage. The average age at which people actually marry is always higher than that permitted by law. This is to be expected, since not everyone enters into marriage immediately upon reaching marriageable age. In the countries of Europe listed in table 14 the age at which marriage took place down to 1915 ranged from 21.3 to 27.9 years for females, and 23.9 to 31.8 years for males, or roughly an average of 11.3 years later than the permissible age for women and 12.4 years later for men. During and just after the World War the age at which people marry went up and down erratically; but since 1922 it fell steadily and markedly for men and also fell, but less markedly, for women in most countries in Europe.[12]

In the United States the median age at which marriage took place in 1930 was 25.6 for males and 22.4 for females. This age is lower than that for the countries listed in table 14, except Serbia, although the data are not strictly comparable because of more complete statistics for Europe. The foreign born, both men and women, married at a slightly later age than the general native population, probably due in part to the disparity of the sexes among foreigners. The Negroes, on the other hand, tend to marry at a slightly earlier age than the native white population, probably due in some meas-

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[12] Edward Westermarck, *Future of marriage in Western civilisation* (New York 1936) 153.

TABLE 14. AGE OF MARRIAGE IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES [13]
(Annual median, by years and tenths of years, for periods indicated)

STATES	1876–1885		1886–1895		1896–1905		1906–1910		1906–1915	
	Males	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*	*Males*	*Females*
Austria	30.9	26.8	31.8	26.7	....	....	....	....	....	....
Belgium	30.6	26.7	29.7	27.0	....	....	....	....	....	....
Denmark	30.3	27.3	30.0	26.9	29.1	26.1	29.0	25.9	....	....
England and Wales	....	....	28.3	26.1	28.5	26.3	28.8	26.6	28.9	26.7
Finland	29.5	26.3	29.6	26.2	29.3	25.9	29.3	26.0	29.4	26.1
France	29.0	25.2	29.8	25.3	29.7	25.1	29.7	25.3	....	....
Germany	....	....	....	....	28.9	25.8	29.0	25.7	29.0	25.7
Holland	30.5	27.9	30.0	27.3	29.4	26.4	29.1	26.8	29.2	26.7
Hungary	28.6	23.4	28.8	23.9	....	....	....	....	....	....
Italy	29.9	25.1	29.6	25.0	29.1	24.8	28.6	24.5	28.8	24.5
Norway	30.5	27.4	30.3	27.3	30.4	27.4	....	....	....	....
Scotland	....	....	....	....	29.0	26.4	29.2	26.5	29.2	26.5
Serbia	....	....	24.5	21.7	23.9	21.3	....	....	....	....
Sweden	30.5	27.8	30.5	27.6	30.2	27.1	30.0	26.8	30.1	26.8
Switzerland	30.9	27.3	30.8	27.4	30.4	27.2	30.0	27.3	....	....

ure to the rural life they lead in the southern states. The details are shown in table 15.

TABLE 15. MEDIAN AGE AT MARRIAGE BY SEX, COLOR, AND NATIVITY FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1930 [14]

COLOR AND NATIVITY	*Male*	*Female*
All classes	25.6	22.4
Native White	25.6	22.6
Native parentage	25.0	22.0
Foreign or mixed parentage	27.3	23.9
Foreign born White	27.6	23.4
Negro	23.3	20.5

Factors in Age of Marriage. In accordance with the difference both in the age of sex-awakening and the permissible age of marriage, men are generally older than women at time of marriage, as seen from the tables above. A special study of marriage licenses granted in Philadelphia and the neighboring counties in 1931 showed that in four-fifths of all the cases the men were older than the women, in two-thirds of the cases the difference being less than six years; in about one-tenth the couples were the same age; in another one-tenth the women were older than the men, the difference in age being less than six years in 88 per cent of these cases. In the most frequent arrangement, the men were one year older than the women; in about 8 per cent of the cases the groom was more than ten years older than the bride.[15] Gini, calculating the marriage rates in Italy for the years 1921–1923, found the highest rates per 100,000 marriages to be between grooms 25 to 29 years of age marrying brides 20 to 24 years of age (16,241); the second highest between grooms 25 to 29 marrying brides of the same age group (11,023); and the third highest between grooms 21 to 24 marrying brides 15 to 20 (10,530).[16]

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[13] Based on Corrado Gini, *et al.*, *Demografia* (Torino 1930) 107. The following note by Gini, *et al.*: Austria and Belgium 1881–85 and 1881–90, Denmark 1901–05, England 1906–14, Germany 1901–05 and 1911–14, Italy 1881–85, 1891–1900, 1911–14, Norway 1871–80, 1881–90, 1891–1900, Scotland 1904–5, 1906–14, Serbia 1896–1900 first marriages only, Sweden 1906–13, Switzerland 1881–90, 1891–1900, 1901–10, Hungary 1881–85, 1891–99, Finland 1881–85, 1896–1900 first marriages only, 1906–14.

[14] United States Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930: Population*, ii (Washington 1931) 838.

There are other conditions which seem to produce a smaller or a greater departure in actual age of marriage from the permissible age in both sexes. It was once thought that climate had a bearing on the age of marriage; people who lived in warmer climates were thought to marry nearer the permissible ages than those in colder climates, the underlying factor being earlier maturity of the female in southern climates. "Recent investigation would seem to show that climatic conditions do not have so profound an influence on the establishment of puberty as formerly supposed. It is now generally believed that the average age of puberty in the various sections of the earth is nearly the same and that it does not vary so greatly as heretofore believed. It has taught, however, that girls raised in the city mature at an earlier period than those raised in country districts, and also that those reared in affluence mature earlier than those raised in a poor environment."[17] For the North American continent as a whole, climate "has practically no *influence;* race, very *little*, and . . . mentality, surroundings, education and nerve-stimulation stand out prominently in this country [U. S.] as the factors which determine the advent of puberty."[18]

Rural-urban location seems to have a bearing on the age of marriage. Country people seem to marry closer to the permissible age than city people. The median age at first marriage in the United States in 1930 was 25.1 for urban men, as compared with

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[15] See James H. S. Bossard, "Age factor in marriage" in *American journal of sociology*, xxxviii (1933) 536–547.

[16] Gini, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 118.

[17] P. Brooke Bland, *Gynecology, medical and surgical* (2d rev. ed. Philadelphia 1932) 3. By permission of Dr. Bland and F. A. Davis Company.

[18] *Ibid.*, 15.

24.3 for rural men; and 22.3 for urban women against 21.1 for rural women.[19] The factors responsible for these differences are not clear. It may be that as life is not highly specialized and the necessities are more readily available in the country, early marriage is economically more feasible; whereas in the city people are obliged to think of the necessities in terms of money and to consider the specialized requirements of urban life. In the country a wife and children are assets as helping hands; in the city a family is a synonym of expense, and a sense of economic security is probably less easy to reach. Again, country life is often isolated and monotonous, and social contacts and activities are less numerous and varied; intimate companionship is, therefore, necessary. In the country sex stimulation among the young may result from the frequent observation of the procreating of animals; in the city, on the other hand, contraceptive knowledge and devices are widely disseminated and quite accessible. In the country extramarital sexual arrangements are difficult, whereas in the city apartment living, the anonymity resulting from large numbers, and the general lack of close community bonds probably contribute to such arrangements.

Socio-economic conditions also seem to have a bearing on the age of marriage. In general, the poor and uneducated seem to marry at an age closer to the permissible age than people in opposite circumstances. The poor seem to have less foresight and less control over the sex passions than do the more well-to-do and better educated. Again, the children of the poor, living as they do under crowded conditions and being for much of the time out of reach of the parents, are subjected earlier and more often to the propinquity which leads to sex awareness. In addition, there is no special economic advantage to the youthful poor in postponing marriage: the wages paid in menial occupations for which no apprenticeship is required vary little with age. Further, the poor, perhaps because of their low standards of living, seem to labor under the delusion that two can live as cheaply as one. Parental guidance and control are less operative among the poor; for the parents are too much engrossed in the struggle to make a living, and the children are economically independent at an earlier age. Finally, the poor usually lack the information which people in the higher income brackets have for alternative sexual outlets.

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[19] United States Bureau of the Census, *Median age at marriage*, release of October 15, 1935.

Children of middle-class and wealthy parents, on the other hand, seem subject to several influences which discourage early marriage. The parents in these income groups, especially the rich, seem to be psychologically dependent on and to cling to their children much more than poor parents; and therefore they are likely to delay rather than to forward the marriages of their dependents. Such psychological hanging-on may serve as compensation for the lack of other vital interests among the well-to-do. Among the poor the struggle to exist, to maintain a home, and to rear children is stimulating; among the rich, boring. Marriage in middle-class and wealthy groups is postponed also because of more costly standards of living, the longer period given to education and professional preparation, and the contraceptive knowledge and methods available to them. Especially is this true of college young people who, on account of socio-economic demands, are forced to remain in college and graduate school long after they are biologically ready to marry. The so-called sex problem in colleges and universities is due to this biological, social, and economic fact, rather than to any special immorality on the part of college students. Perhaps solution may be found in student marriages or in the foregoing of a college education.

Some of these socio-economic factors are reflected in table 16, which shows, according to the social class of the husband, mean and modal age at marriage. The data refer to women of native white parentage who were under forty years of age at their marriage, who were married between April 16, 1900 and April 15, 1905, and who were living with their husbands at the time of the 1910 census.

TABLE 16. AVERAGE MARRIAGE AGE OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES ACCORDING TO SOCIAL CLASS OF HUSBAND [20]

SOCIAL CLASS OF HUSBAND	AVERAGE AGE OF WOMEN AT MARRIAGE	
	Mode	*Mean*
Total Urban	20.5	22.4
Professional	23.5	24.8
Proprietary	21.7	23.3
Clerks	21.3	22.9
Skilled workers	19.6	21.8
Semiskilled workers	19.5	21.2
Unskilled laborers	18.5	21.4
Total rural	19.2	21.4
Farm owners	20.0	22.3
Farm renters	19.0	20.9
Farm laborers	18.1	20.1

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[20] Based on an article by Frank W. Notestein, "Differential age at marriage according to social class" in *American journal of sociology*, xxxvii (1931) 40.

Another factor which seems to influence the age of marriage is the stage of culture. In an early stage of cultural development, as for instance in colonial America, people tend to marry earlier; but with development life's daily requirements become more exacting, and contacts and demands multiply. It may also be, as Herbert Spencer believed, that the type of life led in more complex culture, particularly intensive mental activity, reduces the sexual urge, certainly reduces fertility, and possibly lowers fecundity. As the urbanization of culture takes place, people tend to marry at a later age.

Present Trend toward Earlier Marriage Age. At present there is in Western culture a general tendency toward earlier marriage. The reasons for this are several. The prospect of joining two incomes, coupled with the increasingly wide prevalence of a knowledge of birth control, making possible the postponement of children until the husband can support them, probably induces employed persons to marry earlier.[21] In "Middletown" earlier marriages were attributed to the virtual cessation of apprenticeship; to increased income from married women's earnings; to easy divorce, which makes the decision to marry less serious than formerly; to conception control, which affords protection against the too-early burden of children; and to the handicap of the unmarried in leisure activities, which is at present carried on in couples rather than in groups.[22] Further, the aid often given today by parents; the increasing realization by the young themselves that a youthful marriage is more likely to achieve a fuller psychological and sexual adjustment; and the business depression, which has shaken the faith of young people in professional achievement and savings accounts, all seem to encourage earlier marriage.

Postponing or Foregoing Marriage. On the other hand, certain factors are at work in the West which induce certain classes of the population to postpone or completely forego marriage. The rise in the cost of living, which requires larger incomes and longer periods of preparatory training, has caused some groups to postpone, if not to forego, marriage. The increasing ability of women to earn their own living and the accumulation of inherited wealth in their hands[23] make women less and less dependent on men; hence delay in marriage and hence also women's apparent unwillingness to bear children. Urban dwelling, with its rooming houses, restaurants, laundries, separation of economic activity from the home, the ease of illicit sexual relations, has likewise made men less dependent on women. The spread of knowledge of contraception has made it possible for those disinclined to assume marital obligations to postpone or forego marriage. Moreover, "by the diffusion of a finer culture throughout the community, men and women can less easily find anyone whom they are willing to take as a partner for life; their requirements are more exacting; their standards of excellence higher; they are less able to find any who can justify their own ideal, and less able to satisfy anybody else's ideal." [24]

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[21] See Ralph de Pomerai, *Marriage, past, present and future* (New York 1930) 95.

[22] See Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown* (New York 1929) chap. x. For a contrary view see Edward Westermarck, *Future of marriage in Western civilisation* (New York 1936) 51, 52.

[23] It is roughly estimated that over half of the spending in the United States is done by women. See Mary Sidney Branch, *Women and wealth* (Chicago 1934).

This tendency on the part of the middle and upper classes to postpone or entirely forego marriage may be regarded as culturally desirable; a desire for security and comfort, for intellectual or other improvement, and for the advancement of the status of children are nearly everywhere looked upon as higher social values. Yet it involves maladjustments. The possible effect of the undue postponement or the complete avoidance of marriage on the physical and psychological structure of the individual may be biologically detrimental. This problem is more than a personal one. Postponement of marriage no doubt is interrelated with prostitution, with the decreasing size of the family, and in particular, with the decreasing size of the family in the more able groups of society. An undue proportion of the aged in a given society also places heavy burdens on the middle-age segments of society.

Age and Success in Marriage. The age at which persons marry seems to have some bearing on success in marriage. Success, of course, is a relative matter. Socially, a marriage may be called successful if the married individuals are sexually mated, and if they are sufficiently adjusted to permit the constructive development of the partners rather than the tearing down of the personality of either.[25] Societally, marriage may be considered successful as long as it does not end in divorce, desertion, separation; if it produces at

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[24] Quoted from an unnamed author by Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 52. By permission of The Macmillan Company. Professor Westermarck has been a bachelor all his life.

[25] An outstanding example of successful marriage is that of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who in their eighties still found life together an adventure. In the preface of their *Soviet communism: a new civilisation?* (New York 1936) xii, they ask, "Why did



FIGURE 4. THE RISK OF DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES [26]

According to ages of the bride and groom at marriage as indicated by Philadelphia marriage license and Domestic Relations Court records.

least two normally healthy and intelligent offspring; and if it does not have to rely on public or private charity to any greater extent than other marriages in the same occupational class and economic condition. It may be assumed that most marriages which are not publicly declared failures must have achieved some measure of adjustment.

The extent to which age has a bearing on success in marriage, as

two aged mortals . . . undertake a work of such magnitude?" And they answer the question: ". . . we had a world to gain—a new subject to investigate; a fresh circle of stimulating acquaintances with whom to discuss entirely new topics, and above all a daily joint occupation, in intimate companionship, to interest, amuse and even excite us in the last stage of life's journey." By permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

[26] Hornell Hart and Wilmer Shields, "Happiness in relation to age at marriage" in *Journal of social hygiene*, xii (1926) 405. By permission of The Am. Social Hygiene Association.

TABLE 17. SUCCESSFUL MARRYING AGE [27]

INVESTIGATOR	AGE FOR MEN	AGE FOR WOMEN
Popenoe	20's (early)	20's (early)
Duncan and Young	20–22	17–19
Howard	21	18
Bruce	21 (at least)	18 (at least)
Galbraith	23–26	23–26 (not more than 5 years man's junior)
Metrop. Life Ins. Co.	25 and over	20–25
Walsh	25–30 (latest 35)	21–25 (latest 30)
Hart and Shields	25–33	22–29
Wissler	25–34	22–29
Bossard	30	23–25
Van de Velde	30	23–25
Murry and Young	35	

success is here defined, is not known precisely. Practically no data exist; also the variables are many. However, authoritative opinions throw light on the question. Carr-Saunders states that marriage before puberty often produces the premature death of the female, respiratory diseases, or ovarian difficulties.[28] Too early marriage is believed to be unsuccessful in terms of adjustment, those under twenty at present proving to be particularly so as a rule.[29]

On the other hand, comparatively early marriage is believed to have biological, social, and societal advantages. One author claims that after a girl is 18 or 20, an early marriage tends to remove the emotional strain of celibacy which, if prolonged, may distort her natural personality. A younger woman has a wider choice of men and therefore is more likely to secure a suitable mate, making it easier for younger couples to adjust themselves to one another in the marriage state. Judges and divorce lawyers have noted less frequency of divorce in early marriages than in late ones.[30] However, no data are available with which to substantiate the proposition, and there are so many other possible factors that to draw a general conclusion would be unwarranted.[31] About all that can be said is that age appears to be one factor in success or failure in marriage.[32] Figure 4 on page 164 and table 17 on page 165 on the successful ages should therefore be used with caution.

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[27] Paul Popenoe, Interview of December 1, 1935; Otis D. Duncan, *et al.*, "Factor of age in marriage" in *American journal of sociology*, xxxix (1934) 473; George Elliott Howard, *History of matrimonial institutions*, 3 vols. (Chicago 1904); Gustav Marius Bruce, *Marriage and divorce* (Minneapolis 1930) 184; Anna M. Galbraith, *Family and the new democracy* (Philadelphia 1920) 241; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Right marrying age" in *Literary digest*, 102 (1929) 32; Hornell Hart and Wilmer Shields, "Happiness in relation to age at marriage" in *Journal of social hygiene*, xii (1926) 403–407; Clark Wissler, "Integration of the sexes—marriage" in Edmund V. Cowdry (ed.), *Human biology and racial welfare* (New York 1930) 289; James H. S. Bossard, "Age factor in marriage" in *American journal of sociology*, xxxviii (1933) 545–547; Theodor Hendrik van de Velde, *Ideal marriage* (New York 1930) 274; John Middleton Murry and James C. Young, "Modern marriage" in *Forum*, 81 (1929) 22–26.

[28] See A. M. Carr-Saunders, *Population problem* (New York 1922) 104.

[29] See James Hayden Tufts, *America's social morality* (New York 1933) 102.

[30] Paul Popenoe, *Modern marriage* (New York 1925) 50.

VI. SOURCES OF MATES

Exogamy. Society also specifies the source from which the mates must or must not be chosen. In this regard two principal mores, known as exogamy and endogamy, have prevailed for a long time in Western culture. Exogamy provides that mates must be chosen from outside certain definite limits. The most widely prevailing and rigidly enforced form of exogamy is consanguineous or kinship exogamy. This prohibits a person from marrying within his own immediate family; and violations are severely punished throughout the West. The prohibition applies most rigidly to father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister marriages; less rigidly to first, second, and third cousins; while prohibitions of uncle-niece and aunt-nephew marriages vary from total restriction to mild social disapproval.[33] Departures from these rules have occurred in the past and do occur. Parent-child marriages are very rare. Brother-sister marriages are less rare, especially among royal families which employ it as a means of preserving "blood purity." Half-brother-sister marriages are even more frequent, while uncle-niece, aunt-nephew marriages and cousin marriages are not uncommon in the modern Western world.

The other forms of exogamy are not of particular significance in the contemporary West. The marriage of relatives by marriage is ordinarily permitted; marriage with a deceased wife's sister, usually prohibited by the Catholic Church, is still quite common. Name exogamy seems to have prevailed chiefly among primitives, who attributed to a common name a mystic link between people and who ascribed to a name blood relationship, as indeed in small tribal communities this was usually the case. Name exogamy does not seem to have prevailed at all widely at any time; in any country, one may find considerable interbreeding among persons of the same name. Place or "local" exogamy exists in some parts of the Eastern culture area, as in Australia where marriage is prohibited between inhabitants of the same village, even though there is no blood relationship; but in most parts of the West this form of exogamy has no validity.

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[31] See Jessie Bernard, "Distribution of success in marriage" in *American journal of sociology*, xxxix (1933) 194–203.

[32] "Our modern standard of living puts such a premium upon the husband's earning power that few girls can hope to marry a husband near their own age without facing a grievous sacrifice. . . . This disparity of marriage age that is so often forced upon our girls by economic urge is one of the commonest causes of divorce." George A. Bartlett, *Men, women and conflict* (New York 1931) 211, 212.

[33] The Roman Catholic Church has in the past prohibited marriage within seven generations, and at present it prohibits it within three cousin generations. See Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 74–75.

Reasons for Exogamy. Various explanations of exogamy have been advanced: the superstitious belief that fertility had magic power and the desire to form political or economic alliances among neighboring tribes[34] have been offered as possible explanations. But as a matter of fact nothing is actually known about the origin of exogamy.

Exogamy is sometimes explained in terms of innate aversion. It is believed that people have an inherent or acquired aversion to mating with blood relatives, especially with those who have lived in close proximity from infancy. "Generally speaking, there is a remarkable absence of erotic feelings between persons living very closely together from childhood. . . . Such indifference is very generally combined with sexual aversion . . . , aversions which are generally felt readily lead to moral disapproval and prohibitory customs or laws."[35] This explanation, however, is based on fragmentary evidence and does not take into consideration that parent-offspring matings are known to have occurred. Nor is this but "the negative expression of a corresponding desire for the forbidden thing,"[36] for parent-offspring mating must have occurred on a sufficiently wide scale to have led to the general disapproval of incest and to the legal punishment of it which prevail in Western society.

Exogamy rules are sometimes explained in terms of the belief that inbreeding produces deleterious biological effects. This idea was widespread during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and statistics were sometimes cited to prove it.[37] But evidence does not warrant the conclusion that inbreeding *per se* produces inferior progeny. The cases of the Kallikak and the Jukes families used to be cited; but the inferior results of these instances of inbreeding only show that the original stocks were so inferior that they could not fail to produce offspring of low quality. Generally speaking, the findings of biology indicate that inbreeding (or outbreeding) *per se* has little if any bearing on quality. In fact, improvement may occur whenever two well-developed specimens inbreed; children born in families of superior people will more probably be superior than children born in inferior families.[38] If it should ever be established that intrafamilial breeding produces a high type of progeny, mankind would have made one of the greatest discoveries of all times and have at its disposal a technique for the definite control of breeding the race. The incest taboo, therefore, is believed to be magical and not due to instinct, nature, reason, or common sense.[39]

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[34] See F. E. Williams, *Blending of cultures* (Government Printer, Port Moresby 1935) and a review of the same in *Sociological review*, xxix (London 1937) 110.

[35] Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 80, 84. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

[36] See Brenda Z. Seligman, "Incest taboo as a social regulation" in *Sociological review*, xxvii (London 1935) 75–93.

[37] See Michael G. Mulhall, *Dictionary of statistics*, article on "Marriage" (London 1892) 383.

A third explanation of exogamy is the social one. This theory holds that the very existence of the family as an economic and social unit rests upon the authority of the parent and the subordinate position of the child. Parent-offspring unions would, therefore, tend to destroy this relationship. Accordingly, exogamy rules were developed on the part of the elders as a means of self-protection, in order to preserve their authority and thereby assure to themselves respect and care. Exogamy, thus, is essential to social structure.[40] This theory, however, works in the case of mother-son marriages, where the mother has to descend from her superior position to the inferior one of a wife; but it does not explain the prohibition of father-daughter and sister-brother marriages. For when the wife was bought, together with the slave, camel, or horse, her position was not much different from that of a daughter or a sister; and consequently there was not much elevation in position when a daughter or a sister became a wife.

None of these explanations is satisfactory; and as in the case of all origins, no valid explanation is available. Whatever the origin, exogamy rules are among the most rigidly enforced rules in Western culture; and violations, termed incest, are severely punished.

Endogamy. While exogamy provides that marriage must take place outside consanguineous and related bounds, endogamy stipulates that marriage must take place within prescribed limits. These limits refer chiefly to race and culture, and to a less extent to nationality, religion, economic status, and sometimes political affiliation.

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[38] See Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) 273–322.

[39] See Lord Raglan, "Incest and exogamy" in *Social science abstracts*, iv (1932) no. 8884.

[40] See Seligman, *op. cit.*, 93.

Race endogamy provides that marriage must take place within one's own race. How early this rule prevailed it is difficult to say. Previous to the modern era people did not have a clear concept of race; and even if they did, there was a great deal of interracial marriage, judging from the fact that the races are all mixed.[41] In our times interracial marriages occur quite frequently in certain countries, such as France, without opprobrium; but in other countries, such as the United States, marriage between persons belonging to the three parent races, the Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid, is strictly forbidden. Mating occurs, as is evidenced by the mulatto, but it is not approved by society. If society discovers that such a union is contemplated, it clamps upon it rigidly.

What has been said of race applies in a measure also to culture. Religious endogamy has been and is prevalent and rigid. As early as Biblical times, descendants of Abraham were expressly forbidden to intermarry with Canaanites.[42] In the time of the Maccabeans and the wars against the Romans, religious authorities interdicted matrimonial connections between Israelites and all Gentiles. The Rabbinical Code made a general prohibition of intermarriage with Gentiles.[43] Marriages of Christians and Jews were prohibited during the Christian era and were disapproved more than marriage with pagans. In the sixteenth century marriage between Catholics and "heretics" was prohibited; and with modifications the canon law still stands. In most Catholic countries it is almost compulsory that marriage shall be within the communion; and only a small proportion of the faithful marries non-Catholics. Protestant sects also frown upon marriage outside Protestantism and sometimes outside given denominations. Civil law, however, does not recognize these prohibitions, so that religious endogamy is generally ignored even in some semi-Catholic countries, such as France, and in all Protestant nations.[44]

Nationality endogamy also prevails to some extent. Nearly everywhere in the Western world there is some prejudice against marriage with a person of another nationality, the foreigner usually being regarded as "inferior." Throughout the United States, for example, marriage with a "foreigner" is barely tolerated and in many instances is condemned, although there is some difference in degree of intolerance according to the cultural closeness or distance of the country from which the foreigner comes. Nationality endogamy has without doubt lost much of its power in the West due to international migration, to democracy and education, and to social mobility; yet it still prevails in many parts. Even English-American or French-Italian marriages often carry some small degree of social disapproval.

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[41] See chap. 6 above.

[42] See Genesis xxvi:34.

[43] See Edward Westermarck, *History of human marriage*, ii (5th ed. New York 1922) 52, 55.

[44] See Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 58–59.

Endogamy rules apply also to economic class. In early Rome, plebeians could not marry patricians; among the Teutonic people, noblemen and freemen could not marry serfs; and in modern society, marriage between the rich and the poor is rare.

Political endogamy also prevails to some extent. Cases have been known of family disapproval to the daughter of a Republican family marrying a "riff-raff" of a Democrat, while the traditional contempt of the Southern Democrat for a Yankee Republican has established a very real political endogamy. The marriage of a son or a daughter of a "decent and respectable" Republican or Democrat family to a Socialist or Communist is probably generally regarded as a scandal.

Reasons for Endogamy. Various theories have been advanced in explanation of endogamy. It is held that in early times it was necessary to prohibit marriage outside the tribal bounds in order to preserve tribal unity. In all probability this reason played some part, especially in preagricultural and early agricultural times when the social structure depended to a certain extent on the relative uniformity of cultural patterns. Its continuation into modern times is simply an instance of persistence of cultural traits after they have ceased to be useful.

Another explanation is found in ethnic prejudice. Most peoples have regarded themselves as the original and "superior" race and all others as inferior. The Biblical prophets, for example, frequently emphasized the superiority of the "chosen." Such insistence appears to be particularly true of peoples who have not had prolonged cultural experience, or who, being geographically isolated, have not come into intimate, prolonged contact with other peoples. But even that cannot explain it all. Peoples who have had a long cultural history and have come into contact with other ethnic groups seem also to apply the endogamy mores. The Italians, for example, have for generations looked askance upon marriage with Austrians, Yugoslavs, or related groups. This may be political prejudice. Yet political prejudice is not always the underlying reason. Some years ago an urgent cable-message was received from the attorney of a Roman family asking a social worker in Boston to investigate a Back Bay "blue blood" family. The son of the Back Bay family on a visit in Italy had fallen in love with the Roman's daughter, and the Roman family was trying to find reasons which would dissuade the daughter from marrying one "inferior" to her.

Closely related to the above is the social-stratification explanation. This theory maintains that as a given society becomes older, stratified, and ossified, it adopts endogamy rules in order to preserve the established strata, especially the nobility and the wealthy.

The reasons for endogamy rules in our times are probably mainly social. Persons of the same race, culture, class, and religious and political beliefs tend, other things being equal, to adjust themselves in the state of marriage more readily than those belonging to diverse groups. And, as a corollary, the nearer they are in one or more of these respects, the more chance is there that adjustment will take place. The contrary also holds true. Sufficient data are not yet available to prove this generalization, but it is frequently observed that marriage between persons of widely diverse races or cultures tends to present almost insuperable difficulties to accommodation. As already pointed out, when to the normal differences which mark the male and the female are added those of wide racial or cultural divergences, adjustment seems to be almost impossible.

Whatever the underlying reason, endogamy rules generally apply more rigidly to the female than to the male. "Superior" peoples more or less tolerate the marriage of their males into the "inferior" group, but they are exceedingly intolerant when it comes to their females marrying a male of the "inferior" group. The reason for this is very obscure. Westermarck approvingly quotes de Quatrefages as saying that "Woman refuses to lower herself; man is less delicate," [45] but this appears to be rationalization rather than explanation. Another explanation has been sought in the practice that when an "inferior" female marries a "superior" male, she usually accepts his nationality and sometimes his religion and thereby becomes "superior," while when she marries an "inferior" male, she, for the same reason, has to descend to an "inferior" position. Whatever the reason the fact is that whenever two races, cultures, nationalities, religions, classes or political groups come in contact, it is usually the men of the dominant group who depart from the mores and marry into the "inferior" group. In some colonial settlements the men of the governing country have had to be strictly forbidden by law to marry native women; for example, the Spaniards in America, the English in Mauritius, and the French in Réunion and the Antilles. The process is seldom, if ever, reversed.

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[45] Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 54.

At present, the prevalence of democracy, the mobility of population, and the contact of divers population elements, especially in urban centers, are so great that endogamy rules are relaxing nearly everywhere. In Nazi Germany, however, marriage with Jews is strictly forbidden and in Russia marriages with the nobility would be a virtual impossibility. These are probably passing phenomena.

VII. RULES AS TO NUMBER OF MATES

Mores of Plural Marriages. Western culture also makes definite provisions with reference to the number of persons an individual may marry. The bases for polygamy and monogamy are only vaguely known. Some writers point to biological factors, especially in the case of polygamy; while monogamy is ascribed to natural jealousy, to the apparent human preference for a stable union, and to the propensity of human beings for leading a grooved, stable life. But in each case substantiating evidence is meager.

Polygamy. Polygamy, the contracting of two or more legal marriages either concurrently or successively, is a very old form of marriage, judging from the practices described in the Old Testament. Polygamy does not seem to be due to mere concupiscence; there being very little evidence that promiscuity has ever obtained, and that even group marriage has prevailed at all widely. It has two subforms: polygyny, the marriage of one man to two or more women; and polyandry, the marriage of one woman to two or more men.

Polygyny may perhaps best be explained in terms of social factors. Among primitives the duties of the first wife were often so arduous that she bought another female to help with the household duties. In other cases excessive periodicity in the wife, sterility, frigidity, or senility in either partner perhaps gave rise to polygyny.

Often the element of prestige seems to have given rise to additional unions, to have more than one wife or husband being considered a distinction. Then, too, the prohibition against cohabitation during pregnancy and prolonged lactation may have resulted in further marriages.

Polygyny has also arisen in pioneering communities such as those of the Mormons in Utah. Polygyny was adopted there as a means toward increasing the numbers of the faithful. They had practiced polygamy in the East, but only to a limited extent. When they migrated to the great plains and broke immediate contacts with the rest of society, they were able to adopt polygyny as a general form without great difficulty. After the Federal government declared polygamy illegal and undertook to prosecute its practicers, the Mormons gradually abandoned it. However, polygyny was at no time compulsory among the Mormons; monogamy was also recognized as usual.[46]

Polyandry among primitives took two forms: fraternal polyandry, in which a woman married the eldest brother and then the younger ones as they came of age; and unrestricted polyandry. Polyandry seems to have been connected with special conditions. Female infanticide with the consequent scarcity of women may have contributed to it; special communities, such as encampments of soldiers, lumber camps, or bodies of pioneers, have resulted in a locally confined polyandry. It is sometimes contended that militarism tends to foster polyandry in the military group and polygyny at home, but there is little evidence that this is so. In seventeenth century Europe, which was predominantly military, no tendency toward polyandry is discerned. However, this may have been due to special conditions. The military forces withdrawn from society were too small to effect any change in the population in general; the employment of mercenaries tended to concentrate the influence of militarism upon one class of society; and the presence of women as noncombatants, in numbers approximately equal to the men in the theater of war, tended to preserve the balance of the sexes.[47]

[46] See Bruce Kinney, *Mormonism, the Islam of America* (New York 1912); John Henry Evans, *One hundred years of Mormonism* (3d ed. Salt Lake City 1905); Hubert Howe Bancroft, *History of Utah* (San Francisco 1889); Horace L. Friess and Herbert W. Schneider, *Religion in various cultures* (New York 1932).

[47] See Gaston Bodart, *Losses of life in modern wars* (Oxford 1916) 70; Theodore Ayrault Dodge, *Gustavus Adolphus* (Boston 1895) 60, 569–581, 750; George Macaulay Trevelyan, *England under Queen Anne*, i (London 1930) 229–231; Oliver Lyman Spaulding, *et al.*,

Plural Mating. Polygamy is practically nonexistent in the West at present. However, a distinction must be made between polygamy as a legal form and the same relationship without legal sanction. The latter is termed adultery or bigamy, and is proscribed by the criminal law of most countries. The mulatto population of the southern states is evidence of such illicit relationships between Whites and Negroes. The maintenance of "mistresses," the more or less clandestine "affairs," and the many instances of divorced persons who remarry several times are not to be confused with polygamy.

In all probability considerable plural mating occurs in Western society, particularly at present. The peculiar modes of living forced on people in certain occupations, such as motion picture workers, artists, transportation workers, and traveling salesmen; the organization of economic activity away from home, with separation of husband and wife; the daily immediate contacts, such as those between business partners or between employers and secretaries; migration, with the impassable barriers it puts between married persons; and the ease with which divorce usually can be obtained, all favor plural mating in contemporary society.

The legalization of these practices into a system of polygamy is sometimes advocated. Polygamy is said to enable all people to marry; to provide adults with the opportunity of counterbalancing the shortcomings of one mate by the qualities of another; to give males and females a way of securing legitimate offspring even though one mate be sterile or otherwise incapacitated; and to reduce the necessity for divorce, with all its personality disorganization. But polygamy is a chimera so far as the masses are concerned; it is only the affluent who can undertake the responsibility of supporting several mates.[48]

Mores of Monogamy. Monogamy provides that only one marriage may be contracted legally at a given time and that only one man and one woman may unite in matrimony. Actually it means one marriage at a time, either party being permitted to remarry in case of the death or divorce of the mate. Among extreme puritans, monogamy is occasionally interpreted as one marriage for all time, even though one mate should die. While under polygamy

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Warfare (New York 1925) 466–471; Anton Gindely, *History of the Thirty Years' War*, ii (trans. by Andrew Ten Brook, New York 1884) 392–398.

[48] See Robert H. Lowie, "Marriage" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 146–154.

no punishment is meted out if a person prefers a monogamous union, under monogamy a departure is termed bigamy and in Western society is rigorously punished.

Monogamy has a biological and an economic basis. Sex activity has somewhat narrow limits in amount and range, and when it exceeds those limits serious consequences follow. Economically, most males cannot afford to support more than one wife; more than one subjects the parties to the economic law of diminishing returns. The poor men, therefore, can seldom maintain more than one wife and are obliged to get along with one whether she is compatible or not.[49] The Christian church adopted monogamy as the approved form partly because its members in the early days were chiefly of the underprivileged class and partly as a protest against the loose sex practices of the Romans.

Monogamy appears to be disadvantageous because it compels many persons, especially women, to remain out of wedlock. Since under normal circumstances women of child-bearing age tend to outnumber men, it follows that about 4 per cent of women must remain single; while abnormal times, such as wars, produce even more acute conditions. It is estimated that the World War prevented the marriage of three million persons in Germany.[50] Monogamy is disadvantageous also in that it legally binds inexperienced and almost unacquainted persons for life. This disadvantage is mitigated by contemporary divorce, but even then the marriage tie is so tenacious that breaking it leaves deep scars and often disrupts and even wrecks the lives involved. Thus monogamy dooms the mismated to failure and ruin, whatever course they take.

On the other hand, monogamy is said to have advantages. Monogamy in all probability makes possible a closer affectional bond between relatively well-mated individuals, there being just enough traditional "masculinity" and "femininity" to effect a balance. Monogamy seems to produce a more stable small-group union and to effect a more adequate training of the mates and the offspring; and it makes possible more marriages than would be the case otherwise, because the number of males and females is nearly the same in most parts of the West.[51] Monogamy also provides greater personal privacy than polygamy, gives a higher status to women and children, and renders better person to person care of the aged for the very reason that the polygamous group involves too many persons. Property rights are more clearly defined and property is more easily transmitted than in any other form of marriage. Under monogamy less waste of child life occurs, since fewer children are born and fewer die. The offspring are said to receive more prolonged and better care than in polygamous marriages. Under the latter, the children, it is said, are too many for intensive care; they often die in infancy; and they are pushed into making their own living at too early an age. This proposition, however, is not entirely valid. Large families seem to give even better care to the young children than small ones because older children attend to the younger ones; children of large families are probably less self-centered and more socialized than those of small families; also there is some evidence that the children of the polygamic family are as virile as those of the monogamic.[52] On the other hand, there seems to be no correlation between type of family and mortality. It is probable, however, that large families contribute more to child labor than small ones. In any event, the tendency among some classes today seems to be for individuals to have only one mate at a time but to have more than one during their lifetimes.

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[49] See Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, iii, 1878.

[50] See Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 17; and Eugen Würzburger, "Causes of the recent decline in the birth rate" in *Social science abstracts*, iii (1931) no. 18169.

[51] See Lowie, *op. cit.*, 149, for additional items on the balance of the sexes.

VIII. RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN MARRIAGE

Actual Initiation of Marriage. The actual initiation of marriage ordinarily takes place by means of legal and religious acts and ceremonies. The license is secured from the government, which in modern times has the ultimate power to permit marriage, and implies the consent of the state. Then the fact that the marriage is about to take place is published abroad, giving opportunity for the further ascertaining whether the forthcoming union is legal or otherwise in keeping with societal rules. The date is set and made known to relatives and friends. And at the appointed time the parties are united in matrimony in a civil or a religious ceremony. The consent of the parents is generally required for these final steps. In some societies and among certain classes, such as royalty, it was once the custom for parents and relatives to make all the arrangements, often even to dispense entirely with the consent of the bride or the bridegroom; but ordinarily in our times the persons involved must consent. These last steps by implication aim to guarantee the fulfilment of the rights and duties of marriage.

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[52] See Juanita Brooks, "Close-up of polygamy" in *Harper's magazine,* 168 (1934) 299–307.

The Right of Cohabitation. The rights and duties are either explicitly stated in the mores or the laws, or they are implied. The right of cohabitation, though generally not stated, is implied. "Marriage always implies the right of sexual intercourse: society holds such intercourse allowable in the case of husband and wife, and, generally speaking, even regards it as their duty to gratify in some measure the other partner's desire. But the right to sexual intercourse is not necessarily exclusive. It can hardly be said to be so, from the legal point of view, unless adultery is considered an offense which entitles the other partner to dissolve the marriage union; and this is by no means always the case." [53]

Right and Duty to Have Children. Marriage also involves the right and duty of having children. Although no legal requirements compel this, the mores of most cultures recognize the right to have offspring, or at the least provide that barrenness is a valid ground for divorce or for entering into extralegal relationships. Moreover, some societies even attempt to coerce the citizen to bear. During the rule of the Roman Emperor Augustus the upper classes were subjected to pressure to reproduce themselves; the Catholic Church has persistently pressed upon the faithful the duty of having children; and in some contemporary states such as Italy, France, and Germany, the loyal citizen and patriot is urged to be fertile.

Economic and Social Rights and Duties. Again, marriage involves economic rights and duties: the duty of the husband to support his wife; the duty of the wife and the children under age, if there are children, to work for and with the husband and father; and the right to inherit property, presumably on the assumption that since it was acquired collectively it should be transferred to those who took part in acquiring it.

Social obligations are also implied. They include the right of the partners to the companionship, loyalty, and respect of one another. In our times, these social rights and duties create a problem. The impingements of the public order on most men, the demands made on women, and many other factors seem to make the social relationship between most married couples somewhat unsatisfactory. Incompatibility seems frequently to follow and has become one of the widely recognized reasons for divorce.

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[53] Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 1. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

IX. TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

Provisions for Termination of Marriage. Most societies recognize that these rights and duties sometimes lead to maladjustments; therefore they make provisions for the termination of the marriage by divorce, annulment, or other means. Under monogamy, strictly interpreted, the assumption is that marriage shall last as long as both parties to it live; but even under monogamy, under some conditions such as the nonfulfilment of the rights and duties involved in marriage, legal termination of the union has been and is permitted. These regulations, once set forth almost exclusively by the ecclesiastical authority, have in modern times been taken over by the civil authority and have been extended considerably.

Conditions Contributing to Termination of Marriage. The conditions affecting the termination of marriage are the same as those operating in other aspects of life. The economic changes of the last few decades and the influence of science, education, and democracy have brought about a liberalization of divorce and annulment laws. Community care of offspring has reduced the necessity of preserving the union for the sake of the children; the economic independence of women has made it possible for them to terminate the bond without suffering too serious financial consequences; the diminishing economic function of the home has weakened a compulsive force in marriage; the bio-psychological tensions of modern times, especially in industrial centers, produce incompatability, differences in interests, and possibly the dulling of the passions.[54] All of these conditions contribute to the increase in the proportion of marriages that terminates, usually through divorce, before the death of one of the mates. Even the church, particularly the Protestant, has been obliged to recognize an increasing number of grounds for the termination of marriage.

Legal Grounds for Divorce. The legal grounds for divorce in the United States, together with the proportion of the divorces attributed to each, are set forth in the following table.

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[54] It is estimated that 39.03 per cent of the desertions are attributable to sexual factors. See Ernest R. Mowrer, *The family* (Chicago 1932) 175–176; and Joanna C. Colcord, *Broken homes* (New York 1919) 22.

TABLE 18. LEGAL GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND PROPORTION OF DIVORCES ATTRIBUTED TO EACH, 1932[55]

LEGAL CAUSES OF DIVORCE	PER CENT	LEGAL CAUSES OF DIVORCE	PER CENT
Cruelty	42.7	Vagrancy	0.3
Desertion	27.9	Incompatibility	0.2
Adultery	7.3	Bigamy	0.1
Neglect of duty	5.6	Fraud	0.1
Neglect to provide	4.1	Impotency	0.1
Drunkenness	1.4	Insanity	0.1
Crime	0.8	Misconduct	0.1
Separation	0.5	Other causes	8.7

From this table it appears that legally the most prevalent causes of divorce are cruelty and desertion. Adultery, neglect of duty, and neglect to provide are the next most frequent but account for far less of the divorces than the first two mentioned. The legal grounds of divorce, however, do not reveal the true "causes." "Cruelty," for instance, is made to cover a multitude of sins. Detailed studies of case records are necessary to determine actual causes.

TABLE 19. MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES IN UNITED STATES, 1922 TO 1935[56]

YEAR	NUMBER OF MARRIAGES	NUMBER OF DIVORCES	PER 1,000 OF ESTIMATED POPULATION		MARRIAGES PER 1,000 WOMEN 15–44 YEARS OLD	DIVORCES PER 100 MARRIAGES
			Marriages	Divorces		
1935[a]	1,327,000	218,000	10.41	1.71	43.25	16.4
1934[a]	1,302,000	204,000	10.28	1.61	42.84	15.7
1933[a]	1,098,000	165,000	8.74	1.31	36.47	15.0
1932	981,903	160,338	7.87	1.28	32.93	16.3
1931	1,060,914	183,664	8.55	1.48	35.91	17.3
1930	1,126,856	191,591	9.15	1.56	38.53	17.0
1929	1,232,559	201,468	10.14	1.66	42.81	16.3
1928	1,182,497	195,939	9.87	1.63	41.72	16.6
1927	1,201,053	192,037	10.16	1.62	43.05	16.0
1926	1,202,574	180,853	10.32	1.55	43.81	15.0
1925	1,188,334	175,449	10.35	1.53	44.01	14.8
1924	1,184,574	170,952	10.46	1.51	44.62	14.4
1923	1,229,784	165,096	11.03	1.48	47.11	13.4
1922	1,134,151	148,815	10.32	1.35	44.21	13.1

[a] Estimates for 1933, 1934, and 1935 taken from S. A. Stouffer and Lyle M. Spencer, "Marriage and divorce in recent years" in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 188 (November 1936) 56–69. It is noted that no statistics were collected by the Census Bureau after 1932. The figures for 1933–1935 are based on state reports, on marriages from 31 states and on divorces from 20 states.

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[55] Based on United States Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and divorce* (Washington 1934) 4.

[56] United States Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and divorce statistics* (Washington Release of February 19, 1937, Reg. #2813) 1; and United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Statistical abstract of the United States, 1937* (Washington 1938) 93.

Actual Rates of Divorce. The actual rates of divorce differ markedly in the various countries of the West; some countries, such as Italy, do not recognize divorce at all and therefore have no "visible" separations; while others, for instance the United States, have a high rate of divorce, as is shown in table 19 on page 179. But these are mere figures and percentages. Adequate West-wide studies of divorce, in its most significant implications, remain to be made.[57]

X. FUNCTIONS AND FUTURE OF MARRIAGE

Functions of Marriage. Notwithstanding what appears to be a partial breakdown of marriage in some countries, the marital system still performs the main functions which it has performed in the past. The regulation which is carried on by guidance in mate choosing, by the betrothal, by the provisions regarding source and number of mates, by the stipulations about rights and duties, by the engagement and wedding rings, by the appearance of the betrothed in public, and by the marriage ceremony, all have great regulative power. Again, the married state itself affords one of the principal avenues of individual adjustment, and through it, of social adjustment. It is not unlikely that a greater amount of socialization and accommodation occurs in and through marriage than in or through any other institution. Some proof in support of this contention is found in the fact that according to an analysis of the United States Census figures, fewer married men commit crimes than unmarried; fewer married persons go insane; fewer married persons are found in poorhouses; married men have a much lower death rate than the unmarried.[58] Part of all these conditions, however, may arise less from marriage than from the family, a topic we shall discuss in the next chapter.

Future of Marriage. The noteworthy changes of the last few decades have subjected marriage to very severe testing, and one wonders what its future will be. Will the functions now performed by marriage leave the home as economic activity, education, recreation, and religion have left it?

Predictions are difficult to make, but certain trends seem to be quite clear. First, there is a "more general acceptance of the opinion that sexual acts are morally indifferent and no proper objects for penal legislation if nobody is injured by them. . . ." But the general acceptance of this view is predicated on the increase of knowledge and intellectual discernment and on the disappearance of superstition and thoughtlessness—and this is far from being an immediate probability. Marriage will probably continue practically as it is for many generations. Moreover, marriage today and tomorrow will arise from the same deep sources in human nature as it always has. Marriage affords the opportunity and often the realization of ". . . the unity of sensual and spiritual elements in sexual love, leading to a more or less durable community of life in a common home, and the desire for and love of offspring. . . ." These factors "will remain lasting obstacles to the extinction of marriage and the collapse of the family, because they are too deeply rooted in human nature to fade away, and can find adequate satisfaction only in some form of marriage and the family founded upon it." [59]

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[57] However, see J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce, a social interpretation* (New York 1931).

[58] John Lewis Gillin, *Criminology and penology* (New York 1926) 64–65, and *Poverty and dependency* (3d ed. New York 1937) 187, 281. These facts, however, may be ascribed also to the selective factor of marriage; that is, the criminally inclined, the insane, and the improvident are less likely to marry.

The marriage of two persons reasonably well mated and harmonious, produces what is probably the most beautiful continuous relationship that life yields. In that relationship the marketable self is put aside, and one "looks to the self of play, of art, of bodily beauty, of manner and carriage, emotion, aspiration, religious feeling." It leads to privacy, mutual understanding, collaboration, to the unfolding and testing of character, to serenity and beauty of living, to security, which are among the most essential elements in effective living.

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[59] Edward Westermarck, *Future of marriage in Western civilisation* (New York 1936) 264 and 170. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

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Chapter 13

THE FAMILY

I. NATURE OF THE FAMILY

The family is the natural consequence of marriage; and in the course of events most marriages turn into families: in the United States, for example, about 82 per cent of all marriages have children.[1]

A family comes into being when children are born or, more precisely, when conception takes place, for then husband and wife are drawn together by deeper affectional ties and by more rigid rights and duties; while relatives and friends become more concerned over the prospective parents. The family in its comprehensive form includes not only the persons united in wedlock and their offspring or adopted children but also all other relatives who reside with or are otherwise close to the parents or children. Sometimes even servants who are with a household for a long time become and are regarded as part of the family.

The family involves a common habitat. In that habitat they live a more or less communal life: each individual is to a greater or lesser extent submerged in the group; each has rights and duties affecting the whole; each shares income and wealth in some fashion with other members; each is expected to protect the interests of the others; and whatever anyone does, either good or bad, affects the family as a whole.[2]

The family is of much concern to society because of the new life brought into existence in and through it and because of the helplessness of young life. Probably four-fifths or more of the population is brought into being through the family; children born out of wedlock are regarded as illegitimate and are often subjected to inconvenience and opprobrium. Society looks to the family and recognizes it as the only agency that has the right to reproduce the population. The family is said to fulfil this basic function only when it at least perpetuates itself or when it more than perpetuates itself. In most societies three children are necessary to make up for the unproductive couples and the unmarried and to provide an increasing population.

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[1] See Manuel Conrad Elmer, *Family adjustment and social change* (New York 1932) 128.

[2] See William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, iii (New Haven 1927) 1947.

Society demands of the family the care and upbringing of offspring. As the children grow up, society relaxes its hold on the family, the mores apply less rigidly, until, when the children leave home, marry, and start families of their own, society turns its attention to these nascent families, and the parental home virtually passes out of existence as if it had performed its function and died.

II. ORIGINATING FACTORS

Dependence Theory. What factor gives rise to the family and accounts for its importance? The sex drive and its regulation, which account for marriage, do not explain the family. There are so many marriages which do not produce children that the sex urge cannot be regarded the factor which creates and holds the family together.

The greater or lesser dependence of the mother and the child on the father seems to explain the family. The mother is usually dependent on the father of the child for sustenance; even in those primitive cultures in which women, though with child, do something for self-support, the husband-father is still the mainstay. Upon the male devolves the duty of furnishing support and protection for the wife-mother and the children. The dependency of the child upon the mother and the mother upon the husband-father, therefore, seems to constitute the basic originating factor of the family.

"Parental Instinct" Theory. The theory which explains the family in terms of the parental and especially the "maternal instinct" does not seem tenable. It is doubtful whether such an "instinct" actually exists. Mankind seems to have been concerned nearly as much with the prevention of childbearing (sometimes even destroying new-born infants) as with perpetuation. What are commonly spoken of as parental instincts prove, on careful analysis, to be cultural conditioning. Maternal and paternal, as well as filial, responses have been shown to be highly modifiable. They vary according to the individual, the situation, the stage and patterns of a given culture; so much so that the behavior of human beings, in this as in other respects, is better characterized as plastic than as instinctive. Moreover, childbearing and the number of children borne are usually determined not by the number of offspring necessary to satisfy a parental craving, but by economic conditions and prevailing mores and folkways.

Yet, viewing the matter in its entirety, mankind everywhere seems to have a desire to perpetuate itself; and to that end it brings forth children, protects and rears the young, sometimes even at the risk of the parents' lives. The conception, birth, and rearing of children, therefore, predicate some kind of urge or desire.

Bodily Intimacy Theory. Perhaps more tenable than the "parental instinct" theory is that which derives the family from the mere bodily connection between mother and child. "The unborn child belongs with and to the mother just as any other part of her body belongs to her. At birth there is removed from her something that has been part of her and which still remains connected with her until artificially separated. Thereafter she and her child must be together periodically or the child will die. . . . No two other human beings are so associated by nature as are the mother and child. . . ." [3] It is the helplessness of the child, together with the natural wish to preserve this part of her own life, that first leads the mother to care for the child and to build the sheltering institution which we call the family.

Societal Requirements. But even the bodily intimacy theory does not fully explain the family. Although among the higher animals there is also bodily intimacy, animals do not produce the family as it exists among human beings. The explanation, especially of the position of the family in modern society, seems to lie in cultural development. For, as culture has developed, society seems to have recognized the rights of the child, and parents are strictly forbidden from destroying their child once it is born or even once it is conceived. It makes it incumbent on them to rear the child, protect it, and prepare it for membership in the society. So concerned is society over this matter that if parents fail to care for the child properly, it may take the child away from them and itself assume the duty and the right to bring it to maturity.

III. FAMILIAL FOLKWAYS

Size of Family. From the apparently slow growth of early population we may infer that among primitive peoples the family—

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[3] Sumner and Keller, *op. cit.*, iii, 1937. By permission of Yale University Press.

at least the surviving family—was comparatively small. Had the rate of increase been even approximately that which obtained in Europe during the last century, a single couple would have produced, in about seven and a half centuries, about two billion descendants—a population about the size of the present population of the world.[4] The family remained small throughout ancient and classical times; while the relatively stationary population of the Middle Ages indicates that the size of the family probably even decreased somewhat.

In the nineteenth century, however, European population increased, rising from 200,000,000 at the end of the eighteenth century to 600,000,000 by 1914. This great increase leads to the inference—we have no reliable data—that the size of the family must have suddenly and considerably increased; and such fragmentary data as we have seem to indicate that the average family was much larger than at present. Among a fairly representative group of American families the average number of children per wife previous to 1700 was 7.37.[5] The opening of new lands, industrial expansion, the relative increase in the distribution of economic well-being, the application of science to living conditions, the prevalence of the idea of progress, have contributed to the marked population increase.

But by the middle of the nineteenth century, at the latest, the family began slowly to decrease in size, a decrease which, though varying from country to country, is still going on. The following table

TABLE 20. AVERAGE NUMBER OF BIRTHS PER MARRIAGE FOR VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR DIFFERENT PERIODS[6]

COUNTRY	*1876–1885*	*1886–1895*	*1896–1905*	*1906–1913*
Austria	4.33	4.22	4.06	3.92
Denmark	3.86	4.12	3.72	3.39
England—Wales	4.30	3.96	3.48	3.18
France	3.19	2.96	2.70	2.37
Holland	4.85	4.75	4.33	3.97
Italy	4.59	4.67	4.50	4.14
Norway	4.27	4.52	4.29	4.05
Prussia	4.62	4.38	4.13	3.69
Scotland [a]	4.52	4.29	3.85	3.65
Sweden	4.22	4.36	4.00	3.61
Switzerland	4.16	3.83	3.67	3.35

[a] Not including stillbirths, for which data are not available.

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[4] See Warren S. Thompson, *Population problems* (2d ed. New York 1935) 7.

[5] See table 21.

[6] Based on Corrado Gini, *et al.*, *Demografia* (Torino 1930) 136.

shows that in the countries named the number of children born per married couple has decreased in the last few decades.

The number of children born to each woman of childbearing age gives further evidence of this trend. Throughout western and northern Europe, with the exception of Ireland and France, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the average number of children born to women of childbearing age was between 4 and 5; by 1926 the number had nearly everywhere decreased to about 2.3; and only in Russia did the average seem to have been more than 4.[7] In the United States the decrease has been even greater. In a fairly representative sampling the average number of children per wife decreased from 7.37 previous to 1700 to 2.77 in 1870–1879, as is seen from table 21. However, since during the early history of the United States conditions prevailed which ordinarily stimulated the birth rate, the drop is less significant than it might seem on first thought.

TABLE 21. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER WIFE IN AMERICA [8]
(Statistics based upon twenty-two genealogical records of American families)

MARRIAGE PERIODS	NUMBER WIVES	NUMBER CHILDREN	AV. NO. CHILDREN PER WIFE
Previous to 1700	276	2,034	7.37
1700–1749	802	5,478	6.83
1750–1799	1,966	12,649	6.43
1800–1849	5,530	27,320	4.94
1850–1869	3,062	10,630	3.47
1870–1879	1,086	3,004	2.77
Totals	12,722	61,115	4.80

During the present century the average size of the American family continues to show the same trend: it decreased from 4.8 in 1890, to 4.6 in 1900, to 4.3 in 1910, to 4.2 in 1920, to 4.0 in 1930, or to two children per family. This is shown in table 22 on page 188.

Many marriages in the United States are childless. In 1930, 18 per cent of all wives 40–44 years of age, with husbands living, had had no children. The percentage differed with the size of the community. Among unbroken farm families about one in six, or 18 per cent, had no children at home; in small towns one in four,

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[7] See Robert R. Kuczynski, *Balance of births and deaths*, i (New York 1928) 3, and ii (Washington D. C. 1931) 63–64.

[8] Edward Alsworth Ross, *Principles of sociology* (rev. ed. New York 1930) 16. By permission of The Century Company.

TABLE 22. AVERAGE SIZE OF FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890–1930 [9]

YEAR	U. S. CENSUS	LYND'S
1890	4.8	4.6
1900	4.6	4.2
1910	4.3	3.9
1920	4.2	3.8
1930	4.0	

or 25 per cent; in the cities one in three, or 33 per cent; in the great metropolitan areas nearly one-half or 49 per cent of all marriages had either no children at all or children living away from home.[10]

The proportion of childless marriages varies also with the section of the country. In some sections a large percentage of families is dying out, that is, they have less than three children. In the mid-Atlantic states 36.2 per cent of the families are nonsurviving, in New England 35.9 per cent, and in the East North Central 33.6 per cent.[11]

Cultural Significance of Trend in Family Size. The trend toward a smaller family, therefore, appears to be general in Western culture. Industrialization and urbanization, a higher standard and higher cost of living, particularly for the middle classes, the postponement of marriage, the increase in the knowledge of conception control, the "liberation" of women, seem to be in large part responsible.

Some writers consider this trend a menace to society. Children have come to be regarded as an economic burden, as hindrances to the attainment of personal advancement, higher standards of living, or social position. It is contended that the consequences of this are an intensified egocentricity and a lack of adjustment in the marital state—the rise of a generation steeped in selfishness. Further, "the growing desire to escape the natural consequences of normal marital life has created a new mental disease, the fear of conception, which makes a mental wreck of many a normal and healthy woman." [12]

On the other hand, a lower birth rate is regarded as beneficial in that it is believed it reduces the supply of labor, and hence tends to raise wages and the standard of living.

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[9] Calculated from data presented in United States Bureau of the Census, *Abstract of the fifteenth census of the United States* (Washington 1933) 415; Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown* (New York 1929) 110.

[10] William F. Ogburn and Clark Tibbitts, "Family and its functions" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends in the United States,* i (New York 1933) 687–688.

[11] See Warren S. Thompson, "Family as a unit of survival" in *Social forces,* vii (1928) 141–144.

[12] I. M. Rubinow, discussion of Edward A. Ross, "Western civilization and the birth rate" in *American journal of sociology,* 12 (1907) 629.

Some governments have attempted to arrest the downward trend in the size of the family and to stimulate a higher birth rate. Italy, for example, has enacted laws in the past decade providing financial aid to mothers, especially younger women. Families with many children are rewarded in other ways, while bachelors and childless married couples are penalized. Germany has adopted the same policy and practice. In the United States, large families are now and then extolled in the press; and occasionally, as in California in 1934, special taxation of bachelors is advocated. Such efforts, however, seem to have no perceptible influence. Even in Italy and Germany the birth rate continues to slow down; and there is little probability that the family will grow larger in the near future.

Age of Mother. One feature of the modern family which seems to have far-reaching significance is the age of the mother when the first child is born. The interval between the time at which marriage occurs and the time at which the first child is born appears to be increasing in many parts of the Western world, and this increased span seems to have a bearing both on the family itself and on other aspects of the culture. The data necessary for even a conservative generalization are not available. It is clear, however, that the young mother is more successful than the older mother. She has fewer stillbirths and miscarriages. She is better able to nurse her children, a function which seems to contribute to the good health of both child and mother. Children born of comparatively youthful persons tend to have a greater longevity, and they are said to be more intelligent and better mentally balanced than those of older women.[13] If the first child is born when the mother is relatively young, greater opportunity is had for spacing children; this in turn protects the health of the mother and adds to the probability of rearing each child.[14] T. A. Coghlan found in New South Wales that early childbirth is less harmful and dangerous to the mother. On the basis of 56,247 first confinements occurring between 1893 and 1900, he found that the lowest death rate was at 20 years of age, the rates increasing as the age falls below 20 and increasing very rapidly after this age. Thus the rate at 20 was 5.22 per 1,000 confinements; at 30–35, 14.66; and at 40–45, 28.33. A similar tendency occurred for 221,552 second and subsequent confinements, but the increase in the death rates after the age of 20 was less rapid.[15]

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[13] The only scientific evidence for this is the fact that Mongolian idiots, mental defectives of a certain type, are more often the children of older than of younger mothers.

[14] See Paul Popenoe, *Modern marriage* (New York 1925) 52–59.

IV. FAMILY MORES

Care of Offspring. Among the mores governing the family foremost perhaps are those relating to the care and the rearing of the offspring. The family, regarded as it is as the authorized agency for reproduction, is naturally expected to care for and rear the children. Western society, however, does not leave the matter to the discretion of the parents. It lays down rigid rules and sees to it that they are followed. Once a child is born, society requires the family to nourish it, care for it, and rear it; it being vaguely recognized that the new life had no choice in the matter of its coming into the world. And so much concerned is society with the preservation of life that if a child is neglected, society punishes the parents and may even take the child from them.

Nor does this period of responsibility stop with the infancy of the offspring; the family is held responsible for the upbringing of the child through the period of childhood, roughly down to the fifteenth year and among the middle and well-to-do classes even beyond. Phases of child upbringing have in our times been taken over by public agencies, such as the school and community clinic, the recreational center, and the church; but still the family is held ultimately responsible for the total behavior of the offspring.

Economic Obligations. Though the family has lost much of its economic-production function, still it remains an important economic agency in the social sense. In the family the members are economically interdependent; the father supports the wife-mother and the children; the mother often supports the children in the event of the death or the separation of the father; the children are required by law to bring their earnings to the family coffer until a certain age, and by the mores they are responsible for the support of the parents in case of need even beyond that. As the parents grow old the duty becomes increasingly more rigid for the children to support the aged parents in case they have no means of self-support. In Anglo-Saxon countries it is a matter of law that the ". . . children of every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person or other poor person not able to work, being of sufficient ability, shall at their own charges relieve and maintain every such poor person. . . ."[16]

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[15] T. A. Coghlan, *Wealth and progress of New South Wales, 1900–1901* (Sidney 1902) 997–998.

In addition it is in the family that are established the habits of industry, frugality, and of economic independence, or their opposite, which in most cases follow the individual into the society. And the family still remains a primary agency for the transmission of personal property.

Authority in the Family. The locus of authority and the way authority operates in the family are important, first, because they determine the internal life of the family and, second, because the individual ordinarily carries into society at large the habits of cooperation or antagonism, of obedience or disobedience which he has acquired in the home.

It is believed that in remote times the mother ruled the home, gave to the family her name, which was transmitted in the female line, and handed on the family's wealth as she saw fit. This type of family, termed matriarchal or matrilineal, seems to have developed chiefly among fishing and hunting, nomadic, and pastoral peoples. In nomadic tribes the men had, of course, less stable abodes than the women because of the latter's biological function. Possibly the matrilineal family was also polyandrous; the father of a child was often unknown; and the family formed about the mother, who had not only actual control but also formal authority over the children and the home. Students of primitive life, however, have questioned the widespread existence of the matrilineal family, holding that it was exceptional rather than typical. In any event, the matrilineal family has not existed in the West for at least four to five thousand years.

Although the formal authority is not vested in the mother in the West, under the folkways she is actually the dominant member of the family. The mother, being in more intimate and prolonged contact with the child, teaches the child the very elements of living; she usually has more of the child's confidence than any other person; and for these reasons she is the one who sets the deepest stamp of culture on the young, a stamp which is all the more enduring because it is set by sympathetic guidance. There are exceptions of course, as for instance in the case of Lord Chesterfield, but for the most part the rule holds.[17] It is also significant that in cases of separation or divorce, it is usually the mother who gains the custody of the children, and therefore retains authority over them.

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[16] 39 and 40 Eliz. Chap. III, Sec. VII.

The patriarchal or patrilineal family, however, has for centuries been the legal form in the West. It may have developed with the rise of agriculture and fixed habitation. However that may be, it was the chief form among the Greeks and Romans; it existed through the Middle Ages; and now prevails everywhere in Western culture. In the patriarchal-patrilineal family the formal, and often the actual authority is vested in the father. He is the ruler of the household; his name, not that of the mother, is perpetuated. He hands down the family wealth; the male child carries on the name; the first-born male assumes authority in case of the father's death. The Roman paterfamilias was the central figure in his day; and in most parts of the world the father still is.

The actual authority of the paterfamilias, however, has greatly diminished in modern times, especially in the newer countries, and more especially in the urban centers. Various factors have contributed to this change. A greater knowledge of the nature and functions of the family has freed women from subservience to the male; the increase in the age of marriage and in the span between marriage and the birth of the first child has added to woman's independence; the decrease in the size of the family has made for less confusion; the education of women and the inheritance and acquisition of wealth by women and even minor children; the democratic movement; the community care of children and the community recreational agencies have separated the young from the home for longer periods than formerly; the growing protection of childhood by society and the laws forbidding bodily abuse and exploitation of children—all have in various degrees diminished the authority of the male parent.

The result is the democratic family. In the contemporary family, participation has often displaced autocratic control. The father, the mother, and the children, even from comparative youth, cooperate in family affairs, each according to his ability and maturity:

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[17] See Earl of Chesterfield, *Letters to his son* (Washington 1901) 2 vols.

there is much give and take, comparative harmony, and the sharing of benefits.[18]

V. DISSOLUTION OF THE FAMILY

Conceivably society might make provisions whereby under certain conditions, for instance, on the coming of age of the last child, the family might if it so desired consider itself disbanded. But society makes no such provisions. The affectional bond involved and the legal obligations resting upon children to care for parents and other relatives in need hold the family together usually as long as the parents live.

The duration of the family depends on social factors: on whether or not the parents are compatible and whether the family as a whole has become a cohesive unit. Divorce laws in most countries apply to families as to marriages without distinction. The mores are such, however, that the application of divorce laws permits proportionately fewer families than marriages to dissolve. The data regarding the matter are fragmentary. Table 23 covering ten European countries, shows that with the exception of two countries, one-half or more of all divorces involved couples with children. The rate of divorce, however, decreases in inverse ratio to the number of children. Also, the data are for the most part for countries mainly or in part Protestant.

Table 23. Divorces Classified by Number of Children in Families Dissolved by Divorce [19]

(Per cent of divorces, excluding divorces with no children)

Country	Divorces According to Number of Children Living at Time of Divorce							Per Cent Divorces with Children
	Period	1 Child	2 Children	3 Children	4 Children	5 Children	More than 5	
Austria	1918–23	39.25		8.15		2.51		49.91
Danzig	1920–23	28.46	14.75	6.33	3.00	1.61	1.84	55.99
Denmark	1922	29.53	16.34	7.56	4.18	1.69	0.88	60.18
France	1911–19	28.03	14.66	5.37	2.01	1.39		51.46
Holland	1915–23	26.04	16.60	8.69	4.54	2.12	2.27	60.26
Hungary	1915–17 1921–22	24.05	10.10	4.35		2.98		41.48
Norway	1919–22	27.86	19.36	10.91	5.83	8.19		72.15
Prussia	1915–23	26.78	14.80	7.01	3.19	1.41	1.07	54.26
Sweden	1916–20	27.45	19.13	11.34	6.51	4.19	3.11	71.73
Switzerland	1915–22	25.53	16.04	9.11	4.69	2.43	3.30	61.10

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[18] For a discussion of the bases of authority in the family see T. H. Marshall, "Authority and the family" in *Sociological review*, xxix (London 1937) 1–19.

[19] Based on Gini, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 131.

Religion, however, does not seem to be the only factor involved. In England, the United States, and Switzerland, mainly Protestant countries, a proportionately far larger number of divorces occurs among couples having no children or having one child only, than in the countries listed in table 23. In England during the period 1899–1930, 60 per cent or more of divorce petitions concerned couples with no child or one only, and between 38 and 43 per cent came from childless families. In the United States, where 17 per cent of all marriages are childless, almost two-thirds of the divorces are of childless marriages, which constitute only one-fifth of all marriages.[20] The factors making for these variations are obscure.

VI. FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF MODERN FAMILY

Individual-Plane Functions. Though the family has lost some of its efficacy, it still performs important functions and has specific duties. The family is probably the social group that contributes most to the development and the fixing of the individual's personality; it sets a stamp of response patterns which probably last throughout the life of the individual and which in a measure determine his success or failure in life. The family tests the child's self-confidence, creative ability, independence, self-assertion. The process is not conscious on the part of the adult members nor is the child aware of what he is absorbing or rejecting. Yet, for this very reason, it is all the more powerful in its influence to mold and shape the individual's life.[21] The outlook and habits formed in childhood, whether self-reliance or dependence, industry or indolence, bodily care or negligence, devotion to or neglect of duty, acceptance or rejection of given ideals, religious attachment or indifference, political beliefs and affiliation—tend to linger and to cling to the individual more tenaciously than those acquired at any other period of life and in any other association.

The dictum ascribed to the Roman Catholic Church, "Give me a child till he is seven and he will be mine the rest of his life," is in our times far more true of the family than of the church. Though the family has lost much of its more direct influence, it is seriously to be questioned whether any other institution or organization compares with the family in respect to its conditioning influence, or whether any influence brought to bear in adulthood can wholly erase the stamp placed on the individual during his childhood.[22]

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[20] Edward Westermarck, *Future of marriage in Western civilisation* (New York 1936) 36.

[21] See Ernest R. Mowrer, *The family* (Chicago 1934) 47–48.

Social Functions. Of the social functions, that of socialization or conditioning to group living is of primary significance. The home is a nuclear society, a miniature community, in which natural and spontaneous communal interests prevail; in which contacts are intimate, intense, and continuous; and in which the members are compelled to submit themselves, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the socializing discipline. The family, therefore, is the socialization center *par excellence.* Here the simpler forms of recreation, esthetics, religion, and other pursuits engage each member. Here aspirations, discouragements, and fears ordinarily receive sympathetic attention; here in childhood, youth, or manhood is a retreat. Here, above all, is a breeding ground for loyalty and social solidarity. The home gives the child his cultural setting;[23] conditions, if it does not determine, the school and the college or the church which the offspring shall attend, and often the recreational activities or the political party he shall choose. Thus the family places the individual in relation to the public order and prepares him for it. Even in urban centers, where the multitude of outside impacts attract the offspring, the family, because of its continuity and its intimacy, still remains the primary socializing center.

Further, the family serves as an educational center for its members. Although formal education has been taken over by the school, daily impingements in the home are still important. The family alone can give, by the process of slow absorption, the training in morals and in manners. This is the "primitive" educational function of the family.[24] Thus the family, through a combination of unconscious and conscious influences, guides the child and lays a foundation or background for his cultural function.

Some of this socializing occurs by means of antagonism. The interests of the mature organism and those of growing ones are not the same. But because of the intimacy and continuity of family life, and because of the inevitability of some measure of adjustment in the home, the family subjects the individuals to severe tests.

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[22] See Mrs. Rebekah Kohut, *My portion* (New York 1925) for a vivid illustration of this fact.

[23] See Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology* (2d ed. Chicago 1924) 759.

[24] Howard W. Odum, *Man's quest for social guidance* (New York 1927) 244–245.

Societal Functions. The family also transmits the culture heritage. This function, performed from the very beginning by the family, is at present shared by other associations—by the school, church, recreational center, and state. These, however, extend rather than displace the function of the family; in these the process is formal, in the family it is spontaneous and automatic. The plasticity of childhood and youth, the strength and duration of the family ties are such that the offspring absorbs what the family determines. Moreover, human beings remain within the familial nexus longer than is ordinarily realized. Since the average age of marriage for both sexes is about twenty-five years, and since the average life-span is about fifty-seven years, it follows that people remain within the intensive relationship of their parental homes for about one-third to one-half of their lifetimes. There the stamp of the prevailing culture is set upon them; there they acquire the ways of the folk of which they are a part.

The family also assigns the place of the individual in the social order. The family is a means "whereby every individual born is assigned a definite place in his or her society by which his or her social relations to the rest of society are determined." [25] This is no longer an ironclad rule in the West. By marriage, migration, or change of occupation many individuals break away from the family and live on levels above or below those of the family, as may be seen most clearly among first and second generation offspring of migrants; while the instability of the modern family contributes to the same end. Yet even now in many instances the family clearly determines the social status of the offspring.

The family plays a political rôle. In it we find the beginnings of the state. Habits of obedience to authority and of community living obtain here; and in modern times there is a noteworthy element of democracy. It is here that the "automatic citizen" is nurtured, respect for law is instilled, and a sense of civic duty absorbed. Historically there has seemed to be some correlation between the type of political system and the type of family in any one culture area. Among the Hebrews and the Romans, absolutism characterized both the government and the family. The family patriarch served as the representative of God in both nations. Today European dictators, notably Hitler and Mussolini, are trying to build up a family based on the absolute authority of the father.

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[25] Joyce O. Hertzler, *Social institutions* (New York 1929) 52; see also Pitirim Sorokin, *Social mobility* (New York 1927) 184.

In our contemporary world, growing daily more skeptical, the religious function of the family is still important. Notwithstanding modern skepticism, in the family if anywhere are found "the beginnings of formal religion." Even though the child does spend considerably more time away from home than he did formerly, it is there, if anywhere, that he learns the ways of faith, at his mother's knees; there, if anywhere, that all members learn the moral and ethical traditions, the concepts of right and wrong, of justice and consideration that largely determine the character of a people.

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Chapter 14

RISE OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

I. NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

Pivotal Position of the Economic System. The economic system may be termed pivotal in associated living, because whatever else man may or may not possess, he must have food, drink, and shelter before he can carry on any other activity. "Man does not live by bread alone," but he cannot live without it. The economic system, interwoven with marriage and the family, is one of the oldest of the social systems; it has probably always commanded more time, attention, and energy than any other aspect of life; [1] even today it probably consumes fully nine-tenths of all awakened mature life in preparing for, conducting, or conserving the gains of economic activity. It embraces a larger proportion of the population; affects more aspects of associated living; and gives rise to more cultural changes, disturbances, and maladjustments than possibly any other system. Individuals, groups, and whole societies evince a deeper concern over the possession of economic resources, over security, over the preservation of established economic patterns than perhaps over any other aspect of associated living. Little wonder that there are those who interpret all history in terms of economic life.

Compulsive Nature of Economic Activity. The ultimate roots of economic activity are hunger and other needs. Hunger is a mechanism which maintains a balance between deterioration and rehabilitation and which drives man to economic activity: "were it not for the impelling force of hunger, at least half of the industries would suddenly disappear." [2] Nor is hunger the only compulsion. Men need or desire clothing, shelter, rest and amusement, the warmth and affection of home and kin, the esteem of their fellows, security for times of stress and for old age—all of which compel men into economic activity. From earliest times, man has had to win his sustenance and other needs with the labor of his hands or brains. The Biblical injunction, "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return unto the ground," is more than a figure of speech; barring parasites it applies to all human beings.

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[1] The actual amount of time devoted to production is, of course, decreasing on account of mechanization, but the proportion of time given to economic life does not seem to change from epoch to epoch.

[2] John Lewis Gillin and Frank W. Blackmar, *Outlines of sociology* (3d ed. New York 1930) 354.

Moreover, economic life compels social collaboration. Men, as individuals, do not seem to be able to wrest what they need from nature. Collaboration, division of labor, interdependence in family and tribe, between regions and even nations are necessary in order to maintain life.

Disciplinary and Self-Expression Character of Economic Life. The economic system is the disciplinary order *par excellence.* So basic, urgent, and universal is economic need that "the fear of hunger constitutes the chief disciplinary force in society." A man may not be enamoured of his particular task or profession; he may dislike his employer or his superior; he may even abhor the community or country in which he works; yet he will submit, will coöperate with his fellows, will do even the most irksome of tasks, or endure the most untoward and humiliating conditions, in order to be assured of his livelihood. Economic need bludgeons most men into some measure of accommodation to group life.

Further, economic life constitutes one of the most valid, if not the most valid means of the realization of the individual self. In agreeable labor man finds a fascination and a joy; through it he achieves an unfolding of his abilities, reaches whatever degree of excellence he is capable of, and gains the esteem of his fellowmen, serves mankind, or acquires power, as may be his inclination. So true is this that idleness produces *ennui* and decay, while enforced idleness is probably the most irksome and cruel device that man has ever created to punish his fellowmen.[3] If a man be relatively content in his work he will, other things being equal, more likely be at peace with his fellows. There is probably nothing more beautiful, more satisfying in all human existence than to be happy in one's work.

Means of Dealing with Nature and Man. Furthermore, the economic system is the mechanism by which mankind carries on a collective struggle with nature. For nature, though the source of life and sustenance, is in many respects the arch enemy of man, "red in tooth and claw," constantly attacking the sources of sustenance, and making group effort imperative. Nature is often mean, hard, subversive; and man, even in social units, is unable to cope with it. In order to appropriate or conserve natural resources, to provide for possible scarcity, to ward off droughts, floods, pests, and other onslaughts of nature, man has to organize on a societal basis, to order production, make tools, assemble and apply power collectively.

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[3] See Paul H. Douglas, "Reality of non-commercial incentives in economic life" in Rexford Guy Tugwell (ed.), *Trend of economics* (New York 1924) 153–188; and Carl Brinkmann, "Economic incentives" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 330–333.

The economic system also regulates the contest which constantly goes on between individuals, groups, and whole societies in their efforts to assure their sustenance. Since all human beings depend on the same basic resources and since these are limited, each person, group, and society tends to reach for and hold to those resources at the expense of others. Thus contest goes on, continually, intensively, and often reaches the intensity of deadly conflict. By means of price and competition, wage, profit, investments, savings, pensions, the economic system regulates this contest; and, in part through the state, the economic system controls, sytematizes, and regulates competition and conflict, and in a measure mitigates the struggle.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTION

Meaning of "Development." Tool-making, some domestication of animals and plants, and the faint beginnings of ownership go back into very early time; and the development of the intricate structure we call the economic system covers thousands of years. This development has been gradual, spontaneous, and more or less sporadic and automatic, the result of trial and error and of accidental discoveries. Such evidence as is available indicates that the economic system, like any other institution, has not followed a definite sequence of variation, selection, transmission, and adaptation; so that when we describe stages and dominant patterns, we are only naming approximations, not exact demarcations. The early stages are highly hypothetical; the various steps overlap and shade into each other in time and space; while "dominant patterns" are not exclusive forms. Uniformity of development cannot be found anywhere, and often the very old and the very new operate side by side. There are portions of the Western cultural area which still employ the food-producing methods or the tools of Neolithic man, still employ animal and human muscular power to operate the tools, while next-door are found the most improved methods of food-production, the most intricate machines, and the most advanced power-making devices.

Yet the main features of the development are fairly clear. These include food-producing methods, shelter-making, tool-making; the discovery and utilization of power; the growth of the ownership subsystem; and the development of associations.

Direct Appropriation Method. Food-production has always constituted a basic aspect of economic activity. In very early times mankind seems to have depended wholly on gathering whatever nature provided him. Men wandered from place to place, sought and took whatever nature offered in the way of roots, plants, fruits, nuts, and relatively accessible fish and game. During this stage, which probably lasted thousands of years, mankind appears not to have conceived the possibility of manipulating nature or of exploiting earth's resources. Men seem to have wandered about like sheep, taking and munching whatever lay close to hand, scarcely raising their heads to look about them. Nearly all of life must have been spent in food-finding and food-getting; and supplies must always have been precarious.

Hunting and Fishing. The hunting and fishing stage, which is believed to have lasted some 200,000 years, extended the direct-appropriation method. Man still gathered what nature provided; but he now made a greater use of fish and game, thus materially increasing his food supply. This stage, involving as it did a more positive search, led to the development of the first tools: the bow and arrow, the spear, the sling, and the snare. It also led to the initial steps towards the organization and division of labor.[4] But man still remained a wanderer, searching for new hunting or fishing grounds, never sure of his supply. Nor had he as yet developed methods of accumulation or storage, the practice of individual or group property, the system of food distribution, or the method for preserving or conserving food for future needs. He was still at the mercy of nature.

Pastoral Method. The pastoral stage or method of food-gathering brought about or at least extended the domestication of animals. Exactly where, when, or under what circumstances domestication first occurred or what animals were involved, is not known. It seems to have occurred in more than one place at the same time; to have taken place over a long period; and possibly it occurred through the accidental imprisonment of some animal. In any event, the dog seems to have been the first to have been domesticated, indicating that in the early stages domestication may have performed mainly a protective function. The process gradually reached other animals, so that by early historical times most of the animals we term domesticated had come within it.

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[4] See Charles Gide, *Principles of political economy* (trans. from 23d French ed. by Ernest F. Row, Boston 1924) 64.

Animal domestication was an invention of such magnitude that it is sometimes referred to as the first economic revolution. It greatly increased the food supply; it converted animals from competitors into coöperators; it made possible a more intensive exploitation of nature; it made available more concentrated and palatable food; it increased the durability of food supply, since it was now possible to keep dried meats through long seasons; and it made for a greater security of food supply, living animals being more regularly available than seasonal foods, such as fruits and nuts, on which man had theretofore chiefly depended.

Pastoral life had several indirect results. Man, though still roaming, with herds and flocks, became less of a wanderer; this paved the way for tillage and agriculture; ultimately developed the first settlements; and gave rise to the beginnings of the practice of ownership.[5]

Agriculture. The cultivation of plants and animals, or agriculture, represents the first step in food-production proper. It was probably preceded by a long period during which tillage, or the superficial cultivation and repetitive abandonment of land, was practiced. Agriculture proper is believed to have achieved the fullest early development between 4000 and 3500 B.C. or perhaps earlier; and its main habitat seems to have been the Nile-Tigris-Euphrates-Indus valleys, where the unfavorable desert region adjoining the narrow, fertile area seems to have caused periodic scarcity of food and to have forced man to control the supply of food through cultivation of the soil. However, the development probably occurred in more than one locality.[6]

Agriculture was a remarkable invention and for that reason it

[5] See in this chapter, subchap. viii on "Ownership or property usages."

[6] See Charles A. Ellwood, *Cultural evolution* (New York 1927) 122–123.

is sometimes referred to as the second great economic revolution. It extended the domestication process to plants. This meant that man need no longer take only what nature happened to offer, but could now select what was of most use to him, keep it close to his habitat, and produce it. This increased the supply and variety of foods, which in time, with the development of intensive cultivation, increased still more. Agriculture produced a more stable supply of food for animals, made possible the further domestication of animals, and thus increased the animal-food supply.

Agriculture had several indirect results. It produced the beginnings of settled life and the agricultural-village mode of habitation which prevailed for many centuries. Settled life in turn gave rise to permanent abodes; to use of clothing as a social necessity; and in time to the practice of group, and later of private property.[7] The necessity for irrigation systems and flood control probably called forth regulation and contributed to the development of the state.

Commerce. The development of wide-scale commerce may be called the third great economic revolution. Commerce was carried on to a limited extent in early times; it was practiced extensively by the Phoenicians, who became world traders; it was carried on by the Greeks and Romans; and during medieval times there arose cities, such as Venice and Genoa, which came to be known primarily as centers of trade. By the close of the Middle Ages commerce had become one of the master culture patterns.

The Commercial Revolution effected wider distribution and therefore availability of goods. By the thirteenth century man had begun to create small surpluses of goods and a system of exchange. Markets, first established locally, in time served wider and wider regions. Thus a means of adjusting supply and demand came into existence; food supply became more widely available; and both security and variety of food were further increased. The greater availability gave rise to nonagricultural towns; the towns in turn made possible the more efficient fashioning of other commodities; and these came to be exchanged for food. Commerce thus increased the supply and distribution of food, increased availability of clothing, shelter-building materials, and many other commodities. Indirectly commerce in time led to the geographic discoveries which ushered in the modern era.

[7] See in this chapter, subchap. viii on "Ownership or property usages."

Industrialism. Industrialism, the next development, effected such far-reaching changes in so many aspects of economic activity that it came to be known as the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution is too vast and intricate a movement to permit detailed analysis here. It suffices to say that the introduction of scientific technology and the machine brought about a far greater advance in food-production than man had been able to achieve before. The machine has made possible a much more intensive and wide-scale exploitation of natural resources; it has thereby increased the supply, produced specialization in production, extended the variety of foods and their availability, multiplied communication and transportation; it has made such variety more widely available, added to the stability of food supply all over the Western world; and it has given man a far greater freedom from slavish food-producing activity, thereby affording him a greater opportunity for the enjoyment of life. Scientific technology, the use of water power, the steam engine, the internal combustion engine, and electricity have revolutionized economic life and brought about a major turning point in the history of the human race.[8]

III. SHELTER AND CLOTHING

Next to food, man seems always to have been concerned over his shelter. For, in order to survive, man requires protection against wind, storms, heat, cold, wet, and predatory creatures; needs a place where he can rest and recuperate; and in large population centers he needs protection against noises and too great proximity to his fellows.

Nature's Dwelling Places and Primitive Construction. At what stage mankind began to construct shelter we cannot say. During the direct-appropriation stage of food-gathering, it appears that man used only natural shelters, such as forests, hanging rocks, and caves, shelters which at best afforded only a small measure of protection against the elements and predatory creatures. The drawings of Paleolithic man indicate that during the fishing and hunting and the pastoral stages man had already begun to make his own shelter; these seem to have been made of brush and bushes, or to have been caves and dugouts. Neither form is present in all places; both forms seemingly occurred at the same time and in

[8] For other aspects of industrialism, see next chapter.

the same region. In any event, permanent dwellings were probably unknown as long as man led a migratory life.[9]

Permanent Abodes. With the latter phases of the pastoral stage and with tillage and agriculture, permanent dwellings began to appear. In the remains of Crete, Babylon, Assyria, and Egypt there is evidence that houses were already formed; but they were still small, containing practically no divisions, windows, sleeping or cooking compartments, or other facilities. In the cities of Greece and Rome, however, the house was beginning to take the size, shape, and divisions we now know.[10]

The development of shelter shows a gradual, long-term increase in substantiality and durability. At first man employed brush, bushes, and branches in constructing his shelter; later he added skins; still later he built his house of logs and bark, filling the chinks with mud; during the early period of history, brick and stone were used; in classical times concrete was added; while in recent decades steel has been employed, making possible the multiple-storied apartment houses of the modern city.

Elevation and Contour Location. Another development has been that of elevation. Man seems always to have been concerned with raising his dwelling, first from below the ground, and then higher and higher above the ground. This may have been the result of the knowledge that dampness causes discomfort and illness and of the desire to be safe from predatory animals. In any event, while the work-part of his dwelling has remained on the ground floor, sometimes even below the ground, those portions used for general living, resting, and sleeping have steadily been raised higher. In the cities of our times dwellings have also been built taller and taller to meet space requirements and to afford some escape from the incessant noises of the ground level, as well as, of course, to achieve a more intensive application of capital to high-priced land. Within reasonable limits the higher from the ground man was able to get for his rest and sleep, the better off he appears to have been.[11] For this reason, the higher floors of residence buildings are usually in demand and bring greater rentals. Even in mild climates the underground and ground floors are left to the lower economic strata or are given over to the more menial uses. Sometimes lower floors are used by small dealers for combination business and dwelling quarters and bring relatively high rents.

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[9] See Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 158–159; Edward B. Tylor, *Anthropology* (1881) (New York 1913) 229–230.

[10] Edward Bulwer Lytton gives a vivid and authentic description of Roman houses in *Last days of Pompeii* (Boston 1926) 17–20.

[11] The better-to-do Romans used the second story for eating and sleeping purposes.

Exposure to the sun seems also to have been considered important. Especially where houses are close together, the southern and western exposures are usually sought after. It is also interesting that many cities—at least those the author has observed—have expanded mainly to the south and west, each newcomer attempting to assure for himself sunlight and protection from the wind; expansions to the north and east usually occurring only where southward and westward movement is not possible or where a hilly contour, such as that of Rome, affords an abundance of air and sunshine. The low, damp, and otherwise undesirable sections of cities are given over to residences of the underprivileged, to factories, warehouses, and other nonresidential uses.

Divisions for Various Uses. Divisions within the dwelling also came into use with classical times, affording separate compartments for various uses and a degree of privacy. The further advanced a culture is, the more privacy people seem to require. The buildings themselves, particularly in cities, are brought closer and closer together for economy of desirable space, and compactly built apartment houses are inhabited by many families; but within these privacy is sought.

The house was used for many centuries as both a workshop and a shelter. In fact the house sheltered man in all his various activities, as breadwinner, as parent, and while eating, resting, playing, or sleeping. Until comparatively recent times the home was the workshop; and even today in many parts of the world most of the nonagricultural work is done in the home. The workshop, whenever it existed outside the home, was located in immediate proximity. Simple and small, the workshop was owned by the tool-user; it was operated by the owner or his immediate employee; it was part and parcel of the home or the manor. As tools increased in size, complexity, and durability, and as steam power came into use, the shop was moved farther and farther from the home and was increased in size and complexity; until today it is the home that is located with reference to the shop rather than the shop with reference to the home. The factory has thus become the center of the contemporary community and gives rise to many cultural phenomena.

In this development of shelter man seems to have arrived at the creation of a device which would shut out the inimical elements of physical nature, animal life, and plant life; and which would protect him against the intrusion of his fellows. Thus the house has taken on the connotation of home, a place where man can find a degree of comfort, privacy, and familiarity.

Clothing. Clothing as used in the modern West constitutes a form of shelter. It is doubtful, however, whether clothing performed such a function originally. Primitives seemed to have used clothing as ornamentation, or as a means of distinction and status, or to protect the body against what was regarded as inimical nature, such as winds and darkness.

The two perhaps most widely accepted theories ascribe clothing to modesty and to the necessity for protection against the elements.[12] But in nearly identical climates some peoples wear clothing and others do not: the Eskimos, for example, wear very heavy clothing, while the Tierra del Fuegians, living in the very cold region around Cape Horn, wear practically none. The modesty theory, which ascribes the origin of clothing to an "instinct" to cover the genital areas of the body, is likewise unsatisfactory, because different peoples cover different parts of the body. Westermarck points out that the feeling of shame is not a cause but a result of covering the body. The question of course is not important and is of interest only as all matters of the origin of common usages are. As man lived more and more in artificial shelters he probably lost gradually the hairy covering of his body and needed clothing.

The rise of Christianity, with its doctrine of the unworthiness and lewdness of the body, probably made more rigid and gave a moral basis for the practice of wearing clothing. During the Middle Ages clothing became compulsive; and down to our times men and women must cover their bodies, sometimes with heavy and uncomfortable clothing, even in hot regions. In recent decades the tendency has been toward less and less clothing; the feeling of shame over the naked body is in part disappearing; and exposure of the body to air and sunshine is recognized as a healthful necessity. However, fashion still keeps its firm grip on men and women, and the business of designing, making, and retailing clothing has grown to immense proportions.

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[12] See Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 145.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF TOOLS

Tool-Making. Hand in hand with the development of food-producing and shelter-making has gone the development of tools. In fact, tool-making has in many respects been prerequisite to the development of those two activities. In any event, the development of tools has played an important part in the unfolding of the economic institution; it has involved the discovery of materials, the development of methods of tool-making, and the discovery and employment of operating power. For the earlier phases of this, as of all other cultural developments, we are obliged to rely on fragmentary evidence.

Materials Used. The principal materials man has used in tool-making have led to the naming of two great ages, namely, the Stone Age and the Age of Metals, which correspond roughly to the prehistoric and the historic period respectively. The Stone Age is ordinarily subdivided into the Eolithic or Dawn Age—a highly hypothetical period named after the "eoliths" or rudimentary implements then in use; second, the Paleolithic or Old Stone Age, lasting possibly from 100,000 to 10,000 B.C.; and third the Neolithic or New Stone Age, lasting probably from 10,000 to perhaps 3,000 B.C. But all these dates are only rough approximations and they do not, even in crude outline, apply to all regions alike.

Man's early tools, those of Eolithic times, were natural objects, such as sharp sticks or stones, shells, and horns; they were not made, but merely used; the making of them, in so far as it occurred, consisted in improving the natural shape of the stones and flints used.

In the Paleolithic or Old Stone Age man employed chipped stone as the basic material, and there was no "making" of tools in the strict sense of the term. The remains of these tools, found in great abundance, indicate that Paleolithic tools were crude, clumsy, without handles, and usable only with one hand. These tools were dull and brittle, easy to make and as easy to break, requiring primitive man to devote much time to the making of them.

The next step occurred during the Neolithic or New Stone Age.[13]

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[13] Strictly speaking, the Old and the New Stone Ages cannot be separated on the basis of the use of rough and polished stone implements respectively, for the fracturing of stone by blows or pressure, which characterized Paleolithic times, is found well into Neolithic times. See A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 143.

During this period man first hit upon the process of grinding or polishing harder types of stone into implements; the tools, therefore, were more difficult to make and to destroy; this led to the development of dexterity and foresight. Tools were sharper, more durable, smaller; and some of them had handles of wood or bone. All these improvements meant that men need spend progressively less time in tool-making and could devote more time to employing the tools in the exploitation of nature and in the enjoyment of the fruits of labor.

The Age of Metals began with the use of copper, perhaps in the fifth millennium preceding our era. The use of this metal, especially in its alloyed form, bronze, made possible greater sharpness, handiness, durability, pliability, and variety in tools. The tools were easy to cast by means of sand or stone molds; handles could more easily be used; and the tools were more efficient. Among the more intricate and lasting developments of this period were such instruments as the compass, the ruler, the wheel, and the turning lathe. The lathe was especially important, for it was utilized for grinding, polishing, milling, or stamping metals.

The Iron Age began in the second millennium and continues to the present. With that development tools could be made sharper and more intricate, smaller and larger, and more durable. The later stage of the Iron Age, known as the Steel Age, began in the latter part of the eighteenth century and extends to the present day. It produced, by means of intensive heat, a new thick product, which marked a new epoch. It made possible the machine and in turn necessitated the modern factory. The tool shop, no longer attached to the home, has become increasingly larger and is the center of production.

General "Aim" in Tool-Making. Throughout the development in tool-making man appears to have aimed at—or he merely chanced upon—the use of materials that were progressively more durable and could be made into tools ever sharper and more varied in size and uses. The tool of Paleolithic man was a dull and clumsy affair; that of Neolithic man was sharper and had a sort of handle; that of the Bronze Age was still sharper, more varied in size and utility, and easier to manipulate; the tool of the Iron-Steel Age is of far greater variety in size, durability, sharpness, handiness. Through these discoveries mankind has been enabled to give less and less time, energy, and attention to tool-making and more and more to using the tools in the basic tasks of food-production and shelter-making, and to the enjoyment of the fruits of its labor.[14]

V. DEVELOPMENT OF POWER

Muscular Power. Along with the employment of more efficient materials has been the development of the power employed by man in operating tools. So far as we know man has used only three types of power for working tools, namely, the muscular power of living creatures, flowing-nature, and inorganic power.

For thousands of years mankind used only the powers of his own muscles and weight and that of domesticated animals, such as oxen, horses, mules, donkeys, camels, and elephants; and used them apparently without conceiving the possibility of any other. Slavery, an invention probably made in connection with agriculture and encouraged by economic incentive, was a way of assembling and focusing this type of power; a fact which probably explains why slavery lasted so long and why it was displaced only when other and more efficient power was discovered.

Water and Wind Power. The power generated by flowing water and air has been used from early historic times. The use of this type of power was dependent upon the invention of instruments such as the sailing vessel, the windmill, and waterwheel. The power of wind, rivers, tides, and the sun's rays seems to have been employed to some extent as early as the fourth millennium preceding our era, in connection with the irrigation systems; it was brought into fuller use during the Middle Ages; [15] and with the invention of instruments it became still more widely used.

Power of Inorganic Substances. The power man now uses is principally that generated by inorganic substances.[16] The discovery of this source of power, about two hundred years ago, ushered in a new age, the era of power. Man can now reach into the earth, extract iron, weld it into steel, and shape it into a sort of container that we term the machine; and by using coal, petroleum, gas, or electricity, he produces power the like of which even the most fantastic dreams of early man could not have imagined.

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[14] See Mildred Fairchild and Hornell Hart, "Million years of evolution in tools" in *Scientific monthly*, xxviii (1929) 71–79.

[15] Leonardo da Vinci experimented with a primitive sort of dam and lock.

[16] The term inorganic is here used to denote substances which, though strictly speaking organic, are not alive in the ordinary sense, have no metabolism and no power of locomotion and reproduction.

With this empowered machine he can now penetrate deeper into the earth and extract his necessities; he can move faster, farther, and more efficiently than ever before; he can rise above the earth and descend into the depths of the seas. Thus, the new era, marked by the use of water power, the steam engine, the internal combustion engine, and electricity, has enormously increased the amount of power at the disposal of man. In the United States, for example, "the average utilization of energy per person per day . . . rose from 1,600 in 1800 to 150,000 kilogramme calories in 1932." [17] If all the adults in the United States were put to work on an eight-hour shift, they could produce unaided only 2,300,000 h.p. a day; if flowing-nature power were added, they could produce, with present machine equipment, 7,500,000 h.p. or over three times the power possible through man's vital force alone; [18] while one machine alone, operated with inorganic power, can be made to produce 9,000,000 h.p. in a day or nearly four times the possible production by the adult population working unaided.

VI. DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

Early Organization. Among primitive peoples the family was the all-embracing economic organization; it not only produced commodities, but also "marketed" such surplus goods as it produced; and of course the members of the family were at once workers, distributors, and consumers. In fact, the family, for most people, performed that all-embracing function, down to the times of feudalism and the beginnings of large-scale commerce. The home was at once the place around which all work centered, out of which goods were exchanged, and in which they were consumed.

Commercial Organizations. The first economic organizations seem to have been those of trade. Traces of commercial associations are found in Babylonia, in Greece, and in Rome, but they played no important part. In the Middle Ages they began to acquire a wide reach. Some of these medieval organizations, in the main partnerships, were instituted to circumvent the Church's "usury" prohibitions or the lending of money at interest. Soon, however, they took on larger functions. The *commenda*, existing mainly in Italy, consisted of a partnership by which the possessor of a sum of money placed it at the disposal of a sea or land merchant to use it in trade as he saw fit and upon his return from his voyage to divide the earnings or profits with the owner of the money. In time there arose the *societas*, organizations which combined money lenders and merchants. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries arose the regulated company, made up only of merchants—in England woolen-cloth merchants among the first—who were granted special rights by the Crown in their trading operations in foreign lands and, while maintaining their financial identity, were regulated by the state.[19] With the Industrial Revolution and the growth of commerce, merchants' and traders' organizations multiplied and spread into every phase of economic life; until today local, regional, national, and international Chambers of Commerce are among the more influential organizations.

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[17] Charles Horton Cooley, *et al.*, *Introductory sociology* (New York 1933) 87 n.

[18] It is estimated that there is enough power in the flowing water in the United States to generate 35,000,000 h.p. See Edwin G. Nourse, *et al.*, *America's capacity to produce* (Washington D. C. 1934).

Production Associations. Organizations devoted mainly to production have undergone a similar development. In agriculture organization has always played a somewhat unimportant rôle, largely because the agriculturist, by his very mode of life, is a super-individualist. The *latifundia* of the Romans consisted of large tracts of land owned by single families and worked by slaves. In the feudal system of the Middle Ages and in the landed estates of England and the South of the United States, the same conditions prevailed.[20] Even to this day agricultural production remains without comprehensive organization.

Organization for the production of manufactured goods, on the other hand, goes back to early times. Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, and Rome developed the beginnings of such organization, although the family remained the primary production unit. The real beginning of organizations devoted exclusively to production was made by the mercantile and craft associations of medieval times. Later the guilds took on this function: they regulated the number of journeymen and apprentices, hours of labor, wages, kinds of tools used, prices, and quality of articles produced.[21] Gradually independent organizations arose, more or less patterned after the trade associations. From the *commenda* and the *societas* they took the idea of investment and profit-making, from the guilds, the practice of continuity and transference of ownership, from the regulated company, the administrative structure. These features, fused and developed, gradually produced the production corporation which, with the coming of the machine age and the necessity for assembling capital, assumed gigantic proportions and a dominant position in our times.[22]

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[19] See E. A. J. Johnson, *Some origins of the modern economic world* (New York 1936) 44–50; and Arthur Robert Burns, "Partnership" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 3–5.

[20] Johnson, *op. cit.*, 66–72; and André Piganiol, "Latifundia" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 9 (New York 1933) 186–188.

[21] See Piero Silvestro Leicht, *Corporazioni romane e mediaevali* (Turin 1937); Conippo Morelli, *Corporazioni romane di arti e mestieri* (Rome 1937); Mariano San Nicolò, "Guilds: in antiquity" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 204–206; M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and economic history of the Roman Empire* (Oxford 1926) 160, 482–483.

Labor Organizations. The organization of laborers is the last to have arisen. In ancient and classical times, slavery made it impossible for workers even to think of organizing themselves for the improvement of their condition. In the Hebrews' experience in Egypt we may trace the vague and distant beginnings of laborers' efforts to rebel against unfavorable conditions of labor: the organized exodus of these people *en masse* out of Egypt is sometimes facetiously referred to as the first great labor strike and Moses as the first labor leader. The plebeian movement in republican Rome seems to have been partly in the nature of labor organization. But all these early movements were not of enduring significance. The laborer remained the slave of the employer.

Labor organization is the product of our times. The migrations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the educational movement throughout the West, the improvements in the conditions of living, and the development of the middle classes have contributed to its rise. At first it took a general form, as in the Knights of Labor in the United States, which embraced workers in general; later developed trade unions, which unite wage earners in single crafts or trades or in closely related trades; still later came the industrial union, which combines all the workers in a particular industry, regardless of trade; and finally there developed the labor unions which combine workers from all trades and industries, and the company unions, which represent both labor and management in separate plants or industries.[23] Through the organization of local, regional, national, and international units and their confederations, labor has developed the counterparts of merchants' and producers' organizations and has become one of the most powerful agents in contemporary Western culture.

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[22] See A. A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, "Corporation" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 414–415; and Johnson, *op. cit.*, 48–49 and 153–154.

[23] See Richard T. Ely and Ralph H. Hess, *Outlines of economics* (6th ed. New York 1937) chap. xxxiv; and Gordon S. Watkins, *Labor problems* (rev. ed. New York 1929) *passim.*

Significance of Economic Organization. Thus commercial, production, and labor organizations have come to dominate the economic scene of our time. Economic organization, rooted in scarcity, is a means of collective control, it liberates the individual from the oppression of his fellows and gives him a measure of security.[24] As economic life has become more intricate, organization has become a necessity in the orderly ongoing of society. But economic organization also is a master divisive agent in the contemporary West. The interests and procedures of owners or capitalists, merchants, and workers create a temper of strife in modern society, which arrays whole segments of populations and regional units against one another. The combination of Italy, Germany, and Japan, ostensibly aimed at combating communism, carries the contest into the international sphere and may well throw the entire world into self-destructive activity. To this topic we shall return in the next chapter.

VII. ECONOMIC FOLKWAYS

Self-Reliance. There are several folkways specifically governing economic life. First, there are the rules regarding independence and self-reliance. Throughout Western culture it is generally expected that the individual and the family be self-sustaining; or, to put it negatively, individuals or groups who depend on others, including relatives, for sustenance are regarded as socially inadequate.[25] Dependence usually carries a stigma with it; and except during periods when natural or societal catastrophes force large bodies of people to depend on the community, it subjects the dependent to humiliation; in fact, even in such extraordinary periods, sensitive persons experience humiliation.

Familial Interdependence and Provision for Crises. Society also expects intrafamilial economic interdependence. It is a general rule that within the familial and closely related group each member shall contribute to the economic support of the entire group, especially in times of need. Society demands that the husband support the wife, that parents sustain children, that children bring their earnings to the common fund, that parents share with children the economic gains, and that adult children support needy parents.

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[24] See John R. Commons, *Institutional economics* (New York 1934) 6, 69, 71, 73, 87. Professor Commons uses the term "institution" for association.

[25] See Charles Lamb, "Poor relations" in *Elia and the last essays of Elia* (London 1912) 178–184.

Society also makes it incumbent on the individual and the family to provide for possible emergencies and for old age. Virtually everywhere social pressure, as well as the will to survive, obliges individuals and families to put aside portions of their earnings in order that in times of illness, unemployment, and old age, they shall not become dependent on the community.

Prestige and Obligations of Wealth. Again, possession of wealth ordinarily confers prestige. In all Western societies the person who has accumulated an unusual amount of wealth is usually regarded with a degree of respect. As a rule this respect is held for those who have achieved economic competence in ways which society regards as honest and humane; however, even if wealth has not been gained equitably or humanely, it confers upon the person or group possessing it the respect of the average citizen.

On the other hand, society places obligations on the possessors of wealth. The assumption underlying this practice is that wealth is usually acquired at the expense, or at least with the collaboration, of the community, and that the person who possesses it has, therefore, some obligation to society. The religious institution strongly emphasizes the stewardship of wealth; the Papal See has made emphatic pronouncements on the matter; while socialistic societies have even more explicitly emphasized the responsibility of wealth.

VIII. OWNERSHIP OR PROPERTY USAGES

Explanations of Property. The most important usages relating to economic life are those which have to do with ownership. The practice of owning things is ordinarily explained in terms of "organic striving which appropriates from the environment material for self-provision, self-development and racial perpetuation." [26] It is believed that man not only needs and desires food, shelter, clothing, tools, and other goods, but he seems also, sometimes most emphatically, to crave unhindered access to them, with security of possession and use. Some early psychologists termed this desire an instinct, and some early economists interpreted it as a natural state. The owning propensity, however, is far from universal in either the animal or the human kingdom. The objects owned differ widely with times, places, and peoples; while most people in a state of nature seem to have been and still to be indifferent to ownership. The instinct and the state-of-nature hypotheses appear to be rationalizations, doctrines worked out to justify ownership practices, rather than explanations of the fact. The same thing may be said of the explanation which attributes ownership to prior claim, or taking possession of whatever has been found without previous owner, or to the practice connected with conquest of claiming that "to the victor belong the spoils."

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[26] Ernest Beaglehole, *Property* (London 1931) 127.

A second theory explains ownership in terms of sentiments and attachment habits. "All the primary needs, sex, nutrition, aesthetic and cognitive interests may serve as nuclei for the sentiments of property. . . . Constant or recurring needs are of special importance, giving the objects to which they are attached an abiding value." "Objects connected directly or indirectly with the satisfaction of important needs gather around them groups of emotional dispositions, including especially the prospective and retrospective emotions of desire, hope, fear, anxiety, disappointment, as well as pleasure in attainment and joy in mastery. . . . Men come to love things because they have put their energy into them, and because they are instruments of general satisfaction, but especially because they give them power over nature and other human beings." [27]

This explanation, however, fails to account for the fact that while the basic needs of food and sex, aesthetic and cognitive interests, are presumably more or less general, intensive, and repetitive, the sense of ownership is far from general. The masses from time immemorial have evidently felt no necessity for owning resources, things (other than strictly personal belongings), persons, or methods; while great achievers in the aesthetic and cognitive fields have shown little or no interest in possessing what they have produced.

The best explanation of property lies, perhaps, in cultural conditioning and in the exigencies of everyday living. The contest for individual and group survival and the relative scarcity of resources and things offer a realistic explanation for the development of ownership. Private property is a man-made device, related to group survival, and demanded by expediency. In the struggle for existence it becomes necessary to apportion wealth and to protect the weak. Things are held in common or privately according to the peculiar circumstances prevailing in a given time and place.

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[27] Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 192, 192–193. By permission of Thornton Butterworth Ltd.

Ownership Practices. Primitive groups seem to have practiced both communal and individual ownership, depending upon the type of articles involved.[28] Land, for example, was held in common. On the other hand, articles that could readily be monopolized, particularly movable articles such as weapons, utensils, ornaments, and amulets, were individually owned. Also, magic formulas and legends were owned by their originators; songs could be repeated only by the composer until bought by some one else; certain goods automatically passed to the chiefs, priests, and aged men; while ornaments and clothing have probably always been objects of individual ownership.

Scarcity of the particular articles seems always to have had something to do with ownership. Primitives did not own land because there was more than enough for everybody, while other articles which were relatively scarce were owned. In fact, people seem indifferent to owning what is not somewhat scarce. From the first ownership seems to have attached to "economic goods," to those articles, particularly the man-made, of which there were only a few or which had scarcity-value to particular persons.

Ownership of Land. The ownership of land is believed to have first arisen in connection with burial grounds which had unusual value; early man held the dead sacred and their last resting places inviolable.

In general in the early stages of culture land was not owned but simply occupied. Primitive peoples simply lived upon a piece of land and used it, without conceiving that occupation and use had any connotation of ownership. In so far as any "right" was involved, it consisted in the right to use, to till a piece of land, to hunt a certain forest, and to fish in a particular stream. In hunting times it was not the land that was held valuable, but the food it contained. Such rights as existed were really game rights. There was a monopoly but only of occupancy and use: hunting tribes regarded certain territories as their exclusive hunting grounds and forced all others off. There was no idea of ownership of game; one took it where he found it.

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[28] See Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive society* (New York 1920) 235–243; Clark Wissler, *Introduction to social anthropology* (New York 1929) 73–77; A. G. Keller, *Man's rough road* (New York 1932) 139; Beaglehole, *op. cit.*, 131.

During pastoral times also interest lay in the use, not in the ownership of land. With the domestication of animals came a new form of private possessions: flocks and herds. The domestication and herding of animals—cattle, sheep, reindeer—implied private ownership of the animals; but primitive herders did not claim individual ranges. They simply asked a share in the tribal domain, the tribe of course claiming rather definite territory. A fixed abode was not possible as food had to be sought for the animals; so while the concept of exclusive use of land arose, there was no idea even of group ownership in the modern sense of the term.

Some authorities hold that among some peoples a system of family ownership prevailed among hunting tribes. The family hunting territory was supposed to constitute the main bond of union and interest of family groups, which consisted of individuals bound together by ties of descent or marriage to the men of the family. Hunting outside one's inherited territory was sometimes punishable by death, although permission could be obtained to hunt in another man's territory.[29]

In the intermediate stage of tillage, land ownership was still vested in the group. A family failing to till the land was deprived of its allotment; the land reverted to the clan and was reassigned. It was with the development of agriculture that the first steps seem to have been taken towards private ownership. With settled communities people began to crowd upon given tracts of land; interest was in particular small areas and for longer periods; increased cultivation represented investment in the soil; and the practice of owning took definitive shape.

Group Property. The fixity of abode in agricultural regions, the prolonged labor required to produce results, the necessity of fencing in the ground to protect the crops against predatory animals, the growth of population settlements, the attendant competition for food resources—all seem to have contributed to the development of the group property practice. The right, at first, seems to have been to own not the land itself, but the product of the land. The length of time this right could be held depended on the type of crop grown and was gradually extended to the period between one harvest and another; longer tenure arose when trees were planted; finally the time limitations of ownership became indefinite; and eventually the right to transfer property became established.[30]

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[29] See F. G. Speck in Clark Wissler, *op. cit.*, 74–75.

Group or tribal ownership was but a step towards family ownership. In land, as well as food, shelter, tools, and power, the family became the owning unit. Under the patriarchal family, the patriarch owned all these items. In reality he even owned the members of the family inasmuch as he had the right to the services of the members, particularly the younger ones, even as in our times parents have the right to the services and earnings of minor children. In ancient Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome rulers came to have the right to own conquered land, equipment, and peoples. In this manner slavery came into existence.

Personal Property. Personal property in land was in a measure recognized even in communalistic tribes. Arrangements were permitted whereby if a man would reclaim waste land not part of the tribal domain, he could retain it for his own family and could pass it on to his children. So the idea of personal property arose naturally with the development of the tribe and was recognized by agricultural peoples. During the advanced agricultural period the possibility of profit from land was seen and economic rent was recognized.

Private property further developed under feudalism. Under this system it became a common practice for a powerful lord to drive out the occupants and establish ownership over land. He often captured the workers also, divided the land among them, and declared them his vassals or slaves. Thus land, food, shelter, tools, animals, and men came into the possession of the feudal lords.[31]

Corporate Ownership. In modern times land, food, shelter, tools, and power have become less and less the property of those directly using them and more and more that of corporations. The employment of the machine has made the direct ownership of man power increasingly less profitable and has consequently led to the abolition of slavery. Concurrently, however, what is called "wage slavery" has developed, through which corporations, though not owning men themselves, own the product of man's labor. Likewise the ownership of other sources of power has gradually passed from operating-group to corporations. In some nations, however, the community retains the right to some of the sources of power.

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[30] See Gide, *op. cit.*, 368.

[31] See *ibid.;* Ellwood, *op. cit.*, 187–188; Bernard De Voto, "The West: a plundered province" in *Harper's magazine*, 169 (1934) 355–364; Henry George, *Progress and poverty* (New York 1925) *passim.*

Two new types of ownership have appeared in contemporary life. First, the exclusive possession of ideas. In almost every country of the West there are laws giving people the right to use ideas and their statement, such as the exclusive ownership of songs, trade-names, and other intangibles. The second type, an outgrowth of money economy, consists in the right to own "intangible wealth," or mere pieces of paper representing value or good will, such as stocks and bonds.

Inheritance. A further extension of private ownership consists of the right to transmit property from generation to generation. It is thought that even in very early times legends, songs, and man-made objects could be transmitted only within one's family; but among some peoples there was the rule that there could be no transfer by gift—a father had to charge his son for even a magical device, although such a device was held to be a birthright of the son.[32] Relatively early, especially in patriarchal societies, herds and crops were thought to be inheritable within a family. Certain peoples drew sharp sex distinctions in the inheritance of property, the conventional property of women descending through females and that of men through males. Later, under capitalism, the practice and right to own and to transfer on an individual and corporate basis have become general.

IX. CONCLUSION

The development described in the foregoing pages, like every major development, has been gradual, spontaneous, and sporadic, the result of trial and error, fortuitous circumstances, or accidental combinations. Yet all in all it indicates that man has had fairly definite objectives: to have a sufficiency and regularity in the supply of economic goods, to reduce the amount and intensity of labor necessary for sustenance, and to achieve a measure of security in the possession of resources, goods, and wealth.

As a matter of fact, man has achieved sufficiency and regularity of food supply: by the domestication of plants and animals, by the use of agriculture, by employing the machine in agriculture, by establishing communication, transportation, and distribution systems. He has brought about a reduction of labor by the constant improvement in kind and number of tools, by using more enduring materials in tool-making, by the use of collective labor (slavery), by creating devices for the use of natural forces and the muscular power of animals, and, in recent centuries, by turning inorganic substances into power. He has also gained security against the attacks of nature by devising protecting mechanisms, improving his shelter, and by the development of ownership.

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[32] See Lowie, *op. cit.*, 235–255.

Moreover, men have always and in varying degrees planned. Joseph persuaded the Egyptians to join him in a plan that looked forward several years. The Greeks and Romans regulated the supply of labor by the slavery system. The Romans planned and carried out the construction of road and aqueduct systems. Concentrated populations everywhere have provided for the future as far as possible. Such planning has often embodied mainly the desires and ambitions of individuals and small groups, but even then it has also served the needs of society.

Furthermore, in our times societies as societies are planning and establishing controls on vast scales. To be sure, not all planning is directed to the common good, nor are all projected plans successfully carried out; but mankind is increasingly directing its attention to collective, planned development for the common good.

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Chapter 15

THE CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The contemporary economic system, regarded by some as a contrivance devised purposely for exploitation and therefore to be shattered, and by others as perfection itself and therefore not to be touched or even questioned, is but the product of the age-long development described in the last chapter. Its salient features, such as scientific technology and the machine, capitalism, the profit-making procedures, and interdependence, are man's own creation, the fruit of his striving toward definite objectives.

I. DOMINANCE OF THE MACHINE

Nature of Machine. The dominant culture complex in the economic system today, in fact probably in the entire culture, is the machine. By "machine" we do not mean only the instrument itself, but also the arts, scientific technology, the power, the factory and all other features that are related to it. In some respects the machine is very old; the compass, the waterwheel, the loom, the clock are all its forerunners.[1] But the machine of today represents a marked development in the materials and skills with which it is made, in the size and complexity of the instrument itself, and in the power employed to operate it. The preindustrial tool was small, simple in construction, with few parts, and was manipulated by man and animal power or by water and wind; the machine is a large, highly complicated "tool" operated mainly by steam, electricity, and similar means.

The power-driven machine, practically nonexistent two hundred years ago, has along with scientific technology so multiplied in number, kind, and reach as to have almost completely superseded hand-labor production. This increase has been marked in the last fifty years. In the United States, for example, the number of wage-earners increased 57 per cent during the years 1899–1935, the physical volume of production 127 per cent, and production per wage-earner 45 per cent.

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[1] See Lewis Mumford, *Technics and civilization* (New York 1934) 4.

TABLE 24. INDEXES FOR POPULATION, WAGE-EARNERS, AND PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1899–1935 [2]

YEAR	POPULATION	WAGE-EARNERS	PRODUCTION QUANTITY	PRODUCTION PER WAGE-EARNER
1899	100	100	100	100
1904	110	114	122	107
1909	121	137	159	116
1914	131	146	170	116
1919	140	191	214	112
1921	145	147	169	115
1923	149	186	263	141
1925	154	178	274	154
1927	158	177	274	155
1929	162	188	311	165
1931	166	139	206	148
1933	168	129	191	148
1935	170	157	227	145

Advantages of the Machine.[3] The machine has become so dominant that there is scarcely a single economic article that has not, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, been made by the machine.[4] And, even more important, this dominance has called for a reconstruction of the entire mode of living and has brought about marked advantages and disadvantages.

The machine has first of all increased man's capacity to exploit nature. In the machine man has an instrument far more efficient than he has ever had before, one which also makes possible an intensive concentration of power at certain points: one huge blooming-mill motor of 22,000 horsepower represents alone the muscular power of 176,000 men.[5] So efficient and so power-concentrating is the machine that it can and does supply much more than mankind's bare needs; present machine equipment in the United States alone not only produces more than all basic necessities, but it is said, according to various estimates, to be capable of producing from 20 to 77.6 per cent more than it does at present.[6] This does not imply that even the bare needs of food and shelter are supplied to the community, or that the dissemination of goods is in proportion to the power of the machine to supply the goods; it simply means that the machine is capable of producing all that man requires. In brief, the machine has greatly enhanced man's power to supply his needs, as is shown in table 25.

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[2] Based on United States Bureau of the Census, *Biennial census of manufactures 1935* (Washington 1938) 17.

[3] On the advantages and disadvantages of the machine see Michael Pupin, *Romance of the machine* (New York 1930); Elizabeth Faulkner Baker, *Displacement of men by machines* (New York 1933); and Stuart Chase, *Men and machines* (New York 1929).

[4] No adequate data are available on the extent to which the machine has come into operation, the proportion of production directly attributable to the machine, or the extent to which the machine gives a greater amount of production per capita. In the past, it was easier to employ indirect means to obtain rough estimates, but the industrial system has become so complicated as to make it virtually impossible to secure comprehensive data. See Gerhard Colm, "Production: statistics" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 467–472.

[5] See Sumner H. Slichter, *Modern economic society* (New York 1931) 86.

TABLE 25. GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL MACHINE POWER [7]
(In million horsepower)

YEAR	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE	GERMANY	U. S. A.	EXTRA-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (OTHER THAN U. S.)	WORLD
1835	0.3	0.02	0.01	0.3	0.01	0.65
1875	6.0	3.00	4.00	7.8	1.90	26.50
1913	28.5	12.50	21.00	86.0	31.00	211.00
1928	37.0	18.50	32.00	162.0	93.00	390.00

Again, the machine, as a result of greater productivity, has made possible a greater distribution of economic goods. If we contrast present-day economic well-being with that formerly prevailing, or with that in nonindustrial countries today, it would seem from existing records that the machine has made economic goods more widely available. In countries where mechanized industry is the rule, the average man commands a greater number and kinds of economic goods than his forerunners, than even the wealthiest of early times could command.

The machine, plus capitalistic organization, produces a relatively high degree of economic security. In periods of business depression the tendency is to stress the insecurity that prevails and to generalize from it; but the so-called insecurity of depressions is but a lower form of prosperity; the curtailment is not so much of the necessities as the comforts and luxuries. Moreover, the total insecurity prevailing in our times is small compared with that which seems to have obtained even in immediate preindustrial times or that which prevails today in nonindustrial lands. No reliable data exist to make possible exact comparative statements; but a fairly accurate statement can be made with respect to famines. Whereas there were 400 recorded famines alone between

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[6] Maurice Leven, *et al.*, *America's capacity to consume* (Washington D. C. 1934) places it at 20–22 per cent.

[7] R. Palme Dutt, *Fascism and social revolution* (New York 1935) 25.

1000 and 1800 A.D., in the contemporary world famines are relatively rare.[8] At present the very poor have, even in periods of economic distress, at least a minimum of food, shelter, and other necessities. There still is much privation, undernourishment, and insecurity, but this is due to societal maladjustment. The machine has made possible a security of economic goods far greater than that prevailing before.

In addition, the machine has freed man from his more laborious tasks. The machine can do practically all the burden-bearing, the boring, pulling, and lifting that man performed chiefly with his own muscles for thousands of years. One need not go very far back in time to perceive the significance of this. Even down to the beginning of the present century one could see in any seaport in which the machine had not penetrated men loading ships with lumber, like beasts of burden, bearing unbelievable loads on their backs. In contrast one could see in a port where the machine had been introduced a man sitting at the lever and handling a dozen logs by means of a grapplehook as if they were straw, with almost no effort on the part of man. In the sulphur mines of Sicily one may still see dwarfed little men climbing some three thousand sulphur steps out of the very depths of the inferno, carrying large baskets of sulphur on their flattened backs; while in a machine-equipped mine not far distant a steam apparatus sucks out the mineral from even greater depth, without man having to raise his hand.

Disadvantages of the Machine. On the other hand, conditions accompany the machine which are socially disadvantageous. The urban concentration associated with the machine; the intensity of machine-driven life with its constant shocks and vibrations; the noise, the crowding, and the dirt; the separation of the masses from direct access to the restorative power of nature; the loss of quiet, sunlight, and seclusion; the millions of industrial accidents,[9] are but a few conditions which accompany the machine.

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[8] From 1000 A.D. to 1855 A.D., 450 famines were recorded. Owing to lack of records and of a precise definition of the term "famine," we do not as yet have a comprehensive knowledge of the extent or number. On the general topic of famines, see Frank A. Southard, Jr., "Famine" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 6 (New York 1931) 85–89; Warren S. Thompson, *Population problems* (2d ed. New York 1935) 228; Ralph A. Graves, "Fearful famines of the past" in *National geographic magazine*, xxxii (1917) 69–90; "Famine" in *Living age*, 293 (1917) 688–691; A. M. Carr-Saunders, *Population problem* (New York 1922) 249; *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, x (11th ed. 1910) 167 and vol. xi, 8–9.

[9] See Slichter, *op. cit.*, 90–91 and *passim.*

Again, the machine leads to the excessive exploitation of physical resources. It is estimated that in the United States at present natural resources are being used at the rate of 70 units where one unit would suffice. If man continues to exploit nature at this rate, the West may in time, in spite of synthetic materials, face a scarcity of natural resources.

The machine also makes possible an excessive exploitation of human resources. The modern industrial process taxes human strength, subjects man to intensive shocks and strains, and then discards him the moment he shows signs of diminished efficiency. Man becomes but a machine tender; human life loses some of its value. Man goes on round after round, like a mule around the treadmill. The wage-earner, especially, is tied to one type of work and is in many respects incapacitated for well-rounded, complete living in and through his work.

The machine also limits some phases of enjoyment. The widespread standardization of machine-made goods, though affording a greater variety, takes the choice away from the consumer. The shape, color, size, texture, content, style, and quality of goods are no longer determined by the consumer's taste; they are determined, rather, by the designs for the machines.

The machine has apparently taken away some of the joy man once derived from work. Here again, there are no reliable data; but it would seem that the ordinary artisan or manual laborer of preindustrial days had a greater opportunity to express whatever creative impulse he possessed and to derive enjoyment from his labor, than does the machine-tender of our day. The extreme specialization of tasks in modern industry, the workers' inability to see the relation of their work to the whole, the monotony, the repetition, the stationariness, the speeding-up of work—all operate against workmanship. No wonder that morons are said to make the best machine feeders! [10]

Finally, the machine, plus capitalism, economic interdependence, and competition, has produced mechanized warfare. The necessity in such warfare of pitting the entire material and human resources of one nation against another; the inability to compensate for the lack of essential materials, such as an important fuel; the extended scope of combat and invasion; the use of chemical munitions, mechanized armies, and motor arms—these, in one way or another related to the machine, impose devastating effects on entire populations, leave a black trail for future generations, and make warfare a threat to civilization.[11]

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[10] On the other hand, there is a gain in skill in the designing of the machines and tools, a more refined control of the raw materials. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Effect of mass production upon skill in an English factory" in *Monthly labor review*, 28 (Washington D. C. 1929) 473–476. See also Arthur James Todd, *Industry and society* (New York 1933) *passim;* and Sidney and Beatrice Webb, "Labor" in Charles A. Beard (ed.), *Whither mankind* (New York 1928) 139.

II. CAPITALISM

Nature of Capitalism. Capitalism, the second main economic complex, consists in the ownership, control, and operation of financial resources by a relatively few persons.[12] Capitalism is largely a concomitant of the machine. The whole process of manufacturing entails the extraction of raw materials, the employment of high skills, the development of operating power, the erection of large plants—all of which call for financial resources that no one person or small group can command. The relatively small, inexpensive, and easily manipulated tools of the premachine age could be made and owned by individuals; but virtually all the "tools" of production in the machine age are built by the pooled funds of the many. This brings into economic functioning persons and groups who assemble the wealth of others and put it to productive use. Capitalism, therefore, is a "natural" growth; a growth to which perhaps more than to any other feature, may be attributed both the strength and the weakness of the present economic system.

Contributions of Capitalism. That capitalism produces marked benefits is obvious. It assembles the savings of the many and thereby "creates" vast wealth; makes possible the widespread use of the machine and large-scale production; increases productivity; and effects the diffusion of economic well-being and a relative security. The increase in national wealth, production power and productivity of the last century in most parts of the West is largely, if not wholly, the result of capitalism. "If we think of human beings as merely instruments of production, there can be no hesitation in ascribing to the capitalist organization . . . an unprecedented success, in harnessing to production the greatest amount of labor-power at the least relative cost in maintenance, a success demonstrably superior to that of the most efficient system of chattel slavery and the slave trade that the world has known." [13]

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[11] See General E. Requin (France), "Modern developments in methods of warfare" and Lieutenant-General Von Metzsch (Germany), "New tendencies of development in warfare" in Inter-parliamentary Union (ed.), *What would be the character of a new war?* (London 1931).

[12] Ownership is often widely distributed; control is usually vested in the hands of a few individuals who may own but a small percentage of the property or even none at all. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, *Modern corporation and private property* (New York 1932) chaps. iii–vi, xiii and p. 396.

Again, capitalism has integrated industry; it has stimulated mental productivity and opened the way for creative careers to the capable; has weakened class barriers and given many persons from the lower ranks an opportunity to rise; has taken to "backward" peoples the most advanced fruit of civilization; and it has had a share in extending universal education and in controlling disease and pestilence.

Problems Arising from Capitalism. On the other hand, capitalism is probably the root of some of the major maladjustments of our times. Capitalism has taken the ownership of tools, especially production tools, from the workers. Although it is the savings of the common people that make possible the machine, legally the machine does not belong to the masses, not even to individual capitalists, but rather to those "legal persons," the corporations, which are associated with capitalism. These invisible, intangible agencies, operated by a few individuals, are the master organizations of our times, controlling the lives of whole nations.

Especially significant is the fact that capitalism has divorced the laborer from direct participation in the benefits of production and compelled him to "sell" his labor to win his living. This system in turn forces a discipline on labor which places the individual worker at the mercy of the corporation. It creates a distance between workers and managers, produces irresponsibility on the part of capitalists, managers, and workers alike, and breeds far-reaching class conflict.[14]

Capitalism produces or is interrelated with a disequilibrium between production and consumption power. A disproportionate increase in production equipment exists side by side with a relative decrease in purchasing or consumption power. Since machines, factories, and their operation are made possible chiefly by means of collective capital, so much of the savings of the people go into production goods that their purchasing power is reduced. In the

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[13] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Decay of capitalist civilization* (New York 1923) 102. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company.

[14] See John Strachey, *Coming struggle for power* (rev. ed. New York 1934) for a trenchant statement on capitalism.

United States, for example, 900 million pairs of shoes a year can be produced; but the greatest number of shoes purchased in any one year was 300 million pairs. This means that two-thirds of the shoemaking plant is idle, that purchasing power is buried in overexpanded production plants; and this means relatively higher cost of goods, a relative reduction of purchasing power, wasteful, cutthroat competition, a repeated glutting of markets, an inevitable slowing down in the production of machinery, and a periodic plunging of the whole society into economic distress. A certain amount of surplus production capacity is necessary for the efficient operation of economic life, but not the amount which capitalism actually imposes. Thus the promise of capitalism, that the sacrifices entailed in the system would result in greater satisfactions to the masses, has proved a will-o'-the-wisp; a capacity to pay has not kept up with wider availability of consumers' goods.[15]

Moreover, capitalism produces a maldistribution of wealth. Machines and the wealth resulting from their use are controlled by the few; over one-fiftieth of the income is in the hands of one ten-thousandth of the population and some fifty or sixty persons have the ultimate control of more than one-fifth of all business in the United States. ". . . In 1929 [among financial institutions alone] the partners and directors in one investment banking house, two trust companies and three national banks, all in New York City, held over 2400 directorships in corporations with combined net assets of approximately $74,000,000,000, equal to over 20 percent of the assets of all American corporations." [16] As a result, the corporate wealth of the United States is in the hands of 13 per cent of the population.[17] This overconcentration of wealth produces in turn an overconcentration of control of tools. Though a person has invested in the tools, he has little or no voice in determining how they shall be used or who shall benefit from the profits derived from their use.

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[15] See Slichter, *op. cit.*, 44–45; see also Stuart Chase, "Enemy of prosperity" in *Harper's magazine*, clxi (1930) 643.

[16] Gardiner C. Means, "Interlocking directorates" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 8 (New York 1932) 151. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

[17] See Willford Isbell King, *Wealth and incomes of the people of the United States* (New York 1915); and Willford I. King, "Wealth distribution in the continental United States at the close of 1921" in *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, xxii (1927) 135–153; National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., *Income in the United States, its amount and distribution, 1909–1919*, i (New York 1921); Frederick Soddy, *Wealth, virtual wealth and debt; the solution of the economic paradox* (2d ed. New York 1933).

Further, capitalism produces excessive oscillations in economic activity, sharp rises and sudden falls, peaks of prosperity and depths of depression. This phenomenon may be partly due to other causes: [18] to the inability of the leaders to devise instruments of control, and to the fact that society does not possess sufficient collective intelligence to operate the broader aspects of associated living. Man has not thus far been able "to establish a balance between the stupendous power of natural science and its applications, and the self-inflicted backwardness of social science and the consequent impotence of social engineering." [19]

In any event, mankind in the West faces a very extraordinary situation: it has an actual overabundance on the one hand and a scarcity on the other; great natural resources and restricted access to them; vast amounts of tool-resources, yet with periodic nonuse of them; virtually unlimited power with which to operate the tools, but that power partly wasted. Moreover, we have the spectacle of millions of men and women eager to work, yet unable to find employment: as many as a million and a half at all times, from three to five millions in ordinary periods of depression, and fifteen or more millions in periods of great depression, are out of work, go hungry, are insufficiently clothed and sheltered, and bewildered—in a country as rich and efficient as the United States.[20] The capitalistic system in fact might be likened to a fiend who, with infinite power to satisfy man's needs, dangles that power before man's eyes to tantalize and torment him. It is probably no exaggeration to state that in present Western culture at least one-fourth of the population sometime during their lifetime suffer from varying degrees of privation. And it is

> Not that they starve, but starve so dreamlessly,
> Not that they sow, but that they seldom reap,
> Not that they serve, but have no gods to serve,
> Not that they die, but that they die like sheep.[21]

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[18] See chap. 25 on "Change" below.

[19] Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture as a determinant of behavior" in Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences, *Factors determining human behavior* (Harvard 1937) 167.

[20] In a debate, Professor E. R. A. Seligman defended capitalism mainly on the ground that it is a comparatively new system, still developing its concepts of responsibility and regulation. *New York times* (February 3, 1934) 23:4.

[21] Vachel Lindsay, "Leaden-eyed" in *Collected poems* (New York 1925).

III. PROFIT-MAKING PATTERN

Meaning of "Profit-Making." A third complex marking the economic system today is the profit-making pattern, or that system which operates not to serve the community but for monetary gain, with the owners and managers receiving at set times certain amounts, called "profits," after paying interest, wages, and all other costs.[22] The making of profits is not a new practice; it prevailed even in medieval society, despite the "usury" doctrine of the Christian church.[23] But with the Commercial Revolution (from the thirteenth century to the present) it has increasingly become dominant; a new class has arisen, the entrepreneurs, who devote their main attention to profit making. The extent to which the so-called "profit motive" exists in entrepreneurs is difficult to say; yet the profit-making system itself and its operation are of marked significance to society.[24]

Advantages of Profit-Making. It is generally recognized that the profit-making system has many advantages. It probably intensifies economic activity; makes for decisive action in production and marketing; and promotes the wide availability of economic goods. It stimulates business ability, risk taking, resourcefulness, leadership, initiative, judgment, courage, and other qualities which are of service to the community. Profit-making has also led to discoveries and inventions of great importance to society which conceivably might have not been made.

Problems Arising from Profit-Making. On the other hand, the profit system produces an artificial consumption of goods and stimulates the consumption of some goods at the expense of others more, or at least equally, useful. The individual may know his own desires better than anyone else, as the *laissez-faire* doctrine asserts, but he confronts such a multitude of choices and of skilful salesmen pressing one or the other upon him that he is unable to determine what he wants. "Hence, when we find the United States spending more for tobacco than for education, the explanation may be, not that we desire tobacco more than education, but simply that the facilities for getting people to buy tobacco are more efficient than those for persuading them to pay for education."[25]

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[22] See John R. Commons, *Institutional economics* (New York 1934) 792.

[23] See R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the rise of capitalism* (New York 1926) 51–57.

[24] For a discussion of the profit versus the nonprofit motive see Harry F. Ward, *In place of profit* (New York 1933) chap. i.

Profit-making, through competition, produces waste. The so-called "octopus" industries, such as gas, electric light and power, water, railway, and street-railway systems, are a case in point. In order to "get the trade," they duplicate equipment on every hand and run up enormously wasteful costs. This, in turn, leads to the waste of natural resources. In the oil industry, for example, an excessive number of wells in the same field diminishes the natural pressure of the oil, substantially reduces the quantity which can be extracted and greatly increases the cost of getting it. Nor is waste confined to production; it extends also into the distribution of goods. In the milk business of Rochester, New York, for example, to serve a few customers in each block 356 men, 380 horses, and 305 wagons traveled 2,509 miles, when the same service, under a noncompetitive system could have been efficiently given, it is estimated, by using 90 men, 80 horses, and 25 horse-drawn trucks, and by covering only 300 miles.[26]

The profit-making system is also believed to place an unnecessary burden on the community in the form of middlemen. The middleman system does perform necessary functions in view of the complexity of the modern economic system. But it has gradually become, perhaps unavoidably, practically an independent system of sales promoters, who often make fictitious appeals, inflated "sales talk," carry on high-powered advertising and instalment selling. Moreover, the middlemen often are the masters of the economic situation. They destroy the small producer and shopkeeper; they fix prices, often to the point where consumers will do without rather than pay; and they often levy "the highest toll on the most vital necessities."[27]

The profit-making system gives rise to human sacrifices. Organized to produce the maximum profits, industry seems to care but little for "human costs." Managers, aiming to bring down production costs, often bear hardest on labor, reducing wages to the minimum and introducing labor-saving devices. Large staffs carry on technical research or operate elaborate accounting systems, not to discover how to make the jobs more psychologically satisfying and worth while to the worker, but to reduce money costs. Only rarely is an industrial concern interested in determining human costs or in discovering how to make work more enjoyable to the worker. In fact, "if money costs can be reduced by methods which increase human costs—such as speeding up, longer hours, night work, failure to guard machinery properly or to protect workmen against heat, dust, fumes, or industrial poisons—the money-saving method is usually adopted without hesitation." [28]

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[25] Slichter, *op. cit.*, 48–49. By permission of Henry Holt and Company.

[26] See *ibid.*, 50. This duplication, of course, is not clear waste as it gives work to many persons who otherwise might not find work in the improved system.

[27] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Decay of capitalist civilization* (New York 1923) 147–148.

Further, the profit system often reduces the quality of the output. "Adulteration, substitution, and all forms of short weight and false measure, tend to be regarded—to use John Bright's classic phrase, as merely 'methods of competition.'" [29] Consumers' Research, Consumers' Union, the Coöperative League, and other similar agencies do mitigate these conditions, but only in a very small way.

Finally, profit-making tends to transmute all human values. All of life takes on meaning chiefly in terms of pecuniary gain. To the man bent on profit making, "The principle of getting rich and getting-rich-quick establishes the whole scale of values and affects even [his] daily speech and imagination. . . . For him the country is not 'the country' but the place where wheat, corn, cotton, even real estate is raised; a river is not a 'river' properly but a means of transportation or a source of hydroelectric power; a journey is not made for the purpose of 'traveling' but becomes a useful removal; friendship is not merely 'friendship' but a matter of mutual service . . .; a theater is not supposed to bother about art but to pay dividends to its stockholders. The solidity of a house or the esthetic appeal of a skyscraper matter little; what is paramount is that as a business operation the house or skyscraper 'pay' in the briefest possible time." [30] Monetary considerations enter into mating and childbearing; education turns into a preparation not for the sum of living but chiefly for money-making; government becomes mainly a protective system for the maker of high profit; and even science tends to become mainly the servant of the moneymaker.[31]

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[28] Slichter, *op. cit.*, 62. By permission of Henry Holt and Company.

[29] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Decay of capitalist civilization* (New York 1923) 124–125. See Stuart Chase, "Enemy of prosperity" in *Harper's magazine*, 161 (1930) 641–650.

[30] Lucien Romier, *Who will be master, Europe or America?* (trans. from the French by Matthew Josephson, New York 1928) 188–189. By permission of the Macaulay Company. The passage, originally describing American life, has been generalized since it applies equally well to all peoples under pecuniary competition.

IV. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Nature of Interdependence. The fourth main complex marking the contemporary economic system is interdependence. That system, mainly due to the great development of communication during recent decades, has come to embrace all society, from the smallest to the largest regional and national units. Modern industrialism spreads a network of transportation and communication facilities, of capital and goods, and binds the entire West, and even portions of the East, in a single inextricable economic unit. This is perhaps "the cardinal fact in human history." So swift has communication become, so far-reaching, universal and intimate its effects, that "a community of destiny is dictated inexorably to mankind, either the unity of a common purpose or the unity of a common debacle. . . ."[32]

Advantages of Interdependence. This mutual dependence has lengthened the radius of and perhaps deepened cohesion within each nation. The local and regional discords which marked business activity in the Middle Ages; the petty principalities and city states which regarded each other as fields of exploitation, and their merchant princes as agents of conquest, have gradually been subordinated to larger regional and functional groups. The merchant princes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries themselves perceived the futility of rivalry and paved the way for mutual trust. The business world has become one of the main agents of peaceful relations and of the unification of nations.

In contemporary international society the very fact that people of every nation have investments in other countries tends to reduce international conflict. Trade, requiring as it does rapid means of transportation and communication, acts to annihilate distance and to dispel the suspicion and hostility that go with separation. Even nations which insist on isolation and self-sufficiency almost instantly respond to impulses generated far beyond their boundaries. Thus the economic system has become the cohesion-producing agency of our times, supplanting the military of classical times and the church of the Middle Ages as the unifying power.

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[31] See Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) 153.

[32] H. G. Wells, *New America, the new world* (New York 1935) 2.

The dependence of peoples upon each other has also contributed toward security. Economic goods are now available on a West-wide basis. Famines, pestilences, and other disasters have become the common responsibility of mankind and can be more efficiently controlled than ever before. Likewise, every new advance in technical invention sooner or later becomes the possession of the entire world; while the world-wide availability of the products of every region tends to provide a greater degree of the "good life" to practically all peoples.

Disadvantages of Interdependence. On the other hand, interdependence, associated as it is with specialization, produces disadvantages. So long as the stream of commerce flows without interruption, all goes well; but the moment war or other catastrophe interrupts that flow, both those who supply the goods and those who depend on them suffer from relative want of necessary goods. Local specialization also carries the disadvantage of making one community dependent on the purchasing ability of another. So long as the flow of commerce is normal, the prosperity of one center tends to spread to all the others, but in emergencies the misfortune of one region tends to spread to other regions and countries, and to derange the entire system.[33]

The reach of pecuniary competition is no doubt responsible for international cartels and other combinations, which monopolize production and distribution on a West-wide basis and control the prices of goods. Such combinations of capital have spread their power, have erected tariff walls, often prevented the importation of necessary goods, and assumed monopolistic control.

Finally, this very interdependence accentuates nationalism and leads to the building of the vast armies and navies of our times. It leads to rivalries for "colonial" possessions; to "dumping" and other forms of international cutthroat competition, provocative of hard feelings; to periodic wars, great loss of man power, widespread suffering, and aftermath of disorganization, that spreads from generation to generation, from war period to war period. Thus, economic interdependence, potentially cohesive, actually produces divisiveness; a divisiveness which mankind has probably never before experienced to the same extent, and threatens suddenly to arrest cultural unfolding and to produce a long, dark night.

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[33] See Slichter, *op. cit.*, 114–115.

V. STEERING THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Future of Economic Life. The economic system of today, therefore, produces an abundance and wide availability of economic goods, national and international economic security; but at the same time it produces a periodic scarcity of goods, overconcentration of wealth, disaster for the many, and at times threatens to destroy civilization.[34]

Nor have the changes which industrialism set in motion exhausted their influence, "and this is responsible for one of the significant features of the modern system—its want of stability. . . . Every decade witnesses a fresh outburst of economic change, and before society has had time to adjust itself to one set of economic conditions, they are swept away and replaced by another. Economic development is constantly outstripping social development, and the wished-for stabilization of society recedes ever farther into the distance." [35]

Proposed Ways Out. Thus the crucial problem of our times is to discover ways by which to conserve the strong features of this unfolding system and to mitigate its weaknesses. This problem has led to much speculation and violent partisan discussion; but it is patent that no ready solution is possible; it is a problem of vast scope and great complexity, involving so many conflicting elements. Yet proposals are continually being made. The exigencies of life are too severe not to force the search for some kind of solution. Nearly all proposals revolve around the proposition of so organizing the state as to give it control over economic life, either by establishing control by regulating money through some such device as an international bank, or by comprehensive national and international planning, fascist fashion.[36] But there are larger questions; and the main answers are those of individualism, socialism, and communism.

Individualism as a Way Out. Individualism, as the term connotes, would reduce all forms of control or coercion of economic activity. It regards the individual as the focal point of the economic system; it stresses the needs, desires, and rights of the individual above those of society; or, perhaps more correctly, it holds that the

[34] See Walter N. Polákov, *Power age* (New York 1933) 235, 240–241.

[35] Arthur Birnie, *Economic history of Europe* (London 1930) p. ix. By permission of Methuen & Co., Ltd.

[36] Commons, *op. cit.*, 891.

individual best serves the community when he is left free to follow his own interest and work out his own life. Individualism attempts to achieve harmony in the society by a wide distribution of individual property. Collectivism attempts to achieve harmony through collective property.[37] Individualism holds that every country should maintain a strong government, but only to protect the individual in the exercise of his economic freedom, to keep peace within national boundaries, to protect trade, and to defend the nation against the aggrandizing activities of other nations.

Modern individualism, originally intended as a protest against the regulating activities of the state, has developed into a system which in practice secures state protection for the activities of the industrialist, the entrepreneur, and the financier. As most people evidently have neither the intelligence, the time, nor the inclination to recognize their own needs, to follow their own interests, and to protect their own rights, individualism consists of the freedom only of the few who can gain control of government protection and can thereby impose their interest upon the many.[38]

Syndicalism. Syndicalism emphasizes the interest of the productive workers. In a measure like individualism, it would reduce the power of the state and would leave all governing function in the hands of the laborers and their unions; it would make it difficult for nonproducers to exist or to function. All the tools of production would be in the hands of the workers; the workers would organize and carry on the processes of production and distribution; they would work to supply the community with goods in order to serve, and not to make profits; and the state, in so far as it existed at all, would serve to protect the workers in carrying out these ends. The establishment of the syndicalist system would be brought about by revolution, and as an aid to or preparation for the revolution, the strike, sabotage, and other similar means are advocated.[39]

Socialism. Socialism lays emphasis on the all-inclusive nature of economic activity. It recognizes the state as the supreme regulative system of our times; it would give the state control of all economic activities; it would eliminate all competition and establish coöperation; and it would make the basic economic necessities freely available to all. It would make the state the owner and operator of all the main means of production, or at least the basic tools of production; it would permit private enterprise, but only under state control; and it would empower the state to effect the widest possible distribution of the products of labor. Socialism is the antithesis of anarchism and individualism in that it advocates a strong state as the protector and promoter of the interests and rights of society. Fascism, though it deprecates the use of the very term "socialism," is in its essence socialistic: by organizing all economic enterprise on a corporative basis, it aims to assume a complete ("totalitarian") control and direction of all economic activity.

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[37] *Ibid.*, 108.

[38] See Herbert Adolphus Miller, "Individualism in the future" in *American scholar*, iii (1934) 155–160, for a stimulating discussion of the possibilities inherent in individualism.

[39] See C. E. M. Joad, *Introduction to modern political theory* (Oxford 1924); Bertrand Russell, *Proposed roads to freedom* (New York 1919) esp. chap. viii.

Communism. Communism combines elements of syndicalism and socialism. It emphasizes the rights of productive workers, and at the same time it stresses the need of the strong arm of the state to protect and promote these rights. Unlike socialism, which would place the governing power in the hands of a central state, communism ideally would organize economic activity on the basis of the commune or the local community; would make the commune the owner and operator of all the tools of production; it would own consumers' goods; it would place control in the hands of the workers; it would demand of each according to his ability, and achieve as nearly as possible an equal distribution of the products of labor; it would destroy competition and profit-making and establish coöperation, to the end of satisfying the needs of the entire community; and it would, like syndicalism, achieve these ends not by constitutional means, as in the case of socialism, but by revolution and the utter destruction of capitalism.

Which Doctrine Will Prevail? Which one of these doctrines will prevail, it is not possible to predict. That individualism is on the decline is probably true. In addition, in most countries of the West the tendency is in the direction of some form of socialism. Virtually all the modern states are increasingly assuming some control of economic life. Writing more than eighty years ago, John Stuart Mill, defender of *laissez-faire*, admitted that "If . . . the choice were to be made between [socialism] with all its chances and the present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices; if the institution of private property necessarily carried with it as a consequence, that the produce of labour should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in an inverse ratio to the labour—the largest portions to those who have never worked at all, the next largest to those whose work is almost nominal, and so in descending scale, the remuneration dwindling as the work grows harder and more disagreeable, until the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily labour cannot count with certainty on being able to earn even the necessaries of life; if this, or [socialism], were the alternative, all the difficulties, great or small, of [socialism], would be but as dust in the balance." [40]

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Chapter 16

THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

I. NATURE OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

Nature of Education. The primary function of the educational system is to transmit a knowledge of the forms and skills society regards as indispensable to its survival and improvement. That system regularizes the knowledge-transmitting activity; inculcates the folkways and the mores; trains the young to fit into the established cultural scheme; aims to aid the individual in the development of personality and aptitudes; and sets forth the broad lines which the society believes must be followed in order for it to survive and improve.

Generally speaking education embraces all instructional activities: the random knowledge-imparting activity of the young themselves; the informal instruction carried on in the home; knowledge disseminated through literature, magazines, newspapers, the radio, and the cinema as well as formal schooling. In the following discussion, however, attention is directed to formal schooling, since it is this that Western culture mainly employs in the shaping of individual and group life.

Distinguished from Science. Education is often confused with science, but the two are not the same. Education devotes itself almost wholly to transmitting knowledge, science to extending it; the former passes on what is believed to be true and correct, the latter tests what is known and aims to discover what is as yet unknown. The two institutions are interdependent and overlap in objectives and operation; the educational system, especially in colleges and universities, often carries on knowledge-extending activities, and the scientific system often passes on what is already known. But in the main the two have different objectives or functions. They are becoming increasingly differentiated, though frequently still housed in the same set of buildings.

What Lies at the Root of Education? Marriage regulates the sex drive, the family reproduction, the economic system physical-sustenance activities. Precisely what underlies the educational system? Matthew Arnold held that human beings possess an "instinct" for acquiring knowledge and an "impulse" for relating knowledge to conduct and to the sense for beauty.[1]

Others hold that it is curiosity that underlies education. Indeed, children do seem to be driven by an almost irresistible curiosity to know the whys and wherefores of almost every phenomenon they encounter;[2] while adults, though exhibiting wider variations, evince some thirst for knowing things. Curiosity, however, is probably but a cultural conditioning, rather than an "instinct." Children, adolescents, or even adults do not seek education solely or mainly in response to curiosity. The desire for economic improvement, for personal and familial prestige, and for mating opportunities plays as important, if not a more important part. Even in well-regulated societies, considerable proportions of the population have to be compelled to go to school or they go as little as possible; in fact, were the pressure removed, it is not at all improbable that most formal education would disappear.

Social Impulses in Education. Education seems to rest on social pressure. Elders exert this pressure in part because children, being superindividualists, are highly disturbing until they are inducted into the ways of the group; they tutor the offspring in order that they may not violate the mores and bring the family into disrepute; they seek to raise their family status by preparing their children to enter some profession or other distinguished calling; while many parents undoubtedly press their children into schooling in the hopes that the latter may be saved from the hardships and frustrations which they, the elders, have experienced.

Societal Purpose in Education. In our times considerable pressure is exercised by society as a whole. Each community seems possessed by the desire, amounting to determination, that its traditions, ideologies, usages shall be preserved, shall be passed on to the young in successive generations, as if its very life depended on them.[3] Believing that "good" prevails only in the present order, it looks to the educational institution to train its youthful members

[1] See Matthew Arnold, *Discourses in America* (London 1885).

[2] See Susan Isaacs, "Experimental construction of an environmental optimal for mental growth" in Carl Murchison (ed.), *Handbook of child psychology* (Worcester, Mass. 1931) 129.

[3] See John Dewey, "Education" in Paul Monroe (ed.), *Cyclopedia of education*, 2 (New York 1911) 398; Joseph Kinmont Hart, *Democracy in education* (New York 1918) 9; William H. Burton, *Introduction to education* (New York 1934) 19.

and to discover and train the leaders of the future, for the perpetuation and the improvement of that order. It insists on the indoctrination of the future citizens in order that "good should forever be present to them."

II. PURPOSE OF EDUCATION IN VARIOUS PERIODS

Primitive People's Education. Education, as a separate system, has come into existence only recently, long after marriage and the family, the economic, religious, and governmental orders had been well formed. Its development has taken place in regard to at least four main aspects: in the concepts regarding the purpose of education, in its usages, in organization, and in instruments.

Among the primitive peoples, education centers in the family and has no formulated objectives. The young learn by imitation or by trial and error to perform the daily tasks, which are chiefly related to sustenance; they acquire by rote the traditions, which are mainly religious; they learn the folkways and mores of the group in the home or the compound; their teachers are primarily the familial elders. In tribal communities there are standardized public ceremonials, by which the young, on reaching the age of puberty, are instructed in the tradition of the group and inducted into manhood and womanhood. In these ceremonials the public shamans or elders are the instructors. Thus primitive peoples, without having definite objectives, reach and train virtually every member of the community for meeting the realities of everyday existence.[4]

Education in Ancient Times. The beginnings of formal education seem to have taken place in early agricultural communities. The Egyptians appear to have been the first, during the third millennium before our era, to develop schools. The schools, located at the Pharaoh's palace, served a comparatively small group, made up of the sons of the pharaohs, of the courtiers, and of other privileged persons. These schools instructed in reading, writing, ethics, good manners, athletics, and the exploits of kings and dynasties. They reached a comparatively small number, who were trained in the ideas and customs of the *élite.* Later the Egyptians established schools for boys of the middle classes, who were trained for service in the court. Guild schools were also introduced, but even these seem to have reached a comparatively small number. The Egyptian school therefore was a particularistic system; it exalted the exploits of royalty and separated the educated from the rest of the community.

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[4] See William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society,* ii (New Haven 1927) 1416.

The Hebraic system amounted to the same thing. The Hebraic school was attached to the temple; it instructed in the religious tradition; and it trained for religious service. It, too, reached a small number. The pressure of various rulers, such as Solomon, at times extended the services of the school to all classes, made attendance compulsory, and, since religion affected the whole life of the people, it made education a genuinely societal enterprise.[5]

Education for State Service. The Greeks, amazingly original in so many ways, were the first to create an educational system with a community purpose. They trained their young men to serve the entire community; they insisted on training the whole man for physical, mental, and moral living; they taught the citizen to contribute to the life of the community as a whole. However, even this well-oriented educational system did not go the whole way. The principal emphasis was on training the individual to serve the state. Plato's insistence on education for total well-being was in the nature of a protest against prevailing practices.

Education for Practical Efficiency. The Romans, the "practical" people of classical times, introduced the element of immediate utility and efficiency in education. Although they imitated the Greeks, in the main they prepared their plebeian boys for the trades; their girls, regardless of class, for the domestic arts; the patrician boys for the professions, chiefly those related to the state. Rhetoric was the highest form of instruction. But Roman education did not aim to train the citizen for a rounded, orientated life, but to make efficient mates, parents, citizens, and soldiers. The specialization and complexity of Roman life exacted one characteristic above all others, namely, competence.[6]

Education for the Church. The formal education of the Middle Ages was mainly theological, and its chief end was to prepare for service in the Church. Especially up to the tenth century, theology and the definitions and speculations of the theologians formed the chief substance of education; all other subjects, even the teachings of Christ, received secondary consideration. Considerable intellectual activity existed in the ranks of the Church, but the hand of speculation lay heavily upon the schools. Moreover, the medieval school introduced a censorship for the first time; it specified what should be excluded from the curriculum, a practice which kept out of the curriculum for several centuries items that later were regarded as essential to a well-rounded education and provided a powerful instrument for the inculcation of special ideas.

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[5] See James Hastings (ed.), *Dictionary of the Bible* (New York 1909) articles on "Education," etc.

[6] See Cyril Bailey (ed.), *Legacy of Rome*, essays by C. Foligno and others (Oxford 1923).

Humanistic and Utilitarian Education. Beginning with the eleventh century, there was an inner fermentation in the ranks of the Church. The monasteries and the cathedral schools became the very carriers of classical learning, the centers of much that is precious in modern education. Gerbert, Abelard, Duns Scotus, William of Occam, Roger Bacon became names to conjure with. But these were minority groups; they were on the periphery of the dominant culture area; their actual influence for the time being was nil; and they were hounded and persecuted. They were the harbingers of a new order.

Other powerful factors affected the content of education. The troubadours, with their delight in the secular, disseminated the vernacular and an interest in the arts. The beginnings of the Commercial Revolution in the thirteenth century and the rise of the middle class called for training in secular subjects. Later, the Protestant Reformation emphasized the use of the Bible, advocated literacy for all, and civil control of education. The invention of paper and of printing, the discovery of the New World, and the growing power of science revolutionized education. The human scene gradually became the all-dominant interest in education. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) emphasized the importance of useful knowledge; Comenius (1592–1670) stressed the cultivation of the religious and social tendencies of man and the free unfolding of a child's own nature; Rousseau (1712–1778) insisted on cultivating man's impulses. Out of these forces came the humanistic content of education.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries introduced the utilitarian emphasis. The religious and theological instruction was further subordinated; natural-science studies were extended; the idea of progress, with its belief in man's ability to improve the social order, permeated the school. The end of education was gradually defined as the understanding and the mastery of physical, biological, and human nature. The utilitarians, such as Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, and Bentham, clashed with the classicists; they regarded the essential task of education to be that of preparing the young for survival, for success in life, for proper care of the body, for the employment of leisure, and for participation in social welfare.

Nationalistic Education. With the growth of nationalism, however, the educational system encountered the old problem again. The control did pass to the community, but the practice of using education as an agent for building up conformity grew apace. The nationalistic spirit gradually permeated education. From Prussia, where this emphasis more or less originated, it spread to France, later to England and to other countries, until in the totalitarian states education has completely lost the right to teach anything not approved by the state. Under Communism, Nazism, and Fascism education is employed to inculcate partisan political ends. In these states, the school is frankly employed for partisan indoctrination, and all other doctrines are rigidly suppressed.

III. EDUCATIONAL FOLKWAYS AND MORES

Folkways of Education. The customs related to education are mainly in the nature of folkways. First, Western culture has generally regarded the educated man as one apart and has usually conferred upon him special privileges and prerogatives. Again, ability to attend school has itself been looked on as a mark of distinction, placing the family able to provide it in a class apart. In our time, elementary school education, and in some countries junior high school education, is regarded as necessary; while for the middle and upper classes college attendance confers prestige.

Compulsory Attendance. The principal educational mores relate to attendance. School attendance was first made compulsory in Prussia by Frederick the Great in 1717.[7] The Prussian law, recast in 1736, required all subjects to send to school their own children, boys and girls, as well as those intrusted to their care, not later than the fifth year, "to keep them there into their thirteenth and fourteenth year"; and until they had not only "obtained the essentials of Christianity and know how to read and write readily but can also make satisfactory answer with regard to those matters which are taught them in reading books ordained and approved by our consistories."[8]

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[7] In Massachusetts a law had been passed in 1642 requiring towns to maintain schools, but attendance itself was not made compulsory.

[8] W. Carson Ryan, Jr., "Compulsory education in Germany" in United States Bureau of Education, *Compulsory school attendance*, *Bulletin 1914 no. 2* (Washington D. C. 1914) 137.

Nearly every country of the Western world has gradually come to require attendance up to the fourteenth year and to increase the number of days of compulsory attendance, as may be seen from table 26.

TABLE 26. COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES[9]

COUNTRY	DATE ESTABLISHED	AGE
Austria	1869	6–14
Denmark	1904	7–14
France	1882	6–13
Germany[a]	1717–1873[b] (typical states)	6–14
Great Britain	1872–1900[b]	5–14
Hungary	1868	6–12
Netherlands	1900	6–12
Norway	1889	7–14
Sweden	1882	7–14
Switzerland[a]	1859–1882[b] (typical cantons)	6–15

[a] The states under Germany and the cantons under Switzerland are only typical ones and not all-inclusive. In Saxony the age rules call for 14–17 for boys only and in Wurtemberg 14–18 for boys and 14–16 for girls.

[b] These dates indicate the first and the last years in which compulsory education was established in various subdivisions of these states.

In the United States, compulsory attendance in the elementary grades, begun in Massachusetts in 1852, was gradually established throughout the country, as is shown in table 27.

Compulsory Attendance in Practice. In the early days of this practice in the United States vigorous objection was raised against compulsory attendance. It was argued that it was not necessary since attendance would be as great without compulsion as with it; that it interfered with the liberty of parents; that it was "monarchical," despotic, and increased the powers of the state; and that for these reasons it was unAmerican, not in keeping with the principle of freedom. Objection was specially raised to the making of nonattendance a misdemeanor.[10] Organized labor, however, took a different view; it overrode these objections, insisted on universal, compulsory public education, and fought vigorously for its establishment.

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[9] Based on Anna Tolman Smith, "Compulsory attendance in foreign countries" in United States Bureau of Education, *Compulsory school attendance, Bulletin 1914 no. 2* (Washington D. C. 1914) 91–92; Ryan, *op. cit.*, 95.

[10] See W. S. Deffenbaugh, "Compulsory attendance laws in the United States" in United States Bureau of Education, *Compulsory school attendance, Bulletin 1914 no. 2* (Washington D. C. 1914) 10.

TABLE 27. COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE IN THE UNITED STATES BY STATES, DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT, AND AGE [11]

STATE	DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT	AGE	STATE	DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT	AGE
Massachusetts	1852	7–16	Oregon	1889	7–16
Dist. of Columbia	1864		Utah	1890	8–18
Vermont	1867	8–16	New Mexico	1891	6–16
New Hampshire	1871	8–16	Pennsylvania	1895	8–16
Michigan	1871	7–16	Kentucky	1896	7–16
Washington	1871	8–16	West Virginia	1897	7–16
Connecticut	1872	7–16	Indiana	1897	7–16
Nevada	1873	7–18	Arizona	1899	8–16
New York	1874	7–16	Iowa	1902	7–16
Kansas	1874	7–16	Maryland	1902	7–16
California	1874	8–16	Missouri	1905	7–16
Maine	1875	7–17	Tennessee	1905	7–16
New Jersey	1875	7–16	Delaware	1907	7–17
Wyoming	1876	7–17	North Carolina	1907	7–14
Ohio	1877	6–18	Oklahoma	1907	8–18
Wisconsin	1879	7–16	Virginia	1908	7–15
Rhode Island	1883	7–16	Arkansas	1909	7–16
Illinois	1883	7–16	Louisiana	1910	7–14
North Dakota	1883	7–17	Alabama	1915	7–16
South Dakota	1883	8–17	Florida	1915	7–16
Montana	1883	8–16	South Carolina	1915	8–14
Minnesota	1885	8–16	Texas	1915	8–14
Nebraska	1887	7–16	Georgia	1916	8–14
Idaho	1887	8–18	Mississippi	1918	7–17
Colorado	1889	8–16			

Compulsory attendance has become a widely established culture pattern. Most countries seem to go on the theory that the education of the growing generation cannot be left to the whim of parents. In the United States it is left to the discretion of the parents as to the school to which the child shall go, and even the language in which the child is taught (Nebraska and Oregon, U. S. Supreme Court decisions), but the child must go to school. Furthermore, society itself assumes the right and duty of guaranteeing that the child be mentally trained, a right which not even parents may violate.[12] This practice often keeps youthful individuals in school against their will and at generalized learning for which they have no aptitude; [13] it often causes economic hardships to families in the lower economic strata. Compulsory education, however, is firmly established. In fact every one of the United States has made provisions for keeping children in school either longer hours each day than formerly, more days during the year, or more years. In 1934, minimum ages for leaving school varied from 14 to 18 years, thirty-one states having 16 years as the minimum; [14] while the average length of school year in the United States in 1936 was 173 days.[15]

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[11] Walter S. Deffenbaugh and Ward W. Keesecker, "Compulsory school attendance laws and their administration" in United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education, *Bulletin 1935 no. 4* (Washington D. C. 1935) 8, 12.

[12] See *ibid.*

[13] In the United States, all but three states make (in 1938) some provision for instructing the mentally deficient, and ten states have special classes for gifted children.

The Literacy Pattern. Closely related to compulsory attendance is the literacy pattern. In ancient and medieval times considerable bodies of people lived their lives without being able to read and write; in modern times Western society has come to regard those techniques as prerequisite to good citizenship. In the very nature of the case literacy cannot be made compulsory, and nowhere is a person subject to legal or other punishment if he does not read and write. And yet the compulsion is strong. Illiteracy is generally regarded as a mark of social inferiority, if not of disgrace; while nations war against it as they do against unhygienic conditions, vie with one another in stamping it out, and regard the amount of literacy as an important item in comparing national achievement.[16] The illiteracy rates for the various countries of the West for which data are available are shown in table 28.

The extent to which literacy contributes to constructive social living is difficult to determine. In countries in which a measure of democracy still prevails, there are monthlies, weeklies, and even dailies which aim to create an active, discriminating public opinion; but to one such publication there are probably many which cannot by the furthest stretch of the imagination be classed as instructive. Recently the radio has in a measure superseded the power of the press.

Literacy has been put to other uses: it has become one of the main vehicles in advertising; it has been employed as a test for the franchise; in Portugal, Italy, and other countries where the illiteracy rate until recently was large, considerable portions of the population have been debarred from participating in governmental activity. In the United States, literacy has been used to prevent the

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[14] Deffenbaugh and Keesecker, *op. cit.*, 11.

[15] See David T. Blose and Harry F. Alves, "Statistics of state school systems, 1935–36" in United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education, *Bulletin 1937 no. 2* (advanced pages, Washington D. C. 1938) 14.

[16] See James F. Abel and Norman J. Bond, "Illiteracy in the several countries of the world" in United States Bureau of Education, *Bulletin 1929 no. 4* (Washington D. C. 1929).

TABLE 28. ILLITERACY RATES IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN WORLD [17]

COUNTRY	DATE	GROUP COVERED	PERCENTAGE OF ILLITERACY
Denmark	1921	Of school age and over, unable to read and write	0.1
Sweden	1921–22	Liable to military service, unable to read and write	0.2
England and Wales	1924	Signing the marriage register by mark	0.3
Netherlands	1918	Signing the marriage register by mark	0.3
Scotland	1923	Signing the marriage register by mark	0.3
Switzerland	1906–10	Signing marriage register by mark	0.4
United States	1930	10 years of age and over, unable to write in any language	4.3
Canada	1921	10 years of age, unable to read	5.1
Czechoslovakia	1921	7 years of age and over, unable to read and write	7.0
Belgium	1920	8 years of age and over, unable to read and write	7.9
France	1921	10 years of age and over, unable to read and write	8.2
Hungary	1920	6 years of age and over, unable to read and write	15.2
Argentina	1913–24	Average of conscripts and enlisted men	24.0
Italy [a]	1921	Over 6 years of age, unable to read	28.0
Finland	1921	15 years of age and over, unable to read or write	30.1
Poland	1921	10 years of age and over, unable to read	32.8
Chile	1920	5 years of age and over, unable to read	40.8
Spain	1920	10 years of age and over, unable to read and write	42.9
U. S. S. R.	1926	Above 7 years of age, unable to read and write	43.3
Roumania	1920	10 years of age and over, unable to write	45.0 [b]
Bulgaria	1920	10 years of age and over, unable to read or write	46.7
Mexico	1921	All ages, unable to read and write	62.2
Brazil	1920	5 years of age and over, unable to read and write	71.2

[a] Figures for Tuscany only, which may be deemed fairly representative of Italy as a whole.
[b] Estimated.

Negro population in the South from exercising the franchise and to exclude certain classes of immigrants. In totalitarian countries it is used to create and maintain rigid conformity. Further, literacy is regarded as a panacea, an end in itself, the purveyor of almost magical powers. "We ascribe to elementary book learning power to form character, make good citizens, keep family mores pure, elevate morals, establish individual character, civilize barbarians, and cure social vice and disease. We apply schooling as a remedy for every social phenomenon which we do not like." [18]

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[17] Based on Helen Sullivan, "Literacy and illiteracy" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 9 (New York 1933) 522.

IV. ORGANIZATION OF MODERN EDUCATION

Communal Organization. In former times education was in the main organized, manned, supported, and controlled by special groups; in our times it is almost wholly communal. Special interests do often inject themselves; but all in all the contemporary educational system serves the interest of society as a whole more nearly than any of former times. The school imparts, or aims to impart, knowledge originating in the community and prepares the student to serve the community rather than particularistic groups or interests.

The teacher himself is, generally speaking, regarded as a public servant. In ancient and medieval times the priest or some one representing the ruler was the main teacher. In the contemporary system he is a member of the community; in varying degrees he shares the common experience and transfers a knowledge of it to the pupil. In fact, the teacher's participation in community life is considered an important part of his function.[19]

Reach of Modern School. The educational opportunity is in most countries open to all almost without cost. This has greatly extended the reach of education. In Greece, particularly in Athens, the school apparently did reach a considerable proportion of the free population,[20] still it was limited mainly to the freemen; while secondary schools were private organizations and so far as the records show did not admit girls; in Rome the schools reached mainly patrician and middle-class boys; and in the Middle Ages the schools devoted themselves almost wholly to the preparation of youth for service in the Church.[21]

The rise of the middle classes, from the thirteenth century on, gradually extended the school to larger proportions of the population; in the fourteenth century considerable portions of the middle classes sent their children to school. At present the school in most countries reaches, or aims to reach, practically all of the children.

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[18] William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston 1906) 628.

[19] See C. R. Maxwell, *Observation of teaching* (Boston 1917) 30–31.

[20] It is said that in Alexandria 50 per cent of the population was literate. See Sullivan, *op. cit.*, 522.

[21] From the tenth century on there was a substantial training of "externes," or persons not destined for the Church.

In the United States one-fourth of the total population was attending schools and colleges in 1933–1934.[22]

Moreover, in recent decades some countries, notably England and the United States, have also undertaken the education of adults. This movement is not wholly new; early Christian education was almost entirely for adults; the educational activities of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the early Sunday Schools of England and the United States were almost wholly in the nature of adult education. But in recent times, taken up by some colleges and universities, by workers' organizations, social workers, business and industrial groups, and finally by public schools, it has come to reach considerable segments of the population. In 1936 there were in the United States 783,726 persons enrolled in night schools alone.[23]

Adult education is employed to reduce illiteracy farther, to encourage certain vocations, to "assimilate the alien," to "eliminate crime," to educate parents, or to propagate certain ideas. The students themselves seem to be attracted mainly by the economic motive; 98 per cent of a group investigated in the United States reported that they were attending adult classes in order to increase their earnings.[24]

Classless Schooling. Thus the present-day school reaches a considerable portion of the population. In all previous systems it did not reach the nonprivileged classes, which constitute at all times by far the large majority of the population; it did not reach any considerable proportion of the women, who at all times make up about one-half of the population; and in medieval times it was further restricted by the use of Latin as the main vehicle of instruction. The present-day educational institution, embracing as it does practically the entire population, is one of the main influences in associated living.

The school of today tends to eliminate class and other distinctions. Classical and medieval schools accentuated class distinctions, and even down to the beginning of the present century most countries of Europe maintained schools for the common people and separate schools for the privileged. The contemporary system in the main eliminates this distinction and offers schooling to all on practically an equal footing. Sweden has established the unit plan; England has opened the secondary school to all classes more widely than before; Germany has established a primary school system to which all classes are admitted equally and secondary schools which are open to the promising students of all classes; France has adopted a uniform content for all schools below the *lycée* and has made all schooling, up to the second year of the secondary system, free.[25] The United States has from the very first kept the school door open to all, regardless of race, sex, class, or other distinctions.

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[22] See Emery M. Foster, "Statistical summary of education, *1933–34*" in United States Department of the Interior, Office of Education, *Bulletin 1937.no. 2* (Washington D. C. 1938) 5.

[23] Lester B. Herlihy and Walter S. Deffenbaugh, "Statistics of city school systems, 1935–36" in United States Office of Education, *Bulletin* (Washington D. C. 1938) 21.

[24] See L. M. Wilson and I. L. Kandel, *Introduction to the study of American education* (New York 1934); and Lyman Bryson, *Adult education* (New York 1936) for description of adult education and its development.

Professional Teaching Group. The professionalization of teachers is another feature of the present system. Teacher-training began in the twelfth century, the universities of the times being devoted primarily to teacher-training. But the specially trained teacher as a class, especially for elementary and secondary schools, is the product of modern times. The teacher of today is subjected to prolonged formal training, has to acquire special techniques, and so constitutes a professional group. This professionalization of teaching is at once the product of general cultural development, which as it advances produces increasing separation and specialization of functions, and particularly it is the result of the influence of science, the Industrial Revolution, and the decline of church.[26]

The Woman Teacher. Still another feature of the educational system of our time is the woman teacher. Virtually unknown previous to the twentieth century, the woman teacher has come to play an important rôle throughout the West. Particularly in the United States women have come to take a larger and larger part in education, both as teachers and as administrators. The proportion of men teachers decreased from 42.8 per cent in 1880 to 14.1 per cent in 1920, but increased rapidly after this date to 20.6 per cent in 1936. In 1936 out of a total of 870,963 teachers, 691,890 or 79.4 per cent were women.[27] Another survey, for the period 1900–1930, bears out the same conclusions, as shown in table 29.

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[25] See Charles H. Judd, "Education" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends*, i (New York 1933) 325–326.

[26] See A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The professions* (Oxford 1933) 250–265 and "Professions" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 477 ff.

[27] Blose and Alves, *op. cit.*, 19.

TABLE 29. SEX DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS IN AMERICA, 1900–1930 [28]
(Including Private and Public Schools)

	1900		1910		1920		1930	
	NUMBER	PER CENT	NUMBER	PER CENT	NUMBER	PER CENT	NUMBER	PER CENT
Elementary								
Men	123,064	28.7	96,762	18.7	69,346	11.2	68,705	9.8
Women	306,042	71.3	419,524	81.3	552,199	88.8	633,819	90.2
High Schools								
Men	14,447	47.4	23,402	44.3	38,084	32.6	82,689	35.2
Women	16,042	52.6	29,411	55.7	78,820	67.4	152,405	64.8
Universities and Colleges								
Men	8,987	81.0	14,051	81.3	22,626	74.6	39,735	73.3
Women	2,110	19.0	3,230	18.7	7,708	25.4	14,460	26.7
Professional								
Men	8,277	100.0	13,285	100.0	10,603	97.1	15,562	96.0
Women					312	2.9	652	4.0
Teachers' and Normal School								
Men	1,860	42.5	2,195	37.1	3,560	37.1	5,995	41.5
Women	2,512	57.5	3,719	62.9	6,027	62.9	8,468	58.5
Total								
Men	156,635	32.4	149,695	24.7	144,219	18.3	212,686	20.8
Women	326,706	67.6	455,884	75.3	645,066	81.7	809,804	79.2

The significance of the increase in women teachers is difficult to determine. The claim is sometimes made that women are better fitted by nature to deal with small children; that they are more capable of giving themselves to the detailed reiteration of facts; that they are more concerned with the development of the individual than are men; and that, for these reasons, they are better fitted for the lower schools than for the higher. But there is no conclusive evidence in support of these claims. In fact, there are those who claim that these very characteristics, if they are possessed by women, tend to make women teachers repetitive and pedantic, and to foster conformity rather than the development of the aptitudes or originality of pupils.

Standardization. Another characteristic of the present-day educational system is standardization. Standardization, a marked feature of all aspects of modern life in the West, is in education partly due to the democratic movement, which demands that approximately the same educational opportunity and the same training be given to all. Standardization in content and method no doubt produces socialization. On the other hand, it tends to neglect the needs of special classes of students, to ignore individual and group background and capacity, to emphasize routine achievement, such as attendance, grades, examinations, and the like, and to disregard special capacity and the training of leadership.[29] More recently attention has been directed to the discovery and training of special ability; but as yet standardization is dominant.

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[28] Judd, *op. cit.*, 352. Based on *Biennial survey of education, 1926–1928*, p. 426, and data supplied by United States Office of Education.

V. EDUCATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE

Early Writing. Primitive people rely on the spoken word and ceremonials to impart knowledge and give instruction. The recounting of stories, myths, legends, folklore; games, riddles, and public ceremonials are the devices employed to make the folkways and mores "tangible, understandable, unforgettable."

Writing developed gradually. The pictograph was the first form of symbolic representation and was already in use in early historical times. All writing, before the development of printing, however, had a restricted value as a medium of imparting knowledge. Because of the character of the clay, stone, bronze, and marble on which early writing was done, only a limited use of such records was possible; the teacher and the pupils had to go to the places where they were inscribed in order to use them. In later ancient times papyrus was used to write on; but papyrus, though movable, was difficult and expensive to produce, while writing on it required considerable skill. The invention of parchment, in the second century B.C., increased the number of manuscripts, especially as the Middle Ages advanced and many monks devoted themselves to manuscript book-making. The number of books was also probably increased by the invention in the twelfth century of nutgall ink, which, flowing more easily down the pen than China or lampblack ink, made manuscript work less arduous.

Moreover, all early writing had a relatively limited use. It was employed mainly by priests, governmental servants, and traders and remained the prerogative of the first two classes for many centuries. In Greek times it was employed by professional and a limited number of commercial people. In Athens a considerable portion of the population seems to have been able to read; in Ptolemaic Alexandria 60 per cent of the men and 40 per cent of the women of the middle classes are said to have been able to read and write Greek and an additional undetermined percentage to use Egyptian.[30] In Rome literacy was regarded as important, and it is said that even some of the freedmen could read. In the Middle Ages clerics and commercial people were generally able to write.

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[29] See Edward L. Thorndike, *Education* (New York 1912) 67–70, 262–281.

The Printed Page. The introduction of paper in the twelfth century [31] and of the printing press in the fifteenth century, together with an increased use of the vernacular in writing, produced a veritable revolution and created the printed page practically as we know it now. Coincidentally, the Protestant Reformation, by insisting on Bible reading as the principal means of learning the will of God and by propaganda and counterpropaganda, produced a powerful stimulus to the production and use of the printed page, particularly in the Protestant countries. The discovery of the New World, the rapid expansion of trade, the invention of cheap paper, the spread of democracy—all added to the impetus. Privileged classes at first opposed the education of the masses for fear of loss of status and possibly for fear that the supply of cheap labor might be curtailed. But the impelling drives were too powerful. The modern West has come to rely on the printed page as the principal medium for the transmission of knowledge. More recently the phonograph, the radio, and the cinema have come into use, but as yet these have not been much used in education.

The printed page is a culture deposit of major significance. By it much fuller and more exact records of experiences, events, and achievements are made and transmitted from generation to generation; by it a wider range of communication and presumably of social interaction is created. But modern education has come to emphasize the printed page as the *summum bonum*. Using books has come to mean learning; making and using books the primary activity of the teacher, separating him from everyday life. Hence the teacher is often regarded contemptuously and thus is estranged from the rest of society; while society is deprived of a valuable element. If the teacher takes part in movements of a public character, he is charged with partisanship and is told to go back to his books; but if he devotes himself wholly to his books, he is charged with being indifferent to his time and his people. It is only in very exceptional cases that the teacher, outside purely technical fields, can actually render a practical service to society.[32]

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[30] Sullivan, *op. cit.*, 522.

[31] Paper was used in China as early as the second century B.C.

The use of print has also created undue reliance on the printed page, inculcates "literality," robs the mind of discrimination, and teaches belief in what is "in the paper." Even in colleges and universities the stress is mainly on "literality," on note-taking and note-reading, and on gullible acceptance of technical knowledge. The critical faculty, in so far as it is encouraged, consists mainly of negative criticism, sterile, scholastic hair-splitting, with the consequent loss to society of minds that could be made into perceiving and contributive agents.

The Textbook Evil. One of the outstanding media is the textbook. What Professor Charles A. Beard, himself a writer of textbooks, has said [33] of the textbook, is no doubt largely true: "The textbook evil is the great American academic disease, and, in the opinion of the present grumbler, the source of a great deal of our imaginative sterility and general intellectual mediocrity. . . . We put black-letter heads, italics, numbered paragraphs, and other crutches for the lame, blind, and halt into books for children in the grades. . . . We insist on giving college students black-letter aids for imbeciles until they reach the age of thirty and receive their doctorates. It is worse than a disease; it is a crime, an offence against style, intelligence, spiritual vigor. As a result, we turn out a great army of 'educated' persons who have never read a book, have merely tried to chew desiccated hay packed between signposts. Grand conclusion: a huge host of people whose intellectual range is just equal to the captions of the tabloids, who can not think, who do not know or care for our noble mother tongue, who can not use it, who have received and deserve the title of morons. This is not a criticism of [any particular book]. It is a round, general damnation for pedants, among whom the present reviewer must be reckoned as one—offenders against the intelligence of the American people."

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[32] See Ellsworth Farris, "Two educational problems" in *Journal of educational sociology*, 9 (1935) 40–46.

[33] See *New republic*, li (New York 1927) 209. By permission of *New republic*.

VI. EDUCATIONAL IDEALS AND REALITY

In view of the fact that education is the one institution which deals with plastic youth, most educators place great faith in the educational system and believe that it has far greater possibilities as a shaper of human ongoing than it has as yet realized. Some lay stress chiefly on the administrative aspect of the matter and maintain that in order to achieve its larger possibilities the educational system should aim at autonomy; others stress mainly the extending of the social objectives of the system. Sociologists also, as for example Lester F. Ward and Franklin Henry Giddings, have often expressed the conviction that education can become a master agent of "progress." [34]

Individual Self-Discovery. It is believed that education can render society a marked service by devoting itself more than it does at present to teaching the pupil the art of self-discovery: the understanding of his cultural background, of his capacities and aptitudes, and the limits of his capacities. Particular stress is laid upon the building of the sense of confidence, a trust or faith in one's self within the limits of one's capacity, and a unity of life and contentment. In short, self-confidence without egotism, self-knowledge without self-exaltation, and faith in one's self without ignoring the limits of capacity.

Some educators stress the elimination of the inferiority feeling. The inferiority feeling is probably one of the obstacles which prevent most human beings, great or small, from achieving their complete selves. This feeling, deriving from the inescapable pressures of the physical universe and of associated living, besets most human beings and hinders their social functioning. "When the things we want, the aspirations and ambitions we cherish, and the relationships we most desire are, for various reasons, not being realized, or blocked in their realization, we are forced back upon ourselves. We seem to be alone and isolated from our fellows, stung by a sense of failure, and haunted by the feeling that we have been weighed and found wanting. The cause of the feeling of inferiority may lie in our conduct, in our imperfections, or in circumstances beyond our control, but the feeling itself is one of adverse self-evaluation. It arises when mental conflict becomes marked, when the individual begins to fear that he is unable to control socially-tabooed desires and wishes, that his personal defects are irremediable, or that the external obstacles which block his wishes are insurmountable. Then the individual begins to experience a baffled feeling of hopelessness and helplessness over his situation, and to doubt his ability to succeed." [35]

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[34] See Franklin Henry Giddings, *Civilization and society* (New York 1932) chap. xxi; and Commission on the Social Studies, *Conclusions and recommendations* (New York 1934) chaps. iii and iv, upon which this subchapter is partly based.

Properly directed education, it is believed, would free individuals from this oppression, give them a sense of personal security, impart a consciousness of status in the social order, and thereby aid them to function constructively. To this end far-seeing educators would emphasize the fact that not everybody can be a leader; that humble, simple work has its own intrinsic dignity; and that meritorious work, performed faithfully, efficiently, and with regard for quality is in itself a dignified achievement and constitutes its own reward.

Liberation from Societal Fears. Education is believed to be the institution which can eliminate societal bugaboos and fears. The fear of natural phenomena, the fears of the devil, hell, and an after-life, and the dread of sickness, want, and death, which once plagued the human mind, have in a considerable measure been eliminated; and no doubt the school has had its share in this. But many fears still prevail, such as racial fears, fears of neighbor nations, minority groups, of variant thought and action, and fears of social and cultural experimentation. "Yellow Peril," "Red Peril," "Semitic Peril," and similar "perils," often fostered by the press and the interest-groups it represents, are but "pictures in the head"; they are as groundless as the fear of hell and purgatory that troubled the Western mind for many centuries; and yet they disturb the lives of millions of people, bring them misery, produce restlessness, wars and rumors of war. It is the duty of the educational system so to equip the mind of youthful generations as gradually to free society from these bugaboos and fears.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the educational system itself is in the grip of these very fears. In truth, it rationalizes them, adorns them with the halo of science, and passes them on to the new generations as the last word of wisdom. The school more often than not imbues the student with fear of the new and untried; it expounds to him the danger of participating in inquiry; it anathematizes and often expels those who question the established order; it dubs the inquiring and alert mind "dangerous," "presumptuous," "demagogic," "radical"; it instils in the average student the fear of lifelong failure and disaster if he departs from the teachings of the elders. The problem resolves itself, therefore, into one of freeing the educational system itself from unfounded fears, a problem of major proportions and one which in the nature of things offers no ready solution.

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[35] E. T. Krueger and Walter C. Reckless, *Social psychology* (New York 1931) 405–406. By permission of Longmans, Green and Co.

Rational Control. It is sometimes advocated that one approach to this problem is through the cultivation, especially in the schools of higher learning, of the art of discrimination. To the average intelligent American, education does not mean "an inner change—the putting on of a new man, a new criterion of truth, new tastes." It means, rather, the acquiring of "finer and more flexible tools" for the economic warfare in which he is going to engage; [36] and the educational system only fosters this point of view, with the result that the graduate of college or university is not equipped for reasoned living.

The contention is that education should inculcate trust in reason and prepare the youth to deal with charlatanism and "ballyhoo," the mountebank and the demagogue. This means the cultivation of realistic thinking; the elimination of fantastic notions and rationalizations; the liberation from "isms," labels, and tags of thought; the subjecting of everything that comes within the purview of the mind to examination and testing; the acceptance only of what corresponds to reality. "It is a prime condition of human welfare that men and women should be trained in [criticism]. It is our only guarantee against delusion, deception, superstition, and misapprehension, of ourselves and our earthly circumstances. It is a faculty which will protect us against all harmful suggestion." [37]

Training for Societal Endeavor. Again, progressive educators emphasize the need of preparing the young for societal rather than personal or even primary-group endeavor. Education has in the main produced two types of educated individuals: those who use their education to befuddle the masses and then prey upon them, and those who are cynical about efforts directed toward the improvement of the human lot. Educated individuals who are bent upon improving the social order are few and far between and are ordinarily subjected to ridicule.

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[36] Ludwig Lewisohn, "Business of education" in Kendall B. Taft, John Francis McDermott, and Dana O. Jensen (eds.), *College readings in contemporary thought* (Boston 1929) 200.

[37] Sumner, *op. cit.*, 632–633; see also Everett Dean Martin, *Meaning of a liberal education* (New York 1926).

One of the ideals placed before the educational system is that of training the student in the understanding of present-day conditions and movements; fostering in him contributive attitudes; preparing him to participate in common-welfare activity. Education, according to this ideal, should train a leadership which seeks service to society rather than personal glory or reward; a leadership based on ability rather than on opportunism.[38]

Synthesis of Knowledge. Emphasis is laid also on the now generally recognized need of synthesizing knowledge and focusing the attention of the youthful generation upon social well-being. It is now generally recognized that the segmentation of knowledge has gone so far as to leave the student with scattered fragments of unrelated knowledge as he leaves school or college. In order to equip him for contributive participation in constructive social endeavor, he needs to have a synthesis of the known facts, needs to focus these upon social objectives, needs to discover the interrelatedness and collective nature of human activity, to discover methods and techniques for societal improvement, and to participate in activities which promise the common good.[39]

VII. CONCLUSION

How far can the educational system achieve the objectives set forth above? That system, like every other, is interwoven with other phases of culture, those who control it are the product of the system itself, while the manipulation of any social system or the elimination of the shortcomings implied in the above analysis would constitute a herculean task.

Yet the educational system has already brought about, largely by its own efforts, marked and rapid changes. Although it is one of the youngest of systems, it has gradually become a community-organized, maintained, manned, and supervised system; it serves, or is intended to serve, the entire community rather than particular interests; it is open and free to all, within the economic limitations of the pupil's ability to support himself in secondary and advanced schools; it largely eliminates class, sex, race, and other distinctions; it is standardized and professionalized. Special groups do sometimes inject their interests, but in general the contemporary school system serves the entire community; it enables the whole youthful population and even a substantial proportion of the adult population to enjoy educational privileges. It is not impossible, therefore, that it may become increasingly and by its own efforts an agent of social improvement.

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[38] See Christian Gauss, "Comedy of leadership" in Taft, McDermott, and Jensen (eds.), *op. cit.*, 222–233; and John R. Tunis, *Was college worth while?* (New York 1936) 218–234 for a discussion of the contribution which a university education makes or may make to this end.

[39] Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) *passim*, esp. 30–36, 150–152, 232–280.

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Chapter 17

THE RECREATIONAL INSTITUTION

I. NATURE OF RECREATION

Importance of Recreation. The recreational institution is, on first thought, a system of secondary importance. Individuals, social groups, and societies attend to recreation only after the fundamental needs have been satisfied. Recreation produces fewer important patterns, folkways and mores, and traditions; requires relatively less time; and only a few take it up as a profession.

And yet recreation is an important activity. All societies devote considerable time, effort, and expense to it. In fact, "Only where men are starving and in terror of their lives is there no gladness for anyone. . . . On the other hand, where there is no pressing care for the present or immediate future, mankind turns spontaneously to pastimes, follies, or more refined diversions. . . . Men have striven no less to get pleasure than to win necessities; they have put forth even more effort to attain luxury than to achieve the obviously useful." [1]

Social and Cultural Aspects. Recreation has a social and a cultural aspect. Its social character arises from the fact that most recreation is carried on through companionship or in the presence of others. There are solitaries who, like Byron, find pleasure in pathless woods, rapture on the lonely shore, and in "society" where none intrudes, but these are exceptional. For most human beings recreation constitutes partly a way of being in the companionship of others; even those who derive recreation from the beauties of nature find their fullest pleasure when they share their experience with others. Recreation consists in part of self-projection: a gratification, reassurance, rehabilitation of the sense of self; and this appears to be possible only through social interaction.

The cultural aspect lies in the fact that recreation is closely interwoven with and is utilized by other institutions. Recreation has always been the essence of familial, religious, and other community festivals; and in our time it is used as a means of moral and religious instruction, to promote nationalism and war, to prevent political or economic upheavals, or as in present-day Russia, Italy, and Germany to produce conformity to particular régimes.

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[1] A. G. Keller, *Man's rough road* (New York 1932) 419–420. By permission of Frederick A. Stokes Co.

Explanations as to Origin. It was formerly thought that man was endowed with a recreational or a play "instinct." Recreation, however, is far more than play; it often derives from disciplined, dangerous, and even painful activity, which strictly speaking cannot be termed play; and there is no evidence of an inheritable mechanism which produces uniform automatic expressions in play.[2]

It was also formerly held that active, healthy bodies, especially those of children, in their normal functioning accumulate a surplus of muscular and nervous energy which calls for a free "letting-off of steam." But most recreational activity does not follow on the accumulation, but rather on the expenditure or exhaustion of muscular and nervous energy; it does not take place at the beginning of the day, the week, or the season, when man's energy is at its height, but rather it follows the weariness of the day, the week, the month, or the season. The surplus-energy theory, as this explanation was called, is not wholly applicable even to child life. The process of bodily growth is such in the child that "play" is his compulsive activity, and release from play, rather than more play, constitutes recreation for the child.

The recapitulation theory was also held widely. It made recreation the reënacting of the experiences of the race, repeating what is "racially" familiar, thus bringing rest to the organism. It was thought that in playing war games or fondling dolls, the young reenact the past and prepare for adult life. But not all recreational activities repeat what is familiar; both children and adults continually invent new games; much play does not contribute to preparation for adult life; while recreation for most adults and aged people does not prepare for anything. Considerable recreation derives not from the familiar but from that which has not been experienced, from the strange and the bizarre, from new sights and experiences.

Relaxation-Substitution Explanation. The explanation which is nearer to the facts is that which attributes recreation to the organic necessity for relaxation, a relaxation which comes from alternating or substituting one type of activity for another. The life process is such that it wears on muscle and nerves, produces mental grooving and social strains; it forces the individual constantly to make adjustments to the physical, biological, and cultural environment, to perform physical or mental labor, to assume duties, bear cares, discharge responsibilities, and to submit himself to regulation and regimentation. Wear and tear result also from relative inactivity as well as overactivity, from mere routine or monotony, from a lack of balance between physical and mental labor, from doing what is irksome or artificial, from the boredom of isolation, or from having no pressing responsibility.

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[2] See L. L. Bernard, *Instinct* (New York 1924) chap. xv, esp. 342; Richard C. Cabot, *What men live by* (Boston 1914) 100–101, 155.

Thus, the compulsions of life attack the body and the mind, wear and tear muscles and nerves, groove mind-flow, produce social strains and tension—all of which call for repair and the replenishing of energy if the human organism is to function normally. Some of the repair is made by food and sleep, by the pauses and changes which occur in the daily task, by sheer loafing, by normal social intercourse; but these are insufficient.

Man derives the most effective replenishment of energy from change, especially change from the customary and compulsive to unusual and free activity. Not complete ease or inactivity; for, *ennui* is one of the more unendurable compulsions, as may be seen from the leisure classes' never ending search for release from idleness. It is change that produces relaxation and eventual renewal of energy: change of labor, scene, and social contacts; change from usual to unusual activity, from solitariness to association, from noise to silence, from ugliness to beauty, from country to city, from seashore to mountain, from the fragmentariness of ordinary duty to imaginary unity and completeness.

II. TYPES AND MEDIA OF RECREATION

Types of Recreation. Recreational activities fall into various types. Some recreation exercises man's body, as in hiking or playing tennis; others his mind, as in reading; some his voice, as in singing; others his sentiments, as in witnessing a play.

Again, some recreational activity is isolative, as when one plays solitaire, reads a book, or enjoys some hobby all by himself; or it is coöperative, as in the case of dancing, choral or orchestral music-making, collective hunting; or it is competitive, as in swimming and running contests, football, or baseball.

Recreation may be physically vigorous, as strenuous athletic games, or semivigorous, as parades or hobby-carpentering; or semi-inactive, as in playing cards. Likewise, it may be mentally energetic, as in chess-playing, reading, or arguing over political or religious questions; or it may be largely passive, as in dozing, loafing, or daydreaming.

Some recreational activities are in the nature of sheer escape, as in travel; others are of a self-projection kind, as when a person joins societies or wears distinctive clothing or adornments in a parade; some identify the individual with others, as in a moving picture or a play; others satisfy curiosity, as when people pry into the intimacies of others. Some recreation is derived from aesthetic enjoyment, as from listening to music; other recreations are courageous or defiance-displaying, such as automobile speeding or adventuring; others give vent to cruelty, as in looking on or participating in a fight or a lynching; while considerable recreation is derived from engaging in social service, reform, religious work, or political movements.

Bodily Movement. One of the media or means of recreation is physical movement, as in dancing, walking, mountain climbing, rowing, sailing, and athletics. There are recreations which involve bodily movement on the part of the participant himself, as in dancing, swimming, walking; some involve imaginative bodily movement, as in watching a baseball or football game. Those who actually employ physical movement are, especially in our times, comparatively few, the observers many; but observers derive release and renewal indirectly through imaginative participation in the physical movement and in the contest.

Use of Ornaments. Ornaments are also widely employed as a means of recreation. Some ornaments are worn, others are affixed to the body itself. Finger rings and earrings, arm and leg bracelets, necklaces, girdles, hair adornments, war or "honors" decorations, headdresses—all have been used from time immemorial and everywhere as recreational media. Clothing also is used; a new dress or suit of clothes, a beautiful hat or scarf is a recreative medium. The parade of colorful clothing up and down Fifth Avenue in New York City on Easter Sunday is a striking example of the extent to which clothing is employed as a means of recreation. Ornaments are also attached to the body itself, as when the soldier or chieftain, the sailor or longshoreman has his body painted or tattooed, or when the woman paints her lips and cheeks. Ornaments serve also other uses, such as those of religious ceremonials and of sex attraction, but ordinarily they constitute a means of bodily or mental recreation. It is not, of course, the ornament itself, but the exhibiting of it, the attention and comment it evokes, that act as means of escape and renewal.

Objects of Art as Media. From the day when man first made crude drawings on the walls of his cave or fashioned rough pottery down to our day, he has employed art objects as recreational media. Vases, pictures, statues, monuments, and cathedrals embody elements of beauty, harmony, and completion. Now it is the material, such as marble, with which the object is made; now it is the form, the color, the proportions; now it is the thing or the thought it expresses or suggests, that act as the immediate agent. It is not primarily the making of aesthetic objects that is of importance, though artistic creation has for some releasing power; it is not the collecting or possessing that is fundamentally significant, though showing art objects which one collects and owns is for the few of great recreational value. For most people it is the real or imaginary unity, beauty, harmony, and completion which the object suggests that attract and seize the attention, or take the mind on imaginative flights. The spell of a great cathedral like that of Chartres or of a masterful painting like Michelangelo's *Last Judgment* or Da Vinci's *Last Supper*, brings re-creation of body, mind, and "soul."

Music as Medium. Music also possesses recreative power, as in the playing of a flute, a guitar, a violin, or a piano, however crudely. Song is particularly significant, because the people themselves create it, because no apparatus is needed in its reproduction, and because it can be reproduced freely under almost any condition. From the primitive tom-tom chants, monotonous round on round of mere sound, through the crude songs of early historical time, the religious and folksongs of all peoples, the troubadour songs of the Middle Ages, the romantic songs of the operas, the plaintive Negro and the jazz songs of our time, song has been an ever ready medium of re-creation. Tones and relations of tones, rhythms, variations, intervals, repetitions, cadences, tempi, intensities of sound—have the power to uplift and renew both mind and body.

Literature as Recreational Means. Literature also has recreational use. It is of course far more than a recreational medium; it is a medium for mirroring life, for expressing aspirations, and for transferring the culture heritage. But poetry, drama, biography, books of travel, "juveniles," and fiction spin the webs of thought and imagination and lift man from the drab and the usual. The large sale of "light" literature affords some evidence of the recreational uses literature serves.[3] To cite a few obvious examples, *Huckleberry Finn*, *Five Little Peppers*, *Pollyanna*, and *Penrod* with their fantasy; *Treasure Island*, *Richard Carvel*, and *The Sheik* with their romantic note; *Rebecca of Sunnybrook Farm* and *If Winter Comes* with their appeal to sentiment; *Ben Hur*, *In His Steps*, *The Story of the Bible*, and *The Story of Philosophy* with their religious and philosophic emphasis, seem to bring recreative satisfaction to millions of people.[4] Those who deprecate the enormous sale of this type of literature fail to grasp its recreational significance. No doubt there are those who find their recreation in reading history and philosophy, or books dealing with economic, political, or religious phenomena, but "light" literature is for most people the preferred medium of recreation.

Though it is a far cry from literature to the average magazine or newspaper, nevertheless most magazines and newspapers are almost wholly recreational. Most people, though mildly interested in information, read mainly the "funnies," the sport pages, the exciting news of kidnappings, murders, and divorces, the gossip, the vital statistics. Even political news is often divertive.

Drama as Recreational Medium. Like literature, drama effects relaxation and change through the spectator's imaginative identification with the scenes and persons it portrays. Its sensitiveness to the problems of every age; its portrayal of the absurd, the tragic, and the dangerous; its combination of acting, oratory, dancing, and music; its depiction of the bizarre—have made the drama one of the master media of release and renewal. Its appeal, always potent, has in the West become universal with the advent of cinematographic reproduction.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF RECREATION

Primitive Recreation. Among primitives recreational activities seem to have been few in number, simple, largely unorganized, and to have been conducted principally as part of religious, governmental, and military events. Children, no doubt, played spontaneously as they have always done. Community recreations, however, consisted mainly of folk dances and crude sound-making activities, the wearing of bodily ornaments, and similar activities. Hunting and fishing may have been added to pastimes as agriculture developed.[5] Most primitive peoples seem to have had little or no equipment set apart for recreation; the compound was the playground, even as in colonial New England it was "the village green." Nor did they have a special personnel; the priests and chieftains supervised this activity. Participation, however, seems to have been demanded, and some penalties were inflicted for nonparticipation, especially in cases in which the gods or the chieftains might be "offended."

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[3] Of the 9,035 new or new-edition books published in the United States in 1932, 4,341 or 48 per cent were mainly of a recreational type.

[4] See editorial, "Best sellers" in *Saturday review of literature*, 10 (1934) 676.

Recreation among the Ancients. The Egyptians had community dancing, held stated events in running, swimming, wrestling, acrobatics, and ball playing. The Persians added horse-racing and various weapon-employing games. The Hebrews seem to have added nothing of importance in this field, or at least no record has come down to us. The Talmud did make some prescriptions for recreation, but the Hebrews' life was somber and in so far as they had any recreation it was conducted almost wholly in connection with their religious ceremonials. The terrific struggle for survival to which they have always been subjected was probably responsible. Be that as it may, the fact that the Hebrews did not stress recreation to any great extent is of major significance because it set a stamp upon the early Christian church.

Greeks at Play. The Greeks raised recreation into a major activity. They extended the number and forms of recreational activities. They developed virtually all the children's games known to us: skipping rope, hobbyhorse, blindman's bluff, hide-and-seek, hopscotch, and so on. They engaged in nearly all the athletic games known to us. They also had the gymnasia, in which children from eight to eighteen were instructed in gymnastics and games. They also developed music, drama, oratory, and poetry to a marked degree. In Athens they established the theater, "a place for seeing." Further, the Greeks made recreation available to all the free people, even women being allowed to participate. They organized community, intercommunity, and even interregional contests; the

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[5] A. H. Quiggin, "Hunting and fishing, primitive" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11 (14th ed. 1929) 926–929.

Olympic games, which lasted for four centuries, embraced all of Greece.[6] They constructed large stadia to accommodate large numbers of observers; one of these had an estimated seating capacity of 100,000.[7] The Greeks made recreation an intrinsic part of life; they emphasized its aesthetic aspects, especially the beauty of the human form; and in the day of their grandeur, raised it, notably through the Olympic games, into an activity of major significance to their whole society.

Roman Recreation. The Romans made wide use of baths and gymnasia. They also introduced gladiatorial and animal contests, and other kinds of fighting games. Lions, tigers, giraffes, crocodiles, elephants, and other wild animals were used in public exhibitions, sometimes being egged on to fight among themselves, at other times being sent out against professional hunters, criminals, and captives. It is said that as many as 11,000 criminals were destroyed in the festivities following one military victory, and on another occasion 9,000 animals, including 6,000 lions. Every major public event, new-year festivals, the birthdays of public officials, the return of successful warriors, were marked by public games. Under the Empire recreation was regarded a group necessity. In later Rome, corruption crept into the system: ambitious individuals of the upper classes exploited recreation as a way to secure popular favor and political power, subsidized participants, professionalized athletics, while mass participation gradually gave way to mere observation.

Recreation in the Middle Ages. In medieval times recreation declined somewhat. Christianity held the human body in contempt and barely allowed any activity which was believed not to contribute to the purification of the soul. This attitude, due in part no doubt to the extremely difficult struggle of the early Christians, had a marked influence on recreation. Aside from the tournaments which were essentially for the *élite*, recreational activity became part of religious ceremonies, holidays, pilgrimages, and crusades; it lost the instrinsic uses it had acquired among the Greeks and Romans, and was turned to religious ends. The theater was turned into a religious affair; and when, in the latter part of the Middle Ages, it became secular and popular, the Church anathematized it.

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[6] See A. W. Marsh, "Athletics" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 296–300; Francis Storr, "Games, classical" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10 (14th ed. 1929) 8–11; and Seldon Cheney, "Theatre" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 22 (14th ed. 1929) 20–21.

[7] Storr, *op. cit.*, 8–11.

IV. CONTEMPORARY RECREATIONAL PATTERNS AND TRENDS

Modern Recreation. The Renaissance paved the way for the modern development. Man's body was regarded as worthy of cultivation; dancing, athletic contests, the theater gradually became popular; even girls were permitted to participate in public recreation.

Nationalism added its impetus. Armies, which had been composed of mercenary soldiers, came to be made up of citizens from the time of the French Revolution on. In time governments, notably those of Germany, England, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and the United States, fostered mass recreational activities as premilitary training. Concurrently, the democratic movement demanded recreational opportunities for the masses, for adults as well as for children, women as well as men. Educators made playgrounds part of the school equipment; municipalities built communal parks and other recreational centers; federal agencies put aside large tracts of forest land as national recreational grounds. Gradually recreation came to be regarded an essential part of life, the prerogative of all classes, a means of maintaining health, and was believed to prevent delinquency and crime.[8] Furthermore, the machine age made recreational instruments reasonably inexpensive; while the mechanization of industry has increased leisure time for the people as a whole.

Democratization of Recreation. As a result of these and other factors, recreation which had been the prerogative of the few has become the privilege of whole peoples. Sex, economic, class, and even race distinctions have virtually disappeared,[9] and practically every community provides facilities.

The number of persons who avail themselves of recreational opportunities has steadily increased since the opening of the present century, in spite of the War and economic depressions. In the United States 198,606 individuals visited the national parks in 1910, and in 1930, 2,774,561; in 1920 there were 4,832,671 visitors to the national forests, and in 1930, 31,904,452. Attendance at the football games of 49 organizations and baseball games of the two major leagues amounted to 10,124,000 in 1921 and to 13,475,000 in 1930. The Rotary, Kiwanis, and Lions Clubs had 6,839 organizations with 317,086 members in 1929. Motion pictures, starting about 1900 with practically no following, have now an average of 100 million attendants each week. And in the 1920–1930 decade, in the United States, 12,078,345 families installed radios.[10]

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[8] See Edward S. Robinson, "Play" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 161.

[9] In some localities in the United States, Negroes are excluded from certain theaters, beaches, gymnasiums, and clubs; but the recreations themselves are available to them everywhere, even though in separate places.

In Europe also recreational activities mount to high figures. Germany has some 62,000 sporting associations with a total membership of over 7,000,000; in what was Czechoslovakia the Sokol Societies reached large portions of the population; Italy and Hungary have established universal athletic training for the younger generations; France makes district provision for recreation and has created centers for the training of recreational directors. Similar efforts are being made in Russia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey.[11]

Extension of Facilities. During the last two decades, the increase in recreational facilities has been notable, especially in the United States. Whereas in 1907, cities of 30,000 or more population had a total park acreage of 76,566 acres, in 1930 they had 258,697 acres or a gain of 237.8 per cent, as contrasted with a gain in urban population of approximately 65 per cent. In 1910 there were on the average three playgrounds for each 100,000 city residents, in 1920 approximately eight, and in 1930 nearly eleven; the number of playgrounds in cities having a population of 2,500 and over increased 74.9 per cent between 1920 and 1930.[12]

In addition, gymnasiums, stadiums and grandstands, auditoriums, club houses, moving picture houses, dance halls, automobile roads and mountain trails, beaches, swimming pools, golf courses, tennis courts, school playgrounds have become common. Americans have recently been expending about one-tenth of their annual income, or roughly $10,165,000,000, on recreation. In Europe there has also been an increase, though it was not as rapid.[13]

Community Direction. Public agencies have increasingly taken over the promotion, direction, and control of recreation. National, state, and municipal governments, educational, religious, and philanthropic organizations have all entered the field. Public agencies, in fact, have come to feel the duty of promoting recreation, partly for national reasons, as a means for military preparation and as a method of possibly preventing juvenile delinquency and crime.

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[10] J. F. Steiner, "Recreation and leisure time activities" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends,* ii (New York 1933) 920–940.

[11] Marsh, *op. cit.,* 297.

[12] Steiner, *op. cit*, 915–917.

[13] *Ibid.,* 949. For another estimate see Stuart Chase, "Play" in Charles A. Beard (ed.), *Whither mankind* (New York 1928) 332–353.

The various states expend considerable sums. In Italy the *dopolavoro* (after work) activities cost the nation huge sums each year. In the United States the total amount spent annually for recreational purposes by the various governmental units has been estimated at $193,410,000 a year.[14] Various governments have also passed laws setting the minimum of space and time to be devoted to recreation by public schools; and they have regarded it as their duty to protect natural recreational facilities, such as beaches and forests, against the encroachments of commercial interests and to preserve them for the people.[15]

Social settlements, pioneers in this movement, have continued to experiment. In the United States they have made recreational activities available to underprivileged groups, such as immigrants, and have encouraged immigrants to conserve their folk dances and other forms as a contribution to the life of this country.[16] The churches, which once regarded recreation as more or less unworthy, now carry on a variety of recreational activities: social gatherings, sports, clubs, even dramatic performances and motion pictures.

Extension of Organization. In most countries there have arisen numerous local, regional, national, and even international organizations for the promotion or protection of recreation. This movement, though undoubtedly more intensive and wider in scope in the United States than elsewhere, is not peculiar to this country; it has been marked since the turn of the century, especially among the middle and upper economic classes. In general the laboring masses have had to depend almost entirely on communal action to secure equivalent recreational facilities.[17]

The organizations or clubs are legion and embrace a wide range of activities: golf, country, fishing, hunting, luncheon, breakfast, "social," musical, dramatic, discussion, insurance, service. In 1925, at their peak, the membership of fraternal clubs was 35,500,000;

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[14] Steiner, *op. cit.*, 948; see also Charles Horton Cooley, *et al.*, *Introductory sociology* (New York 1933) 241.

[15] See Steiner, *op. cit.*, 919; and Marsh, *op. cit.*, 297.

[16] See Jane Addams, *Twenty years at Hull House* (New York 1910), and *Second twenty years at Hull House* (New York 1930) *passim.*

[17] See Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown* (New York 1929) chaps. xvii–xix.

in 1929 there were 500,000 members of luncheon clubs alone.[18] These clubs have sublocal, local, state, regional, and national associations. Among the many national organizations in the United States are the National Recreational Association, United States Golf Association, United States Lawn Tennis Association, Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, National Amateur Athletic Federation, American Olympic Association, Amateur Fencers' League of America, National Association of Amateur Oarsmen, Amateur Billiard Association of America, American Skating Union of the United States, American Canoe Association, American Snow Shoe Union, National Association of Scientific Angling Clubs, National Cycling Association, National Horseshoe Pitchers' Association, National Ski Association, National Amateur Casting Association, National Collegiate Athletic Association, United States Football Association.

In addition, several national organizations of a public or semipublic character have been formed, dealing primarily with youth. These organizations, going under the general title of youth or student movements, have the twofold purpose of character building and reform. In Europe political reform has been emphasized. The Action Française, Actione Española, the Irish Blue Shirts, the Italian Balilla, the Hitler Youth, and the Russian Konsomol are chiefly political in aim. In America, on the other hand, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Y. M. C. A. and the Y. W. C. A., the Pathfinders, and the Campfire Girls place more emphasis on individual character and physical upbuilding.

Professionalization and Standardization. Recreational leadership is fast becoming a profession. In 1910 there were in the United States 3,345 employed play supervisors and in 1930, 24,950. In 1900 there were but a handful in the business of operating nickelodeons, the predecessors of the moving picture; at present 350,000 persons find their sole livelihood in that industry.

Recreation also is being increasingly standardized, mechanized, commercialized, and impersonalized. In the older countries, folk dances and folk songs, pageants, community festivals, fairs, and carnivals are still common; these activities are carried on spontaneously, bring groups into face-to-face relationships, and involve the participation of many. But in industrialized countries, recreational activities grow increasingly impersonal, nonsocial, standardized, mechanized, and highly organized affairs. This trend is particularly evident in the United States, where folk recreation has virtually disappeared, giving place to the moving picture, the radio, the newspaper, football and baseball. Nor is this true of the cities alone: a survey of the recreational activities of 6,886 children of rural and urban Kansas showed an increasing dependence on mechanized, standardized, impersonal and prescribed physical recreation—a trend which is probably general throughout the United States.[19]

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[18] Steiner, *op. cit.*, 936.

V. USAGES GOVERNING RECREATION

Recreational Folkways. Since the genius of recreation lies in the liberation it effects, in the freedom it produces from cares and compulsions, it follows that it could not be governed by rigid rules as to when, how, and under what conditions it should be engaged in. The social rule governing recreation consists in the virtual absence of rules.

Some folkways have, however, developed. Some of these are restricted in scope, as, for instance, the question, among the *élite*, of the type of dress to wear to an afternoon tea, a dinner, a dance, or the opera. Other folkways have a wide generality. In Western culture from early times, custom provided that some recreations are "proper" for men but fewer are fitting for women; in those activities permitted to both, the sexes have ordinarily been separated. In contemporary culture these customs still prevail. Most games are "proper" for boys, but some are regarded as barely permissible for girls. Men and women are still separated at certain bathing places, and there are distinct clubs for men and for women. However, the democratic movement, the growth of sex knowledge, the weakening of religious authority, the entrance of women into men's occupations, have lessened the force of these folkways and have somewhat eliminated the practice of the separation of the sexes in recreation. The dance is an outstanding example: in some primitive societies "mixed" dances were taboo, but in modern society a dance in which both sexes do not participate is a curiosity.

The age line has also been rather clearly drawn, certain amusements being looked upon as proper for children, and others for adults. Drinking, smoking, and attendance at certain festivals and plays have nearly everywhere been the prerogatives of adults.

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[19] See Harvey C. Lehman and Paul A. Witty, *Psychology of play activities* (New York 1927); and Chase, *op. cit.*, 341.

Attendance folkways have also been quite general. Attendance at certain public events such as an important religious festival, a celebration in honor of a victorious athlete or warrior, or the public appearance of a ruler or high prelate, has often been more or less compulsory. Nonattendance, especially in smaller communities, has usually been visited with some form of social disapproval, even ostracism. Even in our times the boy who does not attend the baseball game of his village or the football game of his college is frequently subjected to the jibes of his fellows; the girl who does not attend a sorority dance is regarded as "queer"; and even the adult who habitually absents himself from the recreational events held by his club or lodge is regarded as not a "good fellow." Among the sophisticated, a certain "social obligation" virtually compels people to call upon friends or colleagues and to attend group social events, regardless of their real interest in doing so. In some cases, participation customs are in the nature of mores as when students in colleges are often compelled to appear in the "cheering sections" with sweaters and caps in the "institution's" colors.

The winner-loser custom has also prevailed widely. By it the winner is rewarded by the community and the loser is shunned, if not punished. The winner of the early Olympic games was looked upon as a sort of demigod; he was awarded food and shelter for the rest of his life; he was given large sums of money, beautiful slave consorts, and the "post of honor" in battle; his statue was carved by great artists (such as Pheidias and Praxiteles); sacrifices were made in his name and honor; and writers and poets immortalized him in their writings. In Roman days the winner of the gladiatorial contest was elevated, in a day, from the rank of plebeian to that of the upper class with all its privileges; a triumphal march was held in his honor; he was feasted and given other public or private rewards. The loser, on the other hand, was booed and ridiculed; often thumbs were turned down, and he lost his life or, if he lived, he was shunned, even ostracized. Even in our day the winner is raised from the status of the unknown to that of the famous; he wins the plaudits of the crowd, is feasted and rewarded; while the loser, as in the case of the former boxing world-champion Carnera, goes home alone, deserted by everyone. There is an exception now and then, such as that of Jack Dempsey who though defeated is still popular; but public attention generally turns to the winner. The masses, seeking release from misery and frustrations, gain relaxation and substitution by identifying themselves with the victor.

Recreational Mores. Some rules have the force of mores. From ancient times, trickery has been taboo; cheating at cards is ordinarily punished by the ejection of the cheater; horse-racing imposes restrictions which if violated may lead to eviction of a particular horse or jockey from the track; obscenity has usually been frowned on or prohibited in literature and the theater; and the wanton injuring or killing of the opponent in physical combat is usually penalized.[20]

VI. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Financing and Administration. The problems related to recreation are not so important as those connected with other institutions, yet they are significant. The rapid increase in recreation leads to an expansion of public expenditure, lays financial burdens on the people, and adds to the cost of living. The new forms of recreation call for considerable outlay, discourage frugality and thrift, and often lead to the substitution of the less essential. In Middletown, as probably in most towns, an automobile comes before clothes, shoes, food, bathing facilities, home ownership, and other basic necessities.[21]

Again, the regulation of rapidly expanding recreation throws new responsibilities on already overburdened governmental agencies. Providing adequate facilities for recreation for all classes, regulating and restricting antisocial forms of recreation, checking undue commercialization, conserving the forests, beaches, and parks for the people—places greater power in the hands of government, demands more bureaucracy, greater expense, more taxes, and the governmental regulation of one more aspect of life.

Standardization and Mechanization. Standardization and mechanization tend to defeat the function of recreation. So standardized and repetitive has recreation become that the people escape from the daily routine only to plunge into a week-end routine, from one set of mere motion into more mere movement. Endless lines of automobiles ceaselessly move from one place to another on

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[20] See Steiner, *op. cit.*, 912 ff., for various suggestions regarding rules governing recreation.

[21] See Lynd and Lynd, *op. cit.*, chaps. xviii–xix, esp. 255–256, including footnotes.

Sundays and holidays, taking people from one crowded place into another, from noise to noise, from filth to new filth, from one set of confusion to another, to beaches, parks, and other recreation places with the same radio and the same "hot dog" and ice cream stands as those left behind.[22] The new forms of recreation have brought music and other arts to people who did not have them before; but much of contemporary recreation does not provide the substitution of scene, conditions, and relationships and therefore defeats the very object of recreation.

Professionalized Leadership. Professionalization of personnel also tends to destroy the genius of recreation. Trained "recreational leaders" study the habits of the masses, discover the few leisure hours they have, and then turn on the full force of their organizational techniques. They organize, push the people into all kinds of mere motion, propagandize for more and more "recreational" activity, regiment and supervise all leisure activities, until they rob the people of what little real leisure they have. They seize boys and girls the moment they are out of school; organize this, that, and the other club; draw up constitutions, elect officers, hold meetings; and, having filled every moment of young people's ordinary leisure time, they even organize breakfast, lunch, and dinner clubs. Thus the professional, aggressive leader often destroys spontaneity and freedom, the basic elements of recreation.

Commercialization. Commercialization has contributed toward the decline of certain activities that had intrinsic recreational value. The theater is decadent; folk dancing and folk singing are rapidly disappearing; the amateur athlete or musician is practically extinct. Commercialized athletic contests, the tabloid, the phonograph, the radio, and the movie have captured the masses and turned millions of people into mere onlookers and listeners, impoverished recreation, and deprived the people of the spiritual experience which derives from aesthetic activity.[23] Proof of this fact is seen in the eagerness with which many people in the United States have embraced the opportunities afforded them by the Federal Art Projects to practice painting, sculpture, music, and the drama, as if they were conscious of the starvation which ordinary recreation produces.

[22] See Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) 139.

[23] See Lewis Mumford, "The arts" in Charles A. Beard (ed.), *Whither mankind* (New York 1928) 293.

Again, emphasis on contest, largely the result of commercialization, exalts physical force and promotes the combative in all relationships, adds to tensions and the nervousness which characterize the modern Western world.[24] The stress laid on winning, the adulation given to the noted football player, tennis champion, or prizefighter may stimulate a few to emulation, but prevent the many from participating at all. Passive reliance on winners for "recreation" is mere sublimation, an opiate which probably deadens the people and prevents them from engaging in activities of their own.

VII. FUNCTIONS OF RECREATION

Individual Functions. The functions of recreation have been implied in the previous pages. Recreation at its best upbuilds the body, renews the mind, and removes the strains which attend the daily task; salvages and stores up muscular and nervous energy; diverts much which might otherwise be wasted in mere idleness.[25] Recreation provides emotional and instinctive outlets which the daily tasks and routines do not provide; and preserves or creates a balance between longings and the stark realities of life.[26] Recreation fulfils, by emotional anticipation, the basic wishes: the desire for new experience or adventure, the desire for security through conflict and mastery, the desire for expression through activity, the desire for recognition through social contacts.

Aesthetic activities combine and sublimate elements in nature or in human nature and produce imaginary beauty, harmony, and completeness; destroy the conflicting elements and the strident colors, the disharmonies, the strains, and unfulfilled yearnings of life; and create unities that transcend these realities. Art, either in passive enjoyment or still more in creation, often brings profound spiritual satisfaction; through art man may touch the gods themselves; may reach for the sublime and the cosmic; [27] may gain courage and the will to live; and his soul, always questing after the unattainable, may find fresh hope for the fulfilment of its desires. The mere possession of a beautiful work of art often brings a triumphal sense of serenity and security.

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[24] See Steiner, *op. cit.*, 931.

[25] See Keller, *op. cit.*, 422–423.

[26] Clarence Marsh Case, *Outlines of introductory sociology* (New York 1924) 939–940; and William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) 346–356.

[27] Cabot, *op. cit.*, 101–102.

Group and Societal Uses. Recreation transmits culture. Well-balanced recreation trains the individual in the social virtues, teaches the need and the value of self and group discipline, and inculcates a regard for the rights and welfare of others. "It is a curious fact, bearing squarely upon the nature of play, that the man who has not learned to be a good sport in his games is likely to be a poor one elsewhere." [28] Recreation, especially through art, converts common longings into social purpose, beautifies the social bonds, draws men closer, prompts them to make sacrifices for the welfare of the group, gives them strength, and lures them to deeds of altruism, to noble action, so necessary to social well-being.[29]

Recreation has societal value also. Especially through the arts, it often cuts the cake of custom, "constructs a fairer order to shame our low content," projects human aspirations. In designating an artist as "Bohemian," society testifies to the fact that he dares to see and practice the new and the untried. Art often perceives and portrays a new order, challenges atrophied forms, and throws new light upon the human scene.

Recreation occasionally helps to maintain societal equilibrium. In contemporary Western culture, where public life is easily thrown out of balance, where stereotypes are all-prevailing, recreation is thought to restore a balance and to counteract overemphasis.[30] Recreation also plays some part in societal control.[31]

But modern recreation, like other activities, presents features which need scrutiny and analysis. The community needs to check commercialization and exploitation, to plan systematically the preservation of areas for communal recreational use; while public facilities, such as school buildings and grounds, might be used as centers for noncommercial recreation the year around.[32]

Recreation as Part of the Whole of Life. These suggestions, however, stress only the organizational aspects of the matter.

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[28] Keller, *op. cit.*, 422.

[29] John Lewis Gillin and Frank W. Blackmar, *Outlines of sociology* (3d ed. New York 1930) 439–440.

[30] See John Dewey, *Human nature and conduct* (New York 1922) 161–164.

[31] This thesis has yet to establish any specific coefficients of influence. For a detailed treatment of this subject consult M. Guyau, *L'art au point de vue sociologique* (10th ed. Paris 1914); Edward Alsworth Ross, *Social control* (New York 1901) chap. xx; Frederick A. Bushee, *Principles of sociology* (New York 1923) chap. xxix; Karl Bücher, *Arbeit und Rhythmus* (Leipzig 1924); Von Ogden Vogt, *Art and religion* (New Haven 1921); Havelock Ellis, "Philosophy of dancing" in *Atlantic monthly*, cxiii (1914) 197–207; and Charles Murdock Diserens, *Influence of music on behavior* (Princeton N. J. 1926).

[32] See Steiner, *op. cit.*, 956–957.

Recreation to be valid would need to pervade all aspects of life. Recreation at its best could bring a sense of completeness and harmony, beauty and balance, interest and freedom to all phases of life. The aesthetic sense, in particular, can be so cultivated that it will function at all times and in all places in the simple activities of daily life as well as on special occasions.[33]

Recognition for ordinary achievement or performance, rather than for the spectacular, would bring satisfaction to the many. Freedom from the spectacular would probably lead many to learn to play some musical instrument, weave and carve, cultivate a garden, seek out the beauty of nature, or engage in some sport, rather than sit on the sidelines to observe. "While the big Olympic contests are on . . . there are competitive games and sports at home which may mean as much in the lives of tens of thousands of boys and girls. There are three times as many individuals between the ages of 10 and 18 taking part in the Police Athletic League recreational and character building activities in New York City as there were players and spectators . . . in the great stadium in Berlin. . . . Neighborhood councils are being formed in every one of some three hundred small neighborhood communities into which the city is divided. . . . And every unit is as a little Greek State with Union Square or some other center as an Olympia. . . ." [34] In some such manner, recreation may become so rooted in culture as to become part of the whole of life.

But it cannot be too often stressed that the very genius of recreation is spontaneity; and this means freedom from standardization and commercialization. Whether and how this can be accomplished remains to be discovered. Perhaps it will have to wait for the time when the present age has spent some of its standardizing and commercializing power. If recreation is to perform its functions, give-and-take and coöperativeness will need to supplant the win-at-any-cost practices of the present.

Recreation in Work. All of this is related to a larger problem. Present-day standardization of work has almost completely destroyed creativeness in man's daily toil. Some of the more "progressive" employers have tried to mitigate the dullness of industrial labor by giving rest periods, providing showers, gymnasiums, club rooms, athletic fields. But these are mere surface remedies. A comprehensive effort would call for reducing the congestion of the larger cities and for establishing a system of dual occupation which would introduce releasing elements in labor. In short, recreation to be complete needs to be made part of peoples' work, and that is a problem which may be partly solved by decentralizing communities.

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[33] See Felix S. Cohen, "Blessing of unemployment" in *American scholar*, ii (1933) 203–214; also, Walter N. Polakov, *Power age* (New York 1935) 233.

[34] Editorial, "Little Olympics" in *New York times* (August 7, 1936) 18.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The recreational system, then, has a far more important bearing on the life of individuals, social groups, and societies than at first appears. Everyday experience reveals that every individual, young or old, needs relaxation from ordinary occupation, a relaxation that is secured best by means of substituting some other type of activity for that in which a person is ordinarily engaged. Now by physical or mental activity, now in solitude or in companionship, now by escaping from the ordinary and then returning to it, man gains replenishment of his energies. Bodily movement and ornamentation, sculpture, painting, architecture, music, literature, the drama, and other arts afford mankind relaxation and renewal. At all times mankind has given considerable attention to recreation and has developed customs of more than superficial significance. In modern times recreation has become available to the masses, while private and public agencies alike are increasingly supplying facilities, organization, and support. Professionalization and over-organization, mounting expenditures, too rapid expansion, and commercialization have in a measure vitiated the increased opportunities. Still the recreational system performs important functions and will of course continue to do so.

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Chapter 18

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION

I. NATURE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION

The Religious Institution. Religion as an institution is that system of concepts and practices through which human beings express their belief in the existence of God and in His power to control their destiny, and through which they render honor, obedience, and service to God, in the faith that their destiny will thereby be favorably affected.

The institution is very ancient. As far back as records go we find more or less formulated beliefs, usages, and numerous religious artifacts. In the civilizations of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria, the system had already become well defined; in the Hebraic culture it became dominant; in ancient Greece and Rome somewhat subordinate; and in the Middle Ages all-dominant.

The religious system has had a profound influence on associated living. It has set a stamp upon sex practices, marriage, the family, and the economic system; it has virtually molded education and recreation; it has influenced government, law, and the courts; and at times, notably in the Hebraic commonwealth and during the Middle Ages, it has itself constituted the government. There is, in fact, scarcely a human activity on which the religious institution has not placed its imprint.

Origin of Religion. Religion is so universal a phenomenon that upon first thought it seems to be instinctive: that is, it seems that man believes in God and performs religious acts in response to his original nature. However, religion takes too many forms to be attributable to instinct. Beliefs in the supernatural or in the hereafter and religious usages differ so greatly that it would be necessary to posit a different instinct for each type of religion; this would be like attributing the various forms of government to instinctive adaptations. Moreover, religious beliefs and forms have changed markedly during historical times, whereas man's instincts have not altered during that period.[1]

Religion is sometimes said to originate in divine revelation. Men, according to this doctrine, believe in a Divine Being, formulate their beliefs, and perform religious acts because God has revealed Himself to them. God has revealed and reveals Himself through nature, in the phenomena of life and in human events. He has also revealed Himself to outstanding leaders, such as Moses, the Prophets, Jesus; and He reveals Himself in the life of nations and peoples, manifesting favor to some and disfavor to others. Although we may sincerely believe this, we have no tangible proof. The search for the "evidences" of revelation has been long and arduous, has occupied the labor of some of the best and most reverend minds of the race, and has produced a large literature. Yet all this search has left the inquirer, devout though he be, with Job's longing on his lips, "Oh, that I knew where I might find Him." [2]

Religion as Product of Experience. Religion is best explained, perhaps, in terms of man's experience. The phenomena of life, the daily occurrences, the vicissitudes of health, age, death, the whole round of life and its struggles; extraordinary events such as earthquakes, great storms, droughts, famines, epidemics, economic depressions, wars; man's inability to fulfil his desires, and the resulting bewilderment—all set men wondering and seeking after the origin, the meaning, and the end of it all.

It is wonderment, bewilderment, and fear; the hope of experiencing something truer, nobler, more beautiful than earth yields that, according to this explanation, prompts men to try to understand ultimate origins and destinies and leads them to build up the religious system. "The only theory of religion which today seems to have value as a scientific working hypothesis is the theory that religion has its origin and its support in *dissatisfaction* with life, resulting from reflection on the failure of life to satisfy the primary desires of man." [3] In the face of bewilderment, frustration, physical or mental privation or suffering, human beings find release, renewal of hope, and strength to endure the trials of life by believing in God and through fellowship with others who also entertain that belief. So they join minds in a common faith in God, raise their hands together in acts of propitiation or supplication, assemble in groups to lift their voices in prayer and in song.

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[1] L. L. Bernard, *Instinct* (New York 1924) 226.

[2] Job xxiii:3. George Bernard Shaw's *Adventures of the black girl in her search for God* (New York 1933) is a striking expression of the quest.

[3] Knight Dunlap, *Social psychology* (Baltimore 1925) 99. By permission of Williams & Wilkins Company.

II. CONCEPTS OF POWER GOVERNING UNIVERSE

Nature of Power Governing the Universe. Religious concepts deal principally with the nature of God or the power that governs the universe, the act of creation, God's relation with the universe, and God's control of the universe and man's destiny. These beliefs, now implicit and now explicitly stated, constitute the core of declarations of faith or creeds, and in turn form the core of religious systems.

These beliefs fall into three main classes: animism, anthropomorphism, and cosmotheism. Animism seems to have been the belief of early times. According to it, spirits formed intrinsic parts of objects of nature: part of the sun, the moon and the stars, of rivers, the soil, stones, animals, birds, and fishes; and even part of man-made objects. In the earlier stages of the concept, these spirits were regarded as being merely diffused or interfused with the objects, as integral properties, as when the anima or spirit that made the sun shine was said to be an integral property of the sun. In later forms, animism conceived of gods as separate animas residing in the natural objects, who now by obstruction and now by coöperation controlled the destiny of man.[4]

The second main concept, known as anthropomorphism,[5] conceives of God as a manlike person with human attributes—virtues and vices,[6] loves and hates. God is in all respects like man. He eats and sleeps, seeks justice and vengeance, and so on. Even His omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, and eternal existence are but extensions of man's own aspirations. This concept is also very ancient. It was present in the religious systems of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria; it became clear and well defined in the Hebraic religious system; and, handed down through Judaism, it became the dominant concept in Christianity and has endured for at least four thousand years.

The third main concept is known as cosmotheism. According to this idea, God is not a person but a force or the sum of all the forces and laws that hold the universe together and govern it; God is the force or set of forces which at once composes and yet transcends all forces and laws; God is a set of laws, partly known and partly unknown, but present everywhere, governing the universe.[7] This concept was in a measure present in Greek and Roman thought, but its fuller elaboration has occurred in modern times; it is entertained chiefly by the more intellectual, particularly by scientists and scientifically minded persons.

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[4] See Ruth Benedict, "Animism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 65–67; and Clark Wissler, *Introduction to social anthropology* (New York 1929) chap. xii.

[5] See glossary.

[6] Christianity admits no vices. God is perfect.

TABLE 30. MAIN CONCEPTS OF POWER GOVERNING UNIVERSE

NAME OF CONCEPT	DESCRIPTION OF DEITY
Animism	Spirits and souls residing in natural objects and forces
Anthropomorphism	A manlike creature in structure and character
Cosmotheism	Physical power in the universe

Number of Gods. Closely related to the concepts concerning the nature of God are the ideas dealing with the number of gods. In animism there were a multitude of gods; every imaginable object was possessed of or inhabited by a more or less distinctive spirit. Spiritualism, an extension of animism, conceived of a hierarchy of spirits, some more potent than others. Later arose polytheism which reduced the number of gods and attributed more and more power to fewer and fewer gods, as in the ancient civilizations. Still later, monotheism, the idea of one God, arose among various peoples of antiquity and eventually took root in Christianity. Finally, cosmotheism or pantheism conceived of the unity of forces and laws governing the universe as a whole as God.

Thus it would seem that as Western culture has advanced, it has gradually displaced the pluralistic by the monistic concept of God. Elements of pluralism still linger, as in the belief in saints, angels, devils, and the Trinity (three gods in one); but these are believed to be parts of the one God, to be subordinated to, and to derive their power from Him. This development seems to have gone hand in hand with corresponding concepts of human government and possibly with other features of Western culture.

God's Relation to Man. The question of God's relation to man has also puzzled the human mind. Assuming His existence, is God outside the universe, manipulating the world and its creatures like the puppeteer his puppets? Or is He within men? Or among them? Does He guide and control, aid or hinder men and their destiny? Did He create man in the beginning and then relinquish active control over him? Or does He constantly direct man's activities?

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[7] See Edwin Grant Conklin, *Direction of human evolution* (new ed. New York 1922) 193–197; William Herbert Carruth, *Each in his own tongue* (New York 1908) the poem by that name; and Tennyson's poem, "The higher pantheism."

The concepts regarding this aspect of religion range all the way from those which regard the relationship between God and each human being as a person-to-person one, to the idea which makes each human being an intrinsic part of a Supreme Being, and to the concept that no relationship whatsoever obtains between God and man. Four main ideas have developed in this regard: theism, which conceives of God as actually transcending the world and possibly being omnipresent in it; deism, which holds that God is entirely outside of the world and has only a causal relation to it; agnosticism, which entertains the belief that if there be a God, man cannot know Him or His relation to man; and mysticism, which believes God to be imminent in and one with all the living.

TABLE 31. BELIEFS CONCERNING GOD'S RELATION TO MAN

TYPES	CONTENT	NOTABLE EXPONENTS
Theism	God transcends the world and may be omnipresent in it	St. Augustine St. Aquinas
Deism	God is entirely outside of the world, to which He bears only a casual connection	Lord Herbert Lord Shaftesbury Thomas Jefferson
Agnosticism	Man cannot know of the relations of any God to himself or comprehend His activities	Thomas Huxley
Mysticism	The divine nature is imminent and one with all	St. Bonaventura

Creeds. Virtually every Western religion has developed a creed as the authoritative statement of its belief and the central device for the inculcation of that belief. Creeds consist of brief, rationalized, precisely worded statements or assertions of faith, setting forth the essential elements of the particular religion. Creeds are often given poetical form, as in the hymns to the rising and the setting sun in the Eygptian *Book of the Dead;* others are set in prose, as in the Apostles' Creed. Always they are in a form to be easily memorized and repeated in song or otherwise. They are employed to inculcate the early tradition of the particular religion; to ward off the attacks of philosophy, skeptics, and other religions; to reduce or eliminate variations in beliefs within particular religions; to build and maintain group cohesion among the adherents; and to win converts. Creeds are the very bulwarks of the religious system. They have an influence, both within the religious system itself and throughout the culture in general, which cannot be overstated. Whether they are in poetical or prose form, sung or merely repeated, whether they are brief, as the creed of the Jew, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord," or comparatively long and elaborate, like the creedal sentences of the New Testament, they have a far-reaching influence in the spread of a religion. For example, the Apostles' Creed has been accepted ever since the second century A.D. as the fundamental article of faith by all Christendom, and has probably had more influence in setting the stamp of the Christian faith on the Western world than any other single instrument or possibly than all other religious instruments put together.[8]

III. RELIGIOUS CEREMONIALS

Nature of Religious Ceremonials. Religious ceremonials consist in outward acts, usually performed in groups and in public, and giving expression to the belief in God. Specifically, they consist in routine repetition of creeds, prayers, hymns, invocations, benedictions; in making sacrifices or signs, such as the sign of the cross or the Mohammedan's prostration; the burning of incense or candles, the putting on of vestments, the telling of beads, the uttering of sounds. These acts repeated in unison, in a prescribed manner seem to establish a feeling of common humanity in the worshippers, to give them a sense of the presence of God, and, therefore, to afford them a sense of security and peace. It is not the particular ritual followed that matters; it is rather the act of worship, the willing performance of the act in the prescribed manner, the fellowship it involves, and the public performance of the act. Even in the more sophisticated religions, in which the mental attitude is emphasized, some ritual is present and is regarded as essential.[9]

Compulsory Character of Religious Usages. The performance of religious ceremonials is in primitive societies regarded as of great importance. Primitive people live so close to the edge of bare subsistence that the slightest mishap may spell community disaster;

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[8] See Edward Gibbon, *History of the decline and fall of the Roman empire*, ii (1776–1787, New York 1932) 347–348.

[9] See Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, i (New York 1935) 394–395.

and since they believe that prosperity or adversity rests with the gods and that the good will of the gods depends on the ceremonies, they regard the punctilious performance of the rites as of the utmost importance. The individual failing to conform not only may suffer a sense of guilt, but may also be severely punished by the group.[10] Nor is this true only in primitive societies. The persecution of heretics all through history, the burning of witches even as late as the eighteenth century, and the characterizing as "heathen" those who do not baptize children or perform other rites, are evidences of the universality of the importance attached to religious ceremonials. Modern conditions have greatly reduced the force of religion; and yet even in our times the masses of the faithful, notably in backward countries and rural regions, obey the chief religious dogmas and rules of conduct; while certain rites, such as those of baptism, religious marriage, and burial, are still regarded as more or less compulsive in most societies. Religious usages, therefore, are far more than folkways; they are, in fact, among the more rigid customs. The performance of them is usually compulsory and the violation of them sometimes punishable.

Human Objective in Worship. Religious ceremonials are in part sheer worship, that is, they acknowledge the existence of God, express reverence and obedience, and pay Him homage. But they have also human ends. The Deity is worshipped in the expectation that thereby man's needs may be met, that the human lot may be lightened, that man's prospect in the present world and in the hereafter may be bright. In the Lord's Prayer, "Hallowed be Thy name" is shortly followed by, "Give us this day our daily bread," and "forgive us our debts." Fundamentally worship is in part, possibly wholly, homocentric. We worship in order to serve human needs; we implore Divinity to shape our ends; we ask for guidance in our human affairs; implore God to give us a measure of peace and security amid the struggles and the recurring insecurities of life; and we beseech the Divine to catch up the thread of life seemingly broken in death and give it immortality.

Life-Cycle Rituals. Religious rituals fall into two main classes: those relating to the life-cycle of the individual and those centering in economic activity of the group. The more important ceremonials of the first class are those related to birth, puberty, marriage, and death.

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[10] See Pareto, *op. cit.*, ii, 743–746.

Birth ceremonials are implicitly or explicitly based on the belief that the child is "born in sin and conceived in wickedness" and that to make him acceptable to God and fit for life his original impurity must be removed by acts of purification, such as baptism, anointing, fumigation, and circumcision. In practice birth ceremonials subserve immediate purposes. Through birth ceremonials, the parents publicly declare the parenthood and the legitimacy of the child, dedicate him to the particular religious faith and church, to both of which he is considered as henceforth belonging. In addition, birth ceremonials have in the past served the purpose of registration; church registers have in many societies been the sole records and have been used for census and taxation purposes.[11]

Puberty ceremonies form a second group of life-cycle rites. Primitive societies recognized the three states of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood; puberty marked the transition between childhood and adolescence, and marriage the passing from adolescence to adulthood. Each group had special rights and duties, distinctive dress and ornamentation, and frequently had separate residences. The commemoration of the transition from boyhood to manhood was performed by secret societies, usually consisting of men. The ceremonies were conducted by the elders. Knowledge of the rights and duties pertaining to adults, as well as sex education, was imparted. "The simplest formal sex instruction under public or tribal auspices is that often included in the pubertal initiation of youths into manhood. Included in the prescribed ceremonies and curriculum of the initiation in many primitive societies is a certain amount of instruction regarding the physical and social aspects of sex as they are understood and approved by the tribe to which the novice belongs." [12] Puberty rites have decreased in significance, and yet they still survive in such rites as the first communion and confirmation.

The third group of life-cycle rites marks marriage. In the chapter on marriage we have discussed the various marriage customs. Here we need only emphasize that it is the religious institution that, from earliest times to the present, has generally provided the sanctions on which these usages rest. Until well into the modern era, when the state has acquired the prerogative of licensing and even solemnizing marriage, the religious institution was the sole agency having the right to give permission for the marriage, publish the ban, prescribe the form, perform the rites, and record the union.

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[11] See Robert Briffault, "Birth customs" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 565–567. In the early centuries of the Christian church, baptism was postponed to the later years of life. Subsequently the practice was restored to the early years, with exceptions in certain fundamentalist churches which christen the baby and delay baptism to the "age of accountability."

[12] M. A. Bigelow, "Sex education and sex ethics" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 14 (New York 1934) 8–13. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

Death customs have also had a considerable place in the religious institution. Among the primitives, death has been regarded as a new birth, a victory, the passing into a godlike state or existence; it took place publicly, was a familiar sight, and was not feared. Accordingly, most death customs consisted in preparing the dead for that new life. The deceased was washed, anointed, garbed in clean raiment; a watch or wake was kept to commemorate his passage into the new life; there was rejoicing and feasting; and he was buried, in the embryo position, with knees drawn up, in preparation for his passing into the new existence.

Sustenance Rites. Alongside these life-cycle rites, a wide variety of practices has prevailed having a bearing on the ordinary ongoings of life, particularly those related to sustenance. Among all peoples, most of the feasts have had at least a symbolic economic significance. In primitive societies religious acts are largely if not wholly designed to secure the collaboration of the gods in food-getting or to avert calamities which would affect maintenance. As already stated, "Give us this day our daily bread" is still among the first of prayers. So great has been the relation between religion and economic life that some scholars have considered the religious institution to be part of the economic system.[13] Religious acts, however, often transcend mere economic aims. They are frequently related to nonmaterial perpetuation and the projection of the individual and the group, as is seen from the prevalence of the doctrine of immortality; and they are related to the search for the origin of the world and of life, to the quest for the meaning of life. But the economic aspect is usually present. Even in our time celebrations such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Year's, Easter, the Passover feast, have economic significance.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

Rise of Priesthood. The priesthood, part of the religious organization, was probably the first professional class to become articulate. Whether the priesthood arose before the congregation or vice versa authorities differ. Some scholars hold that it was the priestly class which, by elaborating beliefs and refining usages, created the religious organization. "Supernaturalistic congregations presuppose collective mental or spiritual needs essentially the same for all or nearly all members. These needs and cravings rarely if ever lead to definite organizations apart from the efforts of priests—or of laymen who use priests for their own purposes. In this sense, but in this sense only, it may be said that magicians and priests created the supernaturalistic congregations out of which, in a long process of development and refinement, the churches (in the narrower sense) have arisen." [14]

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[13] See William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, ii (New Haven 1927).

Whatever may have been the course of early development, the priesthood seems to have arisen as a separate class or profession in tribal societies. In societies in which the family or the clan was the authoritative unit, the patriarch was the priest. With the rise of the tribe, however, it became necessary for the tribal ruler to delegate religious duties to others. The shamans were among the first of these. So there gradually arose a professional class of men and women who took over the priestly functions. Sometimes they served as subordinates to the political ruler, sometimes they were corulers, and occasionally they themselves became the rulers.[15]

From the very first the priest was a person well above the average in character, capacity, training, and deportment. He was required to be physically vigorous; to subject himself to rigid preparatory training and discipline, to systematic self-sacrifice, hygienic living, and ascetic practices; to know and put into practice the taboos of the tribe; to study and master the sacred texts; to practice celibacy; [16] and above all to have "spiritual" or psychic penetration.

These characteristics and training made the priest the community leader *par excellence.* The priest served as oracle; he was prophet and fortune-teller, magician and medicine man; he was guardian of the holy places and objects, the dwellings of the gods; he organized and conducted religious ceremonies and instruction; occasionally he was an inventor or discoverer, as when Babylonian priests plotted time from the stars. Because of the close relationship which he was believed to have with the gods, his person was deemed inviolable, and this further enhanced his powers. By the Middle Ages the priesthood was the dominant profession.[17]

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[14] Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker, *Systematic sociology* (New York 1932) 615. By permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

[15] E. Washburn Hopkins, *Origin and evolution of religion* (New Haven 1923) chap. xiii.

[16] In its modern aspects celibacy did not become official until the eleventh century, but the practice runs back to early times. See Walton H. Hamilton, "Celibacy" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 283–286.

Familial, Clan, and Tribal Religious Organization. Among primitive peoples religion centered in the family or the clan. The gods, particularly the family gods, were supposed to be in direct communication with the head of the family or clan. He determined and performed the ceremonies, prescribed rules of conduct, even had the right of life and death over members of the household.

Ethnic Religious Organization. The first religious organization proper probably arose among the Hebrews. Although other ancient people had national gods, it was Hebraic religion that first conceived of a national God on a grand scale.[18] Jehovah was a "jealous" and wrathful deity, who threatened His people with national disaster if they did not worship Him, and Him alone. This doctrine, codified in the Ten Commandments some time during the eighth century B.C., became fundamental. The Law, The Passover, circumcision, the doctrine of the Promised Land, Messianism, the keeping of the Sabbath and the Day of the Atonement, and other doctrines and ceremonials were national in content and scope, and their observance was believed to be necessary to national survival.

Christendom. The religious organization embracing the entire West came with Christianity. In the early years, the Christians were so few in number and for the most part of the humbler classes—fishermen, accountants, slaves, and so on—that for at least two centuries they seem to have evoked not even the passing attention of the government in Rome, save in connection with taxation.[19] In these early decades, they met from time to time for fellowship and mutual comfort, without formal organization or leadership. In time they began to organize, notably in the principal cities such as Antioch, Corinth, Alexandria, and Rome. These local churches were unrelated, each having its own loose organization and electing its own presbyter or bishop, who was amenable to the local congregation alone.

[17] See Hopkins, *loc. cit.*, and Alfred Bertholet, "Priesthood" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 388–395.

[18] Among the Egyptians, national gods had already appeared, but not in such a grand manner as among the Hebrews.

[19] Anatole France has given dramatic expression to this indifference in his short story, "Procurator of Judea" in John Cournos (ed.), *Fifteen finest short stories* (New York 1928) 94–113.

But the fundamental concepts of Christianity contained the seed of a wide-reaching organization. The God whom Christ preached was not the ethnic Jehovah of the Jews, but rather a universal God; Christ's God knew no bounds of race, for, as St. Paul later declared, God "made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth." Christ's God knew no bounds of place; He had commanded His disciples, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to the whole creation." So the Christian's God was the God of all mankind; He was the only "true" God, and Him and Him alone must all men worship!

The early Christians took these tenets seriously to heart, and that brought them trouble. They committed a serious political offense when they refused to worship the Roman deities or the Roman Emperor; it was not unlike refusing to salute the flag in time of war or to pay obeisance to one of the present-day dictators. Attacks followed. The Christians were hounded, prevented from holding meetings, subjected to fines and other disabilities. As their numbers increased and their doctrines spread, the authorities came to regard them as dangerous and to subject them to persecutions throughout the Empire. But instead of yielding, the Christians, largely through passive resistance, gained power. Persecution, far from weakening them, strengthened their beliefs, purified their conduct, produced group cohesion, and intensified their devotion. The calm manner in which they took the calculated cruelties gained respect for them, made converts, and gradually won recognition.

Moreover, Christianity had something which the Roman world needed badly. The Roman order, in spite of the appearance of great power, was feeling the pangs of disintegration. The artificiality, regimentation, and sophistication of the later Roman days had broken men's spirit, had left them weary and bewildered; civic spirit had decayed; the old virtues had become obsolete; the remnants of the privileged economic class were utterly powerless to steer the course of the empire's life. Men's souls were adrift. Men had been looking about for a new way of life, for a guiding, steadying ray, for a supreme hope. The Christians offered them that hope, in their doctrine of the goodness of God and of the future life. God had manifested His goodness from the day of creation on; He had sent His Son to earth; and the Lord was to return, to receive the faithful into Heaven. All of which gave meaning to life and gave men the opportunity to work out their own destiny here on earth and to prepare themselves for the blessedness of life in the Great Beyond.

What this doctrine meant to that decadent society we cannot fully apprehend; it seems to have been the one thing that gave people of all ranks courage to hold on, to steady their souls, to redouble their efforts in the face of the great disintegration.[20] This, in turn, gained following, prestige, and power for the Christians. As the hounding relaxed—Diocletian's persecution of A.D. 303 was the last official one—the Christians gradually became mellower, more flexible, less intolerant, more understanding of "this poor earthenware," less concerned with "purity" and austerity of morals. They increasingly turned their attention away from denouncing men's wickedness and toward recounting the purported miraculous events of the early days. Thus Christianity gained a wider and wider following.[21]

The government now began first to tolerate, then to approve, later to defend the Christians. Ten years after Diocletian's persecution, Constantine's Edict of Milan (313) placed Christianity on an equal footing with the "pagan" religions; later, various rulers conferred special privileges on Christian priests; finally, in 394 the Emperor Theodosius decreed Christianity to be the official religion of Rome. Thus Christianity, which had arisen as a despised sect only four centuries before in an obscure corner of the Empire, was on the way to becoming the all-embracing religious system of the West.

V. RELIGION THE UNIFYING SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE AGES

Central Factor in Subsequent Development. The concept of a universal and benevolent God was the dynamic factor of the development which followed. The Hebrews had come very close to that concept, but to them Jehovah was first their own Deity, the God of the chosen people, and only incidentally a guide to the rest of mankind. The God of the Christians, however, was the God of all humanity; a God who knew no bounds of race, place, class, or political creed; who transcended all territorial and ethnic divisions; who embraced within the scope of His power and benevolence all the peoples of the earth. Moreover, and perhaps most important, the God of the Christians was a very tangible God, very close to His people. The Stoics had envisioned a unified society, a fatherland of all men, in which poor and rich, bond and free were to dwell on equal terms, have equal opportunity, and live as brothers; but that was merely a philosophic dream, without power and without drive; and their Olympian gods were too distant, too cold.[22] The Christians' God, on the other hand, was almost human: "closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet." He was with the faithful at all times, upholding them, giving them courage, endurance, and readiness to suffer anything for the cause of human brotherhood and justice. And He offered them a reward which had a warm, human meaning: a life hereafter freed from earth's sufferings.

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[20] See John Herman Randall, Jr., *Making of the modern mind* (Boston 1926).

[21] Gibbon, *op. cit.*, i, 88.

Organizational Structure and Procedure. The medium through which these doctrines and aims were put into operation was the Roman Catholic Church. The rise of that organization from a local congregation to a body reaching the entire West is in many respects unique. Several circumstances contributed to that development. First, the Roman congregation was the only church that could claim apostolic founding and succession: St. Peter was said to have founded it in his purported missionary visit to Rome. Second, this church, located as it was at the capital city of the early Empire, drew extraordinary attention and acquired exceptional prestige and power; from the very first the presbyters of other churches turned to the bishops of Rome for counsel and guidance. Third, when the capital of the Empire was removed to Constantinople in 330, the Bishop of Rome, the strongest official of any kind in the city, was left in charge and automatically became the virtual imperial administrator of the western part of the Empire. Fourth, in 380, Theodosius, wishing to offset the growing power of the prelates of Byzantium, proclaimed the primacy of the Bishop of Rome. Thus the foundation for the supremacy of the Roman Catholic Church was laid. That primacy grew in scope from century to century; until by the beginning of the eleventh century the Bishop of Rome had sufficient power to declare himself pope and to excommunicate the Patriarch of Constantinople; and by the thirteenth century papal supremacy had become generally recognized.

The organizational structure of the Roman Catholic Church also contributed to its supremacy. Patterning itself after the Roman

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[22] See F. S. Marvin, *Living past* (Oxford 1913) 123–124.

Empire, the Roman Catholic Church constructed a pyramid-shaped organization, with the neighborhood and community congregations forming the bulk of the pyramid, the regional and national units forming the broad layers, and at the apex, binding the pyramid together, the papal hierarchy. This hierarchial organization conquered the West through its highly trained priesthood, its wide use of dogma, its elaborate ritualism, its confessional, its works of charity, its aesthetic appeal.

Above all it was the persuasion procedure of its ministries that enabled the church to unify and hold the West together. "And here we touch one of the main services which the Church rendered to the world, which had not been, and could not be, possible for an organization aiming at universal jurisdiction and political control. The missionaries of Gregory could penetrate where the legions of Augustus had been destroyed, and thus the new spiritual power, starting from the vantage-ground which Roman organizing skill had prepared, was able speedily, by the less cumbrous machinery of persuasion, to enlarge the area of Roman incorporation." [23]

Thus the Roman Catholic Church wove itself firmly into the very fabric of Western culture, to remain to this day a highly unified and authoritative yet volitional organization, the oldest existing organization, probably unequalled in cohesion, penetration, and influence among the organizations of the West.[24]

Trained Leadership. The religious institution of the Middle Ages was also marked by a highly trained priesthood. The priest, an important functionary in previous civilizations, became the central figure in the Middle Ages. The pope, claiming apostolic succession, had the prerogative of ordaining bishops, and the bishop had the sole right to ordain priests. The priest, drawn from all classes, regions, and races, subjected to an intensive training, required to take lifelong vows of chastity, poverty, and celibacy, went out to serve all peoples regardless of race, political belief, or class with unequalled equipment and authority. Further, the priest was regarded, perhaps even more than in ancient times, as the ultimate recipient of Divine revelation, the interpreter of "the will of God" and of the Scriptures, the intermediary and intercessor between God and man. Thus priests became the leaders in every learned or semilearned profession. They were the artists and architects, the scribes, chroniclers, and Scripture commentators, the physicians, lawyers, and judges, the political theorists, the counsellors or civil authorities, the discoverers, inventors, scientists, and community leaders of the time. In fact, there was scarcely a profession in which the priest was not preëminent.

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[23] Marvin, *op. cit.*, 125–126. By permission of Oxford University Press.

[24] The Masonic order is said to go back to Solomon's time; but there is no conclusive evidence that it has existed continuously since its founding.

Priestly power and prestige were unequalled for several centuries. The Bishop of Rome, at first but an official to whom political rulers might proffer their "love and respect," gradually became the representative of God to whom rulers must give obedience. Even as early as the dawn of the seventh century, Gregory I (590–604) boldly undertook to arbitrate between secular powers; [25] and when, on Christmas day of the year 800, the Pope placed the purple robe of the Empire on the shoulders of Charlemagne and the golden crown on his head, the Pope had become the Supreme Pontiff, the nominal master of the Western world.

Monasticism and Its Societal Function. Another complex which marked the religious system of the Middle Ages was monasticism. Monasticism aimed, first of all, at providing a place, the monastery, where the highly devout few who did not enter the priesthood might withdraw from the turmoil of the world and achieve orientation, the purification of their spirits, membership in the Christian community of selfless love, and thereby work out their salvation.[26]

But the monastery was much more than this. It was the center from which radiated all the kindlier virtues. As a communal brotherhood, it was a living example of the principles which Christ had set forth. The monks, as intermediaries between the Church and the masses, gave people spiritual guidance and material aid. They carried food to the hungry, gave clothing to the needy, visited the prisoner, sheltered the wayfarer. They erected and maintained hospitals, carried on the work of education, encouraged and practiced the arts, and fostered ancient learning. In other words, the monastery furnished orientation to men's minds and souls, controlled lustful appetites and riotous tempers, raised men's minds from the torpor and disorder which prevailed after the fall of Rome, and guided thought into positive channels.[27]

[25] See Bede Jarrett, "Universal church" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 61–72.

[26] Randall, *op. cit.*, 66.

[27] See Columbia College Associates, *Introduction to contemporary civilization in the West*

Further, the monasteries were large and widely ramified enterprises which gave men's hands something to do. The monks supervised the clearing of the wilderness, the draining of marshes, and the making of roads; they opened up land and tilled the soil, developed new methods of agriculture; they taught the craftsman new processes, and the architect, the sculptor, and the painter new styles. All of these activities effected a high degree of unity and cohesion.

Aesthetic Teleological Appeal. Further, the Church made a profound aesthetic appeal. For several centuries the Church carried on a vast building program somewhat on the order of the works-programs of various governments today. But that program had a deep significance: it aimed to emphasize outwardly, through architectural and other artistic forms, the spiritual unification the Church sought to achieve. The buildings which went up during these centuries were not erected to the glory of dead kings, as were the pyramids of Egypt; were not devoted to civic uses or to extol civic grandeur, as were the great buildings of Greek and Roman times; were not like the "Cathedrals of Commerce" of the Industrial Age, dedicated to acquisitiveness. The cathedrals and monasteries were erected rather to the glory of a living God. Thousands of workers toiled for hundreds of years building those massive structures that still stand as silent monuments to the age. They capped them with majestic domes or graceful spires, inlaid them with mosaics, decorated them with immortal stained-glass windows and frescoes, all to the glory of God; ". . . the wonderful and harmonious architectural constructions, the mural decoration, the sculpture, the glass, the smaller, intimate arts that humanize man's existence," [28] were all used to symbolize the unity of the Church, the Kingdom of God on the earth.

VI. CONCLUSION

These, then, are the nature, function, and characteristics of the religious institution. Arising out of the depth of human longings and experience, it erects subsystems of beliefs, creeds, ceremonials, priestly and lay organizations, aimed at the satisfaction of the aspiration of mankind and at giving a sense of cosmic security.

(7th ed. New York 1929) 25–27; George C. Sellery and A. C. Krey, *Founding of Western civilization* (New York 1929) 54–61, 93–96, 116–120.

[28] E. F. Jacob, "Growth of autonomy" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 73.

By its doctrines of the Fatherhood of God and the future life, by the erection of a far-reaching organization, by the integration of the priesthood, by the promotion of monasticism and the vast public service enterprises it carried on, and by its artistic outward forms, the religious institution unified the West. Important though the religious system had been in ancient times, it achieved in the Middle Ages a prestige and power probably not equalled at any time. What government had been in Egypt, Greece, and Rome, what the economic order is in our time, the religious institution was in the Middle Ages: the all-pervading institution, giving "unity, coherence, value and meaning to the parts as well as to the whole of medieval culture." [29]

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Chapter 19

THE CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION

I. FACTORS OF DECADENCE

Seeds of Division. The religious institution of our times is in many respects the antithesis of the medieval system. Today that institution is marked by divisiveness, a relatively low authority, a priesthood divested of many of its former functions, and by humanism. This fact raises the question whether it is in the nature of institutions to swing from one extreme to another. In its formative stage an institution is marked by simplicity of form, plasticity of functioning, and by an inner equilibrium, but as it unfolds and grows older, it acquires complexity and inflexibility, and a disequilibrium.

Whether or not this is a general law, the fact is that at the very time when the religious institution possessed great unity and strength, the seeds of division were being sown. There were doctrinal conflicts among popes, bishops, monks, priests, scholars, and the laity; and though the Church tried to avoid doctrinal issues and to stress practical collaboration, it was unable to maintain its unity and supremacy from the fifteenth century on.

Priestly Domination. Part of this seems to have been due to the fact that the priesthood had become all-dominant. Numerically alone the priesthood had become powerful. Figures are lacking for the early centuries; but by the seventeenth century there were in Spain alone, for example, about 9,000 monasteries and many nunneries; in the diocese of Calabarra there were 18,000 clergymen, in that of Seville 14,000 chaplains. A single cathedral in Seville supported one hundred. In Italy the situation was about the same; even as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were in Piedmont alone, with a population of about two million, some 20,000 priests and 12,000 monks and nuns.[1]

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[1] See Edward Alsworth Ross, *Principles of sociology* (rev. ed. New York 1930) 576; Pietro Orsi, *Italia moderna* (6th ed. Milano 1928) 4.

Priests had gained a monopoly on the professions. Moreover, their closely knit hierarchy was something of a "big business," with its interlocking directorates. The donations and subventions of the early emperors, the endowments of the rich, the constant contributions of the poor had placed enormous wealth in the hands of the priestly hierarchy and given it control over the economic system. By the thirteenth century, the Church owned one-third of the soil of Europe; it directed the whole machinery of economic life; dictated the daily life of the masses; in fact, so powerful was the hierarchy—numerically, professionally, and economically—that it challenged and for a time actually dominated the state.

Separation from "Reality." The doctrine of otherworldliness made the end of life not this world but the hereafter. This meant withdrawal from the world. The faithful must not delight in the present world; it was wicked; the chosen must withdraw from it, shun, loathe it. And no doubt some of the best medieval minds did withdraw from it, did shun and loathe it. It was in the monastery and not the mart, in the cathedral and not the street, that men sought the "good life." They sought peace in contemplation and study, rather than in facing the problems of life; and only through priestly intercession, could one have access to the Divine, find solace, strength, and courage for life's struggles. In the everyday world was no holiness, integration, solace, or strength for anyone.

The Renaissance (XIV to XVI Centuries). The Renaissance challenged this order. An adequate statement of that movement is impossible here. The Moslem invasion of the eighth century and the Tartar invasion of the thirteenth century brought about a contact and fermentation of culture; the invention of the printing press, gunpowder,[2] and the compass gave the West new and powerful instruments; the rediscovery of the classics, made in the monasteries, opened up a new world of thought. There followed a remarkable quickening of the human mind: the rebirth and extension of science; the rise of rationalism and humanism; the far-flung searches of navigators; the discovery of the New World; the Commercial Revolution; and the beginnings of nationalism.[3] All of these influenced that reorientation, that rebirth, that effervescence which is known as the Renaissance.

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[2] The Chinese had invented gunpowder much earlier, but it was introduced in the West at this time.

[3] See F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Renaissance and Reformation" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 84–102.

The Reformation. In the religious institution itself, however, it was the Reformation that constituted the actual turning point. The roots of the Reformation may be said to lie in the Christian doctrines of the equality of all human beings before God and of freedom of worship, in the contest between the Church and the Empire in the eleventh century, and in the doctrinal conflicts within the ranks of the Church. But the Reformation was part and parcel of the Renaissance and the product of the same forces.

The original intention of Luther, himself a monk, seems not to have been to effect a religious or social revolution, but simply to find a surer way of reconciling the individual soul with God than that which the penance system afforded. In nailing the theses upon the church door at Wittenberg in 1517, he was doing what any professor does when he posts a series of questions on the bulletin board to be answered by his students. But, like matches set to tinder, they started a conflagration of vast proportions. The Reformation set loose forces which, together with other factors such as science, nationalism, and the Industrial Revolution, drove a wedge into the religious institution, which in time gave religion the characteristics it possesses in our day.

II. SALIENT FEATURES OF CONTEMPORARY RELIGION

A Divided Christendom. First, the Reformation broke up the unity of Christendom. As the movement gained momentum, the Protestants challenged the authority of the papacy; repudiated asceticism, monasticism, and celibacy; attacked the corruption of the clergy; questioned their claim to exclusive prerogatives in the administration of the sacraments; assailed the penitential system, pilgrimages, and the worship of saints; discarded the Mass; abolished the use of Latin and introduced that of the vernacular in worship; instructed the laity in the use of the Bible; and introduced Bible reading as the principal religious exercise. Above all, they insisted that ecclesiasticism and ritualism, monasticism and asceticism, the worldly power and splendor of the Church, were all inimical to Christian living. They held, and still hold, that to achieve "salvation," to have access to "God in Christ," the believer must go directly to Christ, not by way of the priest as intercessor; must follow the "hidden splendor" of his own soul; and must conduct his life according to the direct teachings of the gospel.[4]

Weakened Religious Authority. This attack split the West into two religious camps: Catholic southwestern Europe and Protestant northwestern Europe and North America. Nor did the split stop there; it ramified in every direction. The Protestant camp was presently divided within itself, with more and more splittings-off, until at present there are over one hundred major denominations, each claiming to hold the secret of the good life. This division weakened religious authority. If, as Protestantism claims, man need not rely on the church for communion with God and for his salvation, he has less and less use for the intervention of the church. As other factors are involved, it is impossible to state precisely the extent to which this doctrine is responsible; yet it is generally recognized that it has some bearing on the reduction of the power of religion over the people, their thought and activities. In any event, the compulsive power which the church had down to the close of the Middle Ages is gone.[5]

The clergy especially has lost much of its former prestige. The rationalism, freedom of conscience, and political-liberty doctrines resulting from the Renaissance; the rise of science; professional specialization; the spread of writing and printing; the rise of the mercantile classes, have taken from the clergy practically all of the nonreligious functions it once performed.

Humanism. Humanism also characterizes the religious institution of today. Theological speculation and the doctrine of otherworldliness still have some weight, in both Catholic and Protestant churches; but in the main religion is concerned with the good life in the here and now: with morality, conditions of labor and the distribution of wealth, with the problems of delinquency and crime, with questions of social justice and international peace. It is the social gospel, not the theological dogma, that chiefly marks the contemporary church. Institutionalized religion today is concerned not so much with the problem of making saints as with the task of recasting the ethical ideals of society. The religious adherent today is called upon not to keep himself "unspotted from the world," but to socialize his behavior. In fact, so great is this emphasis that

[4] See Columbia College Associates, *Introduction to contemporary civilization in the West* (7th ed. New York 1929) 74–75.

[5] The partial decline of secular power is sometimes attributed to the same source. See James Bryce, *Modern democracies*, i (New York 1921) chap. ix.

at times the religious institution becomes so wrapped up in materialistic and mundane affairs as to lose sight of its basic function, namely, that of giving its adherents a sense of spiritual security.

Freedom of Belief and Worship. Freedom of belief has probably existed for a minority all through human history. In the ancient world all religions were mutually compatible, various gods were worshipped, and the followers of one religion did not interfere with the beliefs of others.[6] However, even the Greeks, who were liberal in the matter, restricted the freedom of belief and of religious usages to the freeman; while in the Middle Ages intolerance prevailed. In the modern religious institution there is in the main freedom of belief and religious practice and tolerance for the religious beliefs of others.

Church Membership in the West. In view of the prevailing concepts and practices just described, it is difficult, if not impossible, scientifically to determine how far and how deeply the religious institution influences society today. Data are not available for even a moderately comprehensive statement on church member-

TABLE 32. CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE WESTERN WORLD, 1931, 1938 [7]

RELIGIOUS BODY	NORTH AMERICA		SOUTH AMERICA		EUROPE	
	1938 World Almanac	1931 Yearbook of American Churches	1938 World Almanac	1931 Yearbook of American Churches	1938 World Almanac	1931 Yearbook of American Churches
Christian						
Roman Catholic	40,000,000	44,494,745	61,000,000	47,181,938	220,000,000	187,549,764
Orthodox (Greek)	1,000,000	882,035			120,000,000	112,439,630
Protestant	75,000,000	38,247,992	900,000	627,806	115,000,000	81,228,270
Total Christian	116,000,000	83,624,772	61,900,000	47,809,744	455,000,000	381,217,664
Non-Christian						
Jews	4,000,000	4,380,657	300,000	237,119	10,000,000	9,886,000
Mohammedan	20,000	478			5,000,000	5,672,124
Buddhists	180,000	180,000				
Hindus	150,000	150,000				
Confucians & Taoists	600,000	600,000				
Shintoists						
Animists	50,000	50,000				
Miscellaneous	25,000,000	77,927,813	2,000,000	33,517,955	5,000,000	103,788,699
Total non-Christian	30,000,000	83,288,948	2,300,000	33,755,074	20,000,000	119,346,823
Total church membership	146,000,000	166,913,720	64,200,000	81,564,818	475,000,000	500,564,487
Per cent of population	86.5	98.9	77.3	98.6	86.4	90.9

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[6] Bryce, *op. cit.*, i, chap. ix.

[7] Based on the *Yearbook of American churches* (New York 1931) and the *World almanac* (New York 1938). The general population percentages are based mainly on R. R. Kuczynski, "Population, history and statistics" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 240–248.

ship in the Western world; such data as are available are presented in table 32. Some of the figures are based in part on unofficial records and therefore must be construed as estimates. The figures of the *Yearbook of American Churches* are those of the censuses of the various countries and general statements by the churches. It will be noted that the total religious population constitutes a relatively high proportion of the total population. This casts considerable doubt on the accuracy of the figures. They are presented here as highly tentative and chiefly to suggest investigation.

III. CONTEMPORARY RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States the features just described are doubly marked. Due to the facts that this country was on the periphery of Western culture; that it came into existence as these features were developing and being adopted; that its population and culture patterns represent various regions of Europe; and due to the penetration of science, the Industrial Revolution, the democratic movement, and the social mobility of its people, in the United States the religious institution has produced more striking expressions of the characteristics which mark the religious institution in the West as a whole.

Heterogeneity and Heterodoxy. The United States has produced an even greater variety of religious beliefs, usages, and organization than the remainder of the West. Here numerous faiths thrive side by side: the Jewish faith with its mundane emphasis; the Roman Catholic Church with its doctrines of apostolic succession, the validity of revelation, and its sacerdotalism; the different Protestant bodies with their various interpretations of God and the relationship between man and God; the Fundamentalists in every church with their tenets of the Virgin birth, the physical resurrection of Christ, the inerrancy of the scriptures, the substitutionary theory of the atonement, and the imminent physical Second Coming of Christ;[8] the Mormons with their emphasis on the primitive beliefs of the Christian Church; the Christian Scientists and their mental healing; the Unitarian and Universalist churches with their stress on the ethical aspects of religion; and other bodies with a variety of doctrines, too numerous to mention. This heterogeneity manifests itself objectively in literally hundreds of denominations.[9]

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[8] C. Luther Fry and Mary Frost Jessup, "Changes in religious organizations" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends*, ii (New York 1933) 1011; see also William Warren Sweet, *Story of religions in America* (New York 1930).

The fundamental tenets have lost much of their power. The dogmas of original sin, of the necessity for forgiveness, redemption through faith, the veracity of the Scriptures, and the divinity of Christ have weakened in their appeal. Science has become the competitor of religion in showing men how to get what they want, and church leaders have been increasingly compelled to harmonize their teachings with the findings of science.[10] The nontraditional bodies, such as the Mormons and the Christian Scientists, have shown a greater increase in membership during the first quarter of the twentieth century; while the traditional Protestant bodies have had a relatively slow increase, and the Roman Catholic a very slow increase. The Protestant churches are further divided into the Fundamentalists who believe that the traditional interpretation of the Scriptures is essential to religious life, and the liberals who stress the social gospel. Trials for doctrinal heresy are still conducted by denominational authorities. But heresy cases during the last forty years have decreased in number; and only a few of those tried in recent years have resulted in convictions.[11]

Wide Variety of Practices. In religious usages, the churches differ all the way from the high ritualism of the Roman Catholic Mass and the liturgical service of the Protestant Episcopal Church to the informal services of most Protestant churches. In parts of New England the Sabbath is still strictly observed; but in most sections of the country, particularly in urban centers, the day is given over almost wholly to recreational activity. Twenty-nine states, with a total population of 76,000,000, directly or indirectly prohibit moving pictures on Sunday; but amusement places actually operate on Sunday in forty-one out of fifty-six large cities. In fourteen states and the District of Columbia, with a total population of 26,000,000, Sunday motion pictures are legalized, while five states allow the matter to be settled by local option.[12] The churches also differ greatly on the questions of divorce, birth control, child labor, war, and other social matters.

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[9] See United States Bureau of the Census, *Religious bodies: 1926*, ii (Washington D. C. 1929).

[10] See Fry, *op. cit.*, 1010–1012; and Harry Emerson Fosdick, "Will science displace God?" in *Harper's magazine*, cliii (1926) 363.

[11] See Fry, *op. cit.*, 1011; also United States Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*

[12] See Fry, *op. cit.*, 1012–1013.

Social Gospel. The emphasis on the "social gospel," however, prevails quite generally in the American religious system. Although the Roman Catholic Church as early as 1891 called attention to the societal functions of religion,[13] European religious organizations do not generally concern themselves with social movements. In the United States, on the other hand, both the Catholic and the Protestant churches have shown great interest in social questions. The Protestant churches, either individually or through the Federal Council of Churches, have made definite pronouncements on matters relating to the conditions of labor, child labor, marriage and the family, birth control, education, and interracial and international problems.[14] However, it is generally recognized among objective observers that in moments of stress the church here, as elsewhere, usually fails to act. Many of its pronouncements on social questions, being in the nature of taboos, fail to act as guiding forces in emergencies, such as wars.

Membership in the United States. As the regular United States census does not ask for the religious affiliation of the people, it is difficult to determine precisely what is the religious population of the United States. From such data as are available there were in 1926 in the United States 54,576,346 people in all denominations. If these data are approximately correct, it is evident that over half of the population holds no membership in a religious organization. It has been calculated that church membership has been growing at about the same rate as the population; persons thirteen years of age and over listed as church members amount to fifty-five per cent of the total number of persons of that age group of the general population. A variety of causes may explain the different rate of membership in this country and other nations: a difference in birth rates and in death rates, and in some countries, of language and nationality, has some relation to religious affiliation.[15] In 1926 the Census reported 212 religious denominations. In 1931, thirty-five religious bodies, each with 100,000 members or more, had 95.6 per cent of the church membership in the United States.[16]

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[13] See Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, *Rerum novarum.*

[14] For illustrative details, see Fry, *op. cit.*, 1014–1019.

[15] Warren S. Thompson, *Population problems* (2d ed. New York 1935) 115–117.

[16] Herman C. Weber (ed.), *Yearbook of American churches* (New York 1933) 297.

TABLE 33. RELIGIOUS POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1926 [17]

BROAD RELIGIOUS GROUP	PERCENTAGE
Protestant	27.2
Roman Catholic	15.9
Jewish	3.5
Not reported as church members	53.4
Total	100.0

Sentiment for Church Union? Repeated efforts have been made to effect church consolidation in the United States. In 1932 an investigation was made to discover the extent to which the leaders of the various Protestant denominations favored: (1) the continuance of the present system of denominational separations, or (2) a federal union among the denominations, or (3) a union of the various bodies into one church. The returned ballots, 7,293 in number, showed the Lutherans, Southern Presbyterians, and Southern Baptists to be opposed to any form of union; the Evangelical, Reformed, Congregational, Christian, Friends, United Brethren, Presbyterian (U. S. A.), and Baptist churches favored federal union; the Disciples, the Methodist Episcopal, Methodist Episcopal South, Methodist Protestant, Unitarian, Protestant Episcopal, and other denominations recorded favorable majorities for some kind of union. Of the total ballots collected, 64.7 per cent favored union, and 28.8 were for the present order (about 7 per cent were mixed ballots). Of the ballots favoring union, 50.07 per cent were for federal and 49.92 for closer union. In a later tabulation of 13,164 ballots, 63.6 per cent favor some sort of union, and 32.2 per cent prefer a continuance of the present order. Of the ballots favoring union, 50.63 per cent now favor a closer, while 49.37 per cent prefer a federal union.[18]

To what extent the urge toward union is real cannot be determined. The above statistics represent attitudes; durable patterns would call for the consensus of the masses of religious adherents. However, in so far as this investigation is at all indicative of a general attitude, it would seem that the churches in the United States recognize, at least by implication, the disintegration of the religious system and the necessity of some form of reintegration. It is also significant that the three Methodist churches mentioned above actually united in May, 1939.

[17] Thompson, *op. cit.*, 116.

[18] H. Paul Douglass in Herman C. Weber (ed.), *Yearbook of American churches* (New York 1933) 308–311.

IV. MALADJUSTMENTS RELATED TO INSTITUTIONALIZED RELIGION

Is Religion an Opiate? Sometimes the question is raised as to the extent to which institutionalized religion has or has not performed constructive functions. Such a question usually generates heated controversy; the only possible scientific reply is that the religious system, like every other human institution, in the performance of its essential function undergoes maladjustment.

The religious institution is said to have in the past bred dependence and fear which have, in turn, retarded the fuller self-realization of the individual and group self, and kept considerable portions of the human race subservient and in ignorance. Employed in this way, organized religion, it is believed, has acted as an opiate, inducing dullness, inaction, and servility, retarding group orientation and opposing the rational integration of society.

Conservatism and Obscurantism of Religion. The religious institution has at times been highly conservative and obscurantist. Endowing its doctrines and practices with divine sanction, it has rigidly held to the established in ideas and usages, and has almost invariably withstood anything new. Established religion resists new light within its own sphere: the Egyptian priests opposed the Hebraic innovation; Judaism once established became dominated by Pharisaism and bitterly resisted the coming of Christianity; Christianity, tolerant so long as it was suppliant, became in time an unbending system; the Church of Rome turned into a bulwark of opposition to change; and the Protestant churches have followed the same course, suppliant and tolerant at first, but once established anathematizing departures from their particular tenets and forms. In this, of course, institutional religion is not unique, as we shall see in the chapter on Persistence.

Organized religion has also ordinarily resisted change in general. It has opposed innovations, discoveries, and inventions, and has discouraged and punished, even with death, those who even questioned the established, as if its primary function were to prevent change. "What aspirations of earnest souls struggling to express a newly discovered truth has it not tried to crush! How often have religious institutions been found on the side of reaction in the struggle for freedom! Even in Ancient Israel, as Cornhill has remarked [*The Prophets of Israel* (1904) 83–90], the outcome of the Prophetic religion was to crush the free spirit of the common people and to bind upon them the rites and ideas of the religion of the narrow party of Jerusalem. It paved the way for the priestly domination of the following centuries, and had a share in preparing for the narrow spirit of the Pharisee. In early Christian times ecclesiasticism crushed the free spirit of the Montanist, drove into ecclesiastical exile that early forerunner of untrammelled thought, the Gnostic, under the leadership of such men as Cyprian and Calixtus narrowed the church to a sect, and bound it with the hard bonds of a party denomination." [19] Some religious leaders, notably the Hebrew prophets, Jesus, the Apostles, and Luther have inspired, initiated, and led reconstruction movements; but these have represented change-seeking minorities, hardly ever established religion which, in general, has stood on the side of the powerful. And in our times, the churches "have become powerful, enormously rich ecclesiastical domains bound up with business interests." [20]

Institutionalized religion has often wasted its energies on irrelevant matters, insisting on the familiar, the established, and the archaic, clinging "resolutely to ancient and therefore holy forms of language, dress, architecture, furniture, music, and instruments and ceremonial in general," [21] as if its very life depended on them. The Hebraic, Greek, and Roman religious systems insisted, for example, on the use of stone for all religious purposes and forbade the use of bronze or iron, when these metals had come into common use. Religion has even clung to religious vestments as if they were its very soul; devout Jews still wear the somber apparel of their predispersion days; the Roman and Greek Catholic priests are still cloaked in the kind of garments worn by their remote predecessors; even the Protestants cling to similar vestigial forms.[22]

The Enemy of Science. Established religion has shown its marked conservatism and obscurantism, especially in relation to free inquiry. Although some of the abler scientific minds have worked within the ranks of the church, although the church has in isolated instances even supported scientific work and defended scientists—as in the case of the support Pope Clement IV gave Roger Bacon—in general, established religion has obstructed the scientific pathfinder. The church, for instance, held Roger Bacon in a prison for fifteen years and forced him to commit his findings to symbolic characters; it tried William of Occam for heresy and cast him into prison; it burned the naturalist Giordano Bruno at the stake; called Abélard to task for his love of the wisdom of this world (and of Héloise); forced Galileo in the autumn of a life of painstaking research to recant his scientific findings. Ecclesiasticism has forced thinkers to hold "back results and views until safe in the grave. The less discreet have been crucified, inquired into by a Holy Office, popularly persecuted, ridiculed, and ignored." [23] Clothed in the garments of divine authority, the church, even in more recent times, has anathematized truth seekers, such as Darwin and Huxley; belittled the findings of science; has tried to hinder the inquiries of conscientious scholars; and often has stood against the defenders of the rights of the common people.[24]

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[19] John Lewis Gillin and Frank W. Blackmar, *Outlines of sociology* (3d ed. New York 1930) 325. By permission of The Macmillan Company. On the Pharisees see also R. Travers Herford, *The Pharisees* (New York 1924).

[20] Felix Morrow in *Saturday review of literature*, x (1934), review of Winfred Ernest Garrison's *March of faith* (New York 1933).

[21] William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, ii (New Haven 1927) 1431.

[22] For other illustrations see *ibid.*, ii, 1430–1441.

It has opposed inquiries into the origin of man and of human institutions, the use of anesthetics, the contractual concept of marriage, the theories of evolution, divorce, birth control; and it still maintains its *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, banning sometimes very notable books. These activities may have at times acted as ballast to the ship of society; yet they have too often made institutionalized religion an agency of reaction.[25]

V. CONSTRUCTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION

Source of Personal and Social Security. The foregoing, however, presents but one side of the picture. The religious institution has performed constructive functions of the first order. For thousands of years the religious institution was practically the only system to afford a sense of personal and group security. Especially among the primitives, who were constantly in the presence of what were to them terrifying natural phenomena, religion must have been a source of assurance. Long before science had endowed man with the concept "natural," religion was steadying the mind and the hand of man, in a measure eliminating fears, and affording some sense of cosmic security.

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[23] Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 90.

[24] See Gillin and Blackmar, *op. cit.*, 325.

[25] In 1933 Pope Pius XI stated that the Church "not only never has feared scientific truth but has always been its herald." "Roman Catholic Church," in *International yearbook for the year 1933* (New York 1934) 724. For the conflict between religion and science see William Morris Davis, "Faith of reverent science" in *Scientific monthly*, 38 (1934) 395–421; Andrew Dickson White, *History of the warfare of science with theology in Christendom* (New York 1910); H. L. Mencken, *Treatise on the gods* (New York 1930); and William North Rice, *Science and religion* (New York 1925) *passim.*

Even in our day of vaunted scientific knowledge, religion seems for the millions the only source of solace and security. In the face of the crises of life: sickness and death, personal and group bewilderment, economic distress, labor and class conflicts, pestilences and war, the church fosters hopefulness, offsets materialism, and maintains groups in which mutual sympathy prevails. The church attempts to throw some light on the perennial problems of origins and destinies; its doctrines of the benevolence of God and of immortality are an unfailing source of strength to millions; it is one of few agencies that builds up, rather than tears down, the sense of personal and group worth, and that gives a sense of cosmic continuity, if not of security.

Philanthropic Agency. Again, the church remains one of the most, if not the most, active of philanthropic agencies. From the day of the Hebraic religion with its practice of succoring the stranger, the beggar, and the sick; through the early Christian church with its agencies for the care of the sick, of orphans, and of the aged; through the church of the Middle Ages with the vast charitable activities centering in the monasteries; to our day with relief systems maintained by various religious bodies, institutional religion has carried on a great deal of the philanthropic work. Long before the state had thought of caring for the poor, long before secular social work had even been dreamed of, the church was conducting a wide range of philanthropic activities. This does not imply that all the charity work carried on by the church—or for that matter, by secular philanthropic bodies—performs a constructive function; but it is a fact that whenever men have been in need, the religious institution, above all others, has been in the foreranks to render them aid.[26]

Agent of Reform. The religious institution has also been a power in reform. Christianity made a marked contribution, for example, toward the abolition of slavery. For centuries, the Christian church forbade the maltreatment of slaves, sanctioned marriage between slaves and free persons, prohibited the enslavement of fellow Christians, and encouraged emancipation of slaves as a deed of charity. The seventeenth century Quakers led the protest against the importation of slaves into North America; the eighteenth century Church of England and the Methodists opposed the slave traffic; and in the nineteenth century various Christian bodies participated in the movement to abolish slavery. It is true that the Christian church has also connived in the practice, has itself held slaves and held on to them with more than ordinary tenacity; Pope Nicholas V in 1454, for example, even sanctioned the importation of Negro slaves into Portugal; but in general Christianity has taken a definite stand against slavery and made a distinct contribution toward its ultimate abolition.[27]

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[26] See Kenneth L. M. Pray, "Charity" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 340–344.

The church has likewise made contributions toward the emancipation of women, the improvement of the lot of the laborer, the reduction of child labor, the adoption of humane treatment of criminals, the movement toward the abolition of war. In addition, the church has been the one agency that has challenged and even defied the state whenever the latter has become overoppressive. The church has often compromised, especially when it itself was not being oppressed; in contemporary Italy, for example, the Church at first vigorously opposed the totalitarian state but later became tacit and even collaborative. And yet until the rise of modern organized capitalism, the church was the only organization that dared to challenge the state. The contest between church and state has constituted one of the oldest and most persistent aspects of Western culture.

Instrument of Societal Control. Further, the religious institution has effected and still effects some measure of discipline. Particularly in periods of national and international stress, in times of conflict, uncertainty, and crisis, the religious institution affords a special refuge; through its special missions, religious revivals, messages, literature, it indirectly, for that reason perhaps more effectively, acts as a societal brake. Its emphasis on self-control and group sanction probably constitutes a powerful directing influence; its thou-shalt-nots still act as effective controls; its resistance to change, though in the main a disservice, safeguards the culture heritage, perpetuates tried standards, tests the new, and prevents drifting away from the basic realities.

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[27] See L. T. Hobhouse, "Christianity" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 454–455; Charles Loring Brace, *Gesta Christi* (5th ed. New York 1912).

A Unifying Power. Furthermore, the religious institution has probably made a definite contribution toward establishing ever wider societal cohesion. In early Christian times Christ's command to His disciples to "go into all the world and preach the Gospel" seems to have had some bearing on the unification of the West; in the Middle Ages the universality of Christianity, the West-wide organization of the church, the universal priesthood and monastic order, all contributed toward breaking down localisms and to the enlargement of peace groups. The influence of Judaism in this respect has perhaps been even more powerful. The Jews, transcending the ethnocentrism of their Palestinian experiences, have been in the forefront of the struggle for the unification of the West, so much so that they have been abhorred and hounded by the great authoritarian, nationalistic states of all times.[28]

VI. CONCLUSION

Although the religious institution does not present the unified front it did during medieval times, although the priesthood has lost much of its former prestige and power, and though its doctrines are so diverse, still religion has great influence on the minds and activities of the masses. In fact, in the present-day world with its gnawing skepticisms, its class and national conflicts, religion performs constructive functions. In the midst of the insecurity and the bewilderment of our times, institutionalized religion is a unifying, alleviating, comforting agency. Its future will depend on whether it will cleave to its essential functions, keep its relative autonomy, its integrity, courage, and fortitude.

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[28] See G. Cogni, *Razzismo* (Milan 1937); Paolo Orani, *Ebrei d'Italia* (Rome 1937); and Abramo Levi, *Noi Ebrei* (Rome 1937).

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Chapter 20

SCIENCE—A NASCENT INSTITUTION

I. NATURE OF SCIENCE

Late Rise of Science. The coördination of scientific activities is a modern development. Strictly speaking science is not an institution, but it evinces several features which justify our speaking of it as a nascent institution.

The late development of science is probably due, first, to the fact that for primitive man the task of making a living was too arduous, too engrossing for him to devote the time, energy, systematic effort, and wealth that scientific endeavor demands. Neither primitive men, nor relatively underprivileged regions, nor poor people have ever been able to make notable contributions to science. Poor people in general take little or no interest in the tasks of science. Science seems to flourish only among those who are not under too great economic stress.

The late rise of science is also probably due to early man's fear of nature. Primitive man was too close to nature, too often under the shadow of catastrophes, too much disturbed by the recurring crises of human life to develop the perspective and the objectivity science requires. To the primitive, the world immediately about him was too oppressive, multi-faceted, and capricious to permit human mentality to lift itself from subjective experience and achieve that long-range view essential to scientific endeavor.[1] Early man had, therefore, to rely mainly on faith.

Finally, the late development of science may be explained in part by the fact that a certain cultural foundation was necessary before science could develop.[2] Precise language for exact recording, instruments for exact observation and measurement, printing for the accumulation, interchange, and wider testing of accumulated knowledge—these and other culture items were necessary before science could start on its way; and these have been attained only in comparatively recent centuries. Of course in this, as in all developments, interdependence obtained; some of the culture items just mentioned were the product rather than the cause of science, or at least went hand in hand with science in its progress. Science in its fuller development depends on numerous discoveries, such as higher mathematics, the use of steel, refined tool-making, which are in the nature of general cultural unfolding.[3]

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[1] See Benjamin Ginzburg, "Science" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 13 (New York 1934) 591–602, esp. 594–595.

[2] Charles A. Ellwood, *Cultural evolution* (New York 1927) 246.

In any event, science as we know it now started on its path during the Renaissance and only in the nineteenth century became an all-pervading influence.

Characteristics of Science. The question of the nature of science inevitably leads to the subject of the ultimate reality of observable phenomena and the validity of facts. But these are metaphysical problems. Ours is a simpler and humbler task, that of inquiring into the more immediate meaning of science. Science, as the Latin term *scientia* signifies, simply denotes knowledge; it assumes the knowableness of phenomena and man's capacity to accumulate knowledge; and as such stands in antithesis to nescience and all other doctrines holding that nature is unknowable.

But science aims at a peculiar sort of knowledge. First, scientific knowledge differs from so-called matter-of-fact or common-sense knowledge. The latter is gained from chance personal experience, practice in a given occupation, daily contact with phenomena, casual observation; it is therefore almost wholly subjective, intuitive, can seldom be accumulated into a fund of knowledge and transmitted as such; nor can it be weighed and tested as to its validity and general applicability. Science, on the other hand, involves active, purposeful search; it discovers, accumulates, sifts, orders, and tests data; it is a slow, painstaking, laborious activity; it is a search after bodies of knowledge sufficiently comprehensive to lead to the discovery of uniformities, sequential orders or so-called "laws"; it may be carried on by an individual, but it gains relevance only as it produces data which can be added to and tested by the findings of others.

Again, scientific knowledge differs from speculative knowledge. Speculation is mainly introspective, starts with preconceptions, depends on deduction, and generally sets out to prove a proposition by citing accepted bodies of knowledge. Science systematically searches for particular data; it groups, tests, and retests facts; it employs induction; and generally sets out to test an hypothesis, rather than to prove it. Science does make use of speculation and logical reasoning in setting up its hypotheses, in arranging and testing, but only in order to discover the laws underlying, or inhering in, objective phenomena. It does not merely endeavor to prove that this or that is false or true. Science directs its effort to the actual rather than the imaginary; it is group activity, the product of the search of many, the accumulation of factual knowledge over generations.

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[3] See Ginzburg, *op. cit.*, 591–602.

Science Distinguished from Education. Science differs also from education. Education transmits already existing knowledge, science discovers new knowledge; education inculcates, indoctrinates, instructs, science inquires, observes, and experiments; education employs mainly the spoken and the printed word or visual representations, science uses mainly instruments and the laboratory. Education often imparts the knowledge accumulated by science, and science frequently employs the methods of education in transmitting the facts it discovers; but the two are clearly in different spheres of mental and physical activity.

Although education and science are not mutually exclusive, the two also draw upon different aspects of mind. Education at best calls for the apprehension and retention of knowledge; science employs the capacity to discover and invent, to classify and analyze, to interpret and synthesize, to search for and grasp underlying uniformities or "laws." Almost anyone can memorize a text or a lecture, but few indeed are those who can profitably devote themselves to the painstaking, arduous, continuous researches of science. Further, education and science point in opposite directions. Education is chiefly retrospective, confirming and upholding accepted theories and practices; science is an explorative activity, seeking to discover what is as yet not known.

II. ORIGINATING FACTORS

Is There an "Instinct" Underlying Science? It has been noted in the preceding chapters that marriage and the family are rooted in the sex and reproduction drives; the economic institution in the craving for the satisfaction of physical wants; education in the desire to transmit the gains of the past; recreation in the necessity for release and renewal; religion in the craving for cosmic security and continuity. What prompts men to undertake scientific activity?

It is agreed that there is no such thing as a scientific instinct, no mechanism in the biological makeup of man which leads him to perform scientific acts. This assertion is based on the same reasoning advanced in connection with other so-called instincts, and need not be repeated here.

Craving for Knowledge and Other "Drives." Scientific endeavor seems to be rooted in a craving for knowledge, a desire to unravel the riddles of the universe, a drive to discover the uniformities which underlie observed phenomena. The objective of scientific endeavor seems to vary in different persons. Some, no doubt, carry on scientific activity in response to the urge to gain new experience, to bury one's frustrations, to achieve self-advancement or personal glory. Others seem to be drawn by a craving to understand nature and to reveal that understanding to men. Still others undoubtedly aim to contribute toward the improvement of the lot of mankind.

In the field of applied science, there are some definite data as to what prompts men to undertake research work. In a study of seven hundred and seventy inventors, the motives for conducting applied scientific work were as follows: love of inventing, 193; desire to improve, 189; financial gain, 167; necessity, 118; desire to achieve, 73; part of work, 59; prestige, 27; altruistic reasons, 22; laziness, 6.[4] Governments, universities, research institutes, commercial and industrial enterprises promote scientific research for practical reasons, to increase profits, or to render some practical service to society.

Whatever the immediate objective, the genuine scientist is driven by a thirst bordering on passion, by what the Greeks called a *daemon*, to discover facts, particularly new facts. This *daemon* conditions the whole psychology of the person it possesses. It pushes him into every imaginable situation, amongst all kinds of phenomena, into all parts of the world, to uncover what still lies hidden from the eyes, the hands, the mind of man.

III. CONCEPTS OF UNIVERSE UNDERLYING SCIENCE

The story of the concepts underlying science from the Mumbo-Jumbo of early magic, through philosophical clarification, to the rules of procedure in natural and applied science of today, is rich in dramatic interest, marked with almost superhuman striving, perseverance, and sacrifice. That story is too long and complex to permit the giving of even the barest outline here; whole volumes have been written recounting it.[5] Moreover, science has not produced clear-cut formulations of its concepts. Religion has its creeds; marriage and the family have their ceremonial statements; the governmental institution has its "charters," "Bills of Rights," or other statements of concepts; but science has not as yet produced a collective formulation of its beliefs. Yet definite concepts underly all its activities.

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[4] Joseph Rossman, *Psychology of the inventor* (Washington D. C. 1931) 152. See also Walter W. Lucasse, "Progress and the sciences" in *Scientific monthly*, xxv (1927) 213–219.

Concepts of Magic. Magic constituted primitive man's "scientific" activity. Magic conceived the world to be confused, mysterious, capricious, and largely inimical. It, therefore, aimed at protecting man from the attacks of "the enemy" and at winning it over to friendly response. But the ceremonies of the primitive magician, astrology, alchemy, witchcraft, sorcery, and other occult practices implied some degree of order or causal relationship and constituted primitive man's attempts to understand that order, conquer nature, or to win its coöperation. Spoken formulae and gestures, ceremonies, incantations, divinations, symbolic signs and objects, mimicking, attempts to whip nature into obedience, reflected the primitive's thought that he could do something with nature.

Magic was practiced by the ancients also. The Egyptians dealt with nature by incantation; their astronomy was astrology, their medicine largely alchemy; diseases were looked on as manifestations of evil spirits and were "cured" by exorcism, amulets, and charms, although the beginnings of medicine proper were being made. The Babylonians believed that certain numbers possessed special virtues, that geometrical diagrams had prediction value, that the stars determined and foretold the course of human events, that by mimicking nature they could control it, that Fate hovered over them and marked out their destiny.[6] Magic permeated even the near-scientific efforts of the Greeks and the empirical labors of the Romans; while the Middle Ages were honeycombed with magical concepts and practices.

Nor is present-day culture wholly free of magic. There are those who still practice rainmaking, rely on astrology, avoid black cats, refuse to pass under ladders, knock on wood, carry charms for good luck, and impute significance to numbers. Moreover, education implies a magical faith in the power of the intellect; sex is still regarded as a mysterious "something" to be dealt with occultly; industry and business are believed to be controlled by mysterious "laws"; private property and individualistic enterprise are endowed with a power to work miracles for mankind.[7]

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[5] See William Whewell, *History of the inductive sciences* (3d ed. New York 1865) 2 vols.; George Sarton, *Introduction to the history of science* (Baltimore 1927) 3 vols.; William Cecil Dampier Dampier-Whetham, *History of science* (New York 1930); and Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the modern world* (New York 1925).

[6] See Dampier-Whetham, *op. cit.*, 1–8.

Metaphysical Cosmos. The Egyptians probably made the first faint contribution to science. A papyrus copied from an earlier medical book in the seventeenth century B.C. is probably "the earliest known really scientific document, for in it we find the human mind for the first time endeavoring . . . to discern and record the *facts*, and then to base *conclusions* upon these observed facts."[8] But the people to take the first real steps towards science proper were probably the Greeks. Their contribution, however, was almost wholly theoretical. They relied on metaphysical speculation and logic; and they sought not so much the meaning of objective data as mentally to construct an order.

The Greeks made three important contributions. First, they regarded the world about them as orderly and neutral, and not as disorderly and inimical. Second, they (chiefly the Epicureans) questioned the existence of supernatural causes and insisted that phenomena could be accounted for in natural terms. Third, they established the categories for scientific investigation. The Greeks failed to produce definite proofs in support of their various contentions, but they took the first steps toward establishing the concept of the natural order.

The scientific school centering at Alexandria came closer to science proper. It searched for sense-perceptible data; it undertook limited and specific inquiries; employed mathematics as the principal technique; counted and measured; and sought to arrive at quantitative "law." But, in the main, this labor fitted in with the mystical concept of order. Euclid, an Alexandrian Greek, systematized geometry.[9] Archimedes studied physics and applied his findings to the art of warfare. The Alexandrians distinguished, for the first time, astronomy from astrology, discovered the relation of the sun to the earth, and advanced proofs of its sphericity; they refined the calendar which, later introduced into Rome, became the calendar of the West; they advanced medical knowledge and developed coinage. The Greeks' world, however, though conceptually orderly, was still mystical, still in the hands of Fate, still beyond the power of men to control.[10]

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[7] Ruth Benedict, "Magic" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 39–44, esp. 41.

[8] James Henry Breasted, *Conquest of civilization* (New York 1926) 88.

[9] Euclid published a textbook on geometry which has been a "best seller" in the field from that date to this.

For the Romans the world still remained largely mysterious, though they did make advances in empirical knowledge. In the main they devoted themselves to making summaries of previously acquired scientific knowledge: Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.) summarized the scientific knowledge of his time in his *De natura deorum;* Pliny the Elder (23–79 A.D.) composed an encyclopedic work, *Naturalis historia* in thirty-seven books; [11] Titus Lucretius Carus (95–55 B.C.) wrote a magnificent poem *De rerum natura*, in which he advanced the theory of natural causation, the evolution theory in elementary form, and the doctrine of the imperishability of matter; Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, and Josephus made records of political and social history; [12] Celsus (early first century B.C.) wrote a treatise on medicine and surgery, summarizing contemporary knowledge and describing many operations which we regard as modern; Dioscorides (middle first century A.D.) wrote a work on botany and pharmacy which remained an authority down to the sixteenth century.

In the main, the scientific labors of the Greeks and Romans were largely speculative; they foreshadowed naturalism, but took only tentative steps toward establishing it in practice.

The Mystical Order of the Middle Ages. These first steps toward naturalism were arrested by the fall of the Graeco-Roman civilization. From the fall of Rome to the thirteenth century there was virtually no scientific endeavor, and nature came to be regarded once more as mystical, though in a different sense from that of the primitives and the ancients.

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[10] The first recorded conflict between science and religion occurred in the fifth century B.C. when the philosopher and scientist Anaxagoras was driven from Athens on charges of atheism. He maintained that the sun was hot stone and that the moon had mountains and valleys. Dampier-Whetham, *op. cit.*, 15, 22.

[11] Pliny seems to have been imbued with a genuinely scientific spirit. He lost his life while watching the storm of falling ashes which in 79 A.D. buried Pompeii and Herculaneum.

[12] Plutarch was a Greek who lived and probably taught philosophy in Rome. Josephus was a Jewish scholar who came under the influence of Rome.

Institutionalized Christianity arrested scientific speculation. The church's one foundation was supernaturalism. Its dogma of creation conceived the world as having been made and finished two thousand years before; its doctrines of predestination and the afterlife, its insistence on withdrawal from the world, its voluntary poverty and penance—were antithetical to naturalism. In the age of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, and of scholasticism, it was not nature or man that was the "proper study of man," but God and the City of God.

There were two non-Western peoples, however, the Turks and the Arabs who, living on the periphery of Western culture and outside the fold of Christianity, were able to carry on some scientific activity. The Turks extended medical knowledge, discovered new medicines, employed new procedures for treating disease, and new methods in surgery. They also developed a distinguished architecture, later known as Byzantine. The Arabs discovered new chemical elements; made new compounds such as potash, alcohol, sulphate of silver, nitric acid, and sulphuric acid; employed improved methods in the treatment of illness; extended and improved hospitalization; and even treated insanity as mental illness rather than as something to be punished. They advanced the knowledge of geography; believed in the rotundity of the earth; contributed to algebra; developed the principles of architecture; and actually produced a characteristic style, building palaces and mosques of distinguished design with arches, domes, transepts, and minarets.

The Heroic Age of Science. The first steps towards the establishment of modern naturalism were taken in the thirteenth century. It is of sociological significance, first, that these steps were taken by persons in the ranks of the Church. The Church tried to hold in leash the vigorous men of the time, for it could not actually control their thinking; in fact, the very attempt at rigid control may have fostered the growth of the thing it opposed. Second, the leadership which paved the way for modern science came from the periphery of the cultural area, from those regions removed from Rome, the cultural focus, and thereby less under the influence of the commanding organization, the Church. It seems to be a sociological law that major cultural departures ordinarily occur not at or near the culture focus but at the periphery of the cultural area.

Be that as it may, it was the English Franciscan friar, Roger Bacon (about 1214–1292), who made among the first radical pronouncements on naturalism. Bacon, though no longer regarded as the great forerunner of modern science he was once thought to be, was nevertheless one of the first, if not the first, to give sufficiently pronounced expression to the fundamental concept of naturalism to command attention. He lectured at the universities of Oxford and Paris; his writings were frequently cited throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, even thereafter; thus he was the spokesman of many minds that were turning to naturalism.[13]

The naturalistic concept, in its fuller development, set forth four cardinal tenets: that the universe is not mysterious, disorderly, capricious, but is a unity, an order, a sequence or succession of phenomena; that nature is self-sufficient and not dependent on or governed by a supernatural power; and that this understanding can be gained mainly through observation and experiment. All these tenets were explicitly stated or implied in Bacon's teachings. In addition, Bacon enunciated an important methodological principle which is not fully grasped even in our day, namely, that in observing and experimenting with various classes of phenomena, each science must develop its own specific procedures.

Practically all that has followed in science from that day to this is substantially an elaboration, extension, and application of these cardinal principles. William of Occam (died 1347), another English Franciscan friar who also taught at Oxford and Paris, emphasized the same doctrines; Copernicus (1473–1543) applied them to astronomical science, laying the foundation for modern astronomy; Francis Bacon (1561–1626) classified all human knowledge on a naturalistic basis, eloquently insisting on the need for observation and experiment and even more boldly contending that nature can actually be dealt with by man; Descartes (1596–1650) insisted on mathematical measurement; and Isaac Newton (1642–1727) worked out the application of the mathematical principles to science as a whole.

This development, however, was almost wholly theoretical. The leading minds were experiencing intellectual reorientation, questioning theological dogmas, challenging scholasticism, unfolding and elaborating the theory of naturalism. But they were not practicing what they preached; they were not systematically compiling, exchanging, and testing data; nor were they inductively searching for basic principles and "laws." The West still lay in the grip of scholasticism; men still advanced propositions and "proved" them true or false by disputation and by quotations from the Bible or the Christian Fathers; astrology, alchemy, magic, and theosophy still held sway; the inquiring mind was still quite foreign; scientific methods and techniques were still virtually unknown; [14] and they were few who had caught even the spirit of science, who perceived the possibilities it held for man, or who actually devoted their lives to scientific labor. Science was still in the embryonic stage; it had no professional personnel, no laboratory, no method, no tools. It had only a theory.

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[13] See Lynn Thorndike, *History of magic and experimental science*, ii (New York 1923) chap. lxi.

Yet that theory was sufficiently disturbing to evoke anathemas and persecution from the church. The Greek period is sometimes called the heroic age of science; [15] but Greek scientists had no occasion for heroism: they faced no prolonged opposition, no legal trials, imprisonment, nor death sentences. It would be far more fitting to call the Middle Ages, when men actually sacrificed their lives for the concept of naturalism, the heroic age of science.

Modern Science Natural and Useful. This heroic striving, however, only served partly to liberate the mind from metaphysical speculation and to orientate it toward naturalism. But natural science as we know it now, both its theory and its practice, was still to come. Its real beginnings were made in the sixteenth century with the gradual refinement of methodological concepts, the development of techniques, and fact-finding on a large scale. Tentatively men began to extend the methods of mathematics and physics to the problems of everyday life; the universities gradually opened their doors to the "nature enthusiasts," as scientists were called; attention turned to the discovery of the humanly useful. Observations and experiments were made in electricity and on the human circulatory system, on animal and plant life, and geological conditions. In the eighteenth century, the scientific method was applied to biology; and finally, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the first serious efforts were made to apply science to man's social relationships. The final steps toward establishing modern science were taken when the Romanticists rebelled against the mechanistic rationalism and dogmatism of Newtonian science. The Romantic philosophers "added a whole new dimension to science by insisting on the importance of growth and development and continuous change." It was from them that biologists later learned the idea of evolution.[16]

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[14] A professor at the University of Padua refused to look into Galileo's telescope because reason made it unnecessary. Reason told him that there were seven metals and seven avenues through which nature can enter the body of man: two ears, two nostrils, two eyes, and one mouth; and as there were seven metals and seven avenues, so there could be only seven planets in the firmament. George A. Hedger (ed.), *Introduction to Western civilization* (Garden City, New York 1933) 244–245.

[15] William Arthur Heidel, *Heroic age of science* (Baltimore 1933).

Thus Aristotle's ideal has found a rebirth: "It is the task of knowledge, thought Aristotle, to criticize, systematize, and understand the various pursuits that make up the best group life. Knowledge should explore the possibilities in these pursuits; it should seek to discover the meaning and significance of all the materials that can be worked into a good life. Above all, it should consider human life itself, and work out such an organization of activities that both a society and its individual members could consciously strive to realize all their capacities for rich and complete living." [17]

IV. THE WAYS OF SCIENCE

The Individual Scientist. Science has developed or is in the process of developing fairly distinctive ways of thinking and acting. Some of these are in the nature of professional rules; others have the force of folkways or nascent mores. It is required of the scientist, first, that he possess certain mental traits: a thirst for knowledge, a desire to extend knowledge, a humility that avoids the limelight, a willingness to devote himself to any scientific task and to make any contribution however small, a readiness to coöperate, to share or even merge his findings with those of others, a generosity that encourages coworkers and scientific endeavor in whatever field. Since the scientist is expected to be a seeker of truth, he must have intellectual integrity and honesty; he must keep himself free, as far as it is humanly possible, from personal and group prejudice, predilections, loyalties, and common beliefs. He needs to be able to perceive the significance of his labors, to avoid indulging in a chase of trivialities with no bearing on human utility, and to see the relation of his work to the totality of knowledge in his specific field. It is further expected that the scientist follow his researches wherever they lead and courageously set forth his findings whatever their bearing.

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[16] Columbia College Associates, *Introduction to contemporary civilization in the West* (7th ed. New York 1929) 137.

[17] *Ibid.*, 118. By permission of Columbia University Press.

The scientist is expected to follow a certain procedure: to seek specific evidence; to pry beneath the surface of things and be uninfluenced by hearsay; to discover, handle, and examine the facts for himself; to test and retest his data; to search for evidence from all available sources; and especially to examine "contrary evidence." It is also required of him that he be cautious in arriving at and in stating his generalizations; that he examine all possible alternatives, test and retest his conclusions before setting them forth; and even then that he set them forth in tentative terms, subject to correction in the light of new information. This caution, though often interpreted as indifference or as an "academic" habit, is highly essential to science; though prudence and care may be and sometimes are excessively employed, they are very important in the discovery of truth.

I. P. Pavlov, shortly before his death, addressed a letter to young Russian scientists in which he set forth the following as the cardinal rules for the scientific worker: be consecutive in gathering knowledge; master the elements of science before proceeding; do not cover up ignorance by means of hypotheses; be restrained and patient; secure the facts and search for their origins and laws; be modest, as pride results in loss of objectivity; have a passion for a life-long pursuit of knowledge.[18]

The extent to which the characteristics mentioned in the above paragraphs mark the individual scientist it is impossible to say in the light of present knowledge. However, in this as in all institutions it is the broadly prevailing patterns that matter. As marriage in the West demands monogamy, as the economic system provides for private property, so science sets forth the broad patterns of thought and action to govern scientific endeavor.[19]

The Scientific Method. Aside from the requirements made of the individual scientist, science has developed methods which have the force of professional standards. These include delimitation of the field of investigation; the setting forth of an hypothesis in clear and concise terms or the stating of the problem involved and a tentative prediction of the probable solution; the painstaking assembling of data according to established categories; the classification of data; the verification of findings; and the setting forth of conclusions in clear and cautious terms.

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[18] *Nation*, cxlii (New York 1936) 596.

[19] The characteristics necessary for fruitful inventive work, as given by 710 inventors, are: perseverance (mentioned 503 times), imagination (207), knowledge and memory (183), business ability (162), originality (151), common sense (134), analytic ability (113), self-confidence (96), keen observation (61), mechanical ability (41). See Rossman, *op. cit.*, 40.

It does not fall within the province of a sociological work to inquire into the technical validity of these ways. They are important to students of society only in so far as they affect social relationships and societal patterns. One thing is clear, namely, that under the influence of these rules of work and conduct, scientists are scanning natural and social phenomena with a relatively high objectivity and integrity; and thereby these rules make for the practical truthfulness of scientific findings.

V. SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS

First Organizations. There is no evidence that organizations for the promotion of science existed in the ancient, classical, or medieval world. The group work conducted under Aristotle, the collaborative effort that produced the Justinian Code, the translation work of the Muslims in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, were not the products of deeply rooted organizations but were accomplished under temporary associations.

The first scientific organizations proper seem to have formed in the sixteenth century. In America the first was established in 1716; and at the close of the eighteenth century there were only about a score of research organizations in the United States; by 1890 there were in this country 150 scientific associations; while during the three decades of the present century 318 new associations were formed. There are at present, in the United States, 681 organizations with a membership of professional or semiprofessional scientists. Further, according to the findings of the National Research Council, in 1927 there were 999 research agencies of various types and connections serving or coöperating with industrial concerns.[20] It is estimated that in the British Isles alone[21] there are 238 scientific associations and 394 associations of applied science.

Number of Members. There appears to be no official estimate of the total membership of scientific associations in the Western world. A rough approximation, based on available membership lists, sets the number in the United States today at 2,250,000. If we include the membership of scientific organizations in educational institutions and of semiscientific clubs and minor organizations the total would probably stand at approximately 3,000,000 members; but there is no way of discovering what proportion of members enrolled is actually engaged in scientific work.

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[20] See Henry S. Dennison, "Management" in Committee on Recent Economic Changes, *Recent economic changes in the United States*, ii (New York 1929) 499 n.

[21] See *Official yearbook of the scientific and learned societies of Great Britain and Ireland* (London 1937). This count must not be considered strictly accurate because of the fact that the *Official yearbook* does not clearly distinguish strictly scientific organizations. No figures have been found by this author for the continental countries.

Characteristics of Scientific Associations. The scientific associations differ from organizations related to the other institutions in several ways. First, they are probably the least promotional among the various associations. Scientists seldom, if ever, conduct intensive campaigns for additional members, such as religious organizations carry on through revivals, missions, and otherwise. Although some of them desire a large membership, scientific organizations are usually comparatively small, rarely exceeding a few hundred members; ordinarily the number that may become members at any one time is limited; and in many cases membership is invitational and is based on achievement or prolonged activity in a special field. They hold conferences, print and distribute literature and data for the purpose of disseminating and exchanging scientific information and testing theories and data. A number of organizations have established laboratories and libraries. By not lightly setting the seal of "scientist" upon an individual, by local organization and autonomy, scientific organizations in a measure guarantee the integrity of their members and their work, thus making it possible for society to place credence in scientific findings.

Scientific Achievements. The major discoveries made from 3500 B.C. to our times, in so far as known, are as follows. Those in mathematics, astronomy, biology, medical science, chemistry, physics, and geology number 7,645; technological inventions and geographic discoveries number 5,116; a total of 12,761 inventions and discoveries were made from 3500 B.C. to 1908 A.D.[22] All but about one-twentieth, however, have been made since 1400 A.D.; from 3500 B.C. to 1400 A.D., 551; since 1400 they number 12,210. The following table, taken also from Professor Sorokin, gives details from 1400 to 1900 by ten-year periods.

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[22] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, ii (New York 1937) table 5, pp. 134–135.

TABLE 34. NUMBER OF IMPORTANT SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGIC, AND GEOGRAPHIC DISCOVERIES AND INVENTIONS BY 10-YEAR PERIODS, 1401–1900 [23]

YEARS	SCIENCE	TECHNOLOGY	GEOGRAPHIC DISCOVERIES	TOTAL
1401–1410	....	3	1	4
1411–1420	....	4	1	5
1421–1430	....	2	....	2
1431–1440	7	6	3	16
1441–1450	5	2	5	12
1451–1460	6	3	3	12
1461–1470	3	6	....	9
1471–1480	8	10	2	20
1481–1490	9	4	2	15
1491–1500	7	9	16	32
1501–1510	6	13	11	30
1511–1520	15	11	11	37
1521–1530	13	7	8	28
1531–1540	26	11	9	46
1541–1550	40	13	4	57
1551–1560	25	13	3	41
1561–1570	21	11	3	35
1571–1580	29	16	4	49
1581–1590	39	10	7	56
1591–1600	31	16	3	50
1601–1610	33	14	7	54
1611–1620	44	11	5	60
1621–1630	23	13	....	36
1631–1640	35	11	2	48
1641–1650	48	14	3	65
1651–1660	35	17	2	54
1661–1670	79	28	2	109
1671–1680	90	16	3	109
1681–1690	68	28	5	101
1691–1700	37	17	1	55
1701–1710	46	20	....	66
1711–1720	48	22	....	70
1721–1730	69	18	2	89
1731–1740	76	25	1	102
1741–1750	121	52	....	173
1751–1760	108	33	....	141
1761–1770	69	53	3	125
1771–1780	165	74	3	242
1781–1790	183	109	5	297
1791–1800	149	113	7	269
1801–1810	228	128	6	362
1811–1820	286	157	13	456
1821–1830	388	227	16	631
1831–1840	441	313	9	763
1841–1850	534	356	9	899
1851–1860	584	423	13	1020
1861–1870	553	424	15	992
1871–1880	635	490	17	1142
1881–1890	663	477	13	1153
1891–1900	625	482	2	1109

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[23] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, ii (New York 1937) table 6, p. 136. By permission of American Book Company. Professor Sorokin adds the following note to this table, "Computed from Ludwig Darmstaedter, *Handbuch zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik*."

VI. SOCIAL MEANING OF SCIENCE

Although science is theoretically concerned with the discovery of facts and not with the question as to whether the facts have utility, "science for science's sake" is a figment. Science is part and parcel of the total activity of society; the facts it discovers and the generalizations it disseminates inevitably affect human welfare one way or the other. Science ramifies in so many directions, penetrates so deeply, and influences so many aspects of life, that whether for good or for ill, it constitutes the very core of Western culture.

Science and Liberation from Fear. Science has no doubt been the primal factor in the partial liberation of the human mind, especially in the West, from thralldom to fear: the fear of natural phenomena, biological crises, or catastrophes, the fear of death and the unknown beyond. This liberation has no doubt led the Western world to face mundane reality, as perhaps never before. Man has learned to glean knowledge by fearlessly peering into nearly every aspect of physical, biological, and human nature, into the most obscure and remote corners of the earth, the waters and the sky, and every ailment that plagues the human body and mind.

Science and Material Well-Being. Specifically, science has, through technology and the machine, unearthed and placed at man's disposal vast natural resources hitherto beyond his reach; has increased the fertility of the soil; has created new plants and animals; has increased the quantity and improved the quality of food; has improved man's shelter and shelter-supplementing devices; has increased his capacity of adjustment to climate and weather, to seasonal and catastrophic changes. Science has multiplied man's operating power; has given him devices for a far greater utilization of nature; has increased the means of communication; has attacked nearly every maladjustment; alleviated numerous physical ills; increased the expectation of life; added to man's comforts.

Scientific students of society perceive that not all of these results of science are necessarily beneficial or that they are an "ultimate good" or that they bring "happiness" to mankind. All that may be reasonably said is that mankind seems always to have sought these very ends and that modern science has at last made possible their attainment. Furthermore, it is not impossible that science, when extended to the realm of the social and cultural, may eventually be able to afford society the knowledge and the means for self-guidance.[24]

Results of Doubtful Value. On the other hand, science has contributed to cultural phenomena of doubtful value. Largely through the direct or indirect influence of science, the population of the West has greatly increased during the last two hundred years, as has the massing of population in urban centers. Science has virtually undone the power of religion, but has thus far failed to supply any equivalent sense of cosmic certainty. It has destroyed the simple faith of our forebears, with its disciplinary uses, and left the vast masses of mankind virtually adrift—disorientated, confused, and dismayed. Science is partly responsible for the modern concentration of wealth. Although this is not an entirely new phenomenon, science, through technology, the machine, and mass production, has intensified the concentration of wealth and thereby possibly increased the suffering of the masses, who in the midst of abundance are obliged to live in relative want, misery, and enforced idleness. Mechanized warfare throws the whole Western world into recurrent periods of devastating disorganization and disaster, destroying the accumulation of generations and threatening civilization itself. All these phenomena are not new; they are not necessarily due to science *per se;* but science has, in one way or another, had a strong influence in producing them or in intensifying their expression.

Dogmatism and Obscurantism of Science. In addition, science is so often permeated with dogmatism as to obstruct many endeavors that promise human betterment. Scientists, prone to regard their beliefs as finalities, often scorn or even hound those with whom they do not agree. They subject the social scientist, honestly bent upon the discovery of uniformities in the social universe, to the same petty slights and indignities, to the same contentiousness, which the "natural" scientists themselves so recently experienced. Nor is this dogmatism localized in a particular science or group of sciences; it appears to be a general malady. Even "social scientists" no sooner gain a foothold than they display the same tendency. "I have heard some of them talk as if the gold standard were an Act of God. No wonder it has been said that *laissez-faire* economics is closer to medieval scholasticism than almost any other intellectual activity in the modern world."[25] Nor is this tendency confined to the "dismal science." The historians, anthropologists, experts in education, sociologists, psychologists all tend to adopt the same procedure; no sooner are they established than they begin to discredit the labor of everybody else; until in practice science becomes in some respects nearly as intolerant as institutionalized religion once was.

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[24] See Howard W. Odum, "Notes on the technicways in contemporary society" in *American sociological review*, 2 (1937) 346.

Amorality of Science. Further, scientists are often so preoccupied with their particular tasks that they seem not even to lift their eyes to look upon the human scene to see the meaning of their discoveries, or if they do, they look upon it with indifference, if not disdain. It is true that pure science cannot be influenced by social considerations; yet the scientist is blind indeed who does not consider the fact that he is part of a social order and that his findings have broad implications. "I can understand the impulse which prompts scientists to defend science against the attacks of the uninformed. Science has achieved so many miracles for society, saved so many lives, made possible so extraordinary an advance in material living standards for so many millions of people, that it is disquieting to think that all the consequences of science can ever be other than good. Yet I don't see what basis we have for assuming that science can and does have only beneficial consequences. Is the product of man's curiosity inevitably good? Is there any reason for assuming that the end result of any enlargement of human knowledge must, perforce, be beneficial? It may be disturbing to realize it, but the truth seems to be that science proceeds without moral obligations; it is neither moral nor immoral, but in essence amoral."[26] If science is to subserve human needs, it will continue to discover and catalogue "all the islands of the universe 300,000,000 light-years or more distant," but it will not fiddle while Rome burns; it will not "continue to work upon our recondite, nonhuman problems, while our neighbors suffer and our nation is criminally demoralized."[27]

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[25] Henry A. Wallace, "Scientist in an unscientific society" in *Scientific American,* 150 (1934) 287. On the technical dogmatism of science see Francis B. Sumner, "New dogmatism" in *Scientific monthly,* xlv (1937) 342–348.

[26] *Ibid.*, 285. For a brilliant discussion of profaned science, see J. Huizinga, *In the shadow of tomorrow* (trans. by J. H. Huizinga, New York 1936) chap. ix.

[27] William Morris Davis, "Faith of reverent science" in *Scientific monthly,* xxxviii (1934) 417.

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Chapter 21

GOVERNMENT

I. NATURE AND FUNCTION

Government the Supersocial System. The nature and function of the governmental institution may perhaps be best understood by recalling the original connotation of the term "government." Both the Greek verb κμβερνᾶν and the Latin verb *gubernare* denoted to pilot or steer a ship, while the Latin noun *gubernator* signified the captain of a ship. Generally speaking, that is what government is and does; it is the system that steers or aims to steer the ship of society. Sometimes the term "state" is used to designate government, but in this work we reserve the term "state" to designate the organized aspect of government.

Each institution, marriage and the family, the economic and educational, recreational and religious systems, has its own internal government; but the governmental institution indirectly regulates all these. It makes laws regulating marriage, industry and business, education, and the other activities.

Again, government is in our times the sole possessor of legal authority. It is government that has the power, for example, to grant permission to marry, to define the rights and duties of the members of the family, to permit the forming of a business partnership or corporation, to make educational requirements, or even to regulate aspects of recreational, religious, and scientific activities.

Furthermore, government is the one institution that has the authority to employ coercion to enforce its will. In the other institutions, adjustment or adaptation is in the main produced by spontaneous interaction; these systems have little or no power, physical or otherwise, to compel adherence to the folkways or even to the mores. The family, for example, produces adjustment in the course of daily contacts and functioning; it has but little power to compel conformity. Likewise industry, education, religion possess no effective means of compelling conformity; persons can simply pick up and go. Government, on the other hand, has the recognized authority to use force to secure obedience; it seldom reasons or employs persuasion; it simply commands; it holds out the threat of physical or other punishment; it even has the power to take away property, liberty of action, and in some instances to take life, if its commands are disobeyed. Obedience to government may and generally does become more or less habitual and voluntary; still it remains at all times intrinsically compulsory.

Government, however, occupies or commands a relatively small proportion of the time, attention, or energies of the subjects. If we analyze the activities of the ordinary citizen from the time he comes of age to the end of his life, we will probably find that approximately ninety per cent of his awakened life is spent in economic pursuits, about seven per cent in marital and familial activities, and most of the remainder in educational, recreational, and religious activities. Government, except of course in the case of persons professionally engaged in its activities, occupies but a small fraction of the average life and has remarkably little direct influence on the daily, intimate life of the people.[1]

This does not mean that the influence of government in the life of the citizen is small; it is sufficient to recall the far-reaching effects of taxation, police protection, compulsory military service, war and its consequences, to perceive how government does affect most human beings in the entire range of their activity. But that influence is indirect and distant. With the exception of times of national celebrations, elections, periods when taxes are to be paid, and when wars or other general disturbances occur, the ordinary citizen goes about his tasks without paying much if any attention to the business of government. This in part explains the irresponsibility sometimes shown by governors and the corruption which frequently develops in government.

Theories as to Origin of Government. It was formerly believed that government was something mystical, arising out of man's instincts, being part of the order of nature, or as having a divine origin and sanction. Man was said to be a "political animal." Government was believed to be part of the order of nature; that is, as nature provides for the perpetuation of the human species by creating male and female, so it creates persons of superior intelligence or other capacity to carry on the task of rulers and those possessing mere physical strength to occupy the place of the ruled; consequently we have ruler and ruled, master and slave.[2] The divine right theory traced government to primitive religion, in which the priest, claiming divine authority, was at once the spokesman for the tribal gods, the civic ruler, and the military leader. The aggression theory attributed government to the tendency of some human beings to take advantage of others, to thirst for wealth, prestige, or power, and to exploit the community; government, therefore, comes into existence to control the aggressors and protect the interests of the community.[3] The compact or contract theory held that government is a sort of contract between the people and their rulers, a voluntary renunciation of personal power and liberty in order to gain the benefits of an ordered society.[4] Finally the economic explanation held that government arises when individuals, unable alone to satisfy their wants, are compelled to develop the coördination and regulation which government effects.[5]

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[1] The percentages mentioned above are rough approximations based on the observations and computations of this author. They are stated quantitatively in the hope that the statement may stimulate detailed inquiry.

Development of Culture as Factor. The more serious political scientists now recognize that these explanations were mainly attempts to justify government, the inequalities, limitations of liberty, and the penalties connected with government, rather than account for its genesis. These theories predicate a uniformity in governmental forms, or an intelligence on the part of the rulers, or an ability purposefully to organize on the part of the community, which historical fact does not reveal.

Political science now inclines to the evolutionary concept of the origin of government, which explains government in terms of the specialization process which has accompanied the development of culture. Among primitives, government constituted a phase of the life of the kinship group, which seldom embraced more than three hundred souls. As population increased, as people developed settled life in conjunction with agriculture, as the number of persons in given settlements grew, associated life became increasingly complex, division of labor and specialization of activity took place, and government thus gradually developed as a special function and separate institution.[6] Kinship rule gave way, first to tribal government based on the power and prowess of rulers; then to territorial government, which gradually reached a wider and wider community and more and more aspects of associated living.[7] Moreover, as population further increased, converged through migration and commerce, became concentrated, developed relatively high densities and frequent contacts, regulation became increasingly necessary.[8] At first the main function of government was to regulate conflict, especially in war; but gradually it took on more and more functions.

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[2] See Aristotle, *Politics;* Géza Engelmann, *Political philosophy* (trans. from the German by Karl Frederick Geiser, New York 1927) chap. ii, particularly 41; Charles Grove Haines and Bertha Moser Haines, *Principles and problems of government* (3d ed. New York 1934) 25.

[3] See William Christie MacLeod, *Origin and history of politics* (New York 1931) 41–48; R. M. MacIver, *Modern state* (Oxford 1926) 40–41, 46–47.

[4] See Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Social contract* (1762) (New York 1935); Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (1651) (Cambridge 1904); John Locke, *Of civil government; two treatises* (1690) (New York 1924); Englemann, *loc. cit.;* Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the modern state* (London 1934).

[5] See Lewis H. Haney, *History of economic thought* (3d ed. New York 1936) 57.

What factors maintain government or produce obedience in contemporary culture, is a question which awaits scientific investigation.[9] In general, the individual automatically accepts government as an intrinsic part of his culture.[10] Again, in times of crises the citizen seems keenly to feel the need of the state, which he believes assures him justice, liberty, and security. So government is taken for granted, as is any other aspect of culture. It is subjected to critical analysis only in times of crises when government, more or less identified with the total self of society, is believed to be responsible for the impending danger.

II. SALIENT ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT

Aspects of Development. Whatever its genesis, the governmental system, like all the other institutions, has gone through a traceable development. This unfolding has taken place in (1) the size of population and territory reached by single governmental units; (2) differentiation and autonomy; (3) internal distribution of authority; (4) source of authority; (5) basis for unification; and (6) the number and kinds of functions performed by the state.

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[6] See L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *Material culture and social institutions of the simpler peoples* (London 1930) 50.

[7] See Raymond G. Gettell, *History of political thought* (New York 1924) 21–23; Albert Kocourek and John H. Wigmore, *Primitive and ancient legal institutions* (Boston 1915) 88–90; also Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient society* (New York 1877).

[8] See Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 50.

[9] Harold J. Laski has made some theoretical contributions.

[10] Early German scholars identified the state with society's moral self. See John Dewey, *German philosophy and politics* (New York 1915) 64–65.

This development has not, of course, been planned, orderly, or continuous; it has rather been sporadic, the product of accident or of trial and error. Development in this as in other systems connotes only broad trends or tendencies. Some of these are in the nature of general cultural trends, that is, tendencies which form a part of the unfolding of culture as a whole; some are epochal trends, or trends which cover whole epochs, such as the Middle Ages; others are secular trends, or tendencies expressing themselves in the span of centuries; and finally minor trends, usually occurring within decades, are minor oscillations in the secular trends. In what follows we deal mainly with cultural and epochal trends.

Population and Territorial Reach. Government has, first of all, embraced a varying number of persons within single states. In primitive times there were probably thousands of small population units, each more or less separated from the others, each having varying degrees of government. This narrowly local kinship system in time gave way to a tribal government, embracing a larger number of persons and a wider territory. This development seems to have arisen from the necessity for common defense and to have been well under way before historical time. By the time of the first great ancient civilizations, those of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia, the territorial reach of their single states was considerable; and comparatively large populations were under single rulers. The Persian, Greek, and Roman empires reached even wider territories. The Roman Empire, for example, covered a total area of 1,290,847 square miles (exclusive of the deserts of Africa) with a population, according to the most conservative estimates, of between fifty and sixty-five million.[11] In modern times economic forces have become dominant; single governmental units have acquired enormous reach by subduing princes and feudal lords or dispossessing peoples near and far of their lands, largely if not wholly in order to secure raw materials and to extend markets. The British Empire, the largest single empire, covers an area of 13,355,426 square miles or about one-fifth of the land area of the globe, and has a population of 500,774,000 or one-fourth of the population of the world.[12]

Differentiation and Autonomy of Government. The first steps toward the specialization of function and autonomy of government seem to have been taken during the nomadic period in Paleolithic times, when the rise of tribal groupings made necessary a wider authority to insure domestic order and group security. The personal and kinship basis of government now gave way to the territorial, and the unity of peoples came to inhere in the territorial state.[13] By ancient times, government had achieved relatively full status. It was regarded as nearly on a par with the religious institution during Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian times. In classical times, especially at Greece and Rome, it occupied a virtually dominant position; since then, barring the Middle Ages, government has been the all-dominant institution in the West.

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[11] See Ferdinand Lot, *End of the ancient world* (trans. by Philip Leon and Mariette Leon, New York 1931) 66–67.

[12] *Statesman's yearbook* (London 1938) p. xvii.

Internal Distribution of Authority. In the tribe, the chief was the sole ruler, though his power was often limited by customary or even democratic restrictions. In intertribal societies authority was vested in a small group—a form which, later known as aristocracy or plutocracy, prevailed for thousands of years in ancient and classical governments. With the rise of the empires, especially the Roman Empire, the governing power was again placed in one person, the monarch, where it remained well down to our times. The Greeks attempted and for a time actually achieved a distribution of governing authority through their council of five hundred. But the movement was short-lived, while in Rome and medieval society the democratic movement was virtually extinct.

With modern times, however, especially in the French and American revolutions, the distribution of authority became tangible. The rise of the mercantile class, the growing education of the masses, the consequent increase in the sense of civic rights have contributed to the distribution of governing power nearly everywhere in the West; larger and larger groups have come to hold considerable power, either directly through the franchise or indirectly through representatives. In addition, in our time dictators not only usually rise from the people, but to gain or keep their power they are obliged to win the masses or at least to seek popular approval; even the strongest dictator would commit political suicide if he did not almost constantly appeal to the people. Furthermore, a constantly growing number of citizens actually participate in government, especially when it affects them directly. It is very doubtful, however, whether the control of rulers or taking part directly in ruling has at any time interested the majority of the people.

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[13] See Gettell, *op. cit.*, 21–23; Kocourek and Wigmore, *op. cit.*, 88–90; and Morgan, *op. cit.*

Basis of Authority. Development has also occurred with respect to the source and the locus of authority. In the simpler kinship societies, authority was derived from age, the eldest of the family ruled by virtue of being the eldest; in tribal societies those with great personal strength or prowess assumed the rule; in ancient civilizations, authority seems to have been considered to be mainly of divine origin, or at least rulers usually had religious backing and sanction. Some authorities hold that even among early tribes the chief or king was believed to have divine power and that, later, the dynasties were formed as devices for keeping the descent within the group supposed to be favored by the gods.[14]

The ethno-theocratic system was first elaborated by the Hebrews. In that system authority was believed to be of divine origin, order, and sanction; the law, as in the case of the Deuteronomic Code, was thought to be revealed directly by Jehovah to the divinely appointed rulers. This practice, partly decadent under the Greeks and the Romans, became the dominant form with the establishment of Christianity, and especially with the Donation of Pepin in 756 A.D. Under the Holy Roman Empire, lasting off and on for a thousand years (800–1806 A.D.), government not only rested on religious sanction, but the religious institution itself was regarded literally as the Kingdom of God on earth. With the rise of the "merchant princes" in later medieval times, some of the larger city states shifted the authority to the community as a whole;[15] but the larger units of government remained theocratic. Canon law reigned supreme, and the dictum of Gregory VII (1073–1085), "The Pope is master of the emperors," was more than wishful thinking.[16]

In time, however, the Universal Church, like the Roman Empire before it, could not withstand "the inevitable decay of immoderate greatness" and was forced to yield to the theory and practice of the Divine Right of Kings. The power to rule was still regarded as emanating from God; but now it was the king or the emperor, not the religious institution, that was supposed to be the agent deriving power from God. In practice the king exercised the temporal authority, and the religious institution was limited to the spiritual realm.

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[14] William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, i (New Haven 1927) 497.

[15] See R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *History of mediaeval political theory in the West*, vi (London 1936) 523–525.

[16] See Bede Jarrett, "Universal church" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 61–72.

Meanwhile the democratic concept was struggling for acceptance. This idea, appearing in embryonic form as early as the Cretan civilization and maturing in classical Greece, regarded governing authority as deriving from the citizens. This concept, and the practice based upon it, struggled for ascendancy in the Roman Republic: the Romans developed private law and the contractual idea of government; they regarded government as a legal personality, possessing sovereignty and the authority to make and apply law. But democracy suffered a virtual eclipse with the fall of the Roman Republic; and for a thousand years following that event, the masses evinced no interest in government and let rulers have their way.[17]

But in modern times the democratic movement revived. The rise of the middle class, especially of the merchant class, led to a demand on the part of economic groups for a share in government; the rediscovery of Greek literature directed attention to the Greek democratic experiment; the discovery that the Donation of Constantine, the Donation of Pepin, and the so-called Forged Decretals, the very foundations of the Holy Roman Empire, were all forgeries,[18] shook the framework of Divine Right; while the glaring abuses connected with it further weakened that rule and contributed toward establishing, at least nominally, the authority of the people.

Basis of Governmental Union. The bonds which unite a people under single governmental units have also undergone development. Primitives were united by kinship bonds; the Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Greek, and Roman civilizations intermingled the ethnic and territorial bases; the Church and feudal government of medieval times had both a local and a cosmopolitan basis, uniting peoples of various historical, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds.

The nation became a unifying basis in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The term nation had been used before by groups of students in the early universities, who because they came from different countries, called themselves "nations of students." Traces of nationalism also appeared in the seventeenth century in German Pietism and in the self-sufficiency movements in England. But nationalism proper was the product of the rise of the middle classes and of their demand for political power, which culminated in the French and American revolutions.

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[17] See James Bryce, *Modern democracies,* ii (New York 1921) 599.

[18] See G. F. Young, *The Medici* (New York 1933) 181.

The bonds which unite a people into a nation are many and complex. They include attachment to a given territory which a people look upon as the fatherland or motherland; a relatively homogeneous people; a common culture, particularly a common language; a single ruler and symbols such as flags and national hymns which foster veneration for the fatherland and submission of the individual to the nation; a national economic policy which stresses the material well-being of the subjects, leads to the acquisition of new resources, to the expansion of trade, and to the building of systems of armaments for the gaining of these or for their protection once secured; and the doctrines of self-determination and of sovereignty which make the nation politically independent of other nations. Nationalism has also been more or less associated with the national-mission and with ethno-cultural movements, such as Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, and Pan-Americanism.[19]

Multiplication of State Functions. Lastly, government has taken on an ever increasing number of functions. The governments of simpler peoples dealt almost wholly with familial and religious matters, and their rules consisted mainly of taboos which were believed to safeguard the group from hostile nature; while tribal government took on the defensive function. These were the two main functions of government for perhaps thousands of years. The Greeks identified the state with society and believed that citizens achieved the good life by yielding to the common will. They, therefore, set no limit on the activities of the state; theoretically the state had the prerogative to regulate all phases of life.[20] Actually, however, state activity was mainly that of defense. Rome provided poor relief, public baths, and other services; medieval states, particularly when the Church was the state, carried on relief, hospital work, and public works; but the functions of the state remained limited.

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[19] See Carlton J. H. Hayes, "Nationalism: historical development" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 240–249, *Historical evolution of modern nationalism* (New York 1931), and *Essays on nationalism* (New York 1926) 5–48; Albert Guérard, "Herder's spiritual heritage: nationalism, romanticism, democracy" in *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 174 (July 1934) 1–8; Friedrich Meinecke, *Idee der Staatsräson* (München 1925).

[20] See Westel Woodbury Willoughby, *Political theories of the ancient world* (New York 1903) 57; Gettell, *op. cit.*, 36–41; H. Krabbe, *Kritische Darstellung der Staatslehre* (Haag 1930) 26–27.

The benevolent despotisms of the eighteenth century started the movement which has led modern states to perform a multitude of functions. The governments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries first undertook to promote "the general welfare." The acquisition of new territories, the granting of charters, subsidizing and protecting of traders and exploiters in distant lands, the promotion of migration—all aimed directly or indirectly to foster the economic welfare of the people. Again, when *laissez-faire* produced rapaciousness, governments undertook to protect the masses from the greed of powerful groups. Some states even undertook economic activity themselves, giving rise to socialism, perhaps the focal controversy of our times. The state took on the right to protect women and children both within the family and in industry, to safeguard the interests of laborers against unscrupulous employers, to guard the people's savings, to provide public health facilities, to furnish education and recreation, and even to conduct fact-finding and the dissemination of information having a bearing on public welfare. In short, the state has increasingly undertaken to protect the whole body of citizens and to give them a greater share of the benefits derived from the activities of the whole community. This approaches the realization of the Greeks' dream of totalitarianism.[21]

In recent decades the state has gone even further. It has undertaken comprehensive economic planning, population control and distribution, improvement of sanitation, and similar activities. The state has come to be regarded as the agent that must guide society in all aspects, while pressure groups have multiplied in number and in their demands on the state.[22] Though *laissez-faire* persists and probably will persist for some time, the state everywhere is enlarging its functions. The magnitude and intensity of this demand differs with the basic conditions prevailing in different countries, but everywhere throughout the West the voice of collectivism, the demand that the state undertake "social planning," is louder from decade to decade.[23] It is more than a passing phenomenon; it is part of the age-long movement by which governments have acquired a wider reach and greater power.

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[21] See R. M MacIver, "Social philosophy" in William F. Ogburn (ed.), *Social change and the New Deal* (Chicago 1934) 107–112; James C. King, "Nationalism" in *ibid.*, 90–98; Arthur E. Burns, "Some theoretic bases of the economic state" in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 174 (July 1934) 173–178; John Dickinson, "Political aspects of the New Deal" in *American political science review*, xxviii (1934) 197–209.

[22] See Cecil C. North, "Class structure, class consciousness, and the party alignment" in *American sociological review*, 2 (1937) 365–371.

Sociological Significance of This Development. Viewing the development just described in its totality, it appears, first, that government has followed the general law of institutional development. As with all the other systems, government has become increasingly differentiated, has acquired its own basic forms, procedures and autonomy, has taken on specialized functions and more and more varied functions.

By acquiring an ever wider territorial reach and embracing larger populations, government has fostered wider societal cohesion; by assuming control of many aspects of associated life and performing an increasing number of functions, by acting as arbiter between various interest groups, and by exercising direct coercive control over entire populations, it has affected vertical cohesion; by bringing an increasing number of local and regional groups under the control of single states, it has no doubt contributed toward the enlargement of the peace group. The exact extent to which government is responsible for these developments cannot be said; cohesion may be inherent in the very structure of society, and the control of groups may have nothing to do with its development. Yet, though other factors are involved, the wider and the deeper is the reach of government, the broader and more penetrating has cohesion been among peoples; the relatively high cohesion of the United States, with its single government, stands in sharp contrast with the international divisiveness of Europe.

On the other hand, the enlargement of cohesive areas has widened and intensified the scope of conflict; it has made for wars on a much greater scale. Further, because government has entered into so many avenues of associated life, because it has gained possession of the main avenues of information and propaganda, it has made society increasingly dependent upon itself. The dangers inhering in this will become clear as we consider the ways government employs in the performance of its functions.

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[23] See R. M. MacIver, "Social philosophy" in William F. Ogburn (ed.), *Social change and the New Deal* (Chicago 1934) 107.

III. SALIENT GOVERNMENTAL WAYS

In the main, government carries on its functions: (1) through the legalization of usages, (2) by enforcing the laws, (3) by imposing taxes, and (4) through war.

Legalization of Basic Usages. We have already noted that government does not create the fundamental rules of society. The mores are the products of long-term, spontaneous systematization of life produced by human interaction. For example, the usages governing marriage and the family or the acquisition and transmission of wealth arose out of interaction in associated living and existed long before they were formulated into laws.

But government is the one institution, especially in modern times, that has the authority to clarify, define, codify, and promulgate important rights and duties. Sociologically this is the essence of all important law. This is not to say that all social rules are set forth in the form of law; primitive societies ordinarily have no formal legislative bodies, no courts, and yet all important rules are followed as if they were laws; while in all societies there are nascent mores that though not accompanied by corresponding laws, are nevertheless commonly obeyed. Nor does it mean, on the other hand, that all laws are based on the mores or deal with the fundamental ways of the people. Some laws are mere administrative rules, such as traffic regulations; others are in the nature of governmental self-defensive means, such as those regulating public speech and assembly; some laws merely confer privileges on special groups, as in most tariff, real estate, and banking statutes; others endeavor to generalize minority practices, as was the case with the legal prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors. Moreover, not in all cases is there a recognized body to enforce the law. The Permanent Court of International Justice, for instance, in substance formulates and interprets a set of laws for which there is no enforcement body.[24] In modern times there is scarcely a phase of human activity which is not to some degree subjected to legislative regulation.

Again, law primarily takes the form of taboos or prohibitive commands—a characteristic which has marked it from primitive times to the present. In contemporary society, however, some laws are not prohibitive, but directive, as are the laws which regulate the formation and conduct of business corporations.

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[24] On the general nature of law see Robert Luce, *Legislative principles* (Boston 1930) chap. i; Sir Thomas Erskine Holland, *Elements of jurisprudence* (13th ed. Oxford 1924) chap. iii; Benjamin N. Cardozo, *Growth of the law* (New Haven 1924) 52; and Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 150.

Laws have multiplied greatly in recent decades. The democratic movement, the consequent increase of pressure groups, and the multiplication of functions undertaken by government, have accentuated the law-making tendency. At the opening of each Congress of the United States, for example, some forty thousand new bills are presented, of which between one and two thousand, public and private acts or resolutions, are passed. This, however, appears to be a general phenomenon. As a culture develops and acquires complexity, it tends to multiply laws, to legalize nascent mores prematurely, to set the stamp of legalization even on folkways, and to overregulate all aspects of life. Such an overmultiplication of laws does not seem to increase regulation, but rather it leads to widespread lawlessness; the very intricacy of laws makes possible antisocial activities and destroys elements of societal cohesion.

Physical Coercion. The state has almost universally the power and the machinery physically to coerce its subjects. In this it differs from all other institutions. In the family it is natural attachment, in the economic system physical necessity, in education the desire for advancement, that brings about adjustment. Disobedience in the family leads to mild forms of correction, in the economic institution to the severance of relationships, in education to change in affiliation.

The state, on the other hand, coerces the individual and the group into obedience, or at the very least it holds out the threat of coercion. The state actively coerces its citizen to obey traffic rules; it indirectly compels the members of a business firm to observe certain laws; it may resort to bodily arrest and imprisonment; or it may even deprive a person of possessions. This does not mean that all obedience is produced by coercion. Obviously it would be impossible for even the most autocratic state to coerce its millions twenty-four hours a day into obeying every law. Considerable obedience is no doubt in the nature of inertia, or becomes customary or habitual. But the state is almost always sustained through some form of coercion, actual or threatened, direct or indirect, physical or psychological.[25]

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[25] See Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, 150–151. The basis and the mechanism of obedience await detailed study.

State coercion is for the most part based on physical force. The agencies employed are the police, the courts, the prisons, and the militia. By these means the state secures the obedience of its citizens in respect to the various activities and defends the nation against enemies. Minor exercise of force is sometimes met with outside the state, as when individuals fight each other, parents chastise their children, economic groups boycott a firm or threaten to destroy a plant, displeased vigilantes seize and escort "undesirables" out of town or even resort to lynching.[26] But these are not ordinary occurrences. On the other hand, the policeman is ever on his beat, the sheriff in his office, the judge on the bench, and the guards at the prison gates. Government is ever vigilant, enforcing its commands, making itself felt wherever the citizen goes, whatever he does.

Compulsory Financial Support of Government. Government also maintains itself through taxation. Taxation seems to have originated in part as tributes from conquered peoples. Later, taxes were exacted, by the Roman state for example, for military purposes; in medieval societies they were imposed as payment in lieu of military service and for financing the Crusades. Generalized taxation began in the eleventh century. The need for protection led to rigid enforcement of the military requirements, and the need of money for maintaining the armed forces gave rise to stringent penalties for tax evasion.

At present taxes are inescapable and attempts to evade them are punishable. Failure to pay taxes is usually punished by confiscation of property or by personal imprisonment, the punishment differing according to whether the tax is based on land or on income or inheritance. Despite the numerous protections to property found in the legal system, there is in most states no redress when the state expropriates for failure to fulfil its tax demands. Very recently a trend is observable to limit the power of government in this respect. There have been farm moratoriums, laws against mortgage foreclosure, and so forth; all of them designed to soften the rigidity of the taxing powers of the state and to adapt them to changing social conditions. The taxing power of the state, however, is still very great.

Compulsory Military Service. Government also usually demands personal military service from male citizens of certain ages.

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[26] Horace Taylor and Columbia College Associates, *Contemporary problems in the United States*, ii (1934–35 ed. New York 1935) 19.

In the early days of Rome the citizen soldiery was recruited as much by tacit compulsion as through voluntary service. Among the early German tribes, with their rudimentary government, military service was customarily exacted of every man, evasion being punishable by death—a practice that in most Western countries applies only in time of war.[27] Modern conscription began in France in 1688, although the practice was not fully applied until the Revolution.[28] More recently compulsion has become general. The British Empire (except the Union of South Africa) and the United States are the only great powers of the Western world that do not exact universal military service in times of peace. There are a few smaller powers which follow the same practice. Few nations place military service on a wholly voluntary basis in time of war.[29] Sharp conflicts arise here between the growing popular conviction that war as an instrument of national policy must be limited and, on the other hand, the crystallized practice of compulsory military service. However, rigidly compulsory conscription may ultimately weaken the coercive system, as it did in Rome where the very military power that created Rome took an important part in destroying it.[30]

Other Compulsions. Government makes other, though less rigid, requirements. Summons to appear in court must be obeyed provided the government observes a certain formality in summoning the accused or witness; without such formal warning, attendance is voluntary. Likewise the power of the courts over individual life remains virtually unrestricted; once adjudged guilty, the accused has little hope of appeal unless he has political power or substantial economic resources. In most nations, and especially in those where English common law prevails, jury service has been demanded of every citizen; in recent times, however, a mechanical plan of selection limited to volunteers has been increasingly adopted. It is also incumbent upon citizens to know the laws, for "ignorance of the law is no excuse for crimes." Deference to leaders and to symbols of government is also more or less compulsive; flags, armies, and leaders exact respect; and noncompliance, especially in times of crisis, is penalized by social ostracism or worse. In a few countries voting is compulsory.[31]

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[27] See Gustaf Wenz, *Die germanische welt* (Leipzig 1923).

[28] See Elbridge Colby, "Conscription" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 220–221.

[29] League of Nations, *Armaments yearbook* (Geneva 1936). The English Parliament passed a peace time conscription law in 1939.

[30] See Lot, *op. cit.*, "Introduction." The situation though not strictly comparable is suggestive.

Noncompulsive Aspects of Government. There are governmental activities, however, which are conducted on a voluntary basis. The practices connected with political parties, in many respects important parts of government, are voluntary. Whether an individual identifies himself with a particular party, takes part in its conventions, helps to shape its policies, is a matter of choice. In most countries voting is a right to be exercised at the individual's discretion. In fact, democratic voting was not established by the rulers until after centuries of controversy, and then in many cases only after the display and use of force by the unfranchised.[32] The right to vote remains voluntary possibly because rulers are reluctant to make compulsive what may be used against them. Or it may be that voting remains voluntary because as society becomes more complex it is impossible to compel people to vote, and the number of citizens who do vote seems to decline.[33] This, in turn, may be due to a growing consciousness of the futility of trying to do anything with so complex an order as modern society.

Other Activities. This by no means exhausts the list of the activities of governments. The power to declare war, to make and change constitutions, to suppress facts, and to subsidize groups has been frequently employed. Government often interferes with nongovernmental activities in order to secure what it conceives to be adequate regulation and order. Most contemporary states regard the schools chiefly as means for the education of future citizens according to the desire of the state; some of them look upon the family as a means for securing soldiers and organized recreation as an agency for maintaining physical vigor and for furthering the discipline of warfare; and economic resources and power are increasingly being subjected to the commands of the state. All of these activities of government have from time immemorial raised serious problems.

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[31] See Harold F. Gosnell, "Voting" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 15 (New York 1935) 289–290.

[32] See Charles Seymour and Donald Paige Frary, *How the world votes*, i and ii (Massachusetts 1918) for authoritative information on voting practices.

[33] See Charles H. Titus, "Voting in California cities, 1900–1925" in *Southwestern political and social science quarterly*, viii (1928) 383–399, also "Rural voting in California, 1900–1926" in *Southwestern political and social science quarterly*, ix (1928) 198–215, and "Voting in California, 1900–1926" in *Southwestern political and social science quarterly*, x (1929) 76–94.

IV. GOVERNMENTAL ASSOCIATIONS

The State. Government is probably the most intensively organized of the institutions. And the state is the all-embracing association in society; so much so that there are those who identify the state with society. In the state converge all the lines of development, the usages, the rights and duties, and the techniques described above. It is the national state that has authority over an entire area and people; that has jurisdiction over nearly all aspects of sociated life; and that has legal right to maintain peace within its own domain and to declare war against other states. For example, it is the federal or national state that has ultimate and all-inclusive authority to govern the nation known as the United States of America.

In ancient times there were probably thousands of states, each, as already pointed out, governing a comparatively small number of people and a small territory. The tendency throughout recorded history seems to have been for small units to fuse and to form states embracing larger territories and populations, until in our times, though the population is much larger than that of ancient times, the total number of national states is comparatively small. In 1938 there were in the entire world only seventy-five national states, of which sixty were in the West. Their size varies greatly, all the way from Monaco with an area of 370 acres and a population of 22,153 to Russia with an area of 8,095,728 square miles and a population of 165,847,100. There are states which govern peoples and territories beyond their immediate confines and are termed empires. There are eight of these: Belgium, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States; the British Empire, as stated above, being the largest, with a territory of 13,355,426 square miles and a population of 500,774,000. Fifty-four states are organized in the League of Nations, a loose association of national states.[34]

National states are among the largest employers. The exact number of employees in the federal government of the United States, for example, is believed to be over a million; in addition there is an undetermined number of functionaries in the various territorial and functional subunits. There are in the United States about 750,000 elective officers alone. It is estimated that the number of government employees is increasing faster than the population.[35]

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[34] See *Statesman's yearbook* (London 1938) *passim;* and *World almanac* (New York 1939) 59.

Territorial Subdivisions. All national states, except those governing small territories and populations, have local subdivisions. These arise either from the fact that as small states fuse they retain certain powers for themselves; or they arise out of expediency; or they are created by the central states as new territories come under their jurisdiction or as population expands. Under agricultural conditions, such as those of ancient and feudal times or early nineteenth-century United States, the local units ordinarily had a large degree of autonomy. But as national states grow in size, local units tend to lose that autonomy. Especially with the advent of commercialism and industrialism territorial subunits of the state have lost much of their independence and have become mere administrative agents of the national state. Thus Revolutionary France abolished its more or less autonomous provinces and established the *départements* as administrative units of the central state; Nazi Germany has deprived its substates of their independence and changed them into agents of the central government; Fascist Italy has emasculated the former provinces. In the United States the states themselves originated the national government, retaining many legislative, judiciary, and executive "rights," but even there many of the rights of the states have suffered.

Of the territorial units, those of the cities are very powerful. Indeed, the cities are the first to develop the more intricate and all-embracing state forms. Many of the cities of the ancient world were states in themselves. In the Middle Ages, the commune, an association of town dwellers, was very powerful, sometimes the only governing unit; membership in it, originally voluntary, became compulsory upon all citizens as the towns grew and the functions of government increased; and it was often independent of feudal lords and even of kings.[36] In our time there are thousands of such city or municipal governing units. In Soviet Russia, under the twenty-two large administrative units, there are 125 autonomous cities and 3,221 other governmental units called the *rayon*, and below these there are other cities and village soviets. The English boroughs, municipal corporations chartered in urban communities, number over three hundred. The County of London alone, with an area of over 100 square miles, contains twenty-eight metropolitan boroughs. The basic unit of local government in both France and Italy is the commune, France with about 38,000 and Italy about 7,300.[37] In the United States in 1937 there were 3,165 municipal governments in urban communities of 2,500 or more population; these had about 680,000 employees and officials and governed 56.2 per cent of the population of the entire nation.[38]

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[35] C. E. Merriam, "Government and society" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends*, ii (New York 1933) 1508; and Leonard D. White, "Public administration" in *ibid.*, ii, 1410–1412.

[36] See Henri Pirenne, "Commune, mediaeval" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 61–63.

The city governments are of especial cultural significance. They tend to develop into intricate, bureaucratic organizations, frequently multiplying their personnel even faster than the community increases in size. For instance, in the United States, municipal employees constitute 6.8 per cent of the population for cities of 10,000 to 30,000 and 13.4 per cent for cities over 500,000.[39] This intricacy, high bureaucracy, and large personnel are probably responsible for the indirection, the political machinations, and the corruption which ordinarily develop in the cities.

City governments, in turn, gain excessive power over surrounding territories and in the policy formation of the central government. There are instances in which cities, underrepresented in state legislatures, fail to obtain proper services.[40] But generally speaking city governments are very powerful; through extralegal means, they are able to override the influence of the rural communities; and often they shape the policies of the national states. This produces deep-seated urban-rural conflict, which ordinarily imposes increasing disadvantages on rural peoples.

Functional Associations. National states, as well as their territorial divisions, are also usually subdivided vertically into organizations or agencies which perform specialized functions. Chief among these are the legislatures, with their one or more chambers; the judiciaries with their hierarchy of courts; and executive bodies with their cabinets, departments, and a multiplicity of suborganizations. While territorial associations do not, in the very nature of the case, greatly increase in number and may even combine, the functional associations show a tendency to increase in number and size, in intricacy, and in specialization of functions as civilization advances.

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[37] Otto Hoetzsch, "Government: Soviet Russia" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 68; and William B. Munro, "Municipal government" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 107, 108, 110, 111.

[38] National Resources Committee, *Our cities* (Washington 1937) 1; and *Municipal yearbook, 1938* (Chicago 1938) 291–292.

[39] *Municipal yearbook, 1939* (Chicago 1939) 224.

[40] See C. E. Merriam, *op. cit.*, ii, 1492–1493, 1532.

In many respects, the functional associations are the actual governing units. It is they that come into direct contact with the people. In addition, it is they that shape policies and even the forms of the governing units: the legislature by making laws, the courts by interpreting the laws, and the executive by applying them. Moreover, they are so interwoven in their actual operation that they serve as checks upon one another. The United States Supreme Court often remakes laws by its interpretations; the executive frequently nullifies the enactments of Congress or the interpretations of the Supreme Court by executive orders; while the legislature sometimes alters executive acts or the rulings of the courts in various ways. And what is true of the functional subunits of the national state is also true of the functional agencies operating in the territorial subunits.

The military, a subdivision of the executive, is very powerful in most states; in states such as those of imperial Rome, Cromwellian England, or present-day Spain under General Franco and Cuba under the former Sergeant Batista, the military is all powerful. It is able to seize the government, to make and unmake rulers, to influence the whole course of a nation. In some instances, the military body acts as the tool of other groups or interests; and at all times, especially in times of actual or imaginary internal or external danger, it may completely control the state.[41]

Political Associations. Apart from territorial and functional organizations, which are provided for in the organic law of national states, in nearly all nations there are also political associations known as "parties." Parties consist of groups of people believing in some doctrine or pursuing some immediate interest; they are organized into national, state, county, city, and ward units; they function by means of public propaganda and through person-to-person persuasion; they reach practically the entire populace; and therefore they have an enormous influence on governmental policies and on the governing process as a whole.

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[41] See Frederick Mundell Watkins, "Praetorianism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 305–307; and Hermann Heller, "Power, political" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 302.

Essentially they are the means by which a people carry on contests, often of a conflictive character, with respect to their basic aims, desires, and needs. Although political parties are found mainly in democratic or semidemocratic nations, they occur also even in autocracies. But everywhere their basic function is to carry on a contest over ideas, aims, and needs. In democratic Athens of the fifth century B.C., the democrats and the aristocrats competed for power. A similar struggle took place between the Optimates and the Populares in Republican Rome of the fourth century B.C. The elective character during the Middle Ages of both the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy gave rise to the struggle in the twelfth century between the Welfs and the Hohenstaufens over the German kingship in Germany, a contest which spread to Italy in the thirteenth century, took root in the Guelf and Ghibelline parties, which not only carried on the contest between the pope and the emperor, but also became the focal centers of prolonged partisan controversies between the nobles represented by the Ghibellines and the great cities represented by the Guelfs.[42]

The modern party system, which is part of the parliamentary system of government, originated in England, especially between 1660 and 1688, as a result of the struggle between the supporters of the king (the Tories) and the large landed families and commercial groups (the Whigs) which supported Parliament.[43] From England the party system spread until at present "in all states with representative forms of government parties exist both in the governmental bodies and among the people who choose the representatives." The latest development of the party is in the dictatorship countries, where only one is legally permitted; this party is used as an instrument of national cohesion and makes the dictatorship possible.[44] Yet dictatorship does not mean that political associations dissenting from the official doctrines may not arise; the purges of the Trotskyites in Russia and of the various underground organizations in Germany and Italy attest to the presence of dissenting groups even under dictators.

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[42] Austin Lane Poole, "Germany, 1125–1152" in J. R. Tanner, C. W. Previté-Orton, and Z. N. Brooke (eds.), *Cambridge medieval history*, v (New York 1929) 345–350, 357–358; Austin Lane Poole, "Emperor Henry VI" in *ibid.*, v, 465; Michelangelo Schipa, "Italy and Sicily under Frederick II" in *ibid.*, vi, 136n; C. W. Previté-Orton, "Italy, 1250–1290" in *ibid.*, vi, 171–202.

[43] W. A. Rudlin, "Parties, political: Great Britain" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 601.

[44] See Arthur N. Holcombe, "Parties, political: theory" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 590–594.

Political associations are, like all other aspects of culture, often interwoven with other interests. The close connection between the religious and the governmental institutions in the Middle Ages and early modern times is patent. The Waldenses and the Albigensians, flourishing in southern France and northern Italy during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and composed largely of artisans, were civil as well as religious dissenters, since they opposed the existing feudal society. The followers of Wycliffe were a similar organization in England. The Taborites, the left wing of the Hussite movement in Bohemia of the fifteenth century, were even more of a political party than a religious sect, for they aimed at establishing a national communistic state in Bohemia.[45] One of the most successful of these politico-religious associations was the English Puritans, who captured the government in the middle of the seventeenth century and thus put the political power permanently into the hands of the middle class, which they represented.

Political associations are often affiliated with or they function through recreational, philanthropic, or other types of organizations. These organizations, ostensibly carrying on "social" activities, are often in essence centers for the recruiting of political support or for the gathering of people of one party or another. Such, for example, were the hetaeria or the oligarchical clubs of Athens in the fifth century B.C., the Dutch and Huguenot clubs of the sixteenth century, the various coffee-house clubs of seventeenth-century London, the Jacobins of Revolutionary France, and the Sokol athletic clubs which were closely associated with the movement for the national independence of Czechoslovakia. The Tammany Society of New York City, which also engages in philanthropic work, has been operating continuously, in spite of reformers, since its organization in 1786. Political clubs, particularly of the ward variety in cities, are somewhat more abundant in the United States than in Europe.[46] The political club seems to be mainly an urban phenomenon; but in rural areas organizations such as the Grange often perform the same function.

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[45] H. Richard Niebuhr, "Sects" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 13 (New York 1934) 625–626.

[46] A. H. J. Greenidge, *Handbook of Greek constitutional history* (New York 1896) 188, 209–211; Joseph McGoldrick, "Clubs, political" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 577–580.

The ultimate means by which political parties function or influence the activity of the state is by placing in office members of the party or persons representing the ideas or objectives of the party in question. Political parties, therefore, not only have an indirect influence upon the state at all times, but also they are in reality the ultimate governing agencies.

Nonpartisan Organizations. In addition to political parties and clubs, there are various nonpartisan organizations which aim to influence the electorate, and through it the governing officials, to carry out some specific public enterprise, such as paving streets, or to effect a certain reform, such as reducing taxes. Nonpartisan organizations tend to increase in number and in the intensity of activity as the complexity of society increases. The distance which arises between the citizen and the governing officials and even the political leaders leads groups of citizens to organize themselves around more specific ideas or immediate objectives than do the parties. Although at times these associations become fanatical, generally they are honest and straightforward, having the community's interest genuinely at heart. So true is this that many citizens, often confused by the multiplicity or the duplicity of political appeals, turn to them for protection, support, for the expression of their ideas, or for supplying their needs.

The nonpartisan organization is found more frequently in America than in Europe where the states are older and therefore tend to have a more efficient bureaucracy.[47] Such nonpartisan associations in the United States include divisions of the United States Chamber of Commerce, of the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Federation of Labor, and of many other organizations too numerous to mention; representing militarist and pacifist, women voters and racial or other minority groups; all of which carry on propaganda campaigns and organize "pressure groups." The more important of these associations maintain representatives at the various seats of government. These "lobbies," as they are called, endeavor to influence legislators or even executives in a direct, person-to-person manner. Their precise number for the United States as a whole is not known; in 1929 it was conservatively estimated that there were more than 500 lobbies before the Congress of the United States. In addition, there are lobbies maintained at the state legislatures; for example, in 1937 there were 164 at the New Jersey legislature and 249 before the California legislature.[48]

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[47] William B. Munro, "Civic organizations" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 498–502.

These organizations though not partisan in the political-party sense of the term are nevertheless partisan in that they insist upon the consideration by legislators and executives of the particular interests they represent and often, through the pressure they exercise, foist upon the community activities which are not in the true interest of the public as a whole.

In addition, there are in every nation numerous educational, economic, religious, scientific, and recreational associations which, sometimes requiring the aid or protection of the state, often acquire great political power. The merchant and artisan guilds of the later Middle Ages, and in our day the capitalistic corporations, labor unions, farmers' organizations, consumers' coöperatives (especially in Europe), church organizations are cases in point.[49] And while the chief purpose of these associations is not political, they frequently are the prime movers of what Professor Beard terms "the engines of state."

Thus government evinces a high degree of organization and organizational interpenetration. Not only does it control the other institutions, but in turn the other institutions exercise a certain amount of control over government, now preserving, now changing its forms and functions.

V. CONCLUSION

Government, therefore, like other institutions, has nothing of the mystic in it; it is the product of the same forces that create all systems of associated living; it is ordinarily subjected to the same processes of development, change, struggle, and maladjustment as any other institution. Many of the serious problems which harass society, however, arise from or are closely related to government. This is probably due to the fact that government is the supersocial system; that it is so intricate in structure, so comprehensive in its territorial and functional reach, so indirect that it is generally inflexible, costly, highly bureaucratic, and open to corruption. Even more, many of the problems arising from or related to government are due to its authoritarian, coercive character; so that the control of governing power may be said to be the central problem of society. To this topic we now turn in the next chapter.

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[48] C. E. Merriam, *op. cit.*, ii, 1511–1514; E. Pendleton Herring, *Group representation before Congress* (Baltimore 1929) 19; Dayton David McKean, *Pressures on the legislature of New Jersey* (New York 1938) 52; California Legislature, 52nd session, *Assembly final history* (Sacramento 1937) 30–34.

[49] See Theodore D. Woolsey, *Political science*, ii (New York 1877) 443–444; Henri Pirenne, "Guilds: European" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 209, 212.

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Chapter 22

PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT

Control of Power. The chief and persistent problems which arise out of or are related to government are those which revolve around the democratic movement, revolution, war, internationalism, and the attempts to establish an ideal government.

All these problems constitute parts of a single, central problem, namely, the problem of the distribution and control of power. The democratic movement consists of attempts to distribute governing power; revolution is primarily a revolt on the part of the governed against those in power; war represents an effort to maintain power already acquired or to gain new power; internationalism is an instrument by which states try to hold onto the power they possess, to gain new power, or to establish an equilibrium; while attempts to establish an "ideal" state resolve themselves into the problem whether government shall serve the interests of powerful groups or those of the entire community. For the sake of analysis these problems will be considered separately, but they constitute a single problem, that of the control of governmental power.

I. DEMOCRACY AS DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Democracy as Societal Struggle. Democracy represents the effort of the people to establish equilibrium between themselves and the governing groups. Government would seem to be inherently democratic, since it legalizes, codifies, and enforces the ways which the people themselves develop.[1] But government often exceeds this function; it frequently overrides the mores, exceeds its prerogatives, and wields undue power. It frequently enforces laws which no longer are in keeping with the mores, as when in emergencies it resuscitates old curfew laws; it sometimes imposes minority practices with no basis in the mores, as when it superimposes on the whole community abstinence from the use of intoxicants

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[1] See William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, i (New Haven 1927) 724.

(prohibition); it often uses coercion simply to maintain the party in power, as when it suppresses freedom of assembly and of speech; and it often employs its authority to enhance the interests of some minority at the expense of the masses, as when it passes tariff laws intended to favor special groups. So government is often arbitrary, coercive, the servant of special groups rather than of society as a whole. The democratic movement consists in efforts, ordinarily peaceful and legal, by which society aims to control or destroy the domination of government and to establish equilibrium.

The Democratic Trend. The driving force in movements to establish democracy derives from the grievances, real or imaginary, of the masses. All attempts to secure democracy, from the sporadic efforts of the Hebrews under the Prophets, the establishment of the Greek democracy, the Roman Republic, and the medieval republics, to the founding of the modern democracies, consisted of a struggle on the part of the governed to correct some basic grievance for which the governing were, or were thought to be, responsible.

In the rise of democracy, particularly important was the Greek democracy, first because of the high degree of development it attained, and second because the record of it was so clearly etched in literature that its recollection was kept alive for centuries.[2] Greek democracy, however, was premature because it did not rest on the people as a whole and because those who did take part had limited training or previous experience for the experiment. This was equally true of the Roman Republic. When these two experiments came to an end, the whole democratic movement subsided. "For a thousand years, after the days of the last republicans of Rome, the most civilized peoples of Europe cared nothing for politics and left government in the hands of their kings or chiefs. Greek democracy had been destroyed by force more than a century earlier, and little regret was expressed at its extinction. The last blows struck for republic freedom in Rome were struck not by the people, but by a knot of oligarchs, most of whom had their personal reasons for slaying the great Dictator." [3]

The democratic movement, however, was not wholly dead. It made itself felt in the medieval city states; it reappeared during the eleventh century in a vague feeling of discontent against the rulers;[4] it became insistent in England in the early struggles between the king and the nobles which resulted in the Magna Charta of 1215, in the struggle of the middle classes for voting power between 1689 and 1867, and finally in the tentative adoption of democracy between 1867 and 1914.[5] Meanwhile, democracy acquired a wider scope and deeper intensity with the American and French revolutions; it had considerable influence for a century or more and reached a peak with the overthrow of nearly all monarchies at the close of the World War in 1918. During that century or more increasing proportions of populations gained the suffrage, and numerous checks and balances were established to control the governing groups. Democracy seemed well established. The appearance of dictators during the post-war decades seems to have arrested the movement. This, however, may be an appearance more than a reality. The dictators of our times are themselves bone of the bone of the common people; they are constantly obliged to appeal to the interests and the will of the constituent masses, to pay at least lip service to the people, indicating that they may be but a momentary revolt from the weaknesses of democracy or the last cry of a dying autocracy.[6] In any event, even the mightiest of dictators would be committing political suicide were they not at least to put on the appearance of consulting the masses or serving them.

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[2] See F. S Marvin, *Living past* (5th ed. Oxford 1931) 65–66.

[3] James Bryce, *Modern democracies*, ii (New York 1921) 599. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

Is Democracy Adequate? Sociologically, the chief end of democracy is to eliminate or mitigate the domination-submission relationship and to achieve equilibrium between the ruled and the ruling and among all classes. This aim predicates that the "average" citizen is actually or potentially capable of participating in government, that he has the necessary sense of public duty, the willingness to render public service, and the readiness to subordinate private to public weal. How far the masses are endowed with these capacities or how far democracy has evoked the exercise of them, if they do exist, it is impossible to state. Democracy is interwoven with so many other factors, such as science, the Industrial Revolution, and nationalism; it has been established for such a brief period; and it has had so limited a spatial reach, that it is impossible at present to determine precisely what it has accomplished or is capable of accomplishing. Only in relatively small isolated communities, such as early New England and Switzerland, has democracy had an opportunity to function ideally; and these experiments are insufficient to prove or disprove its effectiveness to establish the equilibrium it is intended to accomplish. There are also economic factors, such as the relative poverty or richness of a given territory, that may influence the success or failure of the democratic experiment.

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[4] See R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, *History of the mediaeval political theory in the West*, vi (London 1936) 523–525.

[5] See O. F. Christie, *Transition to democracy* (London 1934).

[6] See Bryce, *op. cit.*, i, chap. iv.

Notwithstanding these limitations, democracy has produced or has been closely associated with what are regarded as societal gains. First, democracy has produced or has been accompanied by an increase in liberty. A measure of civil liberty has been gained; religious liberty is surely more prevalent in the modern world than it was in the Middle Ages; political liberty is at least theoretically an accepted tenet in most of the advanced countries of western Europe and America; [7] while social liberty, or liberty to pass from one class to another, is well established in many countries. Moreover, the recent increase of collectivism and the consequent enhancement of governmental power, though limiting the sphere of individuals, are but attempts further to promote public welfare. Even many practices of the fascist dictatorships embody, as already indicated, elements of the democratic purpose.

Second, under democracy the economic conditions of the masses have materially improved. Here again other factors are present; but there seems to be a peculiarly close relationship between democracy and general economic well-being. Broadly speaking, profound and widespread poverty has virtually disappeared from the West during the democratic epoch. "Poverty no longer means the Hunger which Langland describes in *Piers Plowman* (ix. l. 174), that made a man 'look like a lantern all his life after.' However clumsy and mechanical the organisation of the Great Industry may be, it does not involve chattel slavery or predial serfdom. We have escaped, also, from that evil which the Hebrew prophets were never tired of denouncing, and which modern observers sometimes describe as the main curse of Eastern village life, the oppression of the weak man by the strong neighbour from whom he cannot escape." [8]

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[7] Preserved Smith, *History of modern culture*, ii (New York 1934) 545–588.

[8] Graham Wallas, *Great society* (New York 1914) 322. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

Third, under democracy the power of the state to take life has been seriously challenged; and in our day the assumed right of states to demand the service of its citizens even in time of war is, for the first time, being bitterly contested.[9]

Fourth, when democracy operates within reasonably circumscribed bounds, it seems to produce genuine cohesion. In the Swiss Confederacy, for example, the people are held together, work for the common welfare and for mutual defense to a quite remarkable extent, in spite of geographic divisions, the ethnic diversity of the population (German, French, Italian, and Swiss), and notwithstanding the diversities of religions, political parties, and economic classes.[10]

It would seem that democracy has proved as reasonably adequate as any other form of government. Some maintain that democracy is part of the order of nature, that is, that as organisms advance they also become increasingly democratic.[11] Such a law may or may not prevail; what is certain is that democracy embodies one of the oldest and most persistent aspirations of the human race.

Inadequacies of Democracy. Democracy, however, has manifested grave defects, defects not foreseen by those who originally put their trust in it, and perhaps even now not always perceived by its proponents. These defects may be due to inherent weakness or to its having as yet operated only on a limited time and spatial basis. Whatever the reason, democracy in its present form leaves the governing power in the hands of a relatively small minority; it has but changed the basis of privileged rule from that of nobility or birth to that of wealth, rather than eliminated it. Government is too often actually the representative of "big business," in spite of the show of universal suffrage, of "representative" legislatures, checks and balances, referendums and recalls. The political parties pay lip service to the people but serve the interests of the few; they often withhold from the people alternative vital issues, or if they do present them, they forget or put aside their promises as soon as the elections are safely over. Many political practices of democracy are a ghastly mockery of the ideal. The use of propaganda, corruption in voting, appeals to prejudice, alliances between the press and politicians, the power of the political demagogue, the corruption of administrators even in high places, and the apparently unshakeable power of political bosses and political "machines," are but the worst and most prevalent of manifestations of the weakness of democracy.[12]

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[9] See Bryce, *op. cit.*, i, chaps. v, vi, vii.

[10] See *ibid.*, chaps. xxvii–xxviii.

[11] See Charles M. Child, *Physiological foundations of behaviour* (New York 1924) 146, 258, 270, 288–291, 297.

Whether these defects are inherent in democracy or are due to the fact that it is still in its swaddling clothes, remains to be determined. But these weaknesses are so prevalent that they have imbued the masses with "a sense of the fatuousness of political action," have greatly degraded the democratic dogma, and have afforded strong support to the enemies of democracy. Democracy can survive, it would seem, only to the extent to which it is able to correct at least the most glaring of its defects.[13]

II. MEANING OF REVOLUTION

Nature of Revolution. The second means by which society deals with the problem of controlling power is revolution. Political revolution, like the democratic movement, is a form of societal struggle; it arises more or less from the same cause, namely, oppression; and like democracy it aims to destroy domination-submission and to establish equilibrium of relationships. Revolution seems also to arise from the fact that political systems, due to their reach, power, and distance from the governed, tend to become fixed and corrupt, to insist on maintaining particular groups in power at any cost, and to rely mainly on physical force to achieve these ends. Revolution occurs usually after the democratic attempt has failed, after a prolonged period of abuse on the part of those in power, and ordinarily during or after a great upheaval such as a war. Whereas the democratic movement is a gradual, prolonged effort, more or less peaceful and legal, revolution is a sharp, violent, ordinarily bloody upheaval; it is a sudden revolt which aims to bring about the end of long-standing abuse and oppression and the establishment of a new order.

Course of Revolution. Revolution follows a well-marked course. First, there is the period, ordinarily of long duration, during which domination and oppression and the discontent based on them are slowly and accumulatively felt. The slowness of this growth is due to several interrelated causes. Human beings are generally peaceable, given to inertia, and therefore bovine, submissive, and long-enduring. Again, not all persons experience the same hardships at the same time nor in the same degree. Further, the intelligentsia, on whom the spread of the awakening or the actual revolt depends, are more immediately under the influence of dominators and oppressors than the masses, indeed are often a part of them, and, therefore, do not readily espouse the cause of the oppressed. The leaders of revolutions are often of the intelligentsia, as were Marx, Engels, Sorel, Bakunin, Tolstoy, Mirabeau, Paine, Jefferson, Trotsky, Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini; but to be effective they must have shared, in a measure at least, the experiences of the masses.[14] Moreover, revolutionary leaders are compelled to exercise caution in order to prevent premature uprisings, lest the leaders themselves be destroyed and the revolution be nipped in the bud, thus retarding the general movement. For all these reasons the accumulation period is long, the actual length varying with the intensity of the domination and the abuse involved, and with the scope of the revolution. All revolutions, however, seem to be preceded by such a period during which discontent grows spontaneously and accumulates.

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[12] See F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American institutions* (New York 1935) 27–28 and *passim;* Denis Tilden Lynch, *Boss Tweed* (New York 1927) *passim.*

[13] W. J. Shepard, "Government: history and theory" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 14.

The second period or phase is ordinarily of short duration. This is marked by widespread, more or less muffled discussion of the grievances involved. There arise numerous organizations, which as a rule are secret, small, and well disciplined; and there occur sporadic local uprisings, with assassinations or attempts at assassinations of the oppressors. In return, those in power strengthen the secret service, conduct raids, imprison such leaders as they can discover, and employ terror squads in their effort to instill fear. These efforts, however, appear to be of little use in counteracting the movement, especially if the grievances are basic. In fact, attempts to destroy a revolutionary movement and particularly to shatter its organization serve only to intensify the feelings of the oppressed rather than crush them; they convert those who are still undecided; breed in the masses a fear of possible failure with consequent increased hardships; and thus such attempts induce a greater cohesiveness, a clarification and wider understanding of the objectives, and a deeper determination to win. Some of the armed forces, the ranks of which are of the common people, having themselves experienced the general hardship, now come under the influence of the movement; some of them actually join the movement; and thus the stage is set for the actual revolt.

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[14] See Frances Bennett Becker, "Lenin's application of Marx's theory of revolutionary tactics" in *American sociological review*, 2 (1937) 360.

The climax is usually of very short duration. Ordinarily it occurs in connection with or follows close upon some larger disorganizing event such as a war. For example, the Communist Revolution in Russia and the Fascist Revolution in Italy occurred during or soon after the World War of 1914–1918, while the French Revolution and the Nazi Revolution in Germany were precipitated by economic crises. Whatever the actual spark, when the moment for the climax arrives, the masses suddenly and violently give vent to their long pent-up emotions. They send out a wild cry, as it were, in the night of bewilderment, a cry for change, change in any direction, but change. Though there be no such thing as a "social mind," the virtual uniformity of the sufferings a people has endured seems to give it a community of feeling and uniformity of reactions; so that when the society acts, it flares into passionate action as if it had actually one mind; the powers generated by centuries of abuse now burst forth in sudden volcano-like explosion over which the masses themselves or their leaders seem to have no control.[15]

The period or phase of establishment of the new order then follows. All that has occurred to this point is negative, that is to say, it has merely effected, if successful, the overthrow of the established order. The positive phase or the establishment of the projected order is still to follow. The organizational aspect of this phase is usually of short duration, as for example, the initial organization in 1917 of the Russian soviets. But to put the new order into operation is another matter. The habituations of the masses, the habits of dominance soon acquired by the new leaders,[16] the enormity of the task of substituting a new structure for the old, the very presence of old patterns of action and physical instruments, and many other factors—give the old order tenacity. It is usually a long time, therefore, before the projected order even begins to function; and even when the new order is under way the weight of the old order is so great that the establishment of the new is a long and drawn out process.

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[15] For a powerful fictional description of revolution see Sholom Asch, *Three cities* (trans. by Willa and Edwin Muir, New York 1933).

[16] See Donald O. Wagner (ed.), *Social reformers* (New York 1934) 541.

Results of Revolution. Whether in its totality revolution produces genuine advances or merely substitutes one form of abuse for another, is difficult to determine. For one thing, revolution produces results which are at least immediately undesirable. Revolution effects widespread destruction of wealth, disorganization of productive enterprise, general disorientation, disorganization in the social units; brings fanaticism, mob rule, the destruction of societal control; and it leaves in its wake a long train of disorder and instability. Coercion, which revolution had opposed, now becomes even more extensive and intensive; society becomes more or less exhausted; and the leaders become "tired radicals."

Yet revolution ordinarily produces permanent advances; in fact, most definitive advances seem to have resulted from revolution. A revolution breaks "the cake of custom" and of abuse; eliminates some useless and outworn traditional forms; reintroduces, at least for a time, flexibility of thought and action; fosters social mobility; breaks up the icy pessimism of the prerevolutionary period; awakens new hope; and brings about clear-cut attempts to establish equilibrium as the end of government. Revolution brings about even more definite improvements or what are thought to be improvements. The French Revolution, for example, distributed state property; instituted a popular public debt; abolished governmental and other monopolies; established popular sovereignty; and extended the franchise. It founded universal education, opening up careers to all persons of talent; drew up the Code Napoléon; removed "a host of inequalities, of feudal privileges and restrictions, of difference between province and province and man and man;" abolished feudal dues and rights and the last traces of actual serfdom; established a system of "departments," thereby abolishing the barriers of custom which had obtained in the old provinces; destroyed slavery within French domains; and otherwise fostered a broad humanism. In short, it reconstructed the institutional functions, and in ideals it reoriented the society. "It was a potent stimulus both to nationality and democracy, two guiding stars in the succeeding century." [17]

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[17] Marvin, *op. cit.*, 234–240; see also Crane Brinton, "Revolutions" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 125–144; Alfred Meusel, "Revolution and counter-revolution" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 13 (New York 1934) 367–375.

III. WAR AS CULTURAL PHENOMENON

Nature of War. War has marked virtually every great step and every major turning point in the development of culture. There are two main explanations of war, which may be termed the theory of the wolf and that of the lamb. "War," said Plato, "is the natural relation of every community to every other." As every individual in a state of nature is a fighting animal, without moral sense—a wolf in the lair ready to spring upon all others, knowing no law but that of force—so is associated man. Political communities, by virtue of being separate entities, are in a state of nature; each is a law unto itself; each is subject to no legal control, is responsible to no one. Over against this theory of the wolf is that of the lamb, which maintains that man is naturally peaceable; that if he is left to himself he will as a rule live peaceably with his fellows; or that, at least, he will not organize group combat on the scale of wars; and that it is only when prodded on and even deceived by organized self-seeking minorities that communities are driven into wars.[18] Whether or not war is rooted in "original" nature, it is clear that war has constituted one of the major forms of struggle throughout the development of culture.

Periods in History of War. There have been at least five major periods in the history of war.[19] In ancient and classical times, mankind seems to have been in a state of almost continuous warfare, a state mitigated only by the exigencies of intertribal relationships, by rules governing the relation of enemies, and by the intervention of religion, which called upon the gods to witness the agreements arrived at between enemies. During this period, therefore, war seems to have been regarded as a matter of daily routine, a normal aspect of life.

The second period seems to have been characterized by the partial realization that war should be controlled. Rome, under the Empire, so unified the Western world that there were virtually no independent governmental subunits, save the barbaric tribes of the north and west. The *Pax Romana* succeeded in maintaining a relative peace for more than two hundred years.

This, however, was "humanity's golden age," a relatively short period. The spread of monotheistic religions, particularly Christianity and Mohammedanism, ushered in the third period of war and directly contributed to warlike activities for several centuries. From the eleventh century on, now the emperor and now the pope made sporadic attempts to suppress war, but to no avail. The Crusades, in part inspired by the Church, occupied the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. After the thirteenth century, when the authority of the emperor declined, the Church continued to regard war as a phenomenon to be controlled and suppressed.

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[18] See James Bryce, *International relations* (New York 1922) chap. i.

[19] See *ibid.*, chap. i.

The fourth period in the history of war began with the close of the fifteenth century and ended with the World War. The discovery of the New World and the ecclesiastical schism were the immediate sources of renewed conflict. The discovery of the New World led to a scramble among European states for a control of new lands; the conquest of Mexico by Hernando Cortez in 1519–1521, the conquest of Peru by Pizarro in 1531–1532, and the establishment of the American colonies, were all marked by attacks on the native populations and by armed conflicts between the colonizing countries and the colonies themselves.

The ecclesiastical schism was an even greater source of conflict. The rise of Protestantism in the early sixteenth century split Europe into two armed camps, while the subschisms produced by the differences in the teachings of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin gave even more grounds for international hostility. The Peasants' War (1524–1525), the four wars between Charles V and Francis I (1521–1526, 1527–1529, 1536–1538, 1542–1544), the War with the Turks (1526–1532), the Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547), the Wars of the Huguenots (1562–1598), the War of Liberation of the Netherlands (1568–1648), the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), the English Civil War (1642–1646), King William's War with the French (1689–1697)—were only the outstanding conflicts arising directly or indirectly out of the religious schisms.

And yet during this very period of practically continuous warfare, peace conferences came into existence. After more than a century of almost incessant fighting, the nations assembled at Utrecht in 1713 and discussed among other things the possibilities of preventing war. Later the same effort was made at Vienna in 1814 and at Berlin in 1878. The "gatherings of nations," however, turned out to be only another kind of warfare—the scheming of diplomats, aiming to divide the spoils or gain new spoils by the balance of powers, which in turn led to wars on an even "grander" scale. And yet these gatherings were the first attempts in the direction of establishing the idea of international conciliation and arbitration and a system for the prevention of war. The Congress of Vienna, particularly, and the Holy Alliance to which it gave birth, made some attempts to promote the idea of prevention. All these efforts came to naught.

The fifth period in the history of war begins with the World War of 1914–1918. This period is characterized by two phenomena. First, by a change in the authority empowered to initiate and conduct war. Whereas during previous periods, the will of the personal monarch or of a small ruling clique had been sufficient to plunge nations into war, during this period the declaration of war in most countries rests with the people—at least the people have to be appealed to and constitutionally have a voice in the matter. Instead of the arbitrary decision of the governor, the will of the people, at least nominally, is a necessary prerequisite to war. The second phenomenon, however, almost universally vitiates the first; it consists in the growing employment by the government of propaganda as a means of forming the sentiments, opinions, and prejudices of the people into compliance with the aims of the rulers.[20]

Products of War. War has always been and is associated with a whole train of conditions which influence the ongoing of society as a whole. Some of these are generally recognized as detrimental; others are believed to be beneficial.[21] As to the detrimental conditions, war destroys the flower of the younger generations; effects the unproductive consumption of resources in armaments and munitions; ruins roads, fields, crops, buildings, works of art, science, and industry; suspends ordinary productive activity; temporarily breaks up moral standards; produces widespread disorientation, disorganization; and sometimes ushers in, or is closely associated with, the collapse of whole civilizations, as was the case with ancient Greece and Rome.[22]

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[20] See Walter B. Millis, *Road to war* (Boston 1935) *passim.*

[21] See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, 3 (New York 1937) 196–198, 238–239, 259–264, 287–288, 351, 363–369, also items "Army," "Casualty," and "Disturbances" in the index to the same volume; and Leonidas Dodson (ed.), *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 175 (September 1934) *passim.*

[22] For a vigorous statement of the destructive aspects of war by a warrior, see Smedley D. Butler, "War is a racket" in *Forum*, xcii (New York 1934) 140 ff. Many contemporary war novels also bring out the same fact. Among these may be mentioned Erich Maria Remarque's *All quiet on the Western front* (trans. from the German by A. W. Wheen, New York 1930); Arnold Zweig's *Case of Sergeant Grischa* (trans. from the German by Eric Sutton, New York 1929); H. M. Tomlinson's *All our yesterdays* (New

The monetary costs alone are almost beyond the grasp of the human mind. "In money, the World War cost $337,846,000,000, of which 189 billions were spent directly and the remaining cost was in destruction of property and stoppage of industry. Of this amount, the cost to the United States for the war period was 32 billions of dollars. Continuing costs of the World War now total 19 billions of dollars, which, when added to the costs of the war period, make a staggering total of 51 billions of dollars. . . .

"The 51 billions of dollars which the World War has cost us to date could do all of the following:

"Wire the 9,400,000 urban and rural homes of the United States which do not have electricity; pay all farm mortgages in the United States; install bathrooms with running water in the 80 per cent of our farm homes which do not have them; double the present endowment funds of all institutions of higher learning in the United States; build four consolidated rural high schools at $250,000 each in every county of the United States; spend a million dollars in each county for airports and emergency landing fields; build ten bridges like the Triborough Bridge; build another canal across the Isthmus of Panama; establish a five-billion-dollar program for prevention of floods and soil erosion; set up an endowment fund which at 3 per cent interest would provide a pension of $100 a month for every blind person and deaf-mute in the United States; finance the entire recovery and relief program of the United States from the time it was begun in 1932 to the end of the fiscal year 1938, which includes aid to agriculture, the Civil Works Administration, the Public Works Administration, aid to home owners, and the resettlement and housing activities of the Government; and endow at 2 per cent an organization to promote world peace at more than the combined cost of the League of Nations, the World Court, and the International Labour Organization.

"The combined national debts of the countries of the world was increased from about 43 billions of dollars in 1913 to 400 billions in 1921. The cost of living was doubled. The inflated price structure and dislocation of trade and industry finally resulted in the world-wide depression which began in 1929." [23]

On the other hand, war seems to produce some beneficial results.

York 1930); I. A. R. Wylie's *To the vanquished* (New York 1934); and James Hilton's *Knight without armour* (London 1934).

[23] Thomas John Watson, "Cost of war" in *International conciliation*, no. 343 (New York 1938) 339–341.

Professor Malinowski points out that in early times war produced or was associated with slavery, which had a profound bearing on early cultural development.[24] Again, the expectation of or preparation for war seems to unite a nation, to give it a sense of rebirth, a will to live, and a meaning to life, as in the cases of contemporary Italy and Germany. Again, war is believed to reëmphasize and foster the manly virtues, such as courage and fortitude, which in prolonged periods of peace undergo decay; it fortifies the distinctive characteristics of nations or subcultures; tests the folkways, eliminates the outworn, and emphasizes the essentials; brings about some positive biological selection on the part of females; stimulates inventions which eventually are used in peace-time activity; forces needed reforms on rulers; tends to bring youth to the front ranks of activity and leadership; brings about culture exchange, interaction, and interfertilization.[25]

Is War a Necessity? Whether war in its totality is beneficial or detrimental to society is impossible to state; it is too complex a phenomenon, and there are no generally accepted criteria by which to evaluate it with precision. All that is clear is that, on the one hand, war has been one of the outstanding phenomena throughout recorded time; that it seems to be part of the very nature of society; or at least that it has been associated with the rise and continuity of every great nation, and has been a marked factor in the enlargement of the peace group itself.

On the other hand, it is clear that the process of enlarging the cohesion group, from kinship, tribal, regional to national units of population, has been largely an effort to control war and establish peace among larger and larger groups. Relatively clear it is also that from the time when the Romans made the first attempt to establish peace on a permanent basis down to the present, civilized nations have increasingly regarded war as detrimental. Moreover, as culture has advanced, it has become increasingly clear that whole peoples can lead a normal, vigorous national life without war, as it is seen in nations such as Belgium, Switzerland, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and in recent decades the whole North American continent has lived in peace within itself. Furthermore, as popular awareness has increased, the masses have intensified their resistance to war, have increased their attacks on it and their demands for peace. Never before was there so concerted a popular attack as that which has developed since the World War; while the various states themselves have developed agencies and instruments which, half-hearted though they be, aim to prevent war and establish an era of peace. Even the most warlike of leaders, such as Mussolini and Hitler, are obliged to justify their war preparations by repeatedly stating that their ultimate goal is peace.

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[24] Bronislaw Malinowski, "Deadly issue" in *Atlantic monthly*, clviii (1936) 664.

[25] For statements in praise of the redeeming features of war, see Tennyson's "Maud," stanzas 8–13; and Rupert Brooke's sonnet "Peace," beginning with line, "Now, God be thanked who has matched us with this hour."

IV. PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONALISM

Nature of Internationalism. What is now known as internationalism is part or a phase of a well-marked development which has gone on for a long time in Western culture. In early historical times, the kinship groups gave way to tribal and territorial units, thus fusing two or more previously antagonistic groups; in ancient and classical times still larger units of population were joined into peace groups, later forming nations; and in recent centuries the movement has been directed toward establishing a system of peace among the nations, particularly in the West. Several factors have fostered or have been associated with this recent movement: science, the extension of commerce, increased communication, mass education, democracy, and the dissemination of information among the various nations have all contributed toward the development. All of these forces have led the masses and some rulers to recognize that the West is in most aspects a single entity and that united in peace the nations have a greater chance to achieve the well-being of their people. Internationalism aims to control unrestrained warfare, at least to mitigate the causes of international conflict, and to unite the nations on a peace basis in common, constructive tasks. Implicit in internationalism is the doctrine of the essential unity of mankind and the essential community of its needs.

Rise of Internationalism. A remote foreshadowing of modern internationalism was seen in the Roman Empire, which, having gathered under its sway virtually all the peoples of the West, succeeded in restraining strife and establishing for a time a state of peace. This, however, was not internationalism as we know it now. Rome did not bind together independent nations; it simply united the various peoples by means of or under the sway of its armed forces.

In the tenth and eleventh centuries efforts were made to check private warfare. Under the *Peace of God* and the *Truce of God*, conflict between private individuals and groups was forbidden, the faithful being required to desist from armed conflict during certain seasons and on certain days. But these provisions did not apply to wars between potentates. However, for five centuries, from the eleventh century on, the Church made some serious efforts to bring governments into the peace movement. That body, despite its activity in the Crusades, promoted the idea of peace, stressing that the West was in reality a single unit and that the Pope and the Emperor were the defenders of the peace. Two of the outstanding writers of the time, Dante Alighieri in his *De monarchia* and Marsilius of Padua in his *Defensor pacis*, besides others, upheld the doctrine. For a time peace prevailed. But the Pope and the Emperor themselves quarreled; and craftiness, ferocity, and bloodshed were again regarded as inevitable in dealings between states, as may be seen from Machiavelli's descriptions of the ideal sovereign.

The first secular efforts to establish internationalism proper occurred in the seventeenth century, notably with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and hinged on the idea of the Balance of Power. From this point on, international organization has made repeated attempts to create a peace-enforcing mechanism and to prevent future wars. Europe was divided into two political camps of approximately equal strength, each checking the other and each agreeing to oppose a third. But this system, based as it was on arms and conflict, was impotent to stop war; under the Holy Alliance (1815 on) it even turned its attention from enforcing international peace and devoted most of its energies to the defense of dynastic rule in its struggle against the rising democratic nationalism of the time. Likewise, the Concert of Europe, later in the nineteenth century, consisted of an agreement among armed European nations to present a common front in their aims in the non-European world. But the powers criss-crossed one another, leaned upon one another for support in times of crises, and dealt mainly with crises rather than with preventing them. They made a beginning of international law, but it was a law that elaborated the rules for the "humanization" of warfare, that prescribed formal procedures for intercourse between states in times of war, that merely extended parts of Grotius' *Rights of war and peace* (*De jure belli et pacis*, 1625) rather than aimed at the prevention of war. International law remained practically what it had always been, nothing else than a set of rules governing warfare.

It was the Hague Conference (1899) that took the first serious step toward establishing a peaceful international order; it created an international judicial agency, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, popularly called the Hague Tribunal. Under the influence of this tribunal numerous arbitration treaties were ratified, giving proof that there was at least a desire for the establishment of international order and peace. But the pent-up, centuries-old temper of conflict among the nations soon exploded in the World War.[26]

The League of Nations. Yet the hope for a permanent peace kept alive during the World War, and at its close came the formation of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, sometimes called the World Court. But the League turned out to be an association of nations each seeking its own interests, a highly contractual and legalistic body, essentially conflictive, and representing not even the interests of nations as a whole but rather those of the parties in power. Further, the League was identified with the idea of enforcing the peace treaties of 1919 and otherwise of serving the interests of the victors of the World War. The League, therefore, but perpetuated the conflicts of the past, fortified the *status quo*, rather than established a basis of permanent peace.

Yet though the League and its subsidiary organizations should completely fail, they represent one of the most serious and comprehensive efforts society has made to unite the nations. The codification of international law carried on by the World Court is a step of great importance and will probably become a permanent culture deposit. The World Court has also settled questions of major importance, thus demonstrating that a system of international law and judication is possible and workable. Further, the establishment of the International Labor Office, an organization affiliated with the League, makes an important departure in international relations in that its activities are directed not to problems of war and peace, but to the normal ongoing of society. It implicitly recognizes the international importance of commerce and labor in the family of nations; the information which it gathers and disseminates on population and migration, distribution of wealth, labor conditions and agriculture, emphasizes the community of life and interests which actually prevails among the nations. The League has also internationalized the Red Cross Society, an organization which holds great possibilities of serving the nations in peace time, as well as in war; and the League has aided the development of nongovernmental international organizations, which may become effective agencies in bridging the gulf between nations.

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[26] For the various aspects of internationalism see Manley O. Hudson, *Progress in international organization* (Palo Alto, California 1932); Edmund C. Mower, *International government* (New York 1931); R. M. MacIver, "Trend to internationalism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 172–188; H. N. Brailsford, "Internationalism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 8 (New York 1932) 214–219; Norman Angell, "Peace movements" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 41–48; Christie, *op. cit.*, 326–327; and James Bryce, *International relations* (New York 1922) chap. i.

So that, though the League may completely fail, though its activities may be even further twisted out of their originally intended channels, though the persistence of the war temper of centuries may continue to cripple the League, still that organization embodies one of the bravest experiments society has ever made to establish peace among the nations. Its very failure will emphasize that one of the keynotes of contemporary life is the desire to master the conflict of nations and to establish some measure of permanent peace.

The "Interpeople" Movement. During the last century or more another movement has been gathering force, which though designated "international" has no official connection with governments. In order to stress its peculiar significance and characteristics, we shall call it the "interpeople" movement.

It consists of numerous groups of people of various nationalities, bound together not by national or nationalistic interests, but rather by interests which transcend national boundaries. The movement embraces virtually all activities of broad societal significance: economic, educational, recreational, religious, scientific, and governmental. Structurally it consists of associations made up either of national associations or of individuals, which hold conferences and congresses in the various countries, carry on investigations, publish findings, and make recommendations on a nonnationalistic basis.

One of the first, if not the first of such conferences was that called together by Alexander von Humboldt in 1820; it was made up of scientists of different nationalities, and its purpose was to discuss matters of common interest. During the first half of the nineteenth century a number of associations were formed; but after 1848 the movement suffered a setback. During the latter part of that century and the first decade of the twentieth century it recovered and even increased its momentum; it was at a standstill during the World War; and since then it has experienced a marked growth. There are at present approximately six hundred and fifty organizations, some covering the entire West, others including non-Western peoples. All of them deal with common denominator interests. The New Education Fellowship and the International Institute of Agriculture, for example, hold congresses in different countries at stated intervals, gather and publish data covering aspects of their respective fields, and endeavor to improve the conditions or methods of education and agriculture everywhere.

The "interpeople" movement differs from internationalism in that its objectives are functional rather than national, it operates independently of national governments, its meetings are public, and its findings are freely disseminated. It is essentially projective; that is, it seeks to discover and apply in all fields of human endeavor whatever promises to be of universal advantage; its interests are society-wide, humanistic, and intellectual, rather than political.

The "interpeople" movement, like any human activity, has defects. By stressing given interests, these organizations tend to create vertical divisions, to overemphasize their particular interest at the expense of all others, and thus to produce divisiveness on the basis of interest. Moreover, the "interpeople" groups tend to become reformative and to superimpose on the whole society their particular programs of action; they often include fanatics; while the findings, resolutions, and recommendations of these organizations often have only the force of platitudes.

Yet it will be recalled that it is sometimes through such informal, nonofficial, spontaneous interaction that society has in the past constantly enlarged the peace group, from the kinship, to the clan and tribal, to the regional and national states. Official representatives of nations cannot be expected to do other than serve the interests of their particular nations and to perpetuate the contests and antagonisms which prevail among nations. Interpeople organizations, on the other hand, bring a considerable number of people into spontaneous interaction across and without regard to national boundaries; they stress the common-denominator interests of the various nations; they are concerned with the constructive aspects of the life of the people, whatever their nationality, rather than with those of particular nations. They hold forth no panacea, any more than any other movement. But they may contribute toward the ultimate creation of comity among nations.

V. THE IDEAL GOVERNMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Four main theories have been advanced as to what should be the aim of government, what forms it should take, and what functions it should perform in a well-ordered society; namely, anarchism, individualism, socialism, and communism. Each of these theories has had a long development; but none of them has been tried out for long or under conditions which could permit a determination of their practicability or desirability. Hence any evaluation of them is necessarily speculative.

Anarchism. Anarchism does not, as is ordinarily believed, advocate the necessity of abolishing government. The original Greek term denotes simply government without head or ruler, or one with a ruler who has the minimum of power. As anarchism has actually developed, it has been recognized as "an attempt to establish justice (that is, equality and reciprocity) in all human relations by the complete elimination of the state (or by the greatest possible minimization of its activity) and its replacement by an entirely free and spontaneous cooperation among individuals, groups, regions and nations."[27] To put it in sociological terms, anarchism would have government rest primarily on the mores rather than on law; it would establish a government based on spontaneous interaction among individuals and on the equilibrium of groups; and it would eliminate domination-submission relationships and abolish force, especially physical force. It would establish individual and group freedom; would lead society back to the small, self-sufficient community as the primary unit of government; would make these communities governmentally independent of one another and provide for their uniting only in the event of external aggression; would place at the disposal of all members of the community all the primary necessities; and eliminating all coercive laws, permit individuals and groups to live in coöperative freedom. In the main, therefore, anarchism aims first at the overthrow of coercive government and second at the elimination of accumulated property.

But how to achieve these ends? Different anarchists have advocated various means. First, anarchism pins its faith on the malleability of human nature. It holds that human beings are inherently good; that by "natural law" they are bound by solidarity and a wish to coöperate; that the good in human society is the product of the spontaneous, noncoercive coöperation of individuals, groups, regions, and nations; and that if mankind were left to spontaneous coöperation, societies would naturally evolve in which injustice and corruption would be at a minimum. Second, anarchism maintains that government has become an instrument for the subjection and exploitation of the masses in the interest of the governing groups; that as such it is chiefly responsible for the evils prevailing in human society; and that, being the agent of the ruling groups, government cannot be expected to eliminate these evils. Third, it follows that all attempts at reform undertaken by government and the dominant classes are at best palliatives and can only add injustice and corruption to what now prevails. Fourth, it also follows that a change can be effected only by a revolution of the masses; that, in order to succeed, this revolution must be of the "mind" or "soul" of society, and not of a political character, since the latter would only substitute another form of coercion for the one overthrown. Consequently, anarchism holds that revolution can be brought about only through the development of reason and the sense of justice and by scientific experimentation.[28]

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[27] Oscar Jászi, "Anarchism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 46.

The older anarchists, such as Mikhail Bakunin, Proudhon, and Prince Kropotkin, advocated the necessity of overthrowing established religion, on the ground that it constituted the chief impediment to the liberation of man's mind. Count Leo Tolstoy, on the other hand, found in the Gospel of Christ the very foundation of the anarchist movement, the negation of violence and coercion.

Individualism. In theory individualism closely resembles anarchism. The individualist believes in the necessity for a more powerful state than would obtain under anarchism, but he would have government function only in keeping the peace and in protecting a society from foreign attack. To this end, the government would maintain an army and navy, a police force, and law courts. It would punish disturbances of the peace and would impose and collect taxes, but only such taxes as were necessary for its function of guarding the peace. Further, the individual should be left to follow his own interests, for only thus will he achieve his fullest development and, consequently, best serve the interest of the community.

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[28] See *ibid.*, 46.

Modern individualism arose as a reaction against the regimenting activity of governments in former times; it is a phase of the rise of the middle and lower classes, an integral part of the reformist and democratic movement; and it is supported by the Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest. As it has actually developed, however, it has not proved an unmixed "blessing." In fact, under individualism the "unfit" often survive and seem to survive in a greater proportion; not infrequently "captains of industry," whom society itself sometimes finds "unfit" and places behind prison bars, do survive and more than prosper. Individualism has actually tended to foster the interests of minorities rather than those of the community as a whole; few individuals are able to follow the rule of "rugged individualism"; and few are those who know how or have the means to protect themselves against the aggrandizing activity of the overaggressive.[29]

Communism. Communism stands at the other extreme from anarchism and individualism. Underlying it is the broader doctrine of natural law, which holds that human society, like the rest of the cosmos, is governed by universal laws and that the violation of these laws results in injustice and oppression.[30] Communism maintains that government, as it actually prevails, has failed to observe natural law and consequently has become the main source of inequality, oppression, and injustice. Communism, therefore, would establish natural law in human government.

To this end, it would place the state in complete control of all aspects of economic life; it would own and operate all the tools of production; would carry on the distribution process; would own and distribute consumers' goods; and thereby achieve equality and reciprocity. To attain these ends, communism would overthrow the present capitalistic system by revolution, would establish the commune or the small community as the primary governing unit, and would place the governing power in the hands of productive workers. Communism, a very old doctrine and for a long time merely a subject for Utopian writing, has recently become a power of the first order in Western culture. The Union of Soviet Socialist

[29] See A. D. Lindsay, "Individualism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 674–680.

[30] For a thorough treatment of natural law, see Charles Grove Haines, *Revival of natural law concepts* (Cambridge, Mass. 1930), *passim*.

Republics, founded on this doctrine, is one of the most far-reaching experiments in reconstruction that history records. In the course of two decades communism has grown so powerful that it has called forth world-wide repercussions and the joining of hands on the part of three of the six major contemporary powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, ostensibly to combat it on a world-wide basis.[31]

Socialism. Socialism is closely related to communism both historically and in content. Like communism, it condemns the present governmental order as the source of injustice; it believes that mankind has the capacity to reshape its own nature and its institutions by relatively peaceful means; and, again like communism, it stresses the necessity of remolding not only the economic system, but also the educational, ethical, and aesthetic orders to the end of achieving the good life for all. Specifically, socialism emphasizes the necessity of the control of economic activity by the state. Under socialism, the state would own and control the principal means or tools of production, though it would permit private production under state guidance. By these means socialism would eliminate competition, establish coöperation, and achieve as nearly as possible the equal distribution of the products of labor. Socialism, like communism, would place vast powers and far-reaching operations in the hands of the state; but unlike communism, it would foster centralized rather than localized government; would bring about a change in the present capitalistic system gradually by evolutionary and legislative means rather than by revolution; and it would conserve whatever is sound in the present order.[32]

VI. PRESENT-DAY TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT

The foregoing outline of ideologies concerning the forms and ends of government, brief and sketchy though it necessarily is, sufficiently suggests the major issues. That all these doctrines contain elements of weakness is not to be denied. Anarchism, as we have already pointed out, predicates the practical perfectibility of human nature; it imputes to mankind innate coöperativeness, solidarity, and the ability spontaneously to maintain order and harmony—qualities which in reality do not obtain. Individualism has in actual practice resulted not in liberty for either the governing or the governed, but rather in the chaotic enslavement of both the dominant groups and the subjected masses. Communism fails to grapple with the realities of the culture complex generally prevailing in the West and ignores the advantages of capitalism, limited though they are. Socialism has largely proved impotent to produce decisive results through gradual, legislative reform.

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[31] See Max Beer, "Communism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 81–87.

[32] See Oscar Jászi, "Socialism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 14 (New York 1934) 188–212; Bertrand Russell, *Proposed roads to freedom* (New York 1919) chap. i.

Whatever their form, many states are in our time moving toward increasing control of all aspects of life, particularly of the economic. The objectives of many governments are to achieve a greater degree of reciprocity among their people and to bring about a closer approximation to equality than now prevails. This places present-day governments in clear contrast with those of the eighteenth century. In essence governments are becoming increasingly socialistic.

Likewise, and taking a long view, democracy appears to be ascendant. Notwithstanding the weaknesses of present democratic governments, acknowledged by thoughtful students to be many and grave, democracy is one of the most powerful influences shaping present-day governments in the West. The form, that is, so-called representative government, may be passing; but the form must not be confused with the substance. Democracy as an aim to control or even to destroy arbitrary rule, to make the people the source of authority, to distribute governing power within single states, and to serve the interest and the well-being of the masses rather than those of the rulers, democracy in this sense is clearly ascendant. Nor is this wishful thinking. The times have passed, possibly forever, when a ruler can do his will arbitrarily or ruthlessly, when rulers can maintain lavish establishments at the expense of the people, when rulers can ignore the people. Could a king now whip even a subject group into building a pyramid or a colosseum for his own glory? Could a governor afford to let a people perish without taking some measures for its succor? Even the dictators are blood and bone of the masses; they apparently can maintain their governments only by repeated appeals to the masses and by claiming to be serving the interests of the community. Rulers still hold the power of life and death, the power to control the many in the service of the few, to lash them into supine obedience by propaganda, or to build vast war establishments; but these are the very features democracy attacks and is seeking to destroy. Democracy may be a "more or less decomposed body," [33] yet in essence it is still very much alive.

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[33] A phrase from a speech by Benito Mussolini soon after his march on Rome. "Fascism . . . has already passed and if necessary will pass again, over the more or less decomposed body of the goddess of liberty."

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PART IV

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

INTRODUCTION

The reader will recall that Part I described the nature and characteristics of the institutional order; Part II examined the originating factors; Part III analyzed in detail eight master institutions.

The present Part considers the institutional processes, or the common-denominator conditions, procedures, or modes of operation of the social institutional order. The major institutional processes include emergence, development, change, struggle, maladjustment, control, persistence, and teleology or the pursuit of goals. This list is not all inclusive; it contains only those processes which this author considers the principal ones.

Phases of these processes as they apply to specific institutions have already been discussed. Here the aim is to synthesize the previous findings and to emphasize the operation of the institutional order as a whole. Moreover, these processes are not separate or separable, but are an interwoven whole. That is, emergence is part development; development is partly made up of change; change is one phase of struggle; and so on. We examine each separately only for the purpose of detailed description. Actually they constitute a wholeness of action and interaction, movement and counter-movement, which has no beginning and no end.

It is essential to observe that in the discussion which follows we are not considering the social processes, or the processes of primary-group formation, procedure, and functioning. We are here considering those processes which transcend the primary group and which affect whole institutions or societies. The perceiving reader will see that we are here considering many of the phenomena of our era; he will see the *raison d'être* of the changes, struggles, and stubborn resistances which characterize our very day.

Chapter 23

EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONS

I. THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINS

Enigma of Origins. It has already been stated that the question of origins, fascinating though it be, remains unanswered. Children continue to ask insistent, wonder-filled questions, seers and poets to present imaginative descriptions, philosophers and scientists to set forth their speculations or evidences; but origins remain virtually unknown; and the man of faith is nearly as well off in the matter as the painstaking scientist. The question is introduced here only as a starting point in the discussion of processes, or to lay a foundation for the consideration of the cultural process as a whole.

Character of Available Information. The few fragments of knowledge we do have regarding origins consist of the findings of archeology, anthropology, and logic. The archeologist, combining the knowledge of the historian, the skill of the engineer, and the zeal of the antiquarian, unearths various facts which throw light on origins. Anthropology studies the peoples who still live under primitive conditions and leads to some deductions regarding very early forms. Inference produces some safe guesses, as when we can safely assume that man has always carried on certain activities, such as mating, simply because his biological nature has not undergone any fundamental change for a long time.

However, all these data put together are meager. The archeologist has dug up only an infinitesimal portion of the earth's surface, and his findings relate almost wholly to a small segment of life, chiefly to the rudiments of material culture. The anthropologist has examined only a few primitives. Inference, on the other hand, can proceed only from the known facts and therefore is somewhat circumscribed. Hence, the available data do not give us a sufficiently substantial body of facts regarding the emergence of institutions or their early forms. Beyond the findings of all sciences are vast millennial stretches for which we have no records.

II. EARLY EMERGENCE

Primary Factors in Origination. Yet, we are fairly safe in asserting that the institutions originated, first, as the result of the interaction between man and nature. From early times man has been obliged to associate and collaborate with his fellows in dealing with and in utilizing physical nature, in counteracting its encroachments and attacks, in tool-making and shelter-construction, in the domestication of animal and plant life, and so on.

The interaction between man and nature, however, does not explain it all. Man sometimes uses and at other times does not use what nature provides, or he uses nature's resources differently in different places, or he brings to his locale what he finds elsewhere, or he fabricates. Nature explains the formation of human institutions only in a very general way.[1] Other factors are clearly at work.

These other factors consist of man's peculiar abilities. His intelligence, his ability to profit by and to deposit experience in the fund of culture, the continuity of his urges, and all the other traits we have mentioned above have played a part in creating the institutions.[2] And once primordial culture emerges, it itself becomes a factor. One culture trait or complex leads into another; new traits and complexes arise and, commingling with the original ones, produce still others; while accidental combinations conduce to other new forms and to their accumulation.[3]

Semi-Instinctive Activity. In the primordial stages of culture man seems to have passed through a phase in which his activities were largely haphazard and unsystematic. Food-gathering, mating, and offspring-begetting, the protective activities, the use of natural tools, the making of shelter, and the group defense activities seem to have been conducted more or less as they are among animals, in an instinctive or semi-instinctive manner, without the systematization which is embodied in human institutions. Traces of marriage, food preservation, shelter-building, and even property rights appear in rudimentary forms among mammals, so it may be inferred that early man carried on at least these activities.[4] But even for this assumption there is no conclusive evidence; man may well have developed or discarded parts of the instinctive equipment which cognate species possess.[5] Yet it is moderately safe, in the absence of contrary evidence, to assert that man's culture creating ability appears to be an extension of a similar ability in the higher animals.

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[1] See Alexander A. Goldenweiser, *Early civilization* (New York 1922) 293–298; and Franz Boas, *Mind of primitive man* (New York 1911) 160–161.

[2] See Earnest A. Hooton, "Man" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 72.

[3] See chap. 7 above.

[4] See Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 9–30; F. Alverdes, "Animal societies" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930)

Acquisition of Transmission Ability. The transition from this semi-instinctive phase to the faint beginnings of institutional life probably occurred over millions of years. This transition was probably characterized by a sluggish unfolding, without clear demarcations, slowly leading man out of the primordial state. It is possible or probable that the essential element in this transition was the gradual acquisition of the ability to accumulate and to transmit the rudiments of culture. That is, when man was able first to pass on his tool-making and tool-using skills, his modes of choosing mates, or his religious beliefs, then the beginnings of the respective institutions were being made. But the immediate subfactor or means in this process was probably articulate speech.[6]

As yet, however, we cannot speak of institutions in the present meaning of the term. The transitional drift consisted in the gradual, very long-time acquiring of the ability to pass on and to bring into definite shape the deposits which instinctive or semi-instinctive behavior had made. We do not mean that this ability was inherent in or predetermined by man's physical makeup; but that by trial and failure, on the one hand, and by trial and success on the other, mankind was gradually unfolding the ways of transmitting his group experiences, of making experience deposits.

III. TIME AND PLACE ORIGINS

Time Origins. Precisely when man began to erect the durable structures we call institutions we cannot say. The process seems to have gone on concurrently with the evolution of man himself; and since man has been evolving for some seven million years, the remote beginnings of culture may go as far back as that. Some students place the beginning of culture, as marked by the utilization

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63–65; Franz Boas, "Anthropology" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 79.

[5] Margaret Mead, "Family: primitive" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 6 (New York 1931) 65.

[6] See Hooton, *op. cit.*, 72; and Edward Sapir, "Language" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 9 (New York 1933) 155–160.

of natural tools and the fabrication of tools by man, back into the Pleistocene or Pliocene period, four millions or more years ago.[7] In any event, for about forty-nine fiftieths of his existence man had not even the rudiments of culture, no agriculture, domesticated animals, nor handicrafts.[8]

In the absolute sense there is no beginning to any institution. Institutions have developed as man developed. "There was a time when there was no state, and yet the state has no beginning in time, no point of origin." This paradox involves no contradiction, since there is no absolute starting point, no more than we can say that the Renaissance or the Industrial Revolution began at a given date. The process is more one of emergence than origination. As institutions began to be "more distinct, more elaborate, more permanent," then they may be said to be emerging. When government begins to be distinguished from the kinship rule, when custom passes into law, when the patriarch becomes the political chief, and the judge becomes a professionalized individual, then the governmental institution may be said to be emerging and taking the shape as an endurable structure.[9] Such emergence is a matter of late prehistory. By Paleolithic times man had already made major deposits, such as those represented by gesture language, controlled fire, rudimentary tools, and possibly some rudimentary form of the family. Such emergence, therefore, represents a fairly advanced state of culture and not a beginning.

Original Habitat of Human Culture. Our knowledge of the original habitat is also largely conjectural. Such fragmentary evidence as we have seems to indicate that the plateaus of Asia were probably the cradle of human culture; it was there that man first assumed human form and passed into the primordial state. In remote prehistory, two major culture streams seem to have started from those plateaus to be finally separated by the Gobi Desert, one stream moving into what is now called the Euro-Asiatic continent and in time becoming Western culture; the other flowing toward further Asia and developing into what we now call Eastern culture.[10]

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[7] Hooton, *op. cit.*, 73.

[8] Alfred Marston Tozzer, *Social origins and social continuities* (New York 1925) 4.

[9] R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 424–427; L. T. Hobhouse, *Social development* (New York 1924) 39.

[10] See chap. 6 above, subchap. i on "Nature of race and origins of races." There are as yet practically no data dealing with the movement into Africa.

Single or Multiple Origin? As to whether the institutions or their aggregate (culture) arose in one place and among one people and thence spread to other regions and peoples, or whether they arose simultaneously and independently in two or more places and among different peoples, authoritative opinion differs. It is moot whether the domestication of fire, of animals and plants, the systems of slavery, of communal or of private property arose in one place and among one people and then spread to other regions and peoples, or appeared among various peoples and in different regions more or less independently and simultaneously. As we have already discussed the theories of diffusionism, parallellism, and convergence, we need not dwell upon them at this point.[11] The convergence theory seems the most tenable, and according to that theory, virtually all the major areas and peoples have made contributions to culture.

IV. UNITARY ORIGIN

The social institutions have a unitary origin. By virtue of the fact that they are the fruit of the same primary resources and factors, they manifest that unity which is life itself. Human life, after all, is not a segmentary affair or process, but a wholeness; it is broken up into segments or phases only for purposes of description and analysis. The origin of culture may, in short, be said to be part and parcel of the very process of living; and in that process there is no segmentation. Marriage and the family involved religion, education, economics, and government; religion enforced the mores; government was interrelated with the other institutions. In the primordial state, as well as in all stages of culture, the various relationships and activities were not absolute, separable entities; they manifested, as they still manifest, a unity, an interpenetration in emergence, development, and functioning.

The marriage-family system seems to have been the first to take more or less definite shape. In it centered all the functions and activities, those of sex regulation and mating, the economic and educational, recreational, religious, and generally regulative activities. This twofold system was the unitary institution of primitive times. But even this system was not developed to the extent to which it was in late prehistory. There were few social distinctions besides those of age and sex, except that the women did most of the gathering of fruit and other immediately available food, while the men engaged in fishing, hunting, and fighting; there was no formal education, the individual being inducted into the culture by the process of living itself; recreation was incidental to other activities; religion was family worship; while government simply inhered in the elder of the family and was but part of the familial life.[12]

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[11] See chap. 7 above; also glossary.

It was out of this twofold system that there gradually grew the differentiations, distinctions, and separation of functions which we shall discuss next under Development.

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Chapter 24

DEVELOPMENT

I. MEANING OF DEVELOPMENT

Definition. Although the time and place origins of institutions are not definitely known, it is relatively certain that these systems have undergone a well-marked development. By development we mean not merely growth but a series of steps whereby an entity acquires the dynamic and structural characteristics which distinguish it.[1] Applied to social institutions, development means that these systems unfold their inherent functions, take on definite structures, acquire autonomy and authority. Development, for example, produces in a given institution division of labor, specialization of functions, collaboration, an increase in the number and variety of functional groups and associations, and an unfolding of the instruments.[2]

Distinguished from Evolution. Institutional development, as we employ the term, differs from evolution. Evolution connotes a sequential, uniform process of variation, selection, transmission, and adaptation; a movement from simplicity to complexity, from homogeneity to heterogeneity; a process which operates genetically, affects all organisms in a given species, and achieves relative permanency in the end product. For instance, in the course of his evolution man has acquired characteristics which mark all human beings, which are permanent and biologically transmissible.

Development in social institutions is of somewhat different character. Social institutions do not go through sequential and uniform growth, variation, selection, transmission or adaptation, either in their totality or their subphases. Their unfolding shows time gaps, marked differences from place to place, variety in rate, fluctuations and recessions, and once a form or structure is achieved there is no guarantee that it will become permanent.

The history of social institutions affords numerous examples of this fact. Sex education was one of the first cultural usages mankind developed, but it fell into disuse, and even now is not practiced either by the family or by the educational system. Capitalism appeared in rudimentary form in ancient times, but it did not develop in any marked degree during medieval times, while in the course of the last two centuries it has developed at a phenomenal rate. International athletic contests, such as the Olympic games, appeared in ancient Greece, were all but forgotten for centuries, and reappeared only in 1896. Ritualism, greatly developed in the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches, is practically nonexistent in some of the Protestant churches, some Quakers not even having a clergyman to officiate at their meetings.[3] Democracy occurred among the Hebrews merely as an aspiration, in Greece as a dominant form, in Rome and medieval society as a subsidiary pattern, while in modern times it experienced a spurt. "We can point to no order of ideas or social institution whose growth can be traced through a regular sequence of stages repeated in the same order among different peoples. The most we can hope to do is to indicate a movement in humanity as a whole, which, despite actions and reactions, reveals some persistent direction." [4]

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[1] See T. Raymont, *Education* (London 1931) 1–26.

[2] See R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 405.

Since the term "evolution" is employed with very precise connotation in biology and since it cannot be applied with that precise connotation to the realm of associated living, it would at least make for scientific clarity if that term and concept were not employed in speaking of social phenomena. In any event, in this volume we employ the term development to describe those phenomena.[5]

Development Distinguished from "Progress" and "Social Planning." Likewise, development does not necessarily connote

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[3] See Tenney Frank, "Roman world" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 42–60; Werner Sombart, "Capitalism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 206; Francis Storr, "Games, classical" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 10 (14th ed. New York 1929) 8; and F. A. M. Webster, "Olympic games" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 16 (14th ed. New York 1929) 781.

[4] Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 234. By permission of Thornton Butterworth Ltd.

[5] For a discussion of the extent to which the concept "evolution" is or is not applicable to societal development, see Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) chap. i; Morris Ginsberg, *Studies in sociology* (London 1932) chap. iv; Robert Harry Lowie, *Primitive society* (New York 1920) 433–441; Charles A. Ellwood, *Cultural evolution* (New York 1927) *passim*, chaps. i and ii esp.; C. Bouglé, *Evolution of values* (trans. by Helen Stalker Sellars, New York 1926) *passim;* William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) *passim;* MacIver, *op. cit.*, part iv; William I. Thomas, *Primitive behavior* (New York 1937) 3–7; Joseph Needham, "Evolution" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 649–655.

"progress." Progress implies a movement toward given goals, ordinarily regarded as advancement or improvement. But institutional development may be and often is in any direction, progressive or regressive, or perhaps in no clear direction at all. It is an unfolding. In fact, society often produces conditions which by all reasonable criteria cannot be regarded progressive. For example, cities have experienced a great growth in modern times, but that growth is not progress. Great cities are often associated with population congestion, traffic difficulties, organized crime, social distance and indifference, indirection, sophistication. None of this by any standard of social values can be regarded as progress.

Development also does not connote planning or control. Development is automatic, spontaneous, undeliberative. Some degree of awareness is no doubt present; but for the most part development is not a controlled process. "Social planning" may be in harmony with or it may go contrary to development. For example, the control of disease in modern times preserves many lives which in time become a burden to themselves and society. This is control but not necessarily development.

Development follows no mechanically determined line. It is a tentative process, an unplanned trying out of this or the other form or function, a vague quest for adaptation to the physical, biological, and cultural milieu. "The forms of life we see—men, associations of men, traditions, institutions, conventions, theories, ideals—are not separate or independent but . . . the growth of each takes place in contact and interaction with that of others. Thus any one phase of the movement may be regarded as a series of adaptations to other phases. . . ."[6] It is a tentative process, or "selection" by trial and error, or a pragmatic procedure, the growth of that which "works" or functions.

Development Illustrated. The process of development may be illustrated by the economic institution. The beginnings of that system go back many thousands of years into primordial culture. Gradually economic activities assumed more and more definite shape: there was the Old Stone Age, then the New Stone Age, and finally the age of metal-made tools; there was domestication of plants, then tillage, and later agriculture; the employment of muscular power, flowing-nature power, and finally of steam-power and electricity for the operation of tools; and the gradual unfolding from nonownership, to communal, to individual, to corporate ownership of land and other goods.

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[6] Abstracted from Charles Horton Cooley, *Social process* (New York 1918) 3, 8. By permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

But in all this development there are no definite steps or stages; there is overlapping and shading in terms of time, space, peoples, and stages of culture. Different forms occur in the same place and the same forms in widely separated places. The very old is often found side by side with the very latest. There are portions of the Western culture area, such as the backward regions in Asia Minor or parts of Europe, which still employ the food-producing methods, the tools, the food-preparing methods of Neolithic man; still use only animal and human muscular power in propelling the tools; while almost next-door are found the most improved methods of food-production, the most intricate machines, the most advanced power-making and power-using devices. Even along the streets of as progressive a city as Rome one may see old houses, some dating from the Middle Ages, side by side with the most modernistic apartment houses; the most crude and ancient shoe-making and clothing establishments and the most elegant shoe and clothing shops; man-drawn and horse-drawn vehicles criss-crossing with the fastest and most up-to-date *Fiats* or *Lancias*.

II. ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT

Development of Separate Institutions. One aspect of development is quite clear; it consists of the gradual separation and institutionalization of functions. In the previous chapter it was noted that in early times the marriage-family system performed nearly all functions; it regulated the sex relations, systematized the reproduction and rearing of offspring, and carried on the economic, educational, recreational, religious, and even the governmental activities. But in time each function became the nucleus of more or less distinct ideologies, customs, associations, and instruments. In the course of millennia, this resulted in a separation of functions and the growth of a separate institution around each function.

The religion-government function seems to have been the first to separate from the family and to start on the way to become a distinct system. The two functions themselves remained closely interwoven, religion being part of government and government part of religion even down to classical times. The priest was often king and the king, priest. In the Graeco-Roman civilizations the two functions came to be well separated; from that time on government and religion increasingly developed separate concepts, usages, organizations, personnel, habitats, and authority. During the Middle Ages the two developed into master systems, and for a thousand years or more each contested with the other for dominance. Only in modern times has the separation of the two been advocated and partly achieved. One of the major issues in the rise of nationalism during the last two centuries has been the separation of church and state. Cavour's insistence on a free church in a free state became a slogan not only in the movement for the unification of Italy but also in that of other nations. Nor is the process complete; in Russia, Mexico, and elsewhere the issue still lives; and even in the United States, the separation of the two functions is still in dispute, as for example in connection with parochial schools.

The economic function remained part of the familial system well down to modern times. From very early times, under nomadism, pastoralism, tillage, agriculture, and handicraft, the family was the center of economic activity; the production and consumption of goods, the accumulation and the transmission of wealth, were part and parcel of the family. In the Middle Ages, however, the economic function began to develop its own structure. Under feudalism and with the growth of commerce from the thirteenth century on, the production and distribution of economic goods became the primary activity of certain groups. Industrialism has greatly intensified this development, until the economic system, in its productive as well as in its distributive aspects, has come to have a specialized habitat, its own personnel, sets of rules, usages, and associations. In contemporary Western culture the economic institution occupies a master position.

More recently separate systems have developed for the educational, recreational, and scientific functions, each system having adopted concepts, modes of procedure, organizations, habitats, and instruments of its own. With the aging of Western culture, therefore, each major function has gradually become embodied in a separate institution.

Autonomy. Part of development consists in the acquisition of relative independence on the part of institutions in their internal operation, regulation, and authority. Thus, for example, in primitive culture government was part of the familial or tribal system; but as it developed its special ideologies, usages, personnel, organizations, it gradually acquired institutional status, became self-regulating, achieved autonomy, and in our time it has become self-sufficient and masterful. Likewise, all the other institutions in the course of their development have achieved more or less final authority within their own sphere. Complete autonomy never prevails in any institution. The educational and recreational institutions, for example, are dependent on government for financial support; but even then, a large measure of self-rule does rest in the single institutions.

In addition, institutions develop numerous groups and associations which acquire autonomy of their own. In the recreational institution there develop, for example, organizations of professional musicians, athletes, and writers, to say nothing of entire industries, such as those of motion pictures, printing and publishing, and the sport-goods industry, which achieve a high degree of autonomy, thus making the autonomy of the institution as a whole accumulative and profound.

Internal Elaboration. Development consists in part of internal elaboration. By internal elaboration we mean the intensification of activity, the working over and sharpening of concepts, the increase in the number and kind of agencies, groups, and organizations, the refining of procedures, the embellishing of symbols, the multiplication and refining of all instruments. The more government develops, for example, the more it extends the scope and the intensity of its activities; more and more it sharply defines its concepts, such as that of sovereignty; it multiplies and refines its laws; it subdivides itself into legislative, executive, and judicial branches; it organizes political parties and a multitude of departments, bureaus, and divisions; it multiplies its functionaries; it takes on more and more functions; it sharpens its definitions of the citizen's rights and duties; and perfects the methods for reaching the community with its strong arm and for enforcing its rules.

The religious institution has likewise undergone a notable internal elaboration. It has stated and restated its main concepts, such as that of the nature of God; it has greatly multiplied the number and types of organizations; in modern times it has subdivided into several denominations; it has instituted boards of bishops and elders, mission and Sunday school boards, and various other bodies; it has greatly embellished its rituals and formulas; and it has adopted various devices, such as special missions, revival meetings, and financial campaigns.

Organizational Spread and Centralization. Moreover, as institutions develop, their organizations multiply and acquire a wider reach. Thus, the religious system has developed from merely a local affair in early historical times to a vast order with centralized "rulers" such as popes and with organizations in the remotest corners of the West, even in the East; the economic institution now has its own local, national, and international authoritative bodies, such as the various Chambers of Commerce; the educational, scientific, and recreational systems have local, regional, national, and international associations which spread their influence into many regions.

Results of Development in Marriage and the Family. It needs to be noted that in the course of this development the marital and familial systems have lost rather than gained in authority and autonomy; their influence has narrowed rather than increased; they have lost their economic, regulative, religious, and other functions. Marriage has changed from an intensive, intimate, all-embracing, and life-long relationship to a contractual, freely entered-into and freely broken contractual relationship. Monogamy has lost much of its force. The ease with which marriage is broken, the entrance of women in commercial and professional enterprises, and the weakening authority of the paterfamilias, are all evidences of the deterioration of the marital-familial system.[7]

III. CULTURAL CORRELATIVES OF DEVELOPMENT

Development and Cultural Variations. As the institutional development proceeds, it produces results which transcend the institutions themselves and stamp whole cultures and subcultures. One of the more obvious of these is that of cultural variations. As institutions go through the unfolding just described, they produce marked differences in time and place, in the various strata of society, and in the different stages of culture.

Some variations occur mainly because some patterns appear and become so deeply rooted before the development of others that they are in a position of dominance. The striking differences between the major civilizations of ancient and classical times are of this character. The Egyptians were mainly polytheistic, the Hebrews monotheistic; the Greeks developed a semidemocratic state, the Romans a monarchical-imperialistic system. Present-day Latin lands are predominantly Roman Catholic in part because during the rise of Catholicism they were the focal points; while Nordic lands are mainly Protestant in part because the Reformation, like other culture changes, began at the periphery of the area.

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[7] See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, iii (New York 1937) 65–68, 86–88, 98–99, 109–111; Robert H. Lowie, "Marriage" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 153–154; William Christie MacLeod, *Origin and history of politics* (New York 1931) 154.

Development also produces local variations at the same time. The reasons for these are not as yet fully explained, but the differences are clear. For example, Eastern culture has in the main developed polygamy, polytheism, and localized government; the West, monogamy, monotheism, and centralized governments. Regional differences also appear in the prevalence of monarchy or democracy, capitalism or communism, rural or urban dominance. Small local differences also exist in such a fundamental institution as marriage. The percentage of persons married in New England in 1930 was 58.7 for men and 55.8 for women; in the West South Central States it was 61.9 for men and 64.0 for women.[8] There are variations even within specific communities, as in the case of the so-called immigrant colonies in American cities, where peculiar characteristics of language, economic life, and religion produce subcultural milieus quite different from those of the community as a whole.

Further, institutions operate differently among the poor and the rich, the single and the married, the educated and the uneducated, the healthy and the ill, the religious and the irreligious. For example, the family is probably more cohesive among the poor than among the rich, economic activity much more absorbing among the former than the latter, recreation much less active among the underprivileged classes than among the well-to-do. Inbreeding occurs more pronouncedly among royal marriages and aristocracies.[9]

Urban-Rural Variations in Culture. A striking type of variations is that which develops in the larger centers of population. Cities are the foci in which concentrate and out of which radiate the main elements of a given culture. In them are situated the central organizations of government, industry, religion, education, science, and recreation; in them life is more intensive; in them there is a greater degree of organization, artificialization, commercialization, and sophistication.

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[8] United States Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth census of the United States: 1930. Population*, ii (Washington 1933) 853–854.

[9] Robert H. Lowie, "Marriage" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 146. See chap. 7 above, subchap. iv on "Culture variation."

Other phenomena develop. In the United States, the fertility of the city population is about half as great as that of the farm population, and family limitation is largely an urban phenomenon, although it has recently spread into rural areas.[10] Urban life seems to be more favorable to married men, rural life to married women. In the cities of the United States in 1930, 60.5 per cent of the men and 58.5 per cent of the women were married, on the farms 57.9 per cent of the men and 66.0 per cent of the women.[11]

Perhaps one of the most striking illustrations is that of government. "In the cities specialization of labor and the general reliance upon the expert for public services have destroyed the neighborhood still so prominent in rural and village life. The absence of geographical ties and the practical disappearance of any consciousness of common interests on the part of urban dwellers have been accompanied by the exaltation of the expert and the absence of truly political problems in cities. Unless a new technique of citizen cooperation is developed to replace the tie of the neighborhood, it is difficult to see how city government can fail to develop more and more to a point where the normal situation is bureaucracy tempered by occasional revolts on the part of special interests." [12] In urban centers, therefore, administration demands special techniques and quick decisions and precludes the method of discussion and conference which is the essence of democracy. On the other hand, in rural centers democracy is more feasible, if not a necessity. "But where men and women live in close relation to each other and know with perhaps a devastating intimacy each other's private affairs we have the necessary apparatus for the solution of community problems through a genuinely democratic technique. For example, the villages of the United States offer a significant study in democratic government and will long continue to supply a leaven which cannot fail to affect the character of the political process on every level of government and contribute to our political struggle a distinctive flavor." [13]

In fact, culture as it operates in the great cities all over the Western world presents such marked differences from culture in other communities as almost to warrant the conclusion that cities breed a type completely different from that of the general culture.[14]

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[10] National Resources Committee, *Problems of a changing population* (Washington 1938) 127.

[11] United States Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*, 948.

[12] Lane W. Lancaster, *Government in rural America* (New York 1937) 5. By permission of D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.

[13] *Ibid.*, 4.

Deterioration of Functions. As institutions increase in number and intensity of activities, acquire autonomy, centralize their control, and undergo internal elaboration, they tend to concern themselves mainly with the perpetuation of themselves and their forms, and to deform their primary functions. Thus, the educational institution becomes deeply involved in the elaboration of its curricula, methods and administrative machinery, in the maintenance of its own forms and position. The religious system may give itself so largely to theological questions, to the refining of its rituals, or it may become so deeply under the influence of state propaganda, as in times of war, that it may itself become merely an agency of propaganda and lose part of its primary function.

Or take the contemporary economic system. It encroaches on other institutions in its own interest, as when it takes women from their familial functions and turns them into economic producers; it takes children from homes and schools, turns them to production, thus preventing them from achieving normal growth or living their childhood lives; it commercializes aspects of the school, the church, and the state. It even insists upon the right to manufacture or sell goods which may be injurious. A physician gives an example. "Whenever food is closed up in a metal container it is merely a matter of time until certain acids form. The United States Bureau of Chemistry, recognizing this fact, has twice made the attempt to obtain a new legislation which would compel the labeling of cans with an expiration date, just as vaccines and sera have to be labeled. Both times the canneries and their allies were able to suppress these efforts." [15]

Government also undergoes the same process. In modern Russia, Italy, and Germany, for example, the government has flooded the avenues of communication with information which assures the status of the régime in power; it has turned the educational institution into a vehicle of propaganda; has used recreation as a means of making soldiers out of the youthful segments of the population; it tries either to harness the religious institution to its central interest or to crush it practically into silence; it has even sought to direct the reproduction activities of the population in its own interests by fostering marriages and encouraging an increase in the birth-rate.

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[14] See chap. 9 above.

[15] Egon V. Ullmann, *Diet in sinus infections and colds* (New York 1933) 20–21. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

Thus as institutions mature, they tend to become concerned primarily with their own perpetuation and in some respects to deform their functions.

Extension of Cohesion. On the other hand, as institutions achieve a commanding position they tend to bring larger numbers of people under the influence of single cultural units and thereby to extend cohesion. Government affords an illustration. As that system has developed and acquired greater authority, it has brought larger and larger units of population and more activities into coordination. Families, clans, tribes, feudal, commercial, religious, and "nobility" units have one by one and step by step lost the "right" to act as they please or to govern; private feuds or wars are no longer permitted; groups or even institutions have been subordinated to the common-denominator interests of societies as wholes.[16] The extension of commerce, increased communication, democracy, mass education, and the dissemination of information are all parts of the same process.

Communization. In addition, some institutions, especially in recent times, have come under the control of the community as a whole. The educational system, for example, is organized, maintained, manned, and supervised by the community; it serves, or is intended to serve, the entire community rather than particular interests; it is free to all who are economically able to take advantage of the opportunity; and it largely eliminates class, sex, race, and other distinctions. Particularistic groups, to be sure, at times inject their interests, but the school is run today to serve the interests of the entire community and to afford the entire youthful population educational privileges.

Likewise, recreation has come under this same influence. By far the larger proportion of recreational facilities is provided today by public or semipublic agencies, such as national, state, and municipal governments, educational, church, and philanthropic organizations. Public agencies, in fact, consider it their duty to promote and to regulate recreation: governmental agencies increasingly supply recreational facilities; governments pass laws setting the minimum of space and time to be devoted to recreation in public schools; and in most parts of the West they consider it their duty to protect beaches, forests, streams, and game against the encroachments of private commercial concerns and to preserve them for the people.[17]

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[16] See MacIver, *op cit.*, 203–205; Graham Wallas, *Great society* (London 1914) 169; H. N. Brailsford, "Internationalism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 8 (New York 1932) 214; A. G. Keller, *Man's rough road* (New York 1932) chap. ix; Earle Edward Eubank, "Sociological factors in the interpretation of international relations" in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, xix (Chicago 1925) 88–96.

IV. CONCLUSION

Social institutions, therefore, seem to be subjected to a natural law of development which produces separation of functions, the rise of new institutions or subinstitutions, the acquiring of autonomy, internal elaboration, multiplication and concentration of associations. The process is not uniform; it is not necessarily or even generally progressive; it is tentative, haphazard, by no means continuous or proceeding by definite steps. Nor is it subject to human control or deliberate effort to any great extent. And in so far as it is, it shows that arduously achieved forms are lost again and again.

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[17] See chap. 17 above, subchap. iv on "Contemporary recreational patterns and trends."

Chapter 25

CHANGE

I. MEANING AND PREVALENCE OF CHANGE

Change is the succession or substitution of one thing, state, condition, form, or procedure for another. The low Latin term *cambiare* denoted to exchange or barter. In social institutions change comprises in alterations in some concept, usage, organization, instrument, or skill, or in combinations of these. Change may be superficial and unimportant, as in styles, fads, and poses; or it may be profound, as when the machine alters the whole economic structure. Change may be relatively rapid, impressive, even catastrophic, as in the cases of the introduction of a new physical device, in revolutions and wars; or it may be slow, imperceptible, and in the course of normal events, as in the long-time rise of monotheism or the passing of divine right. Change ordinarily signifies the appearance of something new and as such it may be "progressive," but it may also consist of the reintroduction of something old and be regressive, as in the reappearance of dictatorships in our time. Change is ordinarily a phase of development, but it is not necessarily part of the latter. Russia, for instance, has since 1917 made many departures which are not part of the total, long-time development of that country. Changes may be but passing phenomena; the alterations made in Russia may become part of the fund of its culture, or they may be transitory.[1]

Change is cumulative and ramifying; one change may be accompanied by many related ones. Change goes on continually and everywhere. No system of ideas or beliefs, folkways and mores, associations, instruments, and skills is ever wholly the same. Although the tendency is to play up change and consider it a panacea, and almost to ignore the more profound fact of persistence, nevertheless change is of the very warp and woof of associated living.

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[1] See George M. Day, "Folkways vs. state ways" in *Sociology and social research*, xxiii (1939) 334–344.

II. SOURCES OF CHANGE

Physical Nature as Source of Change. Physical nature is one source of change. The gradual geological shifts, the slow separation of the continents, the formation of the oceans, the elevation of mountain ranges, the great movements of glaciers in prehistoric time, broad climatic cycles—all must have brought about important cultural changes, affecting wide areas, considerable numbers of people, numerous generations, and setting a stamp upon institutions. But we do not know much about such changes. Moreover, these changes are so slow, so nearly imperceptible, that they are of comparatively little importance in the associated life of any period.

There are instances, however, when nature produces far-reaching changes. In the early part of the Christian era a sudden desiccation occurred in central Asia which had profound effects on the culture of the West. When the rainfall decreased, said to have been by 50 per cent, in that region, the food supply diminished, and the dense population of men and animals inhabiting the Caspian basin was obliged to move. The migration which followed ultimately reached Europe and effected racial and cultural changes which left a lasting stamp on the West. The northern barbarians who swept upon Rome and took part in the destruction of Roman civilization were only one phase of that movement.[2] Likewise in our times great droughts have caused the depopulation of whole areas in the Middle West of the United States.

Natural catastrophes often produce change. A flood will lead people to build on higher grounds, to construct firmer foundations, or to make their dwellings more sound. An earthquake will have a similar effect. A plague will contribute to the development of medicine. Moreover, catastrophes frequently go far beyond the areas and the particular peoples they immediately affect; volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, or floods often influence bordering territories and societies and leave trails of misery and disorientation that affect generations to come.

Population as Source of Change. Alteration in the racial composition of a population, in the rate of increase, in the proportion of the age groups or of the sexes produces various phenomena. The rapid increase in the population of Europe, which accompanied

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[2] See F. Stuart Chapin, *Social evolution* (New York 1920) 142–144.

the early phases of the Industrial Revolution, led to widespread migration, influenced the rise of the middle and proletarian classes, the spread of democracy, the liberation of women, the concentration of populations, and many other patterns of culture. The present-day decrease in the proportion of the youthful age group and a relative increase in middle age and old age segments in the population of the United States are producing changes in the educational system, are calling for adult education, for old age pensions, for changes in the production aspects of economic life, and other phenomena.

The size and density of population, if correlated with a relative scarcity of natural resources, have a bearing upon such phenomena as social differentiation, invention, the intensification of culture, and mob action. The rise of dictatorships in our time is closely related to high densities of population and a comparative scarcity of resources.

Mobility of population, both physical and social, has also a close relation to change. Migration is often concomitant with the development of trade, markets, industrial specialization, and division of labor. Cultural diffusion stimulates general change; for every case of parallel origination, there are hundreds of instances of diffusion.[3] Culture contacts and contests lead to profound changes. The social fluidity and heterogeneity of population had a bearing upon the disintegration of the civilizations of both Greece and Rome. The Crusades, the trade movements of the latter Middle Ages, and the Arab invasion of Europe in the eighth century were great factors in bringing about the Renaissance.[4]

Discovery. Discovery is one of the most fertile sources of cultural change. The discovery of chemicals, of new migration and trade routes, and of relatively uninhabited areas has brought about great changes. The discovery of America, for instance, changed the focus of activity from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic; lifted the pall of fatalism and implanted a new hope in the people of Europe; initiated a migration of people unparalleled in the history of man; contributed to the rise of nationalism and to international trade on a large scale; had a bearing on the rise of the proletarian and the middle classes, on the growth and power of capitalism, on the decadence of rural life, on the weakening of the family. There is scarcely a feature of Western culture that has not, to some degree, been affected by the discovery of America.

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[3] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 239.

[4] See Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, *Social thought from lore to science*, i (Boston 1938) 258; and Pitirim Sorokin, *Social mobility* (New York 1927) 536–538.

Invention and Change. Invention, or the creation of new forms out of already existing elements, is a source of change. Some inventions may be accidental or the product of a fortuitous combination of conditions or circumstances. The first steps in the domestication of fire, animals, and plants, in agriculture, in the creation of the wheel, the employment of flowing air and water were in all probability not the product of deliberate searching.[5] Nevertheless they resulted in far-reaching changes which marked whole epochs.

Deliberate inventions, especially those which have a bearing on economic life, are significant in producing change. The invention of the power-driven machine has altered the very face of Western culture. It has displaced the small, hand-driven tool with enormous, power-driven tools; removed economic activity from the home to the factory; taken the ownership of tools from the individual and the small group and placed it in the hands of corporations; destroyed hand-labor; relieved man of much physical burden-bearing; greatly extended man's ability to exploit nature; increased food supply. And at this moment the electrification of the machine is reshaping once more the economic life of the West, especially through the decentralization of industry, "one of the most important progressive steps of our age."[6] The machine has affected other than the economic aspects of life. It has had a bearing upon man's physical well-being and longevity; decreased familial interaction and cohesion; produced mammoth cities, with their intensification of culture, their congestion and other undesirable features; it has mechanized, artificialized, and commercialized recreation; and it has also had profound effects on science, education, religion, and government. The changes effected by the machine are so many and varied that they have been epitomized as the Industrial Revolution.[7]

Nonmaterial inventions such as monotheism, monarchy, democracy, have also been associated with great changes. The invention of the coöperatives has altered many aspects of the life of the Scandinavian countries and to a small extent that of England and other countries.[8] Furthermore, the very accumulation of inventions is in itself a source of widespread and rapid change.[9]

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[5] Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, ii (trans. by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston, New York 1935) 524–525; S. C. Gilfillan in *Sociology of invention* (Chicago 1935) 11, points out that the craft of invention moves "from the accidental toward the deliberate and sure."

[6] Frank Bohn and Richard T. Ely, *The great change* (New York 1935) 4.

[7] See Bertrand Russell, *Icarus* (New York 1924) *passim*.

Concepts as Sources of Change. Profound and far-reaching changes are often the result of ideas. Concepts sometimes follow changes rather than create them, but in many instances they lie at the very root of cultural modification. The Christian ideals of the inner life, of the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God were the very leaven of the early centuries of the Christian era; they contributed toward the breaking up of the Roman Empire;[10] made and unmade emperors and other rulers; constituted the core of medieval law; produced a centralized religious organization that lasted for a thousand years; directly and indirectly affected economic life, philanthropy, the marital and familial systems even in far-off regions.

Likewise the concepts of science produced vast changes. They established the fact-finding way as the dominant way of life; destroyed the idea that the world was a finished product beyond man's control and substituted the view that it is subject to natural laws, to investigation, utilization, and even control by man; they had a marked effect in weakening religious influence, in the rise of a multitude of sects, in creating a bewildering state of morals, in the great increase in material wealth, and in looking upon material objects as the source of wealth and power; and they contributed to many other phenomena, too numerous to mention.

In our own day, the Marxist ideal has made millions belonging to the laboring classes straighten their backs, has produced the organized labor movement, has established a conflict pattern between capital and labor, and has created the Russian Revolution, which, in turn, is directly or indirectly effecting notable changes in many areas of the world.

Social criticism is of this same order. Attacks on or defense of conditions or procedures, such as the criticisms of the Prophets, of Jesus and Mohammed, of St. Francis, and of Luther have had a profound influence in effecting change. So has criticism embodied in the arts. The plays of Euripides and Aristophanes, Plato's dialogues, the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, the orations of Demosthenes, the biographies of Plutarch, the fables of Aesop were organs of protest and of advocacy for change. There was far-reaching social criticism in Vergil and Dante, in Shakespeare and Milton, in the songs of troubadours, in the scathing sermons of many divines. All of which have in varying degrees, sometimes directly and at other times indirectly, been sources of profound changes in society.[11]

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[8] See Marquis W. Childs, *Sweden, the middle way* (New Haven 1936) *passim.*

[9] See William F. Ogburn, "Change, social" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences,* 3 (New York 1930) 331.

[10] See Bimillenario della nascita di Augusto, *Mostra augustea della romanità, catalogo* (Rome 1937) 327 ff.

Ideas and ideals may be regarded as "true" or "false," desirable or undesirable, attainable or unattainable, Utopian or realistic; but if they spring out of prevailing conditions, as in ancient Rome and in modern Russia, if they are sufficiently comprehensive, impressively formulated, and widely promulgated, they are the fountain-head of profound and far-reaching changes.[12]

Societal Catastrophes as Sources of Change. Wars and revolutions often precipitate far-reaching changes within single generations. War tends to shift considerable portions of wealth from the vanquished to the victors, from belligerent to neutral countries, from the masses to the enriched few. War destroys much wealth, but this is quickly recovered, especially because war stimulates invention. War increases cohesion among some nations and divisiveness among others. War increases social mobility, displaces many people from their accustomed occupations, makes some people rich and many poor. Birth rates, death rates, rates of marriage and divorce are all affected, although they quickly return to normal shortly after the close of the war.[13]

Soviet Russia today presents a picture of seething change, temporary though it may be, due to revolution. Changes that have extended over 50 or perhaps 100 years in other countries have been worked out there in a decade. The situation presents a mixture of technological and ideological influences. Certainly at the moment the greatest attention is devoted to technological change. To catch up with the world is the first requirement and therefore the primary aim. Ideological changes, however, have also progressed with great rapidity, the ideology having been largely revolutionary and contrary to that of most of the Western world.

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[11] See Robert Morss Lovett, "Criticism, social" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 599–602.

[12] "It is evident that so far as beliefs in ideals are themselves agents influencing social behaviour and social change they cannot be ignored by sociologists. From this point of view, it might reasonably be maintained that ideals are simply another class of facts which the sociologists can study without inquiring into their validity or truth. Indeed, false ideals are just as important to him as true ones, if they can be shown to mould behaviour and effect social movements." Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 34. By permission of Thornton Butterworth Ltd.

[13] Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories* (New York 1928) 337–339, 347–348.

Man's Deliberate Effort. Man's deliberate effort, as we shall detail in the chapter on Control, also brings about changes. In contemporary times vast efforts are being put forth to bring about changes; and though man does not always succeed in effecting the changes he desires, there is no question that some changes are the result of initiative, deliberation, and planning. Constitutionally restless types are always seeking change; underprivileged classes engage in reformist or revolutionary activity;[14] occasionally a ruler, such as Napoleon, Bismarck, Cavour, will initiate changes that will continue to influence generations to come.

Change as Source of Change. Major changes are often prolific sources of other changes. The Industrial Revolution, itself a major change, has produced or contributed toward the employment of women outside the home; the lessened cohesion of the family and the destruction of the patriarch; the changes in birth, death, and divorce rates; the increase in size, movement, and concentration of population; the social mobility of our times; the fluidity of morals, religious standards, manners, and many other phases of life.

III. MORPHOLOGY OF CHANGE

Changes in Material Objects. The forms or types of change, or the phases of associated life in which change occurs, are too numerous to be discussed here in detail; even a moderately full description of them would require a substantial book. The more obvious changes are those which occur in the number, size, shape, and substances used in material culture. The changes in the materials used, in the size, shape, intricacy, and durability of tools, in the types of power employed to operate them, in the size and location of the "tool shed," in shelter and clothing, in food-producing and conserving devices are illustrations of this type of change. Every phase of the material aspects of culture—the types, forms, and locations of buildings, implements, material, and symbolic instruments—has undergone changes.

Change in Associations. Change also goes on in associations. First, in composition; the members come and go in endless succession, for the plain reason that men and women are born, pass through the various phases of the life cycle, and die. Even in families there is a relatively continuous coming and going of members.

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[14] See Ogburn, *op. cit.*, 333.

Associations change in size. The medieval trade guilds were very small organizations at the start, but gradually expanded until they became large and powerful bodies. The merchants, likewise, starting as individuals, first organized small groups, and step by step these grew into vast federated organizations, until in our times we have national and international chambers of commerce. Similarly, capitalistic associations, beginning with the individual money-lenders of medieval times, have by degrees grown in size, intricacy, and power, until they have become vast, interlocking dominant organs, known in their complex as capitalism.

Associations change also with respect to intricacy. Government offers a good example. "The social structure of government grows in times of crisis not only through excess of administrative regulations; it grows also by the creation of new boards, commissions and departments. Thus the executive, in the inevitable process of delegating and specializing its powers, elaborates, splits, increases, and again subdivides, in growth. The result is an enormous gain in the complexity of social organization. There are bureaus within boards and wheels within wheels. At some time, however, the social situation gets so chaotic, what with the creation of new structures almost daily and the tightening membrane of social regulations, that something must be done to clarify the situation. The rank growth of social structure and regulation then contains much that is overlapping and much that is contradictory. A veritable jungle of new social growth entangles itself in inextricable hard knots and curls. At this state social forces of reaction, aiming at simplification, consolidation and coordination, begin to get under way. Slowly the process of integration starts up; it may extend over a period of years."[15]

There are also periods and stages in culture when organizations come into being in great numbers. Especially in urban centers, organizations multiply with great rapidity. In fact, associations become so numerous, so insistent in their appeal, so coercive and insistent in their impingements that they tend to disorientate the individual and in part destroy spontaneous group life. Thus they often contribute to the break up of civilization.

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[15] F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American institutions* (New York 1935) 294. By permission of Harper & Brothers. Professor Chapin also states, "The N.R.A alone [the National Reconstruction Administration under the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt] was responsible in one year . . . for 10,000 pages of pronouncements supposedly having the effect of law. This total exceeded the entire volume of all federal statutes in effect since 1789. The federal code contained 2735 double-column pages." *Ibid.*, 293.

On the other hand associations are constantly dying. Associations as a whole, as we have already pointed out, are relatively short-lived. Genealogical books describe the passing of millions of families. Not even dynastic and aristocratic families are proof against mortality; ancient Egyptian dynastic families lasted about 150 years; the Merovingians existed 269 years; the Carolingians 235; the German dynasties about 120 years.[16]

What is true of families is true of all associations; they come into being, "have their day, and cease to be." Professor Chapin draws an impressive picture of the mortality of American local business firms.[17] Educational organizations, even noted ones like Plato's Academy at Miletus,[18] pass from the picture. The skeletons of churches are strewn over the landscape of every continent; while states, political parties, empires and dynasties, armies, navies, and even whole subsystems, the communisms, fascisms, Hitlerisms, and the democracies of former days are continually going out of existence.

Change in Locus of Function. Another form or type of change relates to the locus of function. While the essential functions persist virtually unaltered, change does take place with reference to the particular institution or subinstitution which carries them on.[19] Not many centuries ago it was the church that sanctioned kings; the church of our time has to secure permission from the government even to erect a building; in some countries, notably Spain, Italy, Russia, Germany, and Mexico, government even restricts religious activities proper. Again, not many centuries ago military activity was carried on by mercenaries and was in large measure economic; today it is wholly in the hands of the state. Philanthropy, once organized, financed, and supervised by the church, in our times is almost wholly in the hands of the state. Current instances are the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and the Works Progress Administration in the United States, which in recent times of stress have provided the neediest with the means to sustain life. Likewise, as we have seen in the discussion of development, the educational, recreational, and scientific systems have in large part shifted their locus of function.

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[16] Pitirim Sorokin, *Social mobility* (New York 1927) 156–157.

[17] See F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American institutions* (New York 1935) chap. v.

[18] The visitor to Athens has his appetite whetted by the eloquent guide who tells him that he is going to show him the remains of Plato's Academy. He travels for an hour or so in the heat of the Athenian summer; at last he stands upon the promised spot. It is a sun-baked bald-head of a hilltop, not a tree in sight, not a trace of a house, nor even the fragmentary remains of one. Whereupon the guide points his very eloquent Grecian finger at the ground and says, "Here once stood the wonderful Academy of Plato." At this writing (Dec. 1938) excavations have unearthed some of the remains of the Academy.

[19] The functional changes which have occurred in the marriage-family system have been repeatedly pointed out in the previous pages and need not be repeated here. See chap. 13 above, subchap. iv on "Family mores."

Change in Concepts. Still another form of change relates to concepts. All sorts of superstitions and beliefs have their day and either change or disappear. In religion, in government, in science, in all other institutions, the fundamental concepts persist, but changes occur constantly in aspects of the ideology. The ideology of science, as indicated in the chapter on Science, has undergone changes. In religion there has been a revolt against religious absolutism, a demand for liberty of conscience and tolerance; in government the concept of divine right has virtually disappeared; the idea of human rights has been aligned against legal and political rights; in the educational system the idea that education was the prerogative of the few has been replaced by the idea that it is the privilege of all citizens.

Change in Usages. Finally, there are changes in the mores and folkways. As previously noted, the mores are very slow to change, and when they do, change only in nonessentials. This is due to the fact that mores relate to life-giving and life-taking activities; and since these do not alter in substance, the mores, the rules governing them, remain practically unaltered from generation to generation.[20]

Yet usages have undergone and do undergo changes. Mate-capture, slavery, duelling, mate-choosing by the family, prenuptial practices, the dowry system, the passing on of family names, the inheritance system have either disappeared or passed through marked changes. The ownership rules have undergone particularly significant changes. From there being no ownership system among the early nomadic tribes, ownership practices have passed through the communal system, private individual or group property, and corporate private or public property. The state has taken over the ownership of certain goods, such as minerals; it has acquired the right to determine what kind of use a piece of land may be put to, as when it specifies the type of building which may be erected within certain zones; and it has even gained the right to confiscate property or to name its own price for land or buildings which it needs for its own use.[21]

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[20] See Florian Znaniecki, *Social actions* (New York 1936) 44–45.

Changes in the folkways are so numerous and obvious that they need not be discussed at length. There are changes in style of clothing, in the manner of addressing people, in the time of meals, in dietary patterns, even in baptismal, marital, and other modes. Instruments also change. Symbolic instruments, such as mounds and tombs, pyramids, and other monuments for the living and the dead, have passed through temporary or permanent changes from early times to these.[22]

IV. VARIATIONS IN RATE AND DEGREE OF CHANGE

Spatial Variations. Change occurs at different rates and in varying degrees from locality to locality. One part of a culture area may be profoundly affected by some change, while another part remains relatively untouched. The heart of the Roman Empire, for example, experienced changes which did not immediately affect the far-off regions of northwestern Europe, though these were under Rome's political influence. In our times there are regions, like sections of the Carpathian Mountains or the southern section of the Appalachian Mountains, that have not been caught up in the sweep of industrial change. To a lesser extent most rural and partly rural regions do not evince the flux, multiplicity of forms, the violent impacts that urban centers do. In fact, the rate and degree of change are among the more striking characteristics which distinguish the country from the city. Furthermore, the periphery or the marginal areas of a culture are often left for many generations uninfluenced by changes which may have revolutionized the culture foci; while new culture patterns take root in the marginal areas and not, to the same degree, in the foci.

Societal Strata and Change. Likewise, change occurs at a different rate and in various degrees of intensity among diverse classes of society. Changes in marriage and the family during the last few decades have affected the lower, middle, and upper economic classes differently. For example, the age and rate of marriage, the number of children per marriage, infant mortality, and the rate of divorce have differed among the various social classes. Thus in the United States between 1900 and 1930, the size of the family decreased 10 per cent among the professional groups, 6 per cent among the proprietary classes, 5 per cent among the clerical, 3 per cent among the skilled and semiskilled, 1 per cent among the unskilled and farm owners; and it increased 5 per cent among farm renters and 13 per cent among farm laborers.[23]

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[21] See President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends in the United States*, i (New York 1933) xxxii–xxxiii.

[22] The entire subchapter above on types of change shows the possibilities of the social institutional approach as an instrument of sociological analysis.

What is true of occupational classes with respect to family-size is true of all groups with respect to most changes. The educated and uneducated classes, the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant groups, the young, the middle-aged, and the elderly segments of the population, the native and the foreign-born groups, the migratory and the stationary elements of the population, all assimilate the major changes at various rates and in varying degrees.

Stages of Culture in Relation to Change. Further, the rate of change varies in the different stages of culture. In the earliest stages of culture, development appears to have been slow; but as culture accumulated, it accelerated, varying directly with the accumulation of culture. Whereas in prehistoric times it took perhaps hundreds of thousands of years to produce a new culture item, in early history it took, roughly, five thousand years; during the classical period it took from five to one thousand years; and the present era has witnessed major additions within the span of single generations.[24]

Although these calculations are too precise and speculative, nevertheless they contain elements of fact. Early man, having no culture base to stand on, was obliged to submit himself to such changes as nature imposed on him, through slow, imperceptible, automatic adaptations; but as the culture base deepened and widened its reach, man was able increasingly to make changes of his own; and the greater the culture accumulation the more rapidly man seems to have been able to make changes. "We may liken the progress of mankind to that of a man a hundred years old, who dawdles through kindergarten for eighty-five years of his life, then takes years to go through the primary grades, then rushes with lightning rapidity through grammar school, and college." [25]

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[23] William F. Ogburn and Clark Tibbitts, "Family and its functions" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *op. cit.*, i, 686.

[24] See chap. 8 above, subchap. i on "General influence of culture base."

In recent centuries far-reaching changes have occurred within brief spans of time. The sixteenth century, for example, was one of such periods. "The decline of Venice and of the south German cities . . .; the outburst of capitalist enterprise in mining and textiles; the rise of commercial companies, no longer local but international, and based, not merely on exclusive privileges, but on the power of massed capital to drive from the field all feebler competitors; a revolution in prices which shattered all customary relationships; the collapse of medieval rural society in a nightmare of peasants' wars; the subjugation of the collegiate industrial organization of the Middle Ages to a new money-power; the triumph of the State and its conquest, in great parts of Europe, of the Church—all were crowded into less than two generations. A man who was born when the Council of Basel was sitting saw also, if he lived to a ripe old age, the dissolution of the English monasteries. At the first date Portuguese explorers had hardly passed Sierra Leone; at the second Portugal had been master of an Indian Empire for almost a generation. In the intervening three-quarters of a century the whole framework of European civilization had been transformed." [26]

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also changes have occurred with great rapidity, so much so that each decade is hailed as an era of great change. This acceleration, however, is believed to have come to an end. There is in our day a slackening in the rate of discovery and invention and even, possibly, the beginning of a period of general cultural dormancy.[27]

V. CONCLUSION

Change is a sort of self-generating process. One alteration in size, position, function, or form leads to another, and the latter in turn produces further changes. While in their totality the institutions remain somewhat inflexible, in their subfeatures they are in a continual flux. This fluidity often contributes to the creation or accentuation of struggle, which we next consider.

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[25] Robert H. Lowie, *Culture and ethnology* (New York 1929) 78.

[26] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the rise of capitalism* (New York 1926) 70. By permission of Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc.

[27] See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, ii (New York 1937) 172.

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Chapter 26

STRUGGLE

I. NATURE AND SCOPE OF STRUGGLE

Nature of Struggle. In addition to development and change, and in part as a consequence of them, institutions undergo struggle. Struggle seems to be part of the very essence of associated life, even as it is of individual existence. As the seed struggles within itself and with the environment as it germinates and grows, so do social entities. As they emerge, develop, change, social systems contest with one another. They also collaborate, but even collaboration is partly struggle. In fact, struggle is so much a part of associated living that societies in which there is a low amount of struggle are decadent or moribund.

This does not mean that institutions struggle with one another as wholes, as organisms strive with one another and with the environment. What really occurs is that the interests inhering in the social systems compete with one another and in a measure do set whole institutions in a state of contest, as when the church, in Italy for example, tries to retain the right to train the young while the state endeavors to acquire that right. In short, social systems act and react toward one another, impinge on each other, and contest with one another.

Generality of Struggle. This condition seems to have always prevailed. "'When man came to take his seat at the banquet of life, he found the places all occupied, and to get a seat he was forced to expropriate a crowd of table-companions who were no less ravenous than he.'"[1] What was true of primitive man has been true throughout the unfolding of society; while in contemporary culture, struggle prevails so greatly as to give the impression that it is all-pervasive and dominant. Novikov finds[2] that social "evolution" consists in part in the elimination of physical violence and the substitution of intellectual for physical struggle; be that as it may, both physical and intellectual struggle are important parts of associated living.

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[1] William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller, *Science of society*, i (New Haven 1927) 96. By permission of the Yale University Press.

[2] See Theodore Abel, "Novikov, Yakov Alexandrovich," in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 402, and Novikov's works mentioned therein.

The Ends of Struggle. Strictly speaking there is no "purpose" in struggle; that is, cultural units do not, as units, consciously and deliberately set out to achieve given ends. Struggle, like other social conditions or processes, is largely unconscious; such awareness as does obtain inheres in the individuals and groups composing social systems and not in the systems as wholes. The contest is mainly in the nature of adaptation. Leaders may have specific objectives in this or the other contest, but institutions as wholes do not.

And yet struggle in its totality does subserve definite ends. Some struggle maintains institutional integrity, as when the family struggles to retain its unity, its affectional bonds, its right to train the child in the face of the impingements of the economic, educational, and governmental institutions. Some struggle is directed toward fuller development, as when a small country strives to achieve its own unfolding and offset the standardizing influence of a neighboring octopus nation. Some struggle is directed toward the achievement or maintenance of status, as when Fascist or Communist régimes try to secure general acceptance of their doctrines and procedures. Finally, some struggle is directed toward attaining or maintaining dominance, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages.

Spheres of Struggle. Struggle among human aggregates is so multiform, so ramifying, it crosses and recrosses so many aspects of associated living, that no complete description can be given. Some struggle goes on within single institutions; often it is transversal, that is, it cuts across the various institutional systems or subsystems; some struggle is interinstitutional, that is, it is a combat between two institutions or between one institution and the rest of the institutions; and, finally, there is struggle which is over and above the institutions *per se* and is interregional, often international, or affects a whole culture.

II. MODES OR FORMS OF STRUGGLE

Sometimes struggle employs the method of defense or resistance and therefore is relatively inactive; sometimes it is overt, aggressive, dogged, and therefore very active; in some instances it is in the nature of competition, in others in the nature of conflict; at times it employs physically coercive means, at others it uses intellectual or moral force. Some of these are but phases of the process as a whole, as for instance, aggression is but the offensive aspect of which obstruction is the defensive. Competition is a peaceable, often constructive phase of struggle, but it often turns into conflict, which may be violent and destructive. Each type or form, however, evinces peculiar characteristics.

Aggressive Struggle. Aggression, probably the most prevalent form or mode of struggle, is usually an organized attack by a component part of an institution or by a whole institution against another. For example, the industrial-commercial segments of the economic institution organize to raise or lower the tariff and thereby gain an advantage over agriculture or over industrial-commercial agencies in other countries. Likewise, employers carry on aggressive struggle against employees, natives against foreigners, the established against the ascendant, governors against citizens, or vice versa. Perhaps the most comprehensive and imposing aggressive struggle going on in the contemporary world is that of Marxism to establish a proletarian society.

Obstructive Struggle. Struggle also goes on by means of obstruction. This mode of struggle, sometimes called passive resistance, consists mainly of inaction. Generally it blocks or stops some specific aggression; it is therefore but the counter-foil to aggression. Its distinguishing trait is that the group or organization attacked does not act, but remains passive. For instance, a body of citizens unfavorably disposed toward the political party in power or disapproving of high governmental expenditures, may simply refrain from paying taxes; and if the government thereupon punishes the individuals, they simply accept the punishment without resistance. Likewise, the inhabitants of a countryside may "sit tight" and simply decline to sell their water rights to a metropolitan district which is gradually encroaching upon them and destroying their agricultural life. The most striking examples of resistive struggle in modern times are Germany's noncompliance with the Treaty of Versailles and Gandhi's "passive resistance" to the English rule in India. Obstructive struggle, therefore, consists in resistance to aggression by means of noncompliance or inaction.

Competitive Struggle. Competitive struggle is like a race in which two or more persons or groups are aiming at the same goal. In human society it is a prolonged, relatively peaceful process ordinarily directed at the attainment of a given objective rather than at the destruction of one of the contestants. Competition between industrial or business firms to gain customers, between sections of a country or between countries to attract tourists, between colleges to enroll students, churches to win members, professions to gain clients, all ordinarily aim at securing relative advantage rather than at the destruction of the other agent. Competition often takes the milder form of rivalry, which is frequently personal and generally amicable; rivalry aims at the winning of some nonmaterial or intellectual goal, such as a game, a debate, or an oratorical contest.[3]

Conflict. Struggle also takes the form of conflict. Conflict is not a contest, but a fight; it is usually conscious, deliberate, premeditated; generally it is violent and aims at the destruction of the contestant; and ordinarily it results either in the elimination of one contestant or in the destruction of the position or power of both. Conflict is usually intermittent, constant combat being impossible.[4] Conflict employs several means: physical violence, argument, admonition, ridicule, litigation. "Conflict is a mode of registering, and often a mode of consummating, social change. Conflict is acute where change is swift, and here the varied interests and sentiments of the old order stand out against eager pressure from the new." A crisis such as a war or a riot, or prolonged litigation, may induce the defeated party to accept the inevitable and in this way relieve the former tension. Sometimes a crisis destroys one or both parties. Conflict may be settled by compromise or by integration. In the former no attempt is made to find common ends; in the latter common ends are merged.[5]

The outstanding examples of conflict are revolutions and wars in which large bodies of men engage in a life-and-death combat. But conflict goes on also on a nonpersonal plane, as when a chain-store corporation "strangles" the "little man" or a large real-estate combine holds large tracts of land around a necessary center, such as a college or university, at prohibitive prices, thereby expelling people of small means and forcing them to live "below the tracks" at long distances from their work.

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[3] See Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology* (2d ed. Chicago 1924) chap. viii.

[4] See *ibid.*, chap. ix.

[5] See Harold D. Lasswell, "Conflict, social" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 194–196.

III. STRUGGLE BETWEEN SEGMENTS OF SOCIETY

Struggle between the Sexes. Among the more prevalent struggles are those which go on between the sexes, between the youthful and older segments of population, and between the classes of society.

The struggle between the sexes is very old and persistent. Due perhaps in part to the biological constitution and function of the female and to the usages arising from them, womankind has from earliest time been in subjection to man. Woman may have enjoyed periods of dominance when a matriarchal or matrilinear system made the female the dominant sex, but recent findings, including those of women themselves, show that such a condition has never prevailed at all widely.[6] There have been times when women of the ruling classes have enjoyed privileges which both men and women of the middle or submerged classes did not enjoy. Also women have generally enjoyed more privileges in liberal eras and countries and less recognition in reactionary periods or countries. "Whenever women have been indoctrinated with religious views stressing virtues of meekness and self-denial and have sought escape from frustration in emotionalized ritualism, they have been subject to intensified discrimination."[7] In Egypt, Greece, and Rome they succeeded in gaining some status; but during the Middle Ages they were wholly subjected.

In modern times women have struggled to attain and in a measure succeeded in attaining important social and legal rights. With the Industrial Revolution and the consequent opening of the economic field to women, a considerable number of women have left the domestic walls, have become relatively independent, and have obtained recognition. Gradually they have entered the professions and secured a foothold in the larger aspects of economic and governmental activities. Especially in democratic countries a few women have become legislators, executives, and diplomats, or have held other positions of importance.

Yet the struggle between the sexes is far from being over. In part this struggle revolves around the question whether woman can render a better service to herself and society through domestic life, through public life, or through a combination of the two. However that may be, the vast majority of women are still subjected or at least subordinated to men; and women are still regarded and treated as different if not inferior human beings. "In our own [American] society the withholding of stimulants and narcotics from women, the double standard of sex morality, the insistence that woman shall stay in her 'sphere,' the resistance to the entrance of woman into the better paid occupations (the professions), the obligation of the wronged wife to suffer more and pardon more than the wronged husband, the greater obligation of women to 'please' men than of men to 'please' women, constitute a considerable residue of male domination."[8] In spite of the "liberation" of women in the more advanced countries, the struggle between the sexes continues, and it will probably continue to exist.

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[6] See Margaret Mead, "Woman, position in society: primitive" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 15 (New York 1934) 439–442.

[7] Bernhard J. Stern, "Women, position in society: historical" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 15 (New York 1934) 443.

Struggle between Young and Aged. The struggle between the youthful and the aged segments of the population is also very old and persistent. The older segments of the population, due in part perhaps to their inability to relive their own youth, due to their greater experience, their habituation to established modes, their possession of economic power, their craving for security, and their desire to project themselves into and through youthful lives, aim to impose upon youth the established ideas, ideals, and usages. Youth, on the other hand, because of its plasticity, its inability to grasp the point of view of its elders, its natural craving for new experience, for self-projection, for achieving economic status, for living an untrammeled life, pitches itself against the elders. The elders try to compel the young to subserve their interests; the young try the reverse. And so the combat goes on; at some times it is more overt than at others; but it is always insistent and persistent. In the past the family, religion, education, government were all on the side of the elders; authority has almost always been derived from the fact of age; the eldest both in primitive societies and in advanced ones has ruled by virtue of being the eldest.

In modern times and in some countries, however, youth has become increasingly articulate; has organized its own youth, peace, and educational movements; has come to be trained by others than the immediate elders; has gained the protection of the state against the physical attacks of the elders; has acquired the right to choose mates; frequently it deviates from the religious and political affiliations of the family; chooses its own occupation; and youthful elements have even gained high posts in educational and political life, as may be seen from the positions which the relatively young sometimes occupy as university presidents or in legislative halls. This may be a temporary postwar phenomenon, yet it is significant.

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[8] Edward Alsworth Ross, *Principles of sociology* (New York 1920) 125. By permission of The Century Company.

Struggle between the Classes. Struggle, sometimes very dogged, goes on between the different classes of society: between the poor and the rich, the uneducated and the educated, operatives and administrators, the governed and the governing. The class struggle has been known throughout history. Slaves have been pitched against masters, serfs against lords, workers against employers. The most outstanding present-day example of class struggle is that between the proletariat and the capitalistic classes. So intensive is this struggle that the world is divided into two great warring camps, transcending national boundaries and interests, engaged in a life-and-death conflict, on the one hand to retain the dominance of the capitalistic way and on the other to win dominance for the proletarian way of life. Even whole nations and combinations of nations are now engaged in this struggle. The war in Spain, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the tripartite alliance of Italy, Germany, and Japan (November 1937) are in varying degrees rooted in the class struggle.

IV. INTRAINSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE

Struggle within and between Associations. A considerable amount of contest goes on within associations. Males and females, young and old will contest within a given family. The partners of a specific business organization will fight one another. A particular political administration will subserve the "interests" which have put it into power, while a body of citizens will endeavor to uphold the interests of the entire community. Contests go on between the factions within a given party, stockholders in a corporation, between the managers and the stockholders, between the right wing and the left wing of a labor union, between the faculty and the administration of a university, between students and the faculty.

Closely related is the struggle which goes on between organizations within the same institution. Competition and even conflict between business firms, between two different types of labor organization, between two political parties, universities, churches, athletic teams, are all familiar examples; while family feuds have occupied a not inconsiderable part of the history of royal or noble families.

Contest of Ideas. The contest of ideas, and the usages associated with them, is very old, persistent, and probably underlies all other contests. Although much struggle involves personal or near-personal encounter, as in organizations, there are contests which fundamentally center in ideas. Competition between two clubs for members, two universities for students, two political parties for votes is predominately a contest between systems of thought or ideological objectives.

Contest of ideas goes on in the religious field. There is the long-standing contest over the nature of God; the controversy over salvation by faith as against salvation by works; the struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism; the contests among the various Protestant beliefs, such as the Baptist and the Methodist concepts of the function of baptism; the controversies over the question of Apostolic succession. Since the beginning of the present century, a heated controversy has been going on, especially in the United States, over "fundamentalist" doctrines, including the inerrancy of the Scriptures, the Virgin birth, the physical resurrection of Christ, the atonement, and the second coming of Christ.[9]

In government there are the long-standing contests between aristocracy and democracy, between the divine-right idea and that of the natural right of the ruled, between liberalism and control, between centralism and localism, between totalitarianism and the limited state, and, in our times, between the fascist and the communist concepts of government. In our times also the controversy over the utility of war has come to the fore. On the one side there is Nietzsche's idea that "Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior; all else is folly;" or as Mussolini puts it, "War alone brings to their maximum tension all human energies and stamps the seal of nobility on those peoples which have the virtue to face it. . . . There is too much talk altogether about Peace. When there are crises, it is arms and war which solve them;" or as Hitler states it, "In constant struggles mankind has become great—in eternal peace it must perish." On the other hand, there is the idea that war is but an expression of the brutal in man, that one of the aspirations of mankind has been and is to establish peace, and that only in peace will the human race achieve its fullest unfolding.[10]

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[9] See *The fundamentals, a testimony to the truth*, a pamphlet issued in 1910, possibly by the Presbyterian Church as a result of the prolonged and heated debate which occurred in the General Assembly of that year. See also C. Luther Fry and Mary Frost Jessup, "Changes in religious organizations" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends in the United States*, ii (New York 1933) 1011.

In the economic field there are the controversies between *laissez-faire* and control, capitalism and communism, class ruled and classless society, syndicalism and socialism. Numerous other illustrations will occur to the reader. The struggle of ideas and their corresponding modes of behavior is an outstanding phenomenon. It sometimes leads to overt conflict involving whole regions, nations, and peoples, as in the case of the Protestant Reformation; sometimes it recasts the mode of life of a whole nation, as when the mercantilism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reconstructed English economic life.

Contest Centering about Instruments. Contests occur also over the adoption or the nonadoption of instruments or other material objects. Handicraft workers offered a dogged resistance to the machine in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution. A little over a century ago, when the steam motor car was invented and put into operation, landlords and road commissioners resisted the innovation and opposed its use, claiming that it would ruin the roads, disturb horses, and destroy the peacefulness of their estates. Consequently, "the English Parliament enacted laws which practically eliminated the steam coach from the roads. . . . The Red Flag law . . . required that a man precede the horseless carriage carrying a red flag by day and a red lantern by night. In addition, the toll roads and bridges raised the charges for the steam carriages until they could no longer operate at a profit." [11] The result was that for nearly three-quarters of a century the steam motor coach did not come into general use in England.

V. INTERINSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE

Struggle also goes on between a single institution on the one hand and the rest of these social systems on the other. Some of this struggle is for the establishment of autonomy by nascent or ascendant institutions, as in the case of the educational and scientific systems in modern times; some of it is for the maintenance of position, as in the struggle now going on in the family to retain its affectional and educational functions in the face of the impingements of the educational, economic, and political systems; and some struggle is directed toward gaining or maintaining dominance over other institutions.

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[10] Sir Herbert Samuel, "Wars of ideas" in *International conciliation*, no. 330 (New York 1937) 475–476.

[11] Anon., "Motor car" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15 (14th ed. New York 1929) 880; see also W. T. Jackman, *Development of transportation in modern England*, i (Cambridge, England 1916) 334.

Religion vs. Other Institutions. The struggle between religion and government probably goes back to very early times when shaman and tribal chiefs contested for supremacy, but we know of it definitely since the days of the Hebrews. Their theocratic system claimed all authority to be of divine origin; the rulers were representatives of God; even the law was believed to have been directly handed by Jehovah to the religious leaders and the divinely appointed rulers. The Greeks contested this practice and in a measure established the authority of the people, and the Romans also in part contested it. But theocracy was reëstablished in early medieval times and became a master pattern in the Western world for a thousand years. Throughout the Middle Ages, the religious institution was literally regarded as the Kingdom of God on earth; canon law was supreme; and the dictum of Gregory VII (Pope from 1073–1085), "The Pope is master of the emperors," was a reality.[12]

The governmental system has now for centuries struggled to check or to destroy the dominance of the religious institution. From the eleventh century on, states began to contest the supremacy of the church and step by step have reduced its power. States have limited the number and functions of the clergy, have secularized law and the courts, have disbanded the various orders, dispossessed the church of its lands, laicised marriage and other relationships, and in a multitude of other ways have divested the church of much of its power. Science, education, and economic development have also contributed to this process, but the state has been the principal agency that has subordinated the religious system.

Government vs. Other Institutions. Nor has government itself been free from struggle. The state, all-dominant in Egypt, Greece, and especially in Rome, was checked by various forces in ancient and classical times, particularly by the democratic movement. The Greek democracy, the city-states of the Middle Ages, the vague discontent of the masses in the eleventh century, the challenge of royalty in twelfth-century England, the Magna Charta of 1215, the long contest between the aristocracy and the middle classes between 1689 and 1867 over the voting power, the actual adoption of democracy in England between 1867 and 1914, the American and French revolutions, and the virtual overthrow of nearly all monarchies at the close of the World War in 1918 have deprived the state of a great deal of absolutism.[13]

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[12] See chap. 21 above, subchap. ii on "Salient aspects of development of government."

In our time it is the economic system that offers the most dogged resistance to government. It resists government's regulation of conditions of labor, hours, and wages; it objects to security laws and other instruments of social security; it protests the taxing of wealth. Even in Italy the one agency that doggedly, though covertly, dares to challenge the fascist state is the economic system. The church also at times raises its voice against the absolutistic practices of government; in Russia, Italy, Germany, and Mexico, the church has again and again, though ineffectively, questioned the state. Likewise, the educational system now and then challenges the state, especially when a particular régime attempts to control it.

Science's Struggle. In the chapter on science we have detailed the long and arduous struggle science had to undergo to achieve status. Its present position is largely due to its medical and economic services. But science is even today not free from struggle. The religious system has not laid down its sword. The *Lamentabili* decree of the Holy See (1907), the *Pascendi* encyclical (1907), the Oxford movement in England and elsewhere, and the fundamentalist movement in the United States are surface evidences of the present-day struggle. Trials, such as that of Scopes in Tennessee in 1925, involving scientific fact and ideas are not unknown in our times; while commercial interests and pseudo-scientists constantly prostitute science.

Struggle of Educational Institution. The educational institution also has had to struggle to gain status. It had first to liberate itself from the control of religion, from the dogmatisms and speculations of the theologian, from the insistence on unquestioning acceptance of church teachings, and from church censorship. In this struggle the troubadours, the commercial revolution, the rise of the middle classes, the Protestant movement, the various discoveries and inventions, and the rise of science, all had a share. Gradually the school came under the control of the state and acquired the right to devote itself to the preparation of the young for the whole of life.[14]

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[13] See chap. 21 above, subchap. ii on "Salient aspects of development of government."

But the educational system has still to contest. With the growth of nationalism, the practice of using that institution as an agent for building up blind conformity and for upholding the state has grown apace. The nationalistic spirit in education, originating in Prussia, spread to France, later to England, and all the other countries of the Western world. In various countries today, notably Russia, Germany, and Italy, education has lost whatever independence it had gained and is employed to further partisan political ends, such as those of Communism, Nazism, and Fascism.

Economic Struggle. The struggle of the economic system is primarily with government. Particularly in modern times, government has assumed the right to control economic life. The contests over *laissez-faire* versus control, between individualism and socialism, between capitalistic fascism and proletarian communism are major aspects of the economic struggle. Government has assumed the right to control the exploitation of natural resources, regulate the conditions of labor, establish wage scales and working hours, insure security of employment, safeguard the savings of the masses, regulate capitalistic and commercial operations, and in many other respects to control economic activities. On the other hand, the economic institution now directly or indirectly controls government, religion, recreation, the family, and even science.

Familial Struggle. In the family the main struggle revolves around child-possessing, child-rearing and training. This right, seldom questioned in the past, has been attacked in recent centuries. Government has taken away the family's prerogative of inflicting bodily punishment on the child; the educational system has taken over education, the church, religious training; school and other community organizations carry on most of the play activities; the economic institution has removed production activities from the home and has often called the wife, the mother, and frequently the children away from the home; states have placed legal restrictions upon the right to transfer property. The family, therefore, the fundamental affectional unit of society, has been waging a losing fight, has lost many of the functions it once performed, and has become but the skeleton of its former self.

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[14] See chap. 16 above, subchap. ii on "Purpose of education in various periods."

VI. CULTURAL STRUGGLE

Contests of Cultures. Struggle often embraces whole cultures. Whenever peoples become aware of differences between their culture and that of others, they tend to magnify these differences, to interpret them in terms of superiority and inferiority, to hold firmly to and project their own culture, and to withstand all others, as if their very life depended upon it. Thus culture contact, especially when manipulated to political ends, produces struggle. This is especially the case where the contacting cultures differ sharply from each other. Marked differences in language build barriers and create misunderstandings; great differences in political organization breed distrust and hostility; economic and religious dissimilarities create superiority-inferiority doctrines and patterns of intolerance and ethnocentrism; and even varying food complexes or striking differences in dress may engender prejudice. Thus Poles come to be pitched against Russians, Kurds against Armenians, Greeks against Turks, Germans against Czechs, Italians against Germans and Austrians,[15] Christians against Jews, Catholics against Protestants.

This type of struggle becomes acute in the case of minorities. When peoples belonging to one culture enter in considerable numbers the territory of another culture, they seem inevitably to produce clashes of ideas, of modes of living, and especially in times of stress produce conflicts of the first order. The persecution of the Jews in late medieval times and in present-day Germany and the virtual expulsion of the Japanese from the United States are examples of this phenomenon.

Contest between Established and Nascent Complexes. Contest also goes on between cultural complexes which are established and those which are forming. The struggle between paganism and Christianity, between Greek democracy and Roman imperialism, and between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism are obvious examples; in our time the most dogged conflict is that between established capitalism and nascent communism. Sometimes the nascent element becomes the aggressor. Having been bludgeoned, misunderstood, misinterpreted, subjected to inconveniences and hardships by the established, the ascendant may take to the warpath and engage in a life-and-death struggle. The aggressive stand of present-day Italy, Germany, and Japan is a case in point.

[15] See esp. Pasquale Villari, *L'Italia e la civiltà* (Milan 1925) part iii.

Struggle between Conservatism and Liberalism. Again there is the ever present contest between conservatives and liberals in most societies. From time immemorial any change in moral codes, such as those pertaining to property rights, has set one segment of the population against another. Conflict of conservatism against liberalism is apparent in religion, in education, in government. Conservatism often turns into traditionalism or deliberate conservatism, an attempt to rationalize the established and to forestall change.[16] Conservatism and traditionalism often become aggressive in the form of antiradicalism, or the movement to put down agitators or new doctrines. The conservative forces are usually allied with the state; but when the state is itself captured by liberal or radical elements, the conservatives resort to extralegal or illegal means in an attempt to regain a hold on the source of power.[17]

Ruralism vs. Urbanism. The rural way and the urban way of life also often contest one another. Although cities were not large in ancient times, even then contest appeared. The contest became acute in the fifteenth century, when the expansion of commerce and the rise of the middle classes gave the city great power. In modern times the rapid growth of the city and its aggrandizing, octopus-like activities have led to a more or less open struggle. When land passes into the hands of nonagriculturalists, when landlords and money lenders tighten their hold around small owners and renters, and when the city encroaches on the water rights and other prerogatives of rural people, then severe conflict may arise.[18]

Minor aspects of the rural-urban contest involve ways of living, manners, morals, and fundamental values. Countrymen are ridiculed for their uncouth speech and dress; townsmen are called parasites on the farmer's toil. Some trouble arises in trading, over high town prices and over alleged rural trickery in palming off dubious products.[19]

In recent decades, however, the transmission of electric power, the increasing ease of transportation and communication, the press and the radio, have produced "rurban" centers or suburban communities, which combine the advantages of the city with those of the country, thus fusing rural and urban cultures and mitigating the urban-rural conflict.

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[16] Peter Richard Rohden, "Traditionalism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 15 (New York 1934) 67.

[17] See Alvin Johnson, "Antiradicalism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 116.

[18] Carle C. Zimmerman, "Rural society" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 13 (New York 1934) 470.

[19] See Alvin Johnson, "Agrarian movements" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 489–490.

VII. PRODUCTS OF STRUGGLE

Cultural Stimulation. Periods of intensive struggle have been associated with virility, physical movement, social mobility, and other characteristics evincing a fullness of life. The Age of Pericles, for example, an age of intensive struggle, produced and handed down many cultural items of the first magnitude. It produced immortals in nearly every field of human endeavor: the dramatists Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes; historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides; the sculptor, Phidias; architects such as Ictinus, Callicrates, and Mnesicles; the painter Polygnotus; and in philosophy Socrates, Zeno, Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Aspasia. That age also made marked deposits in education, athletics, government, and other aspects of associated life. The period of the Renaissance was likewise a time of intensive struggle and renewal. There was a sharp and far-reaching contest of ideas, modes of living, and organizations. That age produced Galileo, Savonarola, da Vinci, Correggio, Michelangelo, Titian, Ariosto, Tasso, Machiavelli, Isabella and Ferdinand of Spain, Montaigne, Martin Luther, Calvin, John Knox, Edmund Spenser, Ben Jonson, and William Shakespeare. Such periods are clearly ages of great mental activity, of newness of life, of vigor and power, of forward-looking on the part of those societies that come within the orbit of the struggle. At least struggle and these cultural products go side by side, and struggle seems to be the generative factor. There is greater effort, more marked selection, and a fuller flowering by individuals, groups, and whole institutions.

Change. Likewise, struggle and change are associated. Struggle produces change, and change is an element in struggle. Struggle brings about modification and alteration in essential concepts, usages, structures, modes. The changes produced by or associated with the French Revolution, the American Revolution, or the Russian Revolution are many and significant. As we have seen in the discussion of change, there is scarcely a field left unchanged in periods of intensive struggle.

Cohesion.. Struggle also produces cohesion. Under stress, labor organizations sometimes unite in a "general" strike; in times of war political parties "bury the hatchet," religious organizations or denominations unite against what they consider a common enemy, such as communism. More complex forms of social organization, the state, social classes, cohesive groups, and even nations are all in part the results of struggle. In the World War large segments of the West united to "make the world safe for democracy."

Maladjustment. As we shall indicate below, maladjustment is at once a source and a result of struggle. Maladjustment gives rise to struggle, and struggle to maladjustment. In the initial stages of the Russian Revolution, for example, the struggle to establish communism led to much maladjustment, and this maladjustment led to further struggle. At present that interrelation has acquired a wider sweep; Russia, still struggling to acquire status and to extend the reach of communism, is partly responsible for the wars and rumors of war which prevail in our day. Marx, in fact, predicted that the struggle will continue indefinitely until capitalism is eliminated; and that, if true, will continue to produce far-reaching maladjustments in the whole society.

Domination and Its Consequence. Domination is also at once one of the main objectives and a result of struggle. Struggle ordinarily produces or is associated with the dominance of one and the subjection of the other of the contestants. However, domination is not always one-sided; often one of the struggling parties may achieve dominance in some respect but become subject in others. And sometimes what is at first the weaker may in the long run become dominant in influence. "What at first appeared the weaker eventually becomes the stronger. This is particularly true of military victories or other successes due to physical force; the conquered often possess an old and complex culture that generates increased power after defeat. The conquerors endeavor to take over the culture of the conquered, and hence adjust to the weaker contingent and are thereby drawn further and further into the charmed circle of an alien people. . . . The relation of the Romans to the Greeks, [the Gallicalization of the conquering Franks in the sixth century], the fate of many Germanic tribes in the *Völkerwanderung*, and the absorption of the victorious Manchus by the Chinese culture they had apparently conquered are all cases in point." [20]

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[20] Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker, *Systematic sociology* (New York 1932) 200. By permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. See also Ross, *op. cit.*, 132–134.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Struggle, then, seems to be part of the very life of society. It now takes the form of attack, now that of sheer resistance; it is now merely competitive, now dogged and to the death. It goes on between the sex and age segments of society, between the various classes, between the institutions themselves, and even between whole cultures or phases of culture. Struggle stimulates culture, leads to new forms and expressions, produces cohesion and maladjustment, and often by domination tends to produce widespread decadence and the death of civilization itself. Struggle may be regarded as undesirable; society may be ever so deeply concerned with its elimination; yet it seems to be part of the very essence of individual as of group life, and life the very essence of struggle.

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Chapter 27

MALADJUSTMENT

I. THE CONDITION AND PROCESS DEFINED

Nature of Maladjustment. Social institutions never achieve a state in which all their parts fit into each other completely or in which they function perfectly. That is, they are at all times in a state of relative maladjustment. They fall short of completely fulfilling their basic functions, or they prey upon each other, or they do not otherwise function smoothly. Thus, according to this definition, maladjustment may be said to exist in the economic institution when, though resources and technology are such as to make possible an abundance for all, widespread scarcity prevails, or when the few appropriate the savings of the many, or when it so commercializes recreation as to rob it of some of its value, or when it turns the government into a mechanism for protecting this or the other economic interest. Maladjustment prevails in the religious institution when it becomes so involved in dogmatism, ritualism, doctrinal disputes, or political activities that it fails to give its adherents spiritual guidance.

Naturalness of Maladjustment. The prefix "mal" as used by sociology in the term maladjustment does not carry ethical evaluation; it does not mean "bad," "ill," or "wrong" in the moral sense; it only signifies incomplete or unsmooth adjustment or functioning. This is in keeping with reality. For maladjustment is not exceptional or extraneous; it is an integral part of social and cultural ongoing; it inheres in the very nature of society. Sociological writings often imply if not actually state that maladjustment is "abnormal," that it is due to corruption or to malfeasance. Actually maladjustment is part and parcel of the "normal" or the ordinary ongoing of society, if we may indulge in a paradox. Maladjustment inheres in the very nature of things: social relationships are so varied, so intricate that maladjustment results naturally in the very process of their functioning. Just as the human body is never in a state of perfect health, so is society. Or, to use a mechanistic analogy, just as the operation of a machine produces wear and tear of parts and disrepairs, so does the functioning of society.

Fractional Nature of Maladjustment. Maladjustment, however, constitutes but a fraction of the total ongoing of human society. Some writings give the impression that "social pathology," "maladjustment," "social problems" are about all there is to human society. While no data are available to indicate precisely what proportion of associated living is subjected to maladjustment, it is safe to assert that maladjustment probably does not constitute more than roughly a sixth of the total ongoing of associated living. That is, not more than that proportion of all social acts depart from the mores or are criminal, not more than a sixth of the marriages are broken by divorce or separation, nor more than ten to fifteen per cent of the population becomes indigent. In different periods or societies there may be more or less crime or poverty; but in most societies "pathological" conditions constitute but a fraction of the total human ongoing. Even profound business depressions, or revolutions and wars do not bring about general maladjustment; the vast majority of the population goes on its daily round scarcely knowing that there is any trouble. People marry, have children, produce and consume economic goods, meet their educational needs, and otherwise satisfy their wants as usual. Even during the World War and the revolutions which followed, life went on "normally" for the masses of the people; many people even in the heart of the warring nations went on their daily round of life without being greatly disturbed. To people outside its immediate orbit, the War was something remote and obscure, and one could find villages and hamlets in which the inhabitants had hardly heard of the War. In 1920 the newspapers of the United States were filled with descriptions of the impending Fascist Revolution; but one could go up and down Italy and while here and there he would see a momentary flare, he found that the people as a whole went about their affairs unconcerned.

Reach of Maladjustment. All of this is not intended to minimize maladjustment, nor the profound distress it causes, nor does it wink at the societal stupidity most maladjustment implies. Maladjustment is indeed a far-reaching phenomenon. In our times business depressions, widespread unemployment, marriage disorganization, class and national conflicts are so common that even the most carefree must be aware of them. Nor are maladjustments peculiar to our age or society: they have occurred over and over in the various stages of culture, among all peoples, and in all places. They vary in time and place, in number and intensity, among the various classes of society, and in the successive stages of cultural unfolding; but in their essence they are timeless and universal.

Moreover, maladjustment is a profound condition. In common speech we often speak of "social problems," by which we mean some pronounced unfavorable condition which catches the imagination of the community and leads to efforts to eliminate it. The widespread unemployment of our times is a good illustration. But maladjustment often goes much deeper. Underlying unemployment is technological invention and worker obsolescence, which prevent the economic system from functioning completely. Thus maladjustment reaches far deeper than is implied in the term social problems; phases of the latter may be readily remedied; but maladjustment usually calls for basic reconstruction, and that is seldom achieved.

II. SOURCES OF MALADJUSTMENT

General Causes of Maladjustment. Generally speaking, maladjustment arises from physical-natural, biological, and cultural causes. Of these, cultural causes are probably the most fertile. Natural phenomena and catastrophies and biological deficiencies do cause maladjustments; yet most maladjustment seems to be due to the intricacy of society and to the difficulty with which it can function smoothly or completely.

Some causes may be said to be primary and others secondary. The Industrial Revolution, for example, was probably a primary cause in the sudden spurt in population growth during the eighteenth century and part of the nineteenth. But that increase in population itself became a cause. It produced population pressure, rapid migration, international rivalry over population quantity, great urban concentration, intensified slum conditions, corruption in city government, and many other maladjustments. Primary causes produce conditions which involve maladjustment, which in turn becomes causes of other unfavorable situations.

This primacy and derivation, however, does not necessarily imply relative importance. Primary causes are not of necessity more productive of disturbance than secondary ones; in fact the latter often lead to difficulties which are severe and far-reaching, as the above statement of the results of the Industrial Revolution indicates.

Moreover, maladjustment does not arise from single causes. The specific causes mentioned in the following pages are singled out only for the purpose of detailed description; in actuality they do not work singly. Nearly every major maladjustment, when examined in detail, is found to have more than one predisposing condition. The modern divorce problem, for instance, may be traced in part to the age-long struggle for the emancipation of women and in part to the changes in economic life and in education which have taken place during the last century or more.

Physical Nature as Cause. Yet there are specific causes. Nature is one source of maladjustment. Floods, fires, famines, storms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions produce immediate destruction of lives and property and occasionally produce long-term maladjustments. A disaster may wipe out a community at one blow, as it did in the case of Pompeii, so that the result is more nearly extinction than maladjustment. More often, however, the attacks of nature are not so severe; wide areas are frequently affected; and there follow periods of economic insecurity, sudden displacement of population, crime, and even the collapse of the state.[1]

Inherent Deficiencies and Disease as Cause. Natural deficiencies in human beings, when sufficiently great and prevalent, produce widespread and long-enduring maladjustments. Feeblemindedness, insanity, and serious physical deficiencies, for example, prevent the smooth functioning of society. Juvenile dependency and delinquency are sometimes due to inherent defects. The natural deficiencies of old age make it difficult if not impossible for this age group to support itself, especially in our age when industry generally discards persons about forty-five years of age; and in the meantime the declining birth rate is greatly increasing the number of old-age people.[2]

Bionatural deficiencies, such as weakness in the nervous organization, mentality, or physical makeup of relatively normal persons, also produce maladjustment; and all individuals, if placed under sufficient strain, will break down in one or more ways. These deficiencies lead to divorce, the break-up of families, to conflict in the economic institution, to domineering on the part of some rulers, to

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[1] See Aleta Brownlee, "Disasters and disaster relief" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 161–162.

[2] For the occupational problem of the aged, see National Resources Committee, *Problems of a changing population* (Washington 1938) 31–34.

lack of coöperativeness among workers, and to undue acquisitiveness on the part of some segments of the population. Sometimes these bionatural deficiencies are intensified by some general process, such as rapid change, but they are always at work and produce maladjustments peculiar to themselves.

Disease also contributes to maladjustment. In 1920, for instance, disease was estimated to be the cause of three-fourths of the blindness in the United States, and only about one-eighth of the blind could be regarded as entirely self-supporting.[3] Poverty is both a cause and effect of disease. One study by the U. S. Public Health Service of Hagerstown, Pennsylvania, showed that the illness rate among the very poor and the poor was 25 per cent higher than among the well to do and comfortable.[4] Severe epidemics are also sources of maladjustments, such as the temporary failure of the food supply, the disruption of trade, and the interruption of traffic. Pestilences, however, are of short duration; the effects attributed to them are generally exaggerated, for the society soon recovers.[5]

Demographic Causes. Population changes often produce maladjustment. The growth of the population beyond the available resources ordinarily produces widespread undernourishment; a marked decline in the birth rate increases the number of old people who become a burden on the rest of the society; a large migration may result in an excess of females in the community of departure and an excess of males in the community of destination, which in turn often results in marital maladjustment in both communities; high densities of population, as in Italy, Germany, and Japan, may give reason or excuse for wars; the reproduction and protection of the biologically unfit may increase inherent deficiencies and place enormous burdens on the community.

Struggle for Survival and Maladjustment. Of the cultural causes of maladjustment, one of the more important is the struggle for survival. Since each individual and group depends on the same supply of natural resources for physical maintenance, each enters into contest with others to gain a share of sustenance and security. This does not mean that the struggle for survival is always crude and to the death. So long as the struggle is on the person-to-person plane, no significant maladjustment seems to arise; members of a primary group seldom rob one another of sustenance or shelter; seldom do they exterminate or permit others to perish; on the social plane the principle of mutual aid seems to be at work generally.[6]

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[3] See Harry Best, "Blind" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 587, 589.

[4] Edgar Sydenstricker, "Morbidity" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 7.

[5] C. A. Gill, "Epidemics" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 571–572.

The moment struggle for survival becomes societal, however, it produces blocks of groups, strata, nations, or whole societies, which contest with one another and even enter into dogged conflict. The class struggle of our times is a case in point. In such a struggle, the privileged are able to have relatively more and more goods and security and the nonprivileged less and less; as a high concentration of wealth on the one hand and widespread poverty on the other occurs, a contest ensues; the wealthy struggle to hold on to what they have and to acquire more; the poor try to secure more than they have; societal strains, frictions, wastes, often open combat follow, thus creating some of the more persistent maladjustments of our times.

Part of the struggle for survival extends into a striving for improvement. That is, people seldom face extinction; but they constantly seek to overcome the untoward conditions under which they labor and to make life more endurable and secure. But here again those groups, classes, and nations which are in a relatively advantageous position tend to impede the efforts of those in less favorable situations. The former, by virtue of the position they hold, are able further to improve their condition, to advance their standards of living, to acquire more natural resources, more leisure, better educational or recreational facilities; while those in unfavorable conditions not only have a much more difficult task, but generally are prevented from improving their conditions and often are driven into further distress. The result is widespread maladjustment. The imbalance between industry and agriculture, international trade contests, tariff wars are phenomena related to this type of struggle. Italy, Germany, and Japan, in order to improve their condition and live on a more nearly equal footing with the countries that already have large colonies, are trying to secure added resources by colonial expansion. Thus, the fight between the "haves" and the "have nots," presumably as old as the race, spreads, becomes persistent, produces a plethora of difficulties, throws the whole society into maladjustment.

[6] See P. Kropotkin, *Mutual aid* (rev. ed. London 1904) *passim.*

Cultural Change and Maladjustment. The rise of forms, modes of thinking, customs which differ sharply from those prevailing, or even the introduction of new devices may produce maladjustment. The introduction of new materials or resources, such as iron in ancient times or electricity in our times; the invention of new instruments, such as the printing press, the telephone, and the telegraph; the discovery of a new route, such as that of the upper Mediterranean in ancient times; the adoption of new concepts and practices, such as those of Protestantism and nationalism, are primary causes of disturbance, disequilibrium, and disharmony of the first order.

It is not the new culture element *per se* that produces maladjustment, but the reactions it produces. The appearance of new elements leads to a contest, sometimes to an open conflict between the old and the new, the established and the ascendant; the dominant groups resist the ascendant, and the new insist on achieving status. And this conflict, providing the new is sufficiently significant, produces widespread strain, friction, and malfunctioning.

Change results in maladjustment in another way. Parts of institutions or whole institutions do not change correlatively with others. For example, the growth of industry in modern times has far outstripped the growth of government's control over it or its ability to control and direct itself as small, handcraft industries were able to do. Notwithstanding criticisms of Professor Ogburn's "cultural lag" formula, the fact remains that an invention or discovery may set some phase of society into such rapid and accelerative motion that other aspects cannot catch up with it. And that is often a primary source of difficulties.

Culture Conflict as Source of Maladjustment. Culture contact sometimes leads to maladjustment. The contests between Christianity and Mohammedanism in the Crusades; the mass expulsion of the Jews from England in the thirteenth century and from Spain during the Renaissance and their compulsory segregation into ghettos in the sixteenth century; the expulsion of the Armenians from Turkey at the end of the World War; the anti-Semitism of present-day Germany, are examples of the conflicts themselves and of the maladjustments to which they give rise. They affect adversely not only the persecuted groups, but also the nations which conduct the persecutions, while communities and nations which receive the refugees are suddenly faced with the problem of caring for large numbers of people and of assimilating the newcomers to their culture. The presence of numerous German Jews in Italy and their capture of the various key positions in the professions have in part been responsible for the development of anti-Semitism even in Italy.

Thus the contact of peoples, or the presence of extraneous cultural groups within any cultural area, almost invariably leads to difficulties. The irredentism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries contributed to the World War; and since cultures cannot be held in water-tight compartments, it is likely that irredentism will always be an important cause of widespread maladjustment.[7] The Negro-White conflict in the United States produces for the Negro a lower wage scale, poorer housing, segregation, discrimination, and occasional lynchings.[8]

Development as Source of Maladjustment. As institutions undergo development, intricacy, elaboration, loss or appropriation of functions, they generate maladjustment. When education develops too many curricular subdivisions, courses, and requirements, when it loses sight of community objectives, or becomes the tool of industry or government, it is evincing or is headed toward maladjustment. Just as breakdowns are more probable in highly complicated machinery, just as the increase in the number of motor vehicles increases the likelihood of accident, so the growing intricacy of institutional life multiplies the probability of maladjustment. When the processing of food is taken from the home and placed in the factory, when the factory becomes an instrument of a nation-wide corporation and the corporation comes to be controlled by an investment banking house, the responsibility for the sanitation and purity of the food becomes so distant as to be exceedingly feeble. The state develops health boards, but these often become political plums and interfere with, rather than aid in, the functioning of sanitary inspectors. The increase in the number of relationships, the indirection which such an increase produces, the lack of personal contacts make it impossible for rulers to appreciate the problems of the masses or they may become so "hard boiled" as not to care.

[7] See Jakob Lestschinsky, "Ghetto" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences,* 6 (New York 1931) 646–648; Joseph J. Senturia, "Mass expulsion" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences,* 10 (New York 1933) 185–189; Max Hildebert Boehm, "Irredentism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences,* 8 (New York 1932) 325–328.

[8] See Hans Kohn, "Race conflict" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences,* 13 (New York 1934) 38–40; Francis W. Coker, "Lynching" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences,* 9 (New York 1933) 639–641.

Further, differential development will set communities or classes into a state of conflict; it will lead the more developed to act with an air of superiority, while the underprivileged will employ obstructive tactics against the "high-brows," the "city slickers," the "imperialists." Persistence also produces maladjustment, as when religion, losing its essential meaning because of its rigidity and dominance, becomes internally corrupt and hunts down and persecutes dissenters.

III. MAJOR CONTEMPORARY MALADJUSTMENTS

Increase of Maladjustments in Our Times. Maladjustment, as we have stated above, is not a phenomenon peculiar to any particular age. Such records as have come down from ancient, classical, and medieval times seem to indicate that in every civilization cycle there occurs a definite movement from clarity of objectives, simplicity, homogeneity, fewness of impacts, and directness toward obscurity of objectives, complexity, heterogeneity, multiplicity of impacts, indirection, and sophistication. In the early stages, as in colonial North America, life is simple and maladjustments are few, but as culture advances, life becomes complicated, problems seem to increase, and especially when the civilization process intensifies, maladjustments seem to increase in number and intensity. This may explain the many problems of our time.

Principal Present-Day Maladjustments. The main maladjustments of our time are rooted in the contest between the outlook and temper of medieval times and those of our age. The cumulative segmentation of the religious institution and the decline of religious authority, the weakening of the moral sense, personal economic aggrandizement, overelaboration of governmental and educational activities, are all productive of maladjustment. In their bewilderment people grasp desperately after anything on which they can pin their faith, be it communism, the Nordic myth, or some other faith.

In material culture, we find great wealth, comfort, diversity of life side by side with widespread, often abject poverty, unemployment, women and child labor. Marriage and the family are experiencing disorganization, divorce, desertion, nonsupport of children. In education we have distortion, overmultiplication of paraphernalia, and partisan uses; overconcentrated control, overorganization, artificialization, and commercialization in recreation; a multitude of sects, dilution of functions, and heterogeneity in religion; and in government we find bureaucracy and corruption rife, especially in the great cities, a loss of regard for legal procedures, and a consequent rush to coercive methods.

IV. EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE PRONOUNCED MALADJUSTMENTS

"Practical Social Service." Society puts forth much effort in aiding those who are maladjusted and in attempting to eliminate maladjustments. A considerable amount of this activity is carried on by so-called social service clubs, men's and women's clubs, educational or religious organizations. This activity consists of helping the families in a given neighborhood needing food, clothing, and medical attention, in giving outings to the children of a congested area, in affording "protection" to newspaper boys, in "Americanizing" the foreigner, and similar work.

Generally speaking, practical social service is hit-or-miss, fragmentary, unplanned, relies on so-called common sense, usually aims at immediate results, seldom undertakes to prevent the recurrence of the conditions it deals with, and almost always ignores the underlying factors. People interested in practical social service are ordinarily impatient of a long view of a given situation or of studying the basic conditions involved. They are usually of the "Lady Bountiful" type, who seek self-projection and satisfaction rather than the betterment of others. Sometimes they do render needed help, but even that generally tends to foster dependence.

Philanthropy. Philanthropy has engaged the attention of society from early times. Among the ancients it was the religious and civic duty of the citizen to succor the aged, widowed, orphans, and mendicants, to feed and shelter the unattached poor. In Greece a considerable amount of public relief went on. Taxes were remitted, debts annulled, the land and wealth of the well-to-do were sometimes confiscated and distributed to the poor, cash and goods were often distributed, and emigration was sometimes encouraged. In Rome there was frequent distribution of corn, and the wealthy were under duty to assist those in need. In the Middle Ages the monastic orders for centuries devoted themselves mainly to philanthropic activity. In modern times there are whole associations devoted to that activity.

Philanthropy is in part prompted by a fear that if the needy are not assisted they may become a menace to the security of society. It therefore does effect some measure of social control. It is possible that governments sometimes deliberately employ this device to hold their needy in check. By feeding the hungry, succoring the distressed, providing employment, even though it be nominal, to the unemployed, and by giving aid through agencies, both private and public, they prevent some overt conflicts, uprisings, and revolts. In addition, by keeping the sufferings of the people before the wealthy and those in power, philanthropy also prevents the latter from becoming too calloused or cruel. But philanthropy seldom, if ever, effects basic solutions of any problem.

Social Work. Social work is a third method employed in dealing with pronounced maladjustments. Social work, especially as developed in recent decades and more particularly in the United States, aims to apply scientific or semiscientific procedures to the correction or prevention of social ills. It generally directs its attention to the relief of unfavorable conditions, such as poverty, sickness, delinquency, and crime; or to the care of dependent, neglected, and defective children; and sometimes to the prevention of these conditions. It sometimes aims at aiding the individual to adjust himself to his social environment and thereby to make his own living or to conduct himself in harmony with society. Sometimes it takes over recreational and other leisure-time activities and endeavors through these to effect the correction of defects or the prevention of them. Occasionally it takes part in social reform and even larger planning.[9]

Reform. Reform goes beyond the alleviative activity of philanthropy and aims more or less permanently to improve the conditions, as when provisions are made for old age pensions, for the sheltering of the homeless, for making secure the savings of the people, or for the public employment of the unemployed. Reform involves greater deliberation, more planning than does philanthropy; it is directed toward the mitigation, the elimination, and sometimes the prevention of maladjustment.

Reform relies almost wholly on emotional agitation and on legislation; it usually centers its attention on single maladjustments or aspects of them; it often fails to perceive the relation of these to other conditions; it frequently directs its efforts towards the mitigation of some immediate unfavorable condition, rather than towards long-term or preventive solutions; it almost invariably proceeds by trial and error and frowns on investigation; and ordinarily it is based on preconceived ideas as to what are the desirable solutions and the means of attaining them. In short, the reformer wants to correct conditions and wants to do it quickly; he brushes aside the scientist's suggestion that basic changes are necessarily slow; and shrinks from the revolutionary's tenet that what is needed is not a tinkering with some one maladjustment but an overhauling of the entire system or of some one key institution.[10]

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[9] For statements regarding the various phases of professional social work see Russell Sage Foundation, *Social work yearbook* (various editions); Philip Klein, "Social work" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 14 (New York 1934) 165–173; and Edwin R. A. Seligman, "What are the social sciences?" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 5.

Reconstruction. From time to time, society strives to reshape its structure so as to remove the basic causes of maladjustment and to build a better order. This type of effort differs from reformative activity in that the latter leaves the relationships and the entire structure untouched, as when in most countries efforts are made merely to readjust the capitalistic system and thereby to improve conditions; whereas reconstruction alters or aims to alter some basic feature, as when Russia attempts to replace the capitalistic order with one based on community ownership and the sharing of the fruit of economic activity.

One of the main means of effecting reconstruction is revolution. Revolution consists of a sudden emotional outburst on the part of considerable segments of the population against fundamental hardships which neither philanthropy has been able to alleviate nor reform has been able to remedy. In its immediate aspect it aims to mitigate or eliminate the suffering of the people, but in its long-time phases it aims to eradicate the primary source or sources of the unfavorable conditions. For that reason revolution is called "radical," that is, it goes to the root (Latin *radix*) of things. While reform proceeds by gradual, peaceful, legislative means and deals with single situations or conditions, revolution is a rapid, sudden movement, involving sharp conflicts, and aims to destroy the bases of the society which produce the maladjustments with one fell stroke.

Whether revolution actually creates a new order or merely recasts the old, is questionable. Revolution usually effects great destruction of wealth, disruption of productive activity, widespread disorientation, and gives rein to fanaticism and mob rule to such an extent that it may well be regarded as one form of maladjustment or the substitution of one form of abuse for another. Yet revolution often effects more or less permanent changes of a basic character. These are detailed above, in the chapter on Persistent Problems in Government.

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[10] Horace M. Kallen, "Reformism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 13 (New York 1934) 194–195.

Societal Engineering. In recent centuries Western society has initiated another method of reconstruction, namely, societal engineering. Societal engineering aims to bring about major improvements by the employment of intelligence and reason. It relies mainly on the scientific discovery of the facts and on the application of this knowledge to the elimination of maladjustment. It is not concerned with immediate problems or their solution, but rather with the understanding of the sources of maladjustment, with the elimination of the basic causes, and with the construction of a new order. It is a very slow process, as yet understood by a very small number of persons, detested by "common-sense" people, by philanthropists, reformers, politicians, and revolutionists, and regarded with suspicion by all who have "vested interests" in the dominant order. By the few it is regarded as the only method through which society will ever achieve improvement. Technocracy, which aims to reconstruct society by means of controlling the production and distribution of power, such as electricity, is an illustration of this type of societal activity.

Is Maladjustment Ever Eliminated? The precise extent to which one or the other of the methods mentioned above is effective cannot be stated. Maladjustment, as pointed out above, seems to prevail in all places and times notwithstanding all the efforts that society puts forth.

And yet some maladjustments have been eliminated during the historical period. Women and children have been freed from the overdominance of the male; slavery has been abolished; much of the irksomeness of labor has been lightened; widespread famines are relatively few; religious bigotry and intolerance are largely a thing of the past; overconcentration of governmental power and aspects of tyranny have been largely eliminated.

But the elimination of one maladjustment seems to bring about new maladjustments. The liberation of women and children has weakened familial cohesion, produced such phenomena as desertion, separation, and divorce; economic freedom constitutes part of the class struggle; religious liberty has given rise to heterogeneity, the weakening of the moral sense, and spiritual bewilderment; the distribution of governing power has produced far-reaching corruption and confusion. In fact, maladjustments seem invariably to follow every attempt to improve conditions; a state of equilibrium is never reached; and there are relatively long periods in human history when maladjustment is so profound that we call such epochs decadent.

Yet mankind is so constituted that it refuses to lay down its sword; its hope springs anew and leads again and again to fresh endeavors. And though its achievements may not be regarded as progress in the absolute sense, it does make gains toward those conditions which it conceives desirable.

V. CONCLUSION

Maladjustment, then, is a phenomenon not peculiar to our time or to any time, place, or stage of culture. It seems to be part of the very nature of society. It may arise from the struggle for survival on the part of a society or its subdivisions, from ever renewed attempts by the whole human race to improve its lot, from the frailties of human nature, from the inevitable dominance of single institutions, from cultural or racial conflict, or from a combination of any or of all these. But it is ever at work in the wholeness of human society, making the society actually ill at times, and probably conducing to the sudden arrests in the advance of culture which society sometimes experiences. And yet though apparently never fully succeeding, mankind directs much attention to attempts to eliminate the great maladjustments and to achieve an increasing degree of control.

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Chapter 28

CONTROL

I. THE PROCESS DESCRIBED

Aside from the elimination of pronounced maladjustments, society carries on a process by which it creates and maintains uniformity and conformity of behavior. Part of this process consists of directing individuals and groups into normative collective behavior and part of it consists of restraining, or preventing, or correcting departures from the norms. While the term "control" is used to include both aspects, for the sake of clarity we shall in the present discussion designate the former aspect by the term guidance, the latter by control. The two are but phases of one process, the objective being to create or maintain uniformity of behavior.

Automatic Aspect of Control. In their larger and long-time aspects, both guidance and control are mainly automatic and adaptive. That is to say, neither the agent, say a teacher, nor the subject, a pupil, is particularly aware that he is guiding or being guided. Agent and subject simply interact spontaneously, by trial and success or failure, and through minute, imperceptive steps transmit or absorb the cultural patterns. As the biological organism in the course of growth gradually and over a long time accommodates itself to the physical environment, so do human individuals and groups conform to the cultural environments in the course of functioning, while passing through the various phases of life. They acquire the culture in the midst of which they are placed over their entire lives. The child gradually learns the language, takes on the mode of dress, acquires the religion of his group, follows the mate-choosing ways, and otherwise adopts the culture of his time and place. The adult likewise constantly adapts himself to the various situations arising during the different stations of life. The foreigner step by step learns the language, adopts the dress and the food patterns, may even change his name, his religion, and his citizenship, and in other ways assimilates the culture of the country in which he has come to reside.

Purposefulness in Guidance and Control. Many aspects of both guidance and control, however, do contain awareness, deliberation, and purpose. Parents, teachers, ministers of religion, some lawyers, judges, legislators, governmental executives, and occasional industrialists, businessmen, and financiers, who are the main active agents in guidance and control, are usually aware of the meaning of their activity and are embued with purpose. There are some who feel a "burden," a sense of deep responsibility to their fellowmen to devote their lives to the directing of the community toward the "good life" or to restrain departures from it. Some engage in these activities professionally; others follow them as an avocation. Some serve directly, as teachers or ministers; others indirectly, as members of school or church boards, as propagandists, or in other ways. Many are fully aware of the social import of their activity.

II. MEANS OF GUIDANCE

Guidance through Custom. In general, the entire institutional order of folkways, mores, organizational rules, decrees, and laws constitutes the means of guidance whereby society canalizes collective behavior. By making provisions that spouses shall be chosen within the bounds of race, that the marriage contract shall be entered into according to a given procedure, that children shall attend school up to a certain age, that traffic shall move at a certain speed, that parents shall support children, society directs the life of its members into the established patterns. In addition, public opinion, suggestion, appeals to personal ideals, art, and literature serve as machinery for grooving social behavior.[1]

Associations as Means of Guidance. Customs, however, do not operate in a vacuum; they function mainly by means of and through associations; and for this reason associations are among the more important means of guidance. The religious, recreational, educational, and governmental associations set the stamp of the culture patterns on each rising generation; now by moral and social instruction, now by suggestion and informal inculcation, they guide the members of society in its normative behavior.

Associations are important also because they have definite purposes or objectives; they set forth standards, rules, codes, laws, and maxims for the carrying out of the purposes; they have systems of discipline which lead members to conform to their standards and rules; and through the direct influence they have over their members, they persuade or compel common action.[2] Furthermore, since most associations are voluntary, they have the consent of their members; and therefore they are able to enforce their rules with comparative ease. Even a state, which often enacts laws created by or representing the interest of a small majority or a powerful minority, frequently evokes willing acceptance of the rules.[3]

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[1] See Edward Alsworth Ross, *Social control* (New York 1901) *passim.*

Of all the associations, the school and the church are most active in guidance. The school is almost wholly directed toward guiding the youthful generations into conformity. By imparting a knowledge of the culture heritage, by appealing to the self-interest and the aspirations of the individual, by making patriotic or moral appeals, the school directs the behavior of the young. The church acts in a similar manner. By extolling the moral life and promising rewards for the religious life, by building up the hope of salvation and immortality, religion brings about conformity. Preaching and the various forms of confession are also great directive forces; the priest, held to be sacred and endowed with divine wisdom, is believed to be capable of giving divine guidance and therefore is often very influential.[4]

Concepts as Means of Guidance. Ideas, beliefs, and ideals are powerful means of societal guidance. Magical beliefs have been employed from very early times; probably no contemporary leader, unless it be a great dictator, has the authority to compel action which the magician-priest or the king-priest of former times had.

The upholding of ideals, such as those of justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, socialism, fascism, or communism, is influential in grooving the activities of millions of people. In the United States even holding up the idea of the sacredness of the Constitution or of the Supreme Court has had a large influence in guiding the masses into conformity.

The idealizing of outstanding individuals, such as Washington and Lincoln, Gandhi and Lenin, Hitler and Mussolini, acts as an effective means of societal guidance. Some leaders profess to be inspired, or at least they or their followers lead the masses to entertain that belief. Others, as for example von Hindenburg, in character humble, modest, and retiring, are sometimes, against their own will, set on a pedestal by the worshipping masses. The authority and prestige of the leader, thus idealized, are great; the higher the position or office he holds in government, religion, business, or other calling, the stronger is his power to sway the masses, the more potent his ability to lead the people to subordinate their individual purposes or to see them embodied in the leader. On the other hand, the debasement of the great leader may change the course of a society. Perhaps there is no more massive instance in modern times than that of von Hindenburg who rose step by step during the World War until he was the idol of Germany, the *Vater des Volkes*, more highly and affectionately regarded than anyone else in the entire country, but who fell almost overnight and thereby contributed to the change in Germany's life from a republic to a dictatorship.

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[2] Jerome Dowd, *Control in human societies* (New York 1936) 12–13.

[3] *Ibid.*, 309–310.

[4] Florian Znaniecki, *Social actions* (New York 1936) 179–182.

Sometimes the recasting of concepts has a powerful influence in societal guidance. The various sects of Christianity have in recent decades reëxamined and restated their fundamental tenets, have stressed the fundamental similarity of their doctrines and glossed over the theoretical dissimilarities of their beliefs, and have thereby been able to face in a united manner the spiritual confusion of our times. In the United States, where this movement has perhaps gone farther than elsewhere, even the most divergent religious bodies—Jews and Christians, Catholics and Protestants—have eliminated much intolerance, have led to the organization of community churches, and otherwise guided the community toward collaboration.[5]

Other Means of Guidance. Other means of guidance range all the way from the telling of simple fairy tales to the most complicated theological, ethical, and metaphysical arguments and discussions. Society also bestows rewards and gifts, medals and public citations, prizes, promotions, bonuses, and pensions; it publicly extols those who have distinguished themselves in conformative activity; it employs slogans and rallying cries, erects monuments, and conducts propaganda to call attention to the deeds of the great conformist; and in numerous other ways it keeps before the public the established. Napoleon is said to have remarked, "You manage men with toys." [6]

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[5] See Dowd, *op. cit.*, 283–288.

[6] See Frederick Elmore Lumley, *Means of social control* (New York 1925) 31–210;

Very common in our times is propaganda. Propaganda is not unlike the preaching of the Middle Ages, with the exception that the priest, believed to be sacred and have mandates from God, was able to compel immediate action, whereas propaganda for the most part merely prepares the hearer or reader for action at some future time, such as for purchasing an article, voting in an election, or enlisting in time of war.[7]

III. SOCIETAL CONTROL

General Means of Control. Societal control is directed toward checking, restraining, and preventing what is considered undesirable behavior or activity, or toward repairing breaks or departures after they have occurred, or sometimes toward preventing them, or in punishing those engaged in them. In this activity as in guidance, the mores and the laws in general are the main and most effective means. By prohibiting mating out of wedlock, by proscribing bigamy, homicide, infanticide, and abortion, by forbidding the taking of another's property, and in numerous other ways society prevents nonconformative activity.

Coercive Means of Control. In control, however, as in guidance, society employs specific means to restrain individuals and groups from undertaking nonconformative activity, or to prevent departures from the norm, or to correct them once they have occurred, and to punish those who engage in them.

For the most part these techniques involve coercion. Coercion ranges all the way from reprimand to severe bodily and mental punishment. Some coercion is mild and sympathetic, as when the juvenile court reprimands the child or lightly punishes him. Some coercion is direct, as when the church expels a member; and some is indirect, as when the state carries out wholesale and spectacular arrests of criminals or radicals in order to intimidate all those engaged in such activity.

A mild form of coercion consists of gossip and ridicule, which are employed mostly in relation to the more intimate aspects of social life, as in the infringement of sex mores. Moral coercion is likewise employed to restrain intangible departures, and it usually takes the form of breaking off relationships with the individual or

R. M. MacIver, "Pressures, social" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 344–348; Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, iii (New York 1935) 1319–1320.

[7] Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, 179–182.

group. Religious coercion characterizes the nonconformist as sinful and threatens him with damnation, hell fire, or other punishment in the future life. Economic coercion deprives the individual of the means necessary to carry on his activities and sometimes even deprives him of his livelihood, as when an employer discharges a radical worker or organizer. More severe is what may be called physiological coercion, by which constituted authority, ordinarily a state, inflicts bodily pain or torture so as to associate the pain with the antisocial act. Most severe of all is physical coercion, such as banishment, prolonged imprisonment, and even binding, crippling, or killing the individual. Ordinarily this is done not only as a punishment to the individual but also as a warning to others.[8]

Effectiveness of Coercion. To what extent coercion does actually correct or prevent departures from the norms is difficult to state. In all likelihood it does prevent some immediate nonconformist acts or promotive activity. Generally, however, it drives the aberrant into secret activity rather than brings him within the orbit of conformity. Moreover, the punishment of a "radical" brings him to the attention of a wide public, strengthens the convictions of his followers and of those who are in sympathy with his cause, and often it wins those who are undecided to the side of the punished. The repeated imprisonment and banishment of Stalin are a case in point. Furthermore, if the suffering of a people is sufficiently deep, as was that of the Russian workers, no amount of coercion seems to prevent the people from rising up *en masse* in defiance of the established order.

IV. CONTROL BY INSTITUTIONS

Control by Whole Institutions. Transcending the control exercised by society over individuals and groups with respect to its general norms, there is the control which is carried on by institutions as such over other institutions or phases of institutions. In the chapter on Struggle it was shown how now one institution and now another aims at control or dominance of some other social system or the entire institutional complex. Directly or indirectly, deliberately or undeliberately, every institution controls or is controlled by another. In the ancient world it was the religious system that held sway; in classical times the government dominated the ongoing of all other systems; in medieval times again it was religion;

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[8] See Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, 94–96; Lumley, *op. cit.*, 211–383.

and in modern times it is the economic system that directly or indirectly has the controlling influence over the other institutions.

The church has frequently exercised or aimed to exercise such control. The following illustration, though savoring of the Dark Ages, is authentically contemporary. The Greek Orthodox Church so hated Venizelos, so feared his possible domination, that the Metropolitan Ambrosios and Archbishop Nikephoros pronounced the following anathemas upon him:

> "Upon that mercenary Senegalese and he-goat traitor Venizelos we have pronounced EXCOMMUNICATION with the prayer that the following calamities may befall him:
>
> THE SORES OF JOB,
> THE FATE OF JONAH,
> THE LEPROSY OF JOHAVA,
> THE GLOOM OF THE DEAD,
> THE AGONY OF THE DYING,
> THE THUNDERS OF HELL,
> THE CURSE OF GOD AND OF MEN."
>
> And against those who should vote for Venizelos was pronounced the same anathema, with a prayer added that their hands might wither and that they might become deaf and blind.[9]

In addition, all institutions exercise considerable control at all times. The religious system is a powerful influence by preaching conformity, education by inculcating it, and the economic system by holding the threat of want.

Methods of Governmental Control. The more formal manifestations of institutional control are those of government, especially in modern times when it has acquired the prerogative of regulating nearly every important aspect of life. Generally speaking, government controls by means of laws and decrees, by courts and other legal means, by police and jail.

Government, however, employs more specific, and sometimes subtle, techniques of control. It often exercises considerable restraint by turning juvenile and adult energy into play, by establishing playgrounds and placing them under the directorship of personnel trained to carry out the will of the state; it organizes great feasts and exhibits, spectacular games, and excursions. It

[9] Compton Mackenzie, "Venizelos" in *Men of turmoil* (New York 1935) 248. By permission of G. P. Putnam's Sons.

controls by demonstrations, by means of regal splendor, parades, and celebrations.

Moreover, government controls by expulsion. It keeps out of its ranks, forbids the entrance of, and outlaws radicals and persons who are not in agreement with its policies, as when prerevolutionary Russia exiled Stalin or when revolutionary Russia banished Trotsky. Government employs intimidation. It often carries out large-scale arrests of criminals and radicals, not alone for the punishment of the principals who are usually elusive, but also to intimidate the masses, to prevent others from joining the ranks of the proscribed, and to impress the community with its power. The wholesale imprisonment of anti-Fascists in Italy in 1925, the repeated arrests of anti-Communists in present-day Russia, and the raids on Communists in the United States in 1919 and 1920 are cases in point.

The most drastic and perhaps most effective means of control government employs is that of the wholesale destruction of individuals and groups engaged in proscribed activity. The mass extermination of Christians in Rome during the first and second centuries, the large-scale slaughter of heretics in Spain during the Inquisition, the assassination of anti-Fascists in Italy during the latter part of 1925, the "terrible but necessary" purge conducted by the Nazis during the week-end of June 30, 1934, the execution of anti-Communists in Russia at various times, illustrate efforts by government to maintain or attempt to maintain control over a people.

Effectiveness of Institutional Control. The effectiveness of control exercised by institutions, especially by government, cannot be measured with any degree of exactness. Because society does not experiment, it is difficult to determine whether a given pattern prevails because of or despite the pursuit of one policy or another.

The actual results of control vary. The Roman Empire was unable to exterminate Christianity; the various nations during the Middle Ages were unable to destroy the influence of the Jews by expelling them; the anti-Communist raids in the United States did not prevent the spread of communist thought or forestall trade with Russia. On the other hand, the Spanish Inquisition did rid Spain of heresy; the purges of the Fascist, Nazis, and Communists have prevented, at least for the time being, the rise of counter movements.

Generally speaking, coercive control seems either to be ineffective or to drive the persecuted under cover, thereby strengthening him and in the long run making him triumphant. By persecuting the Christians, by driving them into the catacombs, by throwing them to the wild beasts in the Colosseum, Rome but strengthened them and weakened itself. The iron rule of both Germany and Russia in prewar Poland but increased the determination of the Poles to be free, and as a result of the World War they did become free. Bismarck's iron heel was unable to eradicate socialism and Catholicism from Germany, and William II had to give in on many matters in order to get support for his measures.[10]

The effectiveness of control, especially when exercised by despotic government, is conditioned by the fact that the despot is obliged to carry out his control through a hierarchy of officials and soldiers. The wider the reach of government, the greater the extent of the coercive measures, and the more comprehensive the control intended, the more government must rely upon subordinates in the carrying out of its purpose. Moreover, if the population involved contains mixed and divergent ethnic, religious, or economic groups, a larger number of subordinates is needed in enforcing its will. But these subordinates are part and parcel of the community; they may have themselves experienced the hardships leading the community to disobey or to defy the state; they may have seen relatives and friends undergoing the difficulties; and therefore they may merely nod their head or do nothing. Moreover, "the people who are charged with their application are weak in resolve, while resistance on the part of those who are to obey is energetic. From that standpoint a despot often has far less power than a free government, since the measures dictated by the latter usually express the will of a party and consequently find many supporters to look after their enforcement. . . ." [11]

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Chapter 29

PERSISTENCE

I. NATURE AND UNIVERSALITY OF PERSISTENCE

Persistence Described. Once an institution, a subinstitution, or a subphase of an institution has come into existence, it tends to cling tenaciously to itself, to persevere, to go through only such modifications as are essentially in harmony with it, to assimilate such departures as may have fortuitously occurred, and as a whole to project itself into the future. Once the marital system, or monogamy, monotheism, private property, or capitalism has developed, it will tend to persist in all its essentials for a long time, over an entire culture area, among all classes, and through the various vicissitudes of cultural development. To this condition and process we apply the term persistence.

Change does occur, but persistence underlies change. To use a rough analogy, persistence is to change what the ocean is to its surface movements: the ocean as a whole remains practically unchanged in size, configuration, volume, depth, whereas drifts and flows, currents and undertows, tides and waves, eddies and streams come and go in endless succession, without affecting the totality of the ocean. So do changes occur in the totality of persistent institutions.

The tendency at present is to play up change and virtually to ignore persistence. This is probably due to the fact that so many changes in the exterior aspects of culture have occurred in recent centuries that they impress the observer. Also, the idea of progress and its corollary that all change is progress are so prevalent that even seasoned scientists may overlook persistence. Persistence may also be deliberately slurred over for fear that the recognition and description of it may lend proof and comfort to conservatism. Nevertheless, persistence is a reality. "All that is new is merely by way of addition to the existing culture base of fundamental institutions, and many innovations in socio-economic relations that at first glance look so startling are really but swirling eddies on the deep and placid current of persistent social institutions."[1]

Persistence, however, does not imply inflexibility. Sometimes the term "ossification" is used to describe the tendency we are considering. Ossification, however, connotes a hardening as in bones (Latin *ossa*); it implies fixity and hardness, a condition which never obtains in any aspect of culture. Culture is a complex of living, fluid, or malleable entities; it never becomes fixed, hardened, and brittle as bones do.

Persistence Contrasted with Cultural Lag. Nor is persistence identical with cultural lag. The latter consists in the failure of one aspect of culture to keep pace with a related aspect. "When the material conditions change, changes are occasioned in the adaptive culture . . . [which] do not synchronize exactly with the change in the material culture. There is a lag which may last for varying lengths of time, sometimes indeed, for many years."[2]

Persistence, however, is a condition more profound than cultural lag. Persistence is not a contest between one phase and other phases of a given institution, nor the failure of related aspects of culture to keep an even pace with each other; it is rather the continuance or perseverance of whatever is established, for example, folkways, mores, associational and instrumental forms or functions, whole institutions, or even whole culture complexes, cultural lag included.

II. EXTENT AND PHASES OF PERSISTENCE

Persistence of Major Institutions. Persistence seems to have prevailed from very early times. So far as the records show, the various major institutions have existed from at least the dawn of history and probably before, either as functions or as nascent institutions. It is conceivable that institutions may have existed the record of which has not come down and the memory of which has been erased from the mind of man. But this is improbable. In any event, it is relatively certain that the marital and familial systems were well established in early history, if not before; that religion and government were nascent in ancient times; and that these retained the essential forms and functions which they acquired in early times.

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[1] F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American institutions* (New York 1935) xv; see also R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 430.

[2] William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) 203.

Continuity of Subphases. Nor does persistence apply only to the institutions as wholes. It occurs also in the component systems. Monotheism, for instance, established in its essential features by the Hebrews some three thousand years ago, has persisted to this day practically unaltered. Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedism, Roman Catholicism, Greek Catholicism, Protestantism, and the Protestant denominations are subexpressions, modifications, or elaborations of that central concept and form. This does not mean that monotheism or any other subaspect of institutions undergoes a wholly uninterrupted linear continuity; but it does point to the persistence of essential elements.

Languages once established persist substantially unchanged, all changes being but etymological ramification, elaboration, and variation of the original roots and forms. ". . . Languages often preserve their existence, and even their territory, with surprising tenacity in the face of conquest, new religions and culture, and the economic disadvantages of unintelligibility." Breton (a Keltic dialect) ". . . has withstood the influence of two thousand years of contact, first with Latin, then with Frankish German, at last with French. Its Welsh sister-tongue flourishes in spite of the Anglo-Saxon speech of the remainder of Great Britain. The original inhabitants of Spain were mostly of non-Aryan stock. Keltic, Roman, and Gothic invasions have successively swept over them and finally left the language of the country Romance, but the original speech also survives the vicissitudes of thousands of years and is still spoken in the western Pyrenees as Basque." [3]

Persistence in Minutiae. Persistence extends even into minutiae. Street-name signs offer an excellent illustration. The street-name sign we employ comes down from the horse and buggy days, when a driver could slowly approach the lamppost and read the name or even stop without inconveniencing himself, blocking the traffic, or endangering the life of pedestrians. Traffic conditions have greatly changed, but the street-name sign remains what it was generations ago. Its letters are about as small as they were in the horse and buggy days; its position makes it practically invisible from a moving automobile by day and by night it is wholly invisible by being stuck under a blinding light; often it is blurred and hidden below the curb, where it cannot be read at all even from a relatively slowly moving vehicle; while signs on a highway are even smaller and more illegible. Nor can the driver stop to read the sign, in either metropolitan areas or in the open country, without exposing himself or others to danger. A street sign appropriate to our age would have large letters, would be placed about halfway down the block in order that it might be of service to motorists and pedestrians; it would be high enough to be clearly visible above automobile tops and yet low enough to be seen from the inside of an automobile; and it would reflect sufficient light to be read from a reasonable distance at night. But the old-time sign lingers and will probably linger for many decades to come.[4]

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[3] A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 104. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company.

What is true of the street-name sign is true of many other items. " . . . The use of mistletoe at Christmas time, the riderless horse at a funeral, the use of the ring in the marriage ceremony, children's games with the bow and arrow, and various superstitions, magical practices, and proverbs . . ." [5] all illustrate persistence in minutiae.

Vestigial Persistence. Moreover, some concepts, usages, or instruments persist in vestigial form even when they appear to be extinct. Totemism has lost most of the function of social identification and classification it performed among primitive peoples; yet its typeform is still active. We employ mascots, emblems, coats of arms, badges, flags, college pennants, amulets, and charms as means of identification. Monarchy as a dominant form disappeared long ago, yet we still pay homage to kings in vast splendid coronations, in hymns and prayers, in crowning May queens, in speaking of a beautiful woman as "a queen" or of a pleasing man as "a prince." [6] We retain numerous titles and elaborate ceremonies, even in some of the most democratic countries. Likewise, polytheism has been extinct for many centuries and is even regarded as immoral in the West, and yet we still believe in angels and demons, still worship saints, and otherwise entertain semipolytheistic beliefs.

Limits of Persistence. It must not be inferred from the foregoing that all forms, once established, tend to persist or do persist. There are many culture traits or even complexes that have disappeared. Slavery, the feudal system, dueling, mercenary armies, the unquestioned subjection of women to men, legal torture and many other items, too numerous to mention, have passed out as dominant items in Western culture. Some of these, notably slavery, have yielded to technical inventions; others have been eliminated by other forces. Despite these eliminations, the fact remains that innumerable items persist even after they become useless or illogical or even injurious to society.

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[4] This illustrates also one type of cultural lag.

[5] Ogburn, *op. cit.*, 150–151.

[6] See R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 429.

III. FACTORS IN PERSISTENCE

Physical Nature and Persistence. Several factors account for persistence. First, nature's continuity and immutability. The continuity of nature, far transcending diurnal, seasonal, and even longer cycles, gives associated living its sets of routines, links generation with generation, makes man's life part of a continuous process, leads him to "look before and after," to utilize and cling to what has gone before and to project the established into the future. With continuity goes immutability. Days, months, seasons, and longer cycles do come and go; but in its totality nature goes on unchanged. Climate, diurnal and seasonal cycles, the round of the sun in its orbit, the rotation of the earth and its inclination on its axis, all remain practically the same, age in and age out; and the forms and structures dependent on these remain virtually unaltered in all essentials. The indestructibility of the soil, for example, and man's attachment to it in part explain the long-time existence of feudalism.[7]

Human Nature. Man's biological nature also contributes to persistence. During the period for which we have definite knowledge, man's body has undergone practically no substantial change. In the principal organ systems, in the processes of digestion, respiration, circulation, excretion, and reproduction, and in the nervous system, man remains what he was at least ten thousand years ago. The same cycle of birth, growth, and decay conditions his life now as it did at the beginning. The sex drive in man,[8] for example, having remained relatively the same for many generations, the modes of controlling and regulating it have also remained practically unchanged; marriage and the family have followed more or less the same basic forms and have experienced the same problems from early historical times to this. The same thing tends to hold true of the other institutions: the basic modes of satisfying hunger, of transferring knowledge to the young, of meeting the recreational and religious needs, though undergoing external changes, have remained substantially unaltered. The more deeply rooted is an institution in man's physiological makeup, the greater seems to be the degree of its persistence. This explains in part the extraordinary tenacity which the basic forms of marriage and the family, of ownership and the transference of wealth evince.

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[7] See Nicholas J. Spykman, *Social theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago 1925) 165.

[8] See chap. 12 above, subchap. ii on "Origin and development of marriage."

Accumulated Culture and Persistence. Some persistence is due to the accumulation of culture. The very fact that buildings were made of stone and brick in ancient times gave the stone-brick complex persistence, especially in regions where that complex had prevailed. When iron and steel came into use, these materials and the new modes of building could not be introduced to any great extent in the areas in which the stone-brick complex had existed, because of the physical and economic impossibility of scrapping the old buildings and constructing new ones. The streets of present-day Rome remain almost impassably narrow for motor traffic because the massive stone structures cannot be demolished except at a prohibitive cost. So in the heart of that city the stone-brick building pattern persists. In addition, even were it possible to "scrap" some buildings and to replace them with those of new material and style, it would be incongruous and repulsive to set the new in the midst of the old. So the established tends to persist.

Nor is this true of material culture alone. Nonmaterial aspects of culture are as persistent if not more so. The very presence of "vested interests" on the part of office-holders or employees, the difficulty of making administrative changes such as would be involved in the consolidation of governmental units in a metropolitan area, the impossibility of actually expelling the holders of church office, lead to the policy of letting "well enough alone," and to the persistence of the established. Once monotheism, monogamy, and private-property usages have become rooted in a culture, as they did long ago in that of the West, they cling to themselves tenaciously; and by their very presence in a given territory they have a power to prevent or repulse all innovations.

Functional Continuity. Persistence is in part due to the continuity of functioning. The monogamic complex, for example, is passed on in part because parents, relatives, neighbors, and friends practice it and both by exposing it to view in actual operation and by inculcation, they pass it on in a never ending chain. Plato recognized this fact when he planned his ideal state; he proposed that the young be taken some distance away from all existing influences to be trained for his ideal society. The very interlocking of daily activity, plus formal and informal education, the imitation of adults by children, social pressure, and the reward and punishment procedures make persistence possible and natural.[9]

"The significance of this factor lies in the fact that the displacement of one generation by the following does not take place all at once. The number of individuals that leave and enter the group at any given time is relatively small compared to the number of those that remain. The change takes place so gradually that the group persists as a unit in a manner not unlike that in which the organism persists in spite of the change in its cells. This physiological concatenation and the fact of inheritance . . . are practically the only factors in modern times which preserve the family in the larger sense. . . . The Catholic clergy is an illustration of such a case. Here the continuity is secured by the fact that enough individuals are in office at a certain time to initiate the neophytes." [10]

Persistence through Sentiment. Sentimental attachment also conduces to persistence. "The persistence of aggregates" of which Pareto speaks is the tendency for related groups of ideas, forms, and activities to cling to each other and to persist on account of the sentimental attachment which people form for them. Pareto ascribes this phenomenon to instinct, a doctrine which is questionable; [11] but that does not invalidate the rest of the theory, since Pareto deals with the effect, not the cause of persistence. The attachment may be to things, persons, ways of doing things, but it is deep. Sometimes the attachment is personified and given a symbolic name, such as "Uncle Sam" or "John Bull," and becomes so fixed in the affections of the people that they even will fight for its preservation.

Once such connections are formed between man and man, between man and place, between man and class, between class and class, between the living and the dead, between groups and forms or concepts, the connections and the related forms and modes tend to persist. The mores become automatic and are transmitted by sheer sentimental attachment. Even though they are demonstrated to be harmful, people cling to them as if their lives depended on them. Man's sentiments are such that he "will endure great suffering and loss rather than drop from his social order any [item] to which he has been long accustomed." [12]

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[9] See Malcolm M. Willey, "Continuity, social" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 316.

[10] Spykman, *op. cit.*, 166–167. By permission of University of Chicago Press.

[11] Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, ii (New York 1935) 596–598.

Utility of the Established. Finally, persistence arises out of the utility of the established. Imperfect though the established may be, it has somehow satisfied the needs of society in the past and the hope is that it will continue to do so. "It was good enough for my parents and it's good enough for me," is a common saying everywhere. The established constitutes habitual regularity; it liberates man from the necessity of constantly making new choices; builds widely prevailing systems; tends to induce cohesion among groups; makes the major modes of behavior automatic; and the established induces a sense of continuity and permanency, which in turn favors group survival.[13]

IV. PRODUCTS OR CONCOMITANTS OF PERSISTENCE

Stability. Persistence prevents rapid or precipitous changes; lends institutions and the whole institutional complex a large measure of orderliness, automatic functioning, continuity, and security. Society, therefore, can devote itself to its essential activities rather than to maintaining the order. It is in part due to this fact that a large proportion of mankind's activities is relatively orderly, automatic, continuous, and peaceful. The disturbances, the interruption of normal functioning, and the insecurity which occur in time of extraordinary change or during a revolution or war clearly illustrate by contrast the high degree of orderliness and security which ordinarily prevails in society.

Cultural Inertia. Persistence produces or contributes to cultural inertia, or the practice of passively and unthinkingly clinging to what obtains without even perceiving the advantage that might accrue from change. The ills of society are ordinarily attributed to the maliciousness of this or the other leader or class, to this or the other political party; in reality they are due to the vast accumulation of daily practices over hundreds and thousands of years. This makes even the most insistent and far-reaching efforts of the strongest governments mere pebble-ripples on the surface of the ocean. The utter inertia of Russian country people in the face of the Bolshevist movement is a case in point.[14]

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[12] Lyford P. Edwards, *Natural history of revolution* (Chicago 1927) 21; see also Chapin, *op. cit.*, 320.

[13] See Joyce O. Hertzler, *Social institutions* (New York 1929) 179.

Conservatism. Persistence is closely interrelated with conservatism, or the practice of doggedly holding to what already obtains and of waging battle against any proposed new concepts, forms, or usages. To natural inertia, there is thus added the activity of whole organizations which deliberately and systematically obstruct every proposed new idea or practice. Nor is conservatism wholly due to the so-called "vested interests." Habituation on the part of the masses often underlies such practices, and habituation is largely the product of persistence. "In Paris in February, 1911, women who appeared on the street in *jupe-cullotes* ('bloomers') were attacked and beaten by mobs. Similar incidents took place in Italy and Spain, and more or less everywhere. Much the same things had happened previously when 'picture hats' first came into vogue, and on occasions of other innovations in fashion." [15] The wealthy are usually the most conservative because they have most to conserve; the poor are conservative because of the recollection of want experienced in the past and for fear of losing what little they now have; but both rich and poor are the slaves of habituation; and if change is to occur it is reaction or change backward that is favored, rather than innovation.[16]

Some institutions tend to be conservative. Government and religion are particularly susceptible to the influence of sentimental attachment. They endow their concepts and practices with divine sanction; they build up rigid dogmas; they call upon the gods or their soldiers to destroy their "enemies"; they resist change in their own forms; every established church and state has bitterly opposed the slightest departure in its tenets or forms.[17] This resistance has often extended to minutiae, insisting on the familiar, the established, and the archaic; clinging resolutely to ancient and therefore "holy" forms of language, dress, architecture, furniture, music, and instruments and ceremonials in general.[18]

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[14] See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet communism: a new civilisation?* (New York 1936) *passim.*

[15] Pareto, *op. cit.*, ii, 670.

[16] See Roberto Michels, "Conservatism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 230.

[17] See chaps. 18, 19, 25 above.

[18] See chaps. 18 and 25 above.

Obscurantism. Obscurantism, or the prevention of the expression of new ideas, is closely allied to persistence. Now the governmental, now the religious, and again, in our time, the economic system tries to suppress new ideas or at least to prevent their widespread expression, both by direct punishment and by other means. It controls the press, censors books, retards the forward-looking, "radical" individuals. This does not mean that all expression of new ideas is prevented; for if the new ideas are sufficiently rooted in prevailing conditions, no power on earth can for long prevent their growth and expression; in fact attempts at prevention may and do often serve to hasten their growth. But obscurantism does attempt to prevent and often succeeds in preventing the immediate spread of new ideas.

Maladjustment. Further, persistence, through stability and resistance, produces maladjustment, which in turn results in conflict, often in disorganization, and sometimes in disintegration. Under the influence of resistance, social institutions tend to cling tenaciously to the established because it is established; to lose the spirit and insist on the letter of the law; to become authoritarian, dogmatic, self-centered, self-satisfied, inert, the "depositories of archaic attitudes, beliefs, ideas, codes, and habits." [19] This condition, itself a form of maladjustment, often produces, as we have seen, other maladjustments.

V. CONCLUSION

Persistence, therefore, is a phenomenon of major proportions. It is the product of physical, biological, and cultural factors. It is not deliberate resistance; it is not mere slowness in change; it is not merely a "recapitulation" of previous practices or experiences. Persistence is a master cultural fact which accounts for many societal phenomena and which has to be dealt with by all who believe in the possibility of improvement in society.

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[19] Hertzler, *op. cit.*, 180.

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Chapter 30

TELEOLOGY OR PURSUIT OF GOALS

I. MEANING OF SOCIETAL TELEOLOGY

The perceiving portion of mankind is probably more or less continuously aware of the impotence of society to guide and control its larger ongoing. Individuals constantly experience frustrations; social groups are swept before the total flow of events; societies are bound within the framework of physical and biological nature; while man, whenever he does succeed in altering the course of human events, often produces conditions which are as undesirable as those he eliminates. In addition, there is ever before mankind the knowledge that all civilizations, including the monumental civilizations of the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, have had their day and passed into oblivion. These facts apparently account for those periods of widespread mental depression and apathy which oppress mankind, such as those which followed the Peloponnesian War in Greece, the fall of the Graeco-Roman civilization, the close of the Middle Ages, and the postwar period of our time.

Societal Teleology. Mankind seems unable, however, to carry on for prolonged periods under the pall of mental depression and social apathy. Every major epoch, every society, has had its distant goals. The Hebrews looked forward to the coming of the Messiah, who would establish a kingdom of the House of David and through it they, the chosen people, would reëstablish the golden age. Modern man, on the other hand, has progress as his goal.

To the setting up of such goals and the striving associated with them we here apply the term teleology. "By real *teleology* I mean the embodiment or operation of a conscious purpose entertained by human intelligence." [1] It is the process by which societies conceive and depict conditions, qualities, and ends (τέλος end) which are valued higher than those obtaining at the time, which serve as standards for the evaluation of historical and present movements, which give meaning to life and animate or inspire whole peoples in their common endeavors.

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[1] B. Bosanquet quoted in *Webster's new international dictionary* (Springfield, Mass. 1924) 2122.

Characteristics of Goals. These goals and the activities associated with them are in the truest sense societal. That is, they are not ideas entertained or activities conducted by the few, such as statesmen or reformers; rather they are actuating forces for entire peoples and epochs. During the Middle Ages the people as a whole were imbued with the Providence Plan concept and were generally influenced by it in the conduct of their lives. In our time the entire West is possessed by the belief in progress; whatever people do, whether they are working to improve the standards of living, laying out a new railroad or real estate subdivision, or holding an exposition or a rummage sale, they do it in the belief that they are contributing to progress.

The movements involved are conceived to be either cyclical or linear. The cyclical goals regard human ongoing as passing through upward and downward movements, but in the end achieving the good; linear goals, such as that of progress, hold that man makes indefinite gains.

The goals are transcendental, as in the belief in a Golden Age past or to come; they also contain a human element, as in the necessity of man's living day by day in such a way as to contribute to the achievement of the goals. The goals, however, differ from those of philanthropy, reform, revolution, education, reconstruction, or social planning. The goals of the latter are more or less definite, limited in scope, relatively near, involving comparatively short periods. The goals of teleological striving are indefinite, comprehensive, distant, and involve long-time striving.

Teleological concepts seem to be formulated during epochs of decadence, such as that of the breaking up of the Roman Empire; all of them embody long-time aims; and all of them endure for long periods before they exhaust themselves and give way to other concepts.

II. MAIN TELEOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES

Teleology in Primitive Times. Among primitives the urgency of the immediate seems to have been so great as to have permitted no contemplation of distant goals. Early man seems to have regarded the world and its ongoing as chaotic and without purpose; and in so far as he entertained the idea of purpose, the future foreboded decay, calamity, and death.[2] Yet primitive magic and religion contained subtle elements of teleology. Magic strove to control the forces of nature and thereby to direct human destiny; religion was a feeling after ultimate meanings. The telic principle was there; only the primitives "found it, or rather, implanted it, in the mind of a divine being of their own creation, and did not discover that they had taken the materials for it from their own minds." [3]

Teleology in Ancient Times. The ancients had their telic concepts. The Babylonians seem to have had some sort of cyclical notion; their goal was to prepare themselves for the return of Hammurabi who would initiate a golden age. The Egyptians, likewise, looked forward to the coming of some prince, a good king, or the god Re himself, who would set them right again and bring them the good. The Persians envisioned the time, three thousand years after Zoroaster's death, when the battle between good and evil would end with the triumph of the good.[4]

Messianism of the Hebrews. The Hebrews seem to have been among the first, if not the first people, to have a comprehensive goal. God had originally created the world and man perfect: the world beautiful, man innocent, human relations harmonious and satisfying. But evil crept in, robbed man of the beauty, innocence, and harmony which he originally possessed, and destroyed paradise. That lost state, however, would be restored with the coming of the Messiah; He would redeem man from his lost state and reestablish perfection; He would give them a King, of the House of David, who would establish a Hebrew empire which would embrace the entire world, end war, and bring happiness to the redeemed. It was the task of the Hebrew society to prepare itself, by daily aspiration and sacrifice, for the coming of the Redeemer. Christianity, which took over the concept from the Hebrews, proclaimed Christ the Messiah; in fact Christ announced Himself as the Messiah; and He promised that He would return at the end of the world and redeem all who would accept Him as the Saviour.[5]

[2] See Wilson D. Wallis, *Culture and progress* (New York 1930) 215.

[3] Lester F. Ward, *Pure sociology* (New York 1903) 464–465.

[4] See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, 2 (New York 1937) 360–363; and Wallis, *op. cit.*, 222–223.

[5] See Shailer Mathews, "Messiah" in James Hastings (ed.), *Dictionary of the Bible* (New York 1909) 607–613. On Messianism in general see Hans Kohn, "Messianism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 356–364.

The Cosmic Cycle of the Greeks. The early Greeks, particularly Hesiod (eighth century B.C.), believed that their age was one of degeneration; that the Golden Age, in which man had been free from toil, care, and infirmity, had given away to the Iron Age, in which metallurgy, shipping, and commerce had plunged man into moral degradation, wretched conditions, endless toil, and sorrow.[6]

After this period, the Greeks developed their teleology. Many of the Greek philosophers held that the world was originally set into motion by a deity; that it is orderly; that though good and evil alternate in ascendancy and dominance, good will conquer in the end. The cycle, according to this concept, takes 72,000 years to complete its course; during the first 36,000 years the original impulse of the Creator is sufficiently strong to make the good prevail; but in the second 36,000 years evil becomes dominant, and degeneration and decay set in. In the first half, life is simple and happy; in the second half, it becomes complex and materialistic; conflict prevails and brings decay and virtual death to civilization. But after decay the original divine impulse again becomes effective and starts the cycle anew. They believed that their age was enjoying improvement in material and social conditions over those prevailing in previous ages, and though decadence ultimately set in, they were moving toward the good.[7]

Greek life, therefore, was animated by the belief that society would in the long sweep of the ages achieve the good. There would come epochs of degeneration, but even in these men could look forward to the renewal of the good. From the Greeks this concept passed to the Romans.[8]

The Providential Plan. For the people of the Middle Ages it was the belief that God had a plan for humanity that gave meaning to life. Although man had fallen from the original condition of good created by God in the beginning, God had a plan for mankind; and at the Last Judgment men would be rewarded or punished. Man's specific task was to accept the plan and learn to play his part in the drama of salvation; God had endowed him with free will so he was to choose his part, within the framework of God's plan. If he chose God's way, he became one of the redeemed and would be rewarded with salvation and immortality in the City of God. To provide man with a guide, God had sent His Son to earth, and through Him a representative had been set up on earth, in the person of the Pope, to interpret God's will and afford guidance.

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[6] See G. Ant. Borgese, "Primitivism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 398–401.

[7] See J. B. Bury, *Idea of progress* (New York 1932) 8–19; and Wilson D. Wallis, *Culture and progress* (New York 1930) 249–250.

[8] See J. B. Bury, *Idea of progress* (London 1920) 9–13.

III. THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

Origins of Idea of Progress. In modern times the lodestar of Western society is progress.[9] The first known use of the term "progress" was made by the Latin philosopher-poet Lucretius (first century B.C.) who employed it in his poem, *De rerum natura*, to designate the improvements man had made in recorded times, particularly by means of the use of fire, implements, metals, and language. But to Lucretius progress meant not what man himself had achieved by his own striving, but what had been produced by natural development. Moreover, Lucretius foresaw a final degeneration, an element foreign to the modern idea of progress. The concept was also implicit in the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century) who believed that the principle of advance prevailed in all things, and in the tenets of Roger Bacon (thirteenth century) who held that man was capable of extending knowledge indefinitely and thereby of controlling his own destiny. But these were vague foreshadowings rather than definite expressions of the idea.

It was during the Renaissance, from the fourteenth century on, that man was first stirred by the idea of progress. Although God was still conceived to be the supreme lawgiver, man now began to look upon the universe as open to human understanding, to regard life as something to be lived in the here-and-now, not in the hereafter, and to believe himself capable of controlling his destiny.[10] For Renaissance men life began to be conceived as something they could master.

For three centuries or more some of the great minds of the West, particularly the French, devoted their best thought to the development of the idea. Jean Bodin (1530–1596) asserted that history is not the product of blind forces, but is controlled by man's wilful action; that as a whole it represents a general ascent; and that modern man is far in advance of classical man in knowledge and in the control of physical forces. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) essayed that man has the possibility of making an almost unlimited extension of knowledge and a betterment of his lot by the application of that knowledge. Descartes (1596–1650) asserted that man is a free agent. George Hakewill (1579–1616) regarded the whole course of human culture as a sequence of improvements along all lines. Descartes and Hakewill, Fontanelle and Saint Pierre, Montesquieu, Voltaire and other encyclopaedists, Rousseau and Condorcet, Adam Smith, Godwin, and Robert Owen added various interpretations on the idea or devised means for its measurement. Various other philosophers and scientists: Leibnitz, Herder, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Babeuf, Comte, Darwin, and Spencer made various contributions; and by the close of the nineteenth century, the idea of progress had become well established.

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[9] For the best account of this concept see Bury, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[10] Machiavelli (1469–1527) was an outstanding exception; he believed that man's achievements oscillate between an unchanging mean.

Content and Prevalence of the Idea of Progress. Progress, then, came to mean a conscious movement in the direction and for the achievement of improvement of man and society. Mankind, the idea asserts, has made definite advances since early historical times; man has accumulated a great stock of knowledge; his mind, particularly his reason, has developed. The concept implies that man has a desire, ability, and will to improve his conditions, that he has the capacity indefinitely to extend knowledge and to apply it to life, that through his reason he can and will shape his own destiny, and that he can achieve liberty, justice, economic well-being.

Progress is—or at least it was until the close of the World War—the one goal that animates Western man, the one standard by which he evaluates or justifies whatever he does. That goal is implicit in most writings of our time; it is the essence of public address, legislation, reform, and even of revolutionary activity; to it men of all walks of life make obeisance. Western society has perhaps never before so thoroughly believed in its capacity to bring about improvement through its own purposive effort. Some believe that all the achievements of man are progressive, others that only that which is carried on by means of intelligent effort is progress. But Western society as a whole is imbued with the central idea that the goal of man's striving is progress, that progress is taking place, and that whatever man achieves toward the satisfaction of his basic desires is progressive.

IV. NATIONALISTIC GOALS

National Messianism. Another goal, in part superseding and in part supplementing the idea of progress, has come to animate Western society in recent times, namely, the goal embodied in nationalism. Most contemporary nations hold before themselves a mission. For some it is the ideal of democracy, for others fascism or communism, but most of them promise to lead their people into the land of plenty and peace. "To the modern national state, as to the mediaeval church, is attributable an *ideal*, a *mission*. It is the mission of salvation and the ideal of immortality. The nation is conceived of as eternal, and the deaths of her loyal sons do but add to her undying fame and glory. She protects her children . . . from foreign devils; she assures them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; she fosters for them the arts and the sciences; and she gives them nourishment. Nor may the rôle of the modern national state . . . be thought of as economic or mercenary; it is primarily spiritual, even other-worldly, and its driving force is its collective *faith*, a faith in its mission and destiny. . . ." [11]

The White Man's Burden. England, early in the nineteenth century, began to hold before its people the duty of carrying to the "backward" peoples the blessings that would come from the intensive development of their resources and from a government distinguished by honesty, efficiency, and responsibility which it would bring to them. Thus India would be given the benefits of a developed culture and be saved to itself and to the world. England would also establish or contribute to the establishment of a *Pax Britannica* by the use of British arms and by setting up English law and order in subject countries and colonies.[12]

Manifest Destiny. In the United States national messianism took the form of "manifest destiny." The philosophy, though enunciated earlier, had the first enduring expression in the July issue of the *Democratic review* in 1845. The editor, arguing for the annexation of Texas, wrote that it is "our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." A year later the term was applied to the claim of the United States to Oregon as against that of England. That claim, wrote one editor, "is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us." The concept of manifest destiny was extended to include the duty to uplift backward peoples in connection with the Mexican War; it was extended beyond the continent in the attempted annexation of Hawaii in 1893; it was applied to the acquisition of the Philippines; and even as late as 1916 a congressman affirmed his belief in the "great destiny and undying glory" of the United States, and that the mandate of the great Republic "whether proceeding from the mouth of an ambassador or from the hot throats of Federal guns," would "be heard and obeyed throughout the earth." [13]

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[11] Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on nationalism* (New York 1926) 105–106. By permission of The Macmillan Company.

[12] See Charles Roberts, "Indian problem" in F. S. Marvin (ed.), *Western races and the world* (London 1922) 174–175; and Melvin M. Knight, "Backward countries" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 379–381.

German Kultur. National messianism was formulated by Fichte for Germany, when that country was in the hands of Napoleon. By it the Germans were conceived as the bearers of the world's progress, of science, and of "Kultur." Later, the Germans came to look upon themselves as also the economic saviors of the world: by creating a controlling economic unit in central Europe, from the Black Sea to the Baltic, they would first save the Slavs from their economic distress and then proceed to Germanize the backward countries of the East.[14]

Other National Messianisms. National messianism spread also to other peoples. It seized the Slavs who came to regard the Latins and Germans as decadent and themselves as in the full vigor of youth, capable of rising to supremacy and by an all-enveloping Slavic movement becoming a guide to all humanity.[15] In the postwar period Italy has become imbued with the dream of reconstructing the ancient Roman Empire and of establishing a new *Pax Romana*. Finally, Japan has in our day come to be spurred on by the goal of freeing Far Asia from the exploitation of the white race and of restoring it to the Asiatics.

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[13] See Hayes, *op. cit.*, 111–112; and Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest destiny* (Baltimore 1935) 111–112, 144–145, 160–189, 252, 259, 301.

[14] See Robert Flint, *Philosophy of history in France and Germany* (Edinburgh 1874) 418–419; and Francis W. Coker, "Patriotism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 27.

[15] See Hans Kohn, "Pan-movements" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 545–547.

V. RACIAL AND CLASS GOALS

Racial Messianism. Intermingled with national messianism is racial messianism. The doctrine on which this movement rests declares that the white race is superior to the colored ones, and that as such it has a right because it is its duty to protect the colored races from their own ignorance and backward conditions and to raise them to higher standards. The doctrine was given epic expression by de Gobineau and Jules Ferry in France, by Chamberlain in Germany, by Kipling, and by Professor (later Sir) John Robert Seely in his *Expansion of England in the eighteenth century*, which became a best seller and made many converts.

Nor was it merely a theory. England used it on a large scale in the conquest of India and in the South African War; France built its empire around the *mission civilatrice;* upon it the United States based its expansion activities and the exclusion of the Asiatics; the doctrine even found its way into mandates A and B of the Versailles Treaty; and in more recent years it has taken root in Italy.[16]

Nazi Racial Ideals. The most vigorous manifestation of racial messianism is that of Nazi Germany. In that country the Aryans are held up as the superior race, the Germans as the superior subrace of the Aryans, and the Nordic as the superior among all Germans. Only by keeping the Aryans pure and undefiled can civilization be saved. "Blood mixture, with the lowering of the racial level which accompanies it, is the one and only reason that old civilizations disappear. It is not lost wars which ruin mankind, but loss of the powers of resistance, which belong to pure blood alone. . . . In this part of the world human culture and civilization are inextricably bound up with the presence of the Aryan element. If it died out or went under, the black veil of a cultureless period would once again descend upon the globe." [17]

In order to achieve this goal, Germany must purify itself of inferior racial strains, particularly the Jews; prospective brides must be examined by breeding experts and classified; desirable wedlocks must be encouraged; only racially pure individuals must be eligible as public servants; family health laws, sterilization laws, and the punishment of all extramarital relationships between Germans and Jews—are to protect German society from recidivism.[18] Nor is the goal to be achieved merely within Germany alone; all Germans everywhere must participate in the great endeavor; for thereby not only Germany but the whole world will be saved from chaos and cultural death.[19]

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[16] See S. H. Swinny, "Humanitarianism of the eighteenth century and its results" in F. S. Marvin (ed.), *Western races and the world* (London 1922) 136; Moritz Julius Bonn, "Imperialism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 610; Stephen H. Roberts, "Native policy: general summary" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 11 (New York 1933) 280; George Young, "Europeanization" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 630.

[17] Adolf Hitler, *My battle* (abrid. and trans. by E. T. S. Dugdale, Boston 1933) 125, 154. By permission of the Houghton Mifflin Company. See also Aurel Kolnai. *War against the West* (London 1938) *passim*, esp. 394–497.

Marxism as Goal. Still another goal, namely, a classless society, has been set before the West in our times. As in the Hebraic Paradise only the chosen would have a place, as according to the Providential Plan only the redeemed would be admitted to the City of God, so in Marxism only the proletariat, those who directly produce, will have a place. To achieve that goal the state will abolish private property and establish collective ownership; it will raise generations of men and women mentally and physically superior to those of today; it will protect the rising generations from contaminating contact with capitalistic society; it will modernize factories, collectivize farming, make five-year plans, to the end that men and women will live the good life of producers in a classless society.[20]

VI. ENDEAVORS PROMPTED BY SOCIETAL GOALS

These goals must not be thought as vague, ineffectual dreams. The activity of whole societies has been animated by them. The activities of Greek society for the improvement of economic life, the spread of education, the liberation of women; the establishment of democracy seem to have been prompted by their belief in the ultimate triumph of the good. Roman society animated plebs and patricians alike with the dream of the *Pax Romana.* In medieval times the whole of Western society was focused on or engaged in the task of establishing the Kingdom of God on the earth as the central ideal of the Providential Plan. The establishment of the papal hierarchy and the Church State, the all-embracing dominance of the priestly class, the vast enterprises of cathedral building, the far-reaching philanthropic activities of the monasteries, the miracle plays, celibacy were focused upon that central task. And it was "Dieu le veult" that led the crusaders on their enterprises.[21] The gaze of the whole society was fixed on preparation for the future life.

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[18] *Ibid.*, 491–492.

[19] Frederick L. Schuman, *Nazi dictatorship* (2d ed. rev. New York 1936) 109–130.

[20] See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet communism: a new civilisation?* ii (New York 1936) 945–947 and *passim;* Henry Noel Brailsford, *Russian workers' republic* (London 1921) 74–75; and Ella Winter, *Red virtue* (New York 1933) 13.

In modern times the entire West has been heatedly in pursuit of "progress." The industrialization, urbanization, organization of society have been carried on in the name of progress. The increase in the size of cities, in the means of transportation and communication, the growth of population, the rise in life expectancy, the decline in the death rate, the "liberation" of women, the rising standards and cost of living, the reduction of illiteracy, the growth of science have all been part of the "progress" movement. Young and old, learned and unlettered, rich and poor, rulers and citizens, whole nations have all been following that dream, vying with one another in bringing about "progress." Nationalism has led to colonial enterprises, to expansion of trade, to the building of vast armies to "follow the flag"; while racial and class messianism are the backbone of the activities of present-day Germany and Russia, activities which in their ramification have divided the whole West into two warring camps.

VII. CONCLUSION

And so it would seem as if mankind has had at all times to have some distant goal, some dream to animate it in its striving for survival or improvement. Now it is spurred by the idea of a golden age, now by some form of messianism, or a cyclical idea; now it is animated by belief in Divine Providence and now by the belief that it is able to control its own destiny. Only the few may be aware of all the striving, while the many follow their lead.

The last comprehensive dream, including racial and class messianism, has been that of progress. The World War and subsequent events, however, have dealt a severe blow to that idea; also evidences have accumulated that there are cycles of epidemics and want, of population growth and decline, of business, of war and peace; so that the idea of the *Decline of the West* has become one of the domant concepts of our time.[22] Meantime, control has come to the fore, in "plans," "new deals," and totalitarian states.

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[21] See Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, iii (New York 1935) 923.
[22] See Sorokin, *op. cit.*, 379–384.

So the day may not be far off "when a new idea will usurp its place [that of progress] as the directing idea of humanity. Another star, unnoticed now or invisible, will climb up the intellectual heaven, and human emotions will react to its influence, human plans respond to its guidance. It will be the criterion by which Progress and all other ideas will be judged. And it too will have its successor." [23]

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[23] See Bury, *op. cit.*, 352.

PART V

FUTURE OF WESTERN CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

Although it is impossible to predict the distant future, it is nevertheless possible to infer from the present what the immediate future appears to hold. The following chapter attempts to present the main patterns and trends, procedures and dilemmas, and to infer from them the future. The temptation is strong to propose solutions for the "problems" which beset our time; but we take a humbler path. For, he is bold indeed who claims to hold the key to the manifold and intricate difficulties of our era. Here and there, however, we venture to make a cautious prediction; and for that no apology is necessary, for, in the words of Park and Burgess, "Sociology, like all other natural sciences, aims at prediction and control."

Chapter 31

FUTURE OF WESTERN CULTURE

I. MAJOR PATTERNS AND TRENDS

Dominant Factors. It is essential to bear in mind that modern Western culture is not something wholly new; rather is it the product of millenniums of associated living. Some of its main features run back to very early times. The use of fire, domestication of animals and plants, spoken and written language, agriculture, the use of the wheel, navigation and commerce; the monotheism of the Hebrews; the artistic, philosophical, political, economic, and scientific achievements of the Greeks; the law, governmental structure, and religion of Rome—all lie at the basis of the modern West.

Yet present-day Western culture has its own peculiar features. These are the products of two main factors, science and the machine. Science, starting on its modern development in the fifteenth century, has become increasingly dominant, until it has come to condition if not to determine practically all aspects of life. As a mode of thought, science questions, tests or tries to test whatever man deals with in nature; it stresses induction and the objectification of phenomena; it leads to segmentation of thought and skepticism. As a way of acting, it leads man to search for the secrets of nature, to discover the laws underlying and governing the world, to select and arrange the discovered facts and laws, and to develop procedures and techniques for applying acquired knowledge to the satisfaction of basic human needs.[1]

The machine, including the technology associated with it, constitutes the second major factor. The machine, itself mainly the product of science, began to be broadly effective in the middle of the eighteenth century; became a dominant factor by the middle of the nineteenth century; and it has, along with its numerous adhesions, come to mark the present as unique.[2]

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[1] See chap. 20 above; also John Dewey, "Science as subject-matter and as method" in *Science*, xxxi (1910) 125; and Harold R. Smart, *Logic of science* (New York 1931) 4.

[2] See Clark Wissler, *Man and culture* (New York 1923) 5–6, 26–27.

Salient Economic Forms. All the major patterns and trends in modern Western culture are clearly rooted in these two master factors. One of the features characterizing the West is the mechanization of economic life. The machine is everywhere present, in economic production and business, in homes and shops, and indirectly even in the school or on the playground, in government and religious activity. Few persons, particularly the city dwellers, rarely see or handle things as they come from "the mint of nature" or things made directly by the human hand.

As we have pointed out in the chapters on the economic system, the machine has conferred unmeasurable advantages on man. It has enabled man increasingly to utilize nature, has made possible a marked advance in economic well-being, has lifted loads from man's shoulders, and in numerous other ways improved his material life. But it has also produced an intensity and complexity of life which at times shake the framework of society. Nor has mechanization reached its maximum; the number, intensity, and complexity of its impacts are constantly increasing; so much so that it is not altogether fanciful to predict that "someday the machines may get the upper hand and make us their slaves." [3] And when to the everyday influence of the machine is added its power in warfare, it is not at all impossible that the machine may prove to be the Frankenstein of our era.[4]

From mechanization to standardization is but a step. Standardization also confers marked benefits: applied to production goods, it results in great savings; applied to consumers' goods, it greatly increases the number and the quality of products available to the many. Standardization, however, produces a deadening sameness that perhaps robs life of some of the satisfactions derived from time and place variety.[5] Standardization of economic life perhaps has some bearing on the deadening levelling which prevails in other aspects of life, in education and recreation, religion, and government. The effect is indirect, but nevertheless impressive. The large numbers of persons in single production centers, the millions of the large cities, the many millions in single marketing areas or governmental units make it easy for most people to do the same thing in a standardized manner. So compulsive is standardization that the standardized man or woman is prized most, while the variant is compelled to be passive within the confines of the great commonplace or suffer extinction before his appointed time. This phenomenon, prevailing in all societies, is no doubt accentuated by modern standardization.

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[3] John Storck, *Man and civilization* (3d rev. ed. New York 1927) 57.

[4] See Lewis Mumford, *Technics and civilization* (New York 1934) 10 ff.; and John Herman Randall, Jr., *Our changing civilization* (New York 1929) chap. xii.

[5] See George Soule, "Standardization" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 14 (New York 1934) 319–322.

Another major complex of modern life is commercialization. Although commercialism also confers marked benefits, liberates man from the patronage, slavery, and serfdom which preceded it,[6] it transmutes many of the values of life and makes the whole of life a matter of barter. Practically everybody is at all times concerned with selling something or other. Education is "sold"; recreation is almost wholly a business; much of science is devoted to creating products that will sell; profit considerations are not unknown in marriage; and even "the clergy have taken over the technique in great numbers, and urge us to church with posters, sky signs, dodgers, and even veiled hints of sermons garnished with sex appeal." [7]

The wage system, a correlative of the features just mentioned, is another major complex of our time. It acquires cultural significance, on the one hand, from the fact that it has freed the laborer from the slavery which prevailed under feudalism when he was bound to his lord in his work life, in his choice of a wife, in the bringing up of his children, in the selection of his habitation, even in the matter of a burial place. On the other hand, the wage system frees the employer from a direct responsibility to his laborers, and makes men and women a commodity, to be used and discarded like so many pieces of machinery.

In its totality, the machine and the industrial system have produced an abundance of goods, but they have also resulted in waves of widespread unemployment and life-long insecurity for large proportions of the working population. That this is a stark reality is seen from the fact that governments have had increasingly to intervene; to insist on minimum working conditions and wages, on a certain number of working days, and on systems of unemployment insurance; and states have been compelled, in part perhaps to save themselves, to go into the business of supplying employment to the unemployed millions, to guarantee earnings and savings, to provide social security, to contribute toward old-age pensions, and in other ways to make the lot of the masses less precarious.

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[6] See C. Delisle Burns, "Commercialism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 31–34.

[7] Stuart Chase, "Salesmanship: six cylinder ethics" in *Forum*, lxxix (1928) 24; see also O. W. Riegel, *Mobilizing for chaos* (New Haven 1934) 209–214.

Marriage and the Family. Marriage and the family are but the shadows of their former selves. Numerous interrelated factors are responsible. The machine and industrial development have taken the production of goods, much of food-preparation and meal-making, the making of clothes, laundering, and most other economic activities away from the home; women have left their home in increasing numbers and have gone into gainful occupations, are accumulating wealth of their own, and are therefore postponing marriage and the rearing of a family; the state has taken over the education of the child; recreational and religious centers have robbed the family of many of the play and religious functions.

For women the home has lost some, perhaps most of its creative satisfaction; and the more enterprising of them have sought and secured a place in business, educational, recreational, and political activities. A retardation of marriage has taken place throughout the Western world; consequently, the distance between the age of biological maturity of both men and women, which is constant, and the age of "economic maturity," which comes later and later, has everywhere increased. The influence this is having on the practices of youth is obvious. In addition, a larger proportion of men and women remain unmarried, resort to substitutes for married life, seek affectional satisfaction outside the marriage state, while divorce and formal and informal separation are probably on the increase.

The size of the family is practically everywhere decreasing. The relative increase in economic well-being of the last century would seem to have produced a large number of children per family; but the contrary has been the case. In fact, the most marked decrease in the size of the family has occurred in the very countries, such as England, France, the United States, in which economic well-being has become the highest. Some governments are making efforts to arrest the decline in the birth rate, but they do not seem to be effective; the factors involved are basic; and the family continues to decrease in size.

The authority of the paterfamilias, undisputed for many centuries, has also declined in modern times, especially in the newer countries and even more notably in the urban centers. The democratic family, in which parents and adolescent children coöperate in family affairs, is increasingly prevalent.

If the present trends continue, there will probably be a larger proportion of childless marriages; the family will probably continue to decrease in size; divorces will probably be more frequent in some countries; marriage and the family will probably become weaker as units of cohesion. But there is no reason to think that marriage or the family will disintegrate. The recent experience of Russia seems to lend proof to that assertion. The union of sensual and spiritual elements in sexual love is too deeply rooted in human nature, and these seem to find their durable expressions in the home and family and in the affectional attachments which they breed.[8]

Educational and Recreational Patterns. In nearly every Western nation the educational system has been brought under the control of the state, elementary education has been made compulsory, and opportunities are afforded for vocational and professional education for the masses. The main emphasis, however, has been on the elimination of illiteracy, rather than on preparation for associated living. Illiteracy had practically disappeared in most countries of the West by the second decade of the present century, but what that means in terms of equipping the individual for associated living is difficult to say. A great deal of printed matter is purely divertive or advertising rather than informative; nor is there any evidence to indicate that people are trained to read or to act with discrimination.

Again, the educational system still remains largely a backward-looking system, content in imparting knowledge regarding the past, which no one can control, rather than imparting a knowledge of the contemporary scene and encouraging intelligent participation in it. Education has liberated itself from the domination of the church, but in the presence of economic and political groups it does not dare call its soul its own. It so exalts book learning and the "white-collar" occupations that it spreads discontent among the masses and robs them of much of the contentment which comes from the performance of simple, homely tasks.

Some educators perceive all this. They see that if education is to serve the common weal it needs to reshape itself in several respects. Some stress the necessity of freeing the system from political and other partisan influences. Others emphasize the content. They would have education turn its attention to the liberation of the mind from the bugaboos, superstitions, and fears which beset society; to the discovery and training of socially minded leaders; to the imparting of a synthesized knowledge of contemporary and future significance.

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[8] See Edward A. Westermarck, *Future of marriage in Western civilisation* (New York 1936) *passim;* Una Bernard Sait, *New horizons for the family* (New York 1938) chap. xxv.

Recreation has come to be controlled or regulated by the community and has become the prerogative of the masses. But recreation has also become so mechanized, standardized, and commercialized as to lose much of the spontaneity and freedom which are its essence. Moreover, political or economic interests so inject themselves into recreational activities, through advertising and propaganda, that recreation often becomes a bane.

Main Religious Patterns. Present-day religion is marked by heterogeneity of creeds and forms, by a multitude of denominational bodies, and by the carrying on of numerous nonreligious activities. Both as cause and effect, these characteristics have greatly reduced the influence of organized religion in the modern West. The decline is noticeable not so much in the decrease of formal church membership or attendance as in the decline of the influence of religion on the family, on economic practices, on education, literature, government, and probably on the inner life of the individual. "Religion has ceased to permeate and inform the other phases of our culture . . . ; the dominant influences in shaping the contemporary spirit have been science, capitalism and nationalism." [9] The church has lost much of its hold on the people, their thought and activities; the compelling power that made the church the masterful agent down to the close of the Middle Ages is gone. Science and the doctrines of freedom of conscience and action advanced by the Reformation have conquered.

And yet no age has perhaps been in greater need of the deeper influence of religion than the present one. In the midst of the harrowing insecurities, the bewilderments, the confusion, and distress of our era, men would seem to need more than ever that sense of cosmic serenity and security which religion at its best brings to men's minds. Men would seem to need some explanation of the meaning of it all, someone to whom to flee in time of trouble or distress, or to whom to voice their aspirations. But there is no evidence that religion is gaining a stronger hold on the mind of the West. Christianity remains the dominant faith, but its lack of unity devitalizes it. The central problem of religion today is how to arrest the splitting-off process of creeds and churches, how to stop the multiplication of interpretations of the Divine, how to gain some measure of unity and cohesion, how to command the authority to challenge the arrogance and madness of the war gods. Only in so far as the church is able to do this can it bring some measure of religious certainty in an era of such profound insecurity as our own.

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[9] Christian Gauss, *Primer for tomorrow* (New York 1930) 79.

Governmental Features. Throughout the West local and regional governing units have been increasingly subordinated to central states. Democracy, which permitted a large measure of local self-government, has largely given way to the centripetal state, which in many instances is autocratic. The Industrial Revolution and the resultant breakdown of local self-sufficiency, the confusion resulting from conflicting local jurisdictions, the mounting expenditures of government—have forced governments to centralize their activities and taxation systems.[10] Though local autonomy is not wholly destroyed and democracy not completely dead, centralization is the order of the day.

Governments are everywhere attempting to control more aspects of individual and social life. Nor is this trend confined to the so-called totalitarian states; the state is everywhere becoming totalitarian. Every modern state is assuming directive control of aspects of the familial and educational systems, of recreation and religion, even of literature and science. Whether autocratic control will displace self-government, which cost society so dearly to gain, or whether liberty of action within the framework of generalized control can be developed, no one can now predict.

II. MAJOR CULTURAL PROCEDURES

Mobility. One of the major procedural features of our epoch is that of fluidity. Contrasted with the rigidities of ancient and medieval times, ours is a mobile society, a society of "*intensive social mobility*" or "social circulation," in which "*horizontal, and to a certain*

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[10] See W. J. Shepard, "Centralization" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 308–310; Maurice Caudel, "Government: France" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 43–44; Roscoe Lewis Ashley, *Our contemporary civilization* (New York 1935) 98; C. E. Merriam, "Government and society" in President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends*, ii (New York 1933) 1490–1495.

extent . . . vertical, mobility . . . has [possibly] been increasing since the end of the eighteenth century."[11] The middle and proletarian classes are established, nobility and royalty have become obsolete; freedom in the selection of occupation, mates, locality, country of residence, and political allegiance is common; women have become relatively emancipated; and comparative freedom of thought, speech, and assembly is among the guarantees of civil liberty. These features, for which mankind strove so long and so arduously, are now being challenged by dictatorships, but even in them they are in part present in subtle and pervasive forms.

Communication and the "Mass Mind." The telegraph, the telephone, and the cable, the magazine and the newspaper, the cinema and the radio have made the West a single system of intercommunication. But it is precisely these means of communication which, though holding such a promise of enlightenment, have produced the "mass mind" of our time. These media, though sometimes employed to impart information or to promote free discussion, are used mainly to foist upon the people a plethora of appeals, which in turn produce the stereotyped mind, bugaboos, and "pictures in the head." The god "profit" has seized upon the means of communication, has cajoled the public, and turned them into its own service. Internationally also the means of communication have been turned into agencies for manufacturing supineness. Nor is this confined to the totalitarian states; all governments at all times, and especially in times of crises, seize the means of communication and, rigidly suppressing all dissenting voices, turn them to the production of the "mass mind."

Specialism. Modern Western culture is also marked by specialism. The educational system, which is most directly engaged in preparing youth for life, turns out almost wholly specialists for shop and office, for the teacher's or the preacher's desk. In the school and even in the college, the public life of facts and ideas is largely ignored. Trained for specialities, most citizens are at the mercy of adroit propagandists and are unable to formulate a political philosophy or a way of life. "Minds in a groove," as Alfred North Whitehead describes them, are successful in coping with technical problems; but when called upon to see life steadily and see it whole, they must accept the ready-made opinions of others. With the growing specialisms and the intricacies of contemporary culture, the masses of the people, even the leaders, are no longer capable of apprehending the large issues or of wisely selecting either policies or leaders fit to execute their policies.

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[11] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social mobility* (New York 1927) 381.

Humanism. Contemporary man stresses the present world and the enjoyment of his life on earth; he pursues the realities of today rather than the ideologies of yesterday or tomorrow; he seeks the satisfactions of this world rather than those of some imagined Utopia or heaven. Reality and practical considerations rather than ideas and ideals are the dominant note. The characteristic thought of our time is the "pragmatic" philosophy of Comte, Spencer, and Mill, of Bentham, James, and Dewey.

Humanism is more than an outlook, a way of thinking, a philosophy. It is a way of life. Though modern culture has been marked by individualism and the profit procedure, it has also increasingly emphasized the importance of the community over the individual and of the common weal over group or individual interests. So much is this so that even those engaged in the pursuit of group or individual interests are obliged at least to profess to be "serving" society. In education and recreation, in religion and science, and in government the emphasis is on collective activity, social responsibility, and societal control.

Interdependence. This flux and flow, intercommunication, this mass mind, specialism, and humanism of our time have produced interdependence among the nations. Highways and railways, seaways and airways, the cable and the radio facilitate communication on an international scale; information concerning various peoples percolates often despite the manipulation of news; culture forms and procedures prevailing in one Western culture area reach other regions and peoples; nations have become relatively homogeneous, almost standardized, notwithstanding nationalistic particularisms. In former times it was mainly the religious and governmental institutions that produced such cultural cohesion as prevailed, and these are still in part operative. But in our time it is mainly the economic system that creates interdependence. The unity of the West, in so far as it exists, is the unity of tangible reality, which often overrides the divergent influences of nationalistic governments. Culture unity is not by any means complete; the conflicts prevailing in our time are far-reaching and profound; but cohesion embraces larger territories and populations than probably at any time in the history of man.

III. URBANIZATION IN OUR TIME

Growth of Cities. One aspect of modern culture, which includes many of the other features just mentioned, is urbanization. The machine and the transportation system have been mainly responsible for the intensive concentration of population in our time. Whereas in 1800 only 3 per cent of the population of Europe resided in centers of 2,000 and over, at present approximately 50 per cent lives in such centers; in 1790 5 per cent resided in centers of 2,500 and over in the United States, at present 56.2 per cent dwells in such centers. Further, whereas in 1790 3.3 per cent of the population of the United States was concentrated in cities of 8,000 and over, in 1930 49.1 per cent was so concentrated.[12] Nor is this phenomenon confined to a particular area; throughout the West cities have grown with extraordinary rapidity and produced many of the striking features of our time.[13]

Characteristics of Urban Centers. This concentration of population in mammoth cities gives rise to or is associated with phenomena of great import. Cities are the centers in which focus and out of which radiate some of the major influences of our time. In cities are found the most developed expressions of education, art, music, drama, architecture, possibly of religion. In cities are located the central organizations for practically all economic, educational, religious, scientific, governmental, and recreational activities.

In cities also are found some of the worst features of culture. In them are found those vast sores on the body of society known as the slums; in them, stark expressions of poverty, bewildered humanity, endless bread lines, organized vice and crime, octopus swindles and "bubbles." Moreover, urbanization is characterized by organization, formality, propaganda, sophistication, indifference, and a morality which is expressed in the formula, "nobody knows, therefore nobody cares." Urbanization produces mass living, the submerging of the individual, and substitutes corporative for individual aims. The individual is not even a cog in the production and consumption machinery; primary contacts, community bonds, the closer, personal integration of the small community give way to the gigantic impersonal and formal relationships of the city. And these characteristics lead to many of the maladjustments of our day, at least in their aggravated form.

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[12] See Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban society* (New York 1933) 32; United States Bureau of the Census, *Abstract of the fifteenth census of the United States* (Washington 1933) 20; and National Resources Committee, *Our cities* (Washington 1937) 1.

[13] See chap. 9 above, subchap. ii on "Rise of civilization centers and their influence."

Distant and Contractual Relationships. It is perhaps out of the city that radiate those influences which make for indirection and distance in human relationships and for the contractual nature of our society. Indirection and distance have obtained in previous societies, but probably never have they so deeply penetrated collective activities or affected such wide areas of life as in contemporary society.

These characteristics arise, first, from the large size of groups in our time: whether it be a class of two hundred students attempting to discuss a topic or twenty-two million voters endeavoring to understand the issues and to preserve democratic procedure, the social distance is enormous. Second, indirection and distance are due to size of the territory over which most relationships extend. Even in most college communities students come from such distant points that they do not attain face-to-face, intimate relationships; most economic connections in a small as well as in a large community are indirect; while in international finance it may be said that face-to-face relationships proper never obtain. Third, there is minute subdivision of functions. The separation of education, recreation, and religion from the home, the separation of the worker from the ownership of the tools of production, the separation of the investor from management, producer from consumer, of governor from the governed, the division of functions and the multitude of specialists in government—all contribute to distance and indirection. Fourth, the diversity of demands leads to the same end. Thus it is not merely the size of a college or the size of the community from which students come, but also the large number of courses offered which reduces the probability of a group of students appearing together in the same classes. Similarly, economic relationships become less regular, less intimate according to the number of stores in which a consumer can make his purchases.

These features are partly traceable to the machine. Not only has the machine extended contact to wider areas, not only has it been a major factor in increasing the size and the concentrations of the population, but it has also created such minute subdivisions of all human activities, has so multiplied and intensified the impacts upon the individual, that the impersonal and intermittent elements enter into comparatively small groups, even into family and friendship groups. Thus all familistic relationships, as Professor Sorokin has pointed out, become more difficult and are replaced by the contractual or the compulsory.

IV. MAJOR DILEMMAS OF OUR TIME

Science at the Crossroads. Contemporary Western culture presents many dilemmas, on the solution of which hangs its future course. We shall mention only three. The first consists of the direction which science, so vital a factor, will take in the near future. There are those who suggest that it might be desirable from the standpoint of human welfare for science to take a "holiday" and permit the social order to catch up with and adjust itself to the gains of the last few decades. Some even advocate that the West discard some of the new technology and the artificial ways superimposed by science and return to a state of nature. In reply, some scientists "denounce these lay proposals as moonshine, as grotesque impediments to progress; and as they turn back to their researches they refer irritably to the ungratefulness and the stupidity of mankind." [14]

To students of society this is a serious matter. Science has in a measure lost the clearcut human-welfare objective which characterized it in its early modern development; it often becomes so wrapped up in abstractions that it loses sight of the social responsibility implied in its activity; it frequently becomes the supine servant or the willing participant of those engaged in the exploitation of society; while scientists often permit their findings to become the source of social perversion, as in the case of the use to which anthropological findings are being employed in Nazi racial practices. Numerous maladjustments arise from the application of science. At least part of the existing confusion in moral standards, in criteria of judicial procedure, in international questions, for instance, can be laid at the door of the scientist.[15] Also, much of the labor of science is used in ways inimical to society. "Instead of complacent after-dinner speeches in sweeping defense of science, I should like to find our more articulate scientists insisting that the benefactions of science be used only in ways that are plainly in the general welfare. It would be encouraging to find, among scientists everywhere, some evidence of honest indignation at the way the gifts of science have been turned against society and therefore against science itself."[16]

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[14] Henry A. Wallace, "Scientist in an unscientific society" in *Scientific American*, 150 (1934) 285. By permission of Munn & Company.

[15] Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 535–536.

If science is to steer the course of Western culture, it will need, first, to preserve, or wherever lost to regain, its integrity, to keep itself as free as is humanly possible from subservience to any "interests"; it will need to keep itself on the path of rectitude, to devote itself to the discovery of facts and laws in all phases of nature and human nature. Further, the established sciences need to recognize the necessity of extending scientific procedures to the human scene. ". . . The enormous advance gained by the sciences of inanimate matter over those of living things is one of the greatest catastrophes ever suffered by humanity. The environment born of our intelligence and our inventions is adjusted neither to our stature nor to our shape. . . . Since the natural conditions of existence have been destroyed by modern civilization, the science of man has become the most necessary of all sciences."[17] Established scientists need to encourage rather than to obstruct, as they often do, the labors of the student of society; need to recognize that there is a possibility of discovering broad laws that govern human society or at least that social science can greatly extend the meager fund of knowledge we now have regarding human relations. Further, scientists need to realize that there is at least as much possibility of controlling some aspects of society as there is of controlling physical nature.

Capitalism or Socialism? The second major dilemma, interrelated with the one just mentioned, revolves around the question whether private capitalism or socialism shall prevail, the terms "socialism" and "capitalism" being used in their wide sense. The conflict, as analyzed in the middle of the nineteenth century by Karl Marx, consists mainly in a struggle between capitalists and the bourgeoisie on the one hand and labor and the proletariat on the other; but it is not limited to these classes. All classes are affected. It is fundamentally a conflict between two major culture-complexes. It is not restricted to any locality or nation; all Western culture, the entire world in fact, comes within its orbit. The tripartite alliance between Italy, Germany, and Japan, the war in Spain, the demands of Hitler and his followers are evidences that the economic dilemma reaches into and permeates the whole world.

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[16] Wallace, *op. cit.*, 286. By permission of Munn & Company.

[17] Alexis Carrel, *Man, the unknown* (New York 1935) 28–29. By permission of Harper & Brothers.

That private capitalism is disintegrating is now generally recognized. The era of *laissez-faire*, which in practice meant that government was not to interfere with high profit-making, seems to have ended. Liberalism, which staked the future on freedom of thought and action, seems also to have come to a close. Everywhere, whether in the fascist states of Italy, Germany, and Japan, or in the communist state of Russia, or in democratic England, France, and the United States, the political status and respectability of *laissez-faire* have largely passed, and private capitalism seems to be dying.[18] It is socialism that, in various forms, is ascendant the Western world over. Virtually all the modern states are increasingly assuming some control of economic life and organizing it coöperatively in an attempt to serve the interests of the community as a whole.[19] Whether the decline of private capitalism will mean the inevitable rise of the proletariat or whether it will mean an increased dictatorship and the turning of the proletariat into a capitalist is by no means certain; and even less certain is it whether the passing of capitalism will mean increased human well-being.

International Organization. The third major dilemma revolves around the problem of the relation between nations. Modern culture has produced the paradox of increased intercommunication and interdependence and at the same time an increased walling-in of nations and an intensification of conflict.

At the root of the present menace of international difficulties lies the disparity in the distribution of natural resources. This has divided society into the "haves" and the "have-nots." Modern industrialism has created or intensified the demand for fuel, iron, oil, for territories to permit population expansion, for markets; but at the same time nations have been building tariff and other walls which make it virtually impossible for the nations which have only meager resources to live. The "haves" rationalize their policies by "White Man's Burden" and "Manifest Destiny" theories; they build combines, cartels, and other devices which prevent the free flow of goods; while the "have-nots" go on a rampage of conquest;

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[18] See Gauss, *op. cit.*, 247.

[19] See section "Which doctrine will prevail," pp. 239–240 above, for John Stuart Mill's statement.

and they too build combinations, such as that of Italy, Germany, and Japan, to justify their aggression. And the gods of war laugh up their sleeves.

On the other hand, modern society has made the first comprehensive effort to build a comity of nations and to create instruments, such as the World Court and the League of Nations, aimed at the mitigation if not the elimination of war. That these efforts have not been successful is beside the point; lack of success only stresses once more the intricacy of society and the slowness with which it unfolds. It is still significant and important that for the first time in the history of man these efforts of government are being put forth and insisted upon by the various peoples; that the people themselves cut across the barriers of nations in a multitude of "international" conferences which may yet, in some distant day, enlarge the peace area and establish the mores of peace among men.

Can the West Resolve This Dilemma? That national interests can be reconciled with a state of peace would seem to be theoretically possible. This involves the recognition of the folly of the politics of force and punitive peace, the frank recognition of the needs of nations, a stop to the practice of using colonies as sacred articles of nationalist faith, the adoption of birth control to prevent overcrowding, the acceptance of well-ordered migration as a uniform international policy.[20] But there is little evidence that the nations are taking steps toward adopting such a course or are even considering these or similar proposals. And yet, the problem is not insoluble and on that solution partly hangs the future of Western culture.

V. WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

Opinions differ as to what the future holds. Many attempts have been made to formulate a "law" of history and to discover whether the past gives any clue to the future. As a matter of fact, we do not have in the past a sound basis for a prediction of the future. Further, our knowledge of the past is not sufficiently detailed to justify such forecasting, and even if it were it is not certain that it would give us a basis for predicting future trends. History does not repeat itself.

Cyclical Prediction. In so far as there is any basis whatsoever for prediction, opinion as to the course of events falls into three classes. Some point out that in the past civilization has followed definite cycles of rise and fall; that from the definite inception of a civilization to its maturity and subsequent fall has taken approximately fifteen hundred years, the rise being slow, taking from ten to twelve hundred years and the fall sudden, taking about three hundred. From which it is concluded that the present cycle will follow more or less the same course. If this were to occur and the period involved were roughly of the same length, present-day civilization, having gone only six hundred years on its course, would therefore have some six hundred years to go before it reached the peak of development and began its decline.

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[20] Ernest Minor Patterson, *World's economic dilemma* (New York 1930) chap. xvi.

Some authorities predict for our civilization possibly an even longer life. "We are approaching a period of culture wealth, or the crest of a cycle;" we have so greatly elaborated some trait-complexes, such as industrial corporations or political mechanisms, that they have become unwieldy; and it is unthinkable that this process can continue indefinitely. That there must come a time of standing-by, so far as these complexes are concerned, there would seem to be no question. But how soon will that time come? "Euro-American culture is still young;" there have been civilizations, such as that of Crete, which have enjoyed a cycle of some three thousand years; ". . . as compared with this, we, as a center, are still in the dawn." [21]

Linear Prediction. There are those who believe that culture has now developed techniques which can prevent a sudden break. There is a reasonable hope that the "development of the scientific method and scientific attitude within Western civilization . . . will tend to prevent, if not entirely to eliminate, the mistakes and blunders in social policy which lead to cultural disaster. . . . There is no inevitable law of decline or decadence in the cultural process. . . . Reversions in culture are, it would seem, no more inevitable than famine, pestilence, or war. All these, to be sure, have hitherto characterized the history of mankind; but science believes that they can all be eliminated and prevented." [22]

New Culture for Old. Recently an empirical attempt has been made to describe the course of culture in the past and to predict the future. That is the attempt made by Professor Sorokin in his *Social and cultural dynamics.* Throughout the three volumes, Professor Sorokin makes a blank indictment of modern Western culture and, in agreement with Oswald Spengler, sees no future for that culture. "We are seemingly between two epochs: the dying Sensate culture of our magnificent yesterday and the coming Ideational culture of the creative tomorrow. We are living, thinking, and acting at the end of a brilliant six-hundred-year-long Sensate day. . . . The night of the transitory period begins to loom before us and the coming generations, perhaps with their nightmares, frightening shadows, and heart-rending horrors. Beyond it, however, the dawn of a new great Ideational culture is probably waiting to greet the men of the future." [23]

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[21] Wissler, *op. cit.*, 249.

[22] Charles A. Ellwood, *Cultural evolution* (New York 1927) 259–260. By permission of the D. Appleton-Century Company.

Cataclysmic Meaning of Civilization. This is not the place to analyze the details of these various points of view. One crucial fact, however, is often overlooked, namely, that historically culture has again and again been arrested in its development and normal flow not by any disaster in culture as a whole, but rather by the concentration, organization, artificialization, formalism, sophistication, impersonalization which are associated with urbanization of culture. The human mind seems unable to live indeterminently on a high degree of social distance and indirection. Today the very flux and flow, the intercommunication, "mass-mind" activity, and interdependence of life have made the city all the more focal in its constructive as well as in its possible destructive power. When we examine the insecurity of our time, it is not any particular disturbances in physical nature, in biology, or even in culture as a whole that produce our more striking maladjustments; it is not primarily that crops fail or that people are producing fewer children, or that they do or do not go to church in the numbers they used to, or that they are or are not occupied in this or the other activity; but it is the activity of the octupuses of commerce and finance, the Wall Streets and the Bogard Streets, the concentration of wealth and wealth control, the vast organizations, and the manipulations of whole nations carried on by gigantic governmental or business organizations which together foment the great societal upheavals that deprive the masses of their livelihood, that pitch the peoples against one another in racial strife and internecine war, that in short, arrest the constructive flow. And it may well be that the future of Western culture lies, not in the lap of the gods, but in the hands of those who from the great cities manipulate our destinies.

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[23] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, iii (New York 1937) 535. By permission of American Book Company.

In the last analysis the contest of modern times is one of economic life. Whether the alternatives of individualism, socialism, and communism are the only ones is the real dilemma. The Scandinavian countries have resorted on a large scale to the coöperatives, which, while mitigating some of the evils arising from capitalism, still retain that system and utilize such advantages as inhere in it. Other countries, notably England, have adopted the coöperative system in a minor way. It may be that that is the "middle way." [24] But these, at best, are only palliatives.

Meanwhile the conflict between individualism, socialism, and communism is on throughout the West. With set jaws and clenched fists, the closed ranks of the vast armies of the nations representing these respective systems are glaring at one another across their borders over this very issue. It will be the chief cause of the next great conflict, and it will be West-wide if not world-wide. And the gods, if gods there be, must throw back their heads and guffaw at the utter stupidity of the societies of man.

Civilization's Fall and Culture's Continuity. However, it is not culture really that falls, but only the city concentrations of culture. Whatever gains of substantial value mankind has made, as far as we know, have been deposited in the fund of culture and have been transmitted from generation to generation for ages, without interruption. Cultures as wholes, or even major complexes of culture, do not fall. It is rather the overelaborations, overconcentrations, the excessive manifestations, the sophistications of culture that build themselves up into gigantic structures and then, grown top-heavy, fall by their own weight. It is not culture that falls. The deposits of human experience, the methods and techniques that mankind has developed, remain in their essence unaltered. They are the foundation upon which the future will build in its own curious and fascinating round.

REFERENCES

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[24] See Marquis W. Childs, *Sweden, the middle way* (New Haven 1936) for an illuminating discussion of the coöperatives.

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SUGGESTIONS TO STUDENTS AND TEACHERS

SUGGESTIONS TO STUDENTS AND TEACHERS

Arrangement of Materials in This Volume. Sociology prepares or aims to prepare for several fields. It aims to prepare the student for the general business of life, by giving him an understanding of the development, structure, functioning, and problems of society. More specifically, it prepares for teaching sociology or general social sciences; for social work and investigation; for business and law; for research in such fields as population, marriage, and the family; and for the more fundamental studies of sociological phenomena and theory. The discipline has recently developed several specialties, such as the sociology of teaching, the sociology of marriage and the family, educational sociology, the sociology of social work and of religion, and political sociology. Thus the discipline offers ample opportunity for creative work according to the student's particular interest and capacity.

It is important, however, first to lay a broad foundation. Many students wish to jump at once into social work, social reform, or into making field investigations. To follow such a procedure is somewhat like trying to be a physician without first mastering biology and chemistry. In fact, society is so intricate that to deal with it requires profound knowledge of society itself and a deep understanding of the techniques of dealing with it; even the most thoroughly trained person is often helpless in dealing with the ills of society. The purpose of this book is to try to lay such a foundation. It deals with fundamentals, with the factors or bases, with the development and functioning, with the processes and major trends.

The discriminating teacher will notice that the author has not written down to the student. The student of college age of today has come to marked maturity during the difficult years of the post-War and depression periods; he has experienced profound awakening, has himself thought seriously on the very questions considered in this volume, and has developed tough mental sinews. The writer has used the materials presented here for several years to students who were for the most part sophomores, and has found that if anything they are simple enough even for the "average" student.

The teacher will also notice that the subject matter is so arranged or stated as to provoke questioning and discussion and to foster creative research. This has been done not only to promote general interest, but also to serve the needs of the more capable students. The latter, generally neglected in present-day secondary education, enter upon a study such as this with freshness, vigor, and often with enthusiasm, and if given an opportunity will be found, as Professor Commons [1] or as the present writer has found, to be the most constructive of helpers. By the very fact that they are in day-by-day relation with the instructor, that they pursue the study over a whole year or more, and that they are relatively free from rationalized prejudgments, they can and often do become a vitalizing force and the best of contributors in such a study. Incidentally, such students acquire a training during the years when it is of most value to them; and in after years they are most grateful for having enjoyed the privilege to engage in creative intellectual activity and to have received the training that goes with it. The materials in this book, therefore, have been arranged and the hypotheses have been stated in such a manner as to give the more interested and capable student an opportunity to question, discuss, and carry on researches which may extend, modify, or clarify the findings set forth.

Suggestions as to Conduct of Course. As to the details of pursuing this study, there is of course no one way. If this book is used in a one-semester course the teacher may wish to omit Parts II and IV. If that is done, however, the instructor will need to present a brief résumé of those Parts, since they deal with the important matters of factors and processes, or else the student will fail to grasp the dynamic and procedural nature of the phenomena under discussion. The student will also find it helpful frequently to consult the glossary, comparing the definitions given in it with those expounded in the body of the text and in the quotations in the glossary.

Some teachers may wish, as the writer does, simply to discuss the main points made in the various chapters and open themselves to questions by the students, thereby developing and keeping alive the spirit of inquiry, of give and take, and of creative activity. It will probably be found that to assign one chapter for each week is about sufficient. The chapter on marriage should be divided into two assignments, both because of the length of that chapter and in order to afford ample time for the consideration and discussion of a topic of vital moment to the student. These assignments may be supplemented with an equal amount of reading selected from the bibliographies found at the end of each chapter. In many cases the number of pages in the various books has been stated in order to facilitate the making of collateral-reading assignments. Such of the books mentioned below as are available and others which the instructor may select may be kept on the shelves for general explorative reading.

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[1] See John R. Commons, *Myself* (New York 1934) *passim.*

Some teachers may wish to require the writing of brief reports on the various topics, or the writing of a comprehensive semester essay, or the keeping of a notebook, paralleling the contents of this book, based on the latest data. The writer has found that a combination of these methods and their alternation from year to year are the most efficient. Ordinary thesis writing and even most notebook keeping followed year-in and year-out become a bane. They almost invariably are left to the end of the semester; at best they become a frantic race in which students go round on round, very busy at doing nothing; and at worst they become a system of competitive racing to buy the best papers or notebooks written in previous years or which efficient hacksters have compiled, a process which most students themselves detest.

The writer has found it best, therefore, first to present a bird's-eye-view of the contents of the whole course, going slowly the first three or four weeks. Then he tries to stimulate students to discover some subdivision that really grips them; and later he gives those who "bite" an opportunity to extend or constructively to criticise the data set forth in this book. The more valuable reports are read to the class or are given in résumé by the instructor, with credit, of course, to the student. In any event, the writer has found it most satisfactory to lecture informally, to elucidate from day to day the main points covered in a given assignment, and, by laying himself open to questions, encourage the students to come to real grips with the study. In short, he tries to make the study a joint adventure in discovery, especially of new data to supplement those presented in this volume.

Part IV is so highly compact, theoretical a statement of the Social Institutional Processes, that the instructor may find it advisable, after using it in the introductory course as set forth in the text and thus preserving continuity and unity of exposition, to use it also as the basis for an advanced, one-quarter or semester course; in which case he can well introduce and contrast the social processes proper with the social institutional or cultural processes, and thus be able to stress the theoretical and practical significance of the two.

Suggested Books. As an aid in keeping the work on a more or less creative plane, the teacher will find that, in addition to the specific references given at the end of each chapter the following books will prove very valuable for the student's general explorative and supplementary reading. J. O. Hertzler, *Social institutions*, glanced over from time to time, will serve to keep the field covered by this book unified. Sumner and Keller, *Science of society*, W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, and A. G. Keller, *Man's rough road* (a condensed form of *Science of society*) contain a wealth of general information useful for explorative reading; many items in this book are based upon these sources. G. A. Hedger (ed.), *Introduction to Western civilization*, though lacking in unity, is a valuable source on many topics touched on in this work, as is F. A. Cleveland (ed.), *Modern scientific knowledge*. F. S. Chapin, *Contemporary American institutions*, though taking a different view of institutions, contains rich illustrative materials; the President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent social trends in the United States* (student's ed.) is a mine of information on many points, especially on how the institutions operate in the United States. C. H. Judd, *Psychology of social institutions* and Knight Dunlap, *Civilized life* throw light on many items from the point of view of psychology. Preserved Smith, *History of modern culture* and H. E. Barnes and H. David, *History of Western civilization* also contain valuable historical material. The same may be said of A. J. Toynbee, *Study of history* and F. S. Marvin, *Living past*. Graham Wallas, *The great society* and P. A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics* will give the serious student much food for thought. Columbia College Associates, *Introduction to contemporary civilization in the West*, various editions, will be found particularly useful as aids to teachers.

Many textbooks in general sociology might be mentioned. The following particularly discuss several of the specific topics taken up in this volume: C. M. Case, *Outlines of introductory sociology*, a book of readings with illuminating introductory notes; R. M. MacIver, *Society* (1937 ed.) is an indispensable book; F. H. Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (1935 ed.) stresses the biological factors in society; Gillin and Blackmar, *Outlines of sociology* (1930 ed.) is an ever present help; von Wiese and Becker, *Systematic sociology* is comprehensive and thought-provoking; E. A. Ross, *Principles of sociology* is always vigorous though tinged with reformism; Kimball Young, *Source book for sociology* contains some valuable material. Others on general sociology are E. T. Hiller, *Principles of sociology*, R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology*, and Reuter and Hart, *Introduction to sociology.*

Among the more thoughtful and stimulating books dealing with the contemporary scene, students will find Parts 3 and 4 of P. A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics* thought-provoking, even though the entire book represents a special point of view; E. M. Patterson, *World's economic dilemma* is an excellent discussion of contemporary economic problems; W. S. Thompson, *Danger spots in world population* deals with the same problems from the point of view of population; and J. Huizinga, *In the shadow of tomorrow* is a stimulating criticism of Western culture as a whole.

In order that the student may not lose sight of the forest because of the proximity of the trees of specific data, it will be well to keep within easy reach some books on the theory of sociology. M. Ginsberg, *Sociology* and J. Rumney, *Science of society: an introduction to sociology* are small but meaty books. P. A. Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories*, though obscure in spots, is very valuable; E. E. Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* is a lucid exposition; Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, though intricate in places, is indispensable; Laurence J. Henderson, *Pareto's general sociology* is a convenient and lucid discussion of Pareto.

Encyclopaedias and Yearbooks. Of the various encyclopaedias none is so valuable for the student of sociology as the *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences* in fifteen volumes, edited by Professor E. R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson; the student cannot afford not to consult the various articles pertaining to the different topics we discuss in the present volume; William O. P. Bliss (ed.), *New encyclopaedia of social reform*, though somewhat old is a good source of information on many items besides social reform; the *Statesman's year book*, the *International yearbook*, the *Social work yearbook*, and the *World almanac* often contain valuable up-to-date information.

Periodicals. The periodicals of value to students in sociology are: the *American sociological review*, official publication of the American Sociological Society, the *American journal of sociology*, the *Sociological review* (London), *Social forces*, and *Sociology and social research.* Important articles are also frequently found in the *Annals of the*

American Academy of Political and Social Science, the *Journal of social philosophy*, *Social research*, and *Social science*. The *Survey* and the *Survey graphic*, the *Monthly labor review*, the *International labor review*, and the various publications of the International Labor Office will also be found to be good sources.

GLOSSARY

INTRODUCTION

The following glossary[1] is intended as an aid to the reader in getting the connotation of the principal terms used in the present volume. The terms have been elucidated in the body of the book in their immediate context. Here they are defined in a more succinct form, are supplemented by etymologies based on the *New English dictionary* and the *Webster's new international dictionary*, and by illustrative sentences from authoritative writers. In a few cases the illustrative sentences are drawn from the text above.

The glossary contains one hundred and seventy-two terms. Sixty of these (marked by asterisk*) are those recommended by the American Sociological Society as the minimum to be learned by the beginning student.[2] It is suggested that the serious student of sociology thoroughly master those concepts and that all students frequently consult the glossary and thereby supplement the expositions given in the body of the text.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN GLOSSARY

A. = Arabic
AS. = Anglo-Saxon

D. = Danish

E. = English

F. = French
fr. = from, formed on, adapted, or adopted

G. = German
Ga. = Gaelic
Gr. = Greek

I. = Irish
It. = Italian

L. = Latin
LL. = Late Latin

MD. = Middle Danish

ME. = Middle English
ML. = Medieval Latin

N. = Norse

OE. = Old English
OF. = Old French
OHG. = Old High German
ON. = Old Norse

p. = participle
pp. = past participle
Pr. = Provençal

S. = Sanskrit
Sp. = Spanish
syn. = Synonym

T. = Teutonic

W. = Welsh

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[1] Parts of the following glossary were published as a separate pamphlet, entitled *Student's dictionary of sociological terms* (University of California Press, Berkeley 1937), and are reprinted by permission.

[2] See *Journal educational sociology*, vii (1933) 81–82.

GLOSSARY

* **Accommodation** [F. *accommodation*, fr. L. *accommodatio*, *accommodatus*, pp. of *accommodare*, *ad* to + *commodare*, *con* with + *modus* to suit, make suitable or to fit] The process by which contacting individuals or groups gradually come to conform or fit to one another, particularly by eliminating elements of conflict; also the condition or state accompanying or resulting from such process. When accommodation contains a low or no element of awareness, it is termed adaptation; when it is mainly conscious or purposeful, it is termed adjustment. See **adaptation, adjustment, assimilation.**

The person who goes into a new social situation, as the student to the university or the immigrant to a new culture, finds a strange welter of procedures and customs. In the typical case he is for a period homesick—that is, he misses and longs for the old familiar stimulations at the same time that he is overstimulated and tired by the new and unfamiliar, but presently habits are formed and interests developed in accord with the new situation and his accommodation to it is then underway. E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1933) 322.

acculturation [L. *ac* to + *cultura*, fr. *colere* to till, attend to, or tend] The process by which cultures or culture groups approximate or become closely similar to each other by adopting one another's culture traits or trait complexes. See **assimilation.**

Acculturation, then, is the name given to all the various ways in which individuals or groups take on new culture traits, and incorporate them into their own manner of living. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 372.

* **adaptation** [F. *adaptation*, fr. LL. *adaptatio*, fr. L. *adaptare* to fit, *ad* to + *aptare* to fit] (1) The process by which organisms slowly modify themselves so as to fit to the natural environment; a condition which is passed on in the germ plasm; for example, changes in the pigmentation of the skin or of the eye, in stature or head shape. (2) The process by which the individual, in response to the environment, undergoes changes which are not transmissible in the germ plasm; for example, the increase of stature of a person who comes to live amid abundant natural resources. (3) Social adaptation is the process by which individuals and groups gradually and unawaringly modify their behavior to fit the culture. See **accommodation, adjustment, assimilation.**

> The immediate result in the biological realm of the struggle for existence is adaptation and specialization. Each species of living form is so adapted as to be able to survive in the existing circumstances. . . . E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1933) 282–283.

* **adjustment** [F. *adjustement*, fr. *adjuster*, *à* to + *juste* just, L. *justus* just, right, fit] The process by which individuals or groups more or less consciously fit themselves to each other, or fit into, or act in accordance with the prevailing culture. Adjustment may be unilateral in that one person or group compromises, or mutual in that both persons or groups yield to each other. Also the condition or state accompanying or resulting from the process. See **accommodation, adaptation, assimilation.**

> The adjustment may be a modification of an instinctive capacity or a novel combination of the simple reactive capacities of the organism. But the adjustment is in some measure reflective rather than reflex; there is an appreciative awareness of the situation; there is a finer point to the conation or endeavour. J. Arthur Thomson, *What is man?* (New York 1924) 141–142.

aggregation (human) [LL. *aggregatio*, fr. *aggregatus*, pp. of *aggregare*, *ag* (*ad*) to + *gregare* to collect, bring into, or add to a flock] Collections or masses of individuals in spatial proximity but not necessarily homogeneous or organized. See **crowd, group.**

> Ross' division of groups with presence from those without presence is the most clear-cut of the aggregational distinctions made among the preceding classifications. All assemblages of any kind—crowds, congregations, audiences, mobs, mass meetings—are easily classed as aggregations. Some are sufficiently personal and face-to-face to result in primary relations; others are so formal and distant that little or no interaction occurs. In either case there is personal propinquity, which is the one thing needful to transform a category into an aggregation. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 158.

* **amalgamation** [ML. *amalgamatio*, probably fr. L. *malagma*, Gr. μάλαγμα emollient, poultice, plaster, fr. μαλάσσειν to make soft, fr. μαλακός soft, or fr. A. *al-jamca* a union, conjugation] The biological fusing by mating of two or more racially distinct individuals or groups. See **race mixture.**

> It is one of the gains of modern social theory to have developed a careful discrimination between *assimilation*, as the blending and unification of divergent cultures, and *amalgamation*, the term now commonly used to denote the mixture of originally distinct racial strains. Sarah E. Simons . . . pointed out that assimilation and amalgamation are processes which can take place more or less independently of each other; the breeding in of a small element of a foreign race may bring about a modification of culture quite disproportionate to the proportion of alien blood introduced, as in the case of modern France, which has a culture essentially Latin, but is overwhelmingly Teutonic in blood. Likewise, considerable assimilation can take place without intermarriage. Floyd N. House, *Range of social theory* (New York 1929) 308.

animism [L. *anima* soul + *ism*] The belief that all objects, both animate and inanimate, possess spirits or souls; the system of religious acts based upon such belief.

> Thus Animism, in its full development, includes the belief in souls and in a future state, in controlling deities and subordinate spirits, these doctrines practically resulting in some kind of active worship. Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive culture*, i (3d American from 2d English ed., New York 1889) 427.

anthropomorphism [Gr. *ἀνθρωπόμορφος* of human form, fr. *ἄνθρωπος* man + *μορφή* form] The attributing of human characteristics and faculties to any object; particularly that form of religion which ascribes a human form and character to the deity.

> The anthropomorphic viewpoint is . . . applied in the conceptualization of inner experiences. . . . Hunger, courage, love, sin, consciousness, death, are . . . endowed with qualities, particularly anthropomorphic qualities, and with concrete form. . . . The skill of a hunter may be objectivated and exist as an object or as an anthropomorphic being leading an existence independent of the hunter himself. Franz Boas, "Anthropology" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 94–95.

* **assimilation** [L. *assimilatio* similarity, fr. *assimilatus*, pp. of *assimilare*, *as* (*ad*) to + *similare* to make like, resembling, similar] The process or condition by which individuals or groups of varying cultures more or less unconsciously exchange and fuse culture traits or complexes. See **accommodation, acculturation, adaptation, adjustment.**

> Assimilation in any case takes place gradually and by degrees so slight that they are not open to observation or measurement. Robert E. Park, "Assimilation" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 2 (New York 1930) 281.

* **association** [LL. *associatio* a united group, fr. *associatus*, pp. of *associare*, *as* (*ad*) with + *sociare* to join or unite, *socius* a friend, companion, associate] The organized phases or parts of a social institution; the formal union of individuals and groups having common interests, definitely expressed purposes or goals, and specifically stated or implied rights and duties. See **coöperation, social organization.**

> In a complex society associations tend to be specialized so that each stands for a particular type of interest or interest-complex. R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 158.

* **attitude** [It. *attitudine*, ML. *aptitudo* fitness, fr. L. *aptus* suited, fitted] Conscious or unconscious bent, or inclination, predisposing an individual to respond to a situation in an habitual or characteristic way.

> Likes, dislikes, avoidances, approaches, withdrawals, appreciations, hatreds, and loves are fundamentally the core of attitudes, as these are directed to vari-

ous situations. The attitude marks the inception of behavior toward situations. It gives direction to it. For the prediction of his behavior therefore, it is more important to know the attitude of a person than to know his mental images or verbal opinions. Kimball Young, *Social psychology* (New York 1930) 138.

* **Behavior pattern** [behavior: AS. *behabban* to surround, restrain, detain; pattern: ME. *patron*, F. *patron* a patron or someone to imitate, fr. L. *patronus*, fr. *pater* a father] A relatively uniform mode of action of an individual or of a group resulting from uniform responses to the same stimuli. See **collective behavior.**

[A young infant] has no innate behavior patterns by which to satisfy his hunger except the reflex of suckling, the chained reflex of swallowing, and the physiological process of digestion. . . . He is so plastic that his taste for food, the time at which he demands it, and the way in which he takes it are, within the limits of his physiological capacity, all determined by the cultural patterns forced upon him by those who have him in charge. James A. Quinn, "Biological factors in culture" in George A. Hedger (ed.), *Introduction to Western civilization* (Garden City, N. Y. 1933) 72.

belief [ME. *bileafe* belief, see AS. *geléafa*] The mental acceptance of a principle, proposition, or statement, unproved or incapable of proof by objective evidence or scientific investigation.

All judgments which are non-scientific are beliefs, whatever their contents may be. Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories* (New York 1928) 661.

birth control [birth: ME. *burth*, fr. AS. *beran* to bear; control: F. *contrôler*, ML. *contrarotulus*, fr. *contra* against + *rotulus* a roll or register] The practice of preventing birth by natural or artificial means. See **conception control.**

Limitation of numbers at the behest of the standard of living is most vividly revealed in the practice of birth-control. A. G. Keller, *Man's rough road* (New York 1932) 75.

* **Caste** [Sp. and Portuguese, *casta* race, lineage, L. *castus-a* pure, unpolluted] A subdivision of a society based on birth or occupation, enforced by the mores of a group, and transmitted culturally from generation to generation; as, for example, the castes of India. See **class, status, stratification.**

A caste may be described as an endogamous group whose members follow by tradition a single occupation, or certain cognate occupations, and who are held together by definite social rules of behaviour, and by common ceremonial or ritual observances. The system is rigid, and the individual cannot raise himself out of the place in which he is born. . . . Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 166.

centralization [F. *centralisation* centralize, fr. L. *centralis*, *centrum*, fr. Gr. *κέντρον* the point around which a circle is described] The process by which individuals and groups congregate into or about a given geographic area, such as the heart of a city, for the fulfilment of common ends.

While concentration deals with density of populations and social institutions in a given area, *centralization* denotes the tendency of basic types of institutional services to locate at focal points of transportation and communication. Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *Introduction to sociology* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 124–125.

ceremony [ME. *cerymonye*, fr. L. *caerimonia* sacredness, sanctity, awe] The standardized set of acts usually performed collectively, expressing belief in the importance and sanctity of an object or event; for example, baptismal, marriage, naturalization ceremonies.

Ceremony gathers about our most sacred institutions and tinges them with an impressiveness they do not naturally possess and which they sorely need, if they are to withstand the shock of unrestrained human impulses and desires. Marriage, the institution which bridles for us one of the most ungovernable passions of man and brings it into subjection to the welfare of society; initiation among primitive folk into the responsibilities of manhood and womanhood; entrance into the church, or lodge, or business corporation . . . all these are occasions when it is important for the welfare of society that each onlooker be most impressively reminded that he has important social duties. John Lewis Gillin and Frank W. Blackmar, *Outlines of sociology* (3d ed. New York 1930) 439.

change [L. *cambiare* to exchange, barter] The process by which a pre-existing culture trait or complex undergoes alteration as a result of its coming into contact with another culture or as a result of discovery, invention, or other cause. See **persistence.**

Culture may be thought of as the accumulated products of human society, and includes the use of material objects as well as social institutions and social ways of doing things. Hence cultural change is the change in these products. William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) 58.

church [OE. *circe* and ME. *chirche*] The organized aspect of the religious institution. A formal organization having membership, rights, obligations, edifices, and specific purposes, such as the perpetuation or propagation of a given belief or ritual. See **religion.**

Religion, on the other hand, is inseparable from the idea of a Church. . . . A Church . . . is a moral community formed by all the believers in a single faith, laymen as well as priests. Émile Durkheim, *Elementary forms of the religious life* (New York 1915) 45.

civilization [F. *civilisation*, fr. L. *civilis* of or pertaining to citizens; *civis* citizen, *civitas* the body of citizens] Civilization is the city-concentration of culture, that stage or aspect of societal development in which culture becomes highly organized, artificialized, removed from contact with nature, especially as found in the great centers of population; for example, the Egyptian, Greek, or Roman civilizations. See **culture, urbanization.**

> The growth of cities and the migration from the country to the city has been witnessed in the course of every great civilization. In fact the original meaning of the word "civilization" is just urbanization. As Nineveh and Tyre, Mycenae and Tiryns, Troy, Babylon, Athens, Sparta, Rome, Carthage, the Egyptian Thebes, Alexandria, Byzantium, Florence, Venice, rose in influence and power, so did the corresponding civilizations grow; as these cities declined so did their civilizations decline. R. M. MacIver, *Society: its structure and changes* (New York 1931) 361.

class [L. *classis* a collection, division, akin to Gr. *κλῆσις* a calling, fr. *καλεῖν* to call] A horizontal division of society embracing persons of same or similar economic rank, religious or political status, or possessing common cultural characteristics. See **caste, status, stratification.**

> In addition to primary and secondary, or personal and impersonal groups, the organization of society can be better understood by a division into vertical and horizontal. Race, religion and nation are examples of vertical groups. . . . The class or caste grouping is easily understood as horizontal. . . . There are many levels in this grouping, and many names to describe them. Upper and lower, . . . aristocracy and *hoi polloi*, capital and labor, or bourgeois and proletarian. . . . Herbert Adolphus Miller, *Races, nations and classes* (Philadelphia 1924) 14–15.

coercion [L. *coercio*, *coertio*, *coerctio*, fr. *coercere* to shut up, to press together or down, *co* with, together + *arcere* bend or force] The exercise of physical or social pressure, usually conscious, in order to bend individuals or groups to conformity to the mores or laws of a community.

> Among the most advanced forms of the civic state the public authority has vast powers of coercion at its disposal, and though such powers are said to rest upon the will of the people, there always remains a great deal of unwilling subordination, indifference or mere acquiescence. Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 139.

* **collective behavior** [collective: L. *collectivus* gathered, fr. *collectus*, pp. of *colligere*, *col* (*con*) with + *legere* to gather; behavior: AS. *behabban* to surround, restrain, detain] Uniform, usually conventional action, carried on by groups in response to social situations and as if prompted by common impulses. See **behavior pattern.**

> The process by which sporadic collective behavior assumes institutional form can be clearly seen in the case of religious sects. Although they arise ordinarily out of the ferment of religious revivals and seek to maintain and renew from time to time the sentiments and attitudes in which they were originally con-

ceived, sects characteristically develop traditions, attitudes and an organization which give unity and direction. Robert E. Park, "Collective behavior" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 3 (New York 1930) 632.

collective representation [collective: L. *collectivus* gathered, fr. *collectus*, pp. of *colligere*, *col* (*con*) with + *legere* to gather; representation: L. *repraesentatio* representation, fr. *repraesentare*, *re* re + *praesentare* to put before, present] An easily recognizable object or act symbolizing common concepts, sentiments or ideals, producing similar overt reaction; for example, a flag, the cross or the crescent, the wedding ring, the singing of a national hymn. See **ritual, symbol.**

A collective representation such as a flag or home, reflects the combined experiences of many persons, and it has the same general meaning for each person. . . . Durkheim laid great stress upon the concept "social mind," by which he meant that a society or group has a "mind" that controls the minds of the individuals composing the group or society, and it does so through collective symbols, words [slogans], ceremonies, and the like, which he called "collective representations." Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *Introduction to sociology* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 265–266, 811–812.

Without doubt the pressure exerted by society, the exaltation kept up by collective representations, help the individual to organize not only his moral but his intellectual life. C. Bouglé, *Evolution of values* (New York 1926) 182.

* **communication** [L. *communicatio* a making common, imparting, fr. *communicatus*, pp. of *communicare* to impart, convey, fr. *com* (*con*) with + *munis* ready to serve, or fr. *communis* common] The process of exchanging commonly understood ideas, facts, or usages by means of language, visual representation, imitation, suggestion.

Through communication different individuals come to have like feelings and ideas,—the *sine qua non* of common activities. John Lewis Gillin and Frank W. Blackmar, *Outlines of sociology* (3d ed. New York 1930) 337–338.

* **community** [L. *communitas* fellowship, community of relations, a sharing in common, *communis*, *com* (*con*) with + *munis* ready to be of service; in ML. *communitio* used as equivalent to *universitas* the whole or a body of fellows] (1) Any group of people, large or small, living in a delimited territory and in comparative proximity, carrying on basic activities, having relatively common traditions and usages, and ordinarily common rule; (2) also any group of people, not necessarily in spatial proximity, who share basic interests and common traditions; for example, the Dominican Order. See **neighborhood, society.**

Wherever men live together they develop in some kind and degree distinctive common characteristics—manners, traditions, modes of speech, and so on. These are the signs and consequences of an effective common life. It will be seen that a community may be part of a wider community, and that all community is a question of degree. For instance, the English residents in a foreign capital often live in an intimate community of their own, as well as in the wider community of the capital. It is a question of the degree and intensity of the common life. R. M. MacIver, *Community* (New York 1928) 23.

companionate marriage [companionate: LL. *companio*, fr. *com* (*con*) with, together + *panis* bread; marriage: ME. marriage, F. *mariage*, fr. *mari* husband, fr. L. *maritus* husband, belonging to marriage nuptials, possibly fr. *mas*, *maris* male] A proposed legal form of marital union in which the wedded individuals abstain from having children until there is reasonable assurance of a harmonious union; which may be terminated by divorce upon the mutual consent of the parties involved; and which assumes the characteristics of ordinary marriage in the event of offspring.

The Companionate is legal marriage; and every childless marriage wherein, by mutual agreement, the parties can obtain a divorce if they want it, is a Companionate. In other words, the Companionate is a firmly established, perfectly respectable institution among us right now. Ben B. Lindsey and Wainwright Evans, *Companionate marriage* (Garden City, N. Y. 1927) 140–141.

* **competition** [L. *competitio* demand, rivalry, fr. *competere* to strive after something, *com* (*con*) with + *petere* to seek, aim at, go toward] Individual or group contest in which the contestants aim at achieving advantage over one another without seeking, as in conflict, to eliminate or to destroy the rival. Competition may be direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious; it is usually impersonal. See **conflict.**

Competition is universal in the world of living things. Under ordinary circumstances it goes on unobserved even by the individuals who are most concerned. It is only in periods of crisis, when men are making new and conscious efforts to control the conditions of their common life, that the forces with which they are competing get identified with persons, and competition is converted into conflict. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology* (2d ed. Chicago 1924) 509.

conception control [conception: L. *conceptio* becoming or being pregnant, fr. *concipere* to bring into existence, to take in and hold; control: F. *contrôler*, to check or regulate, fr. ML. *contrarotulus*, fr. *contra* against + *rotulus* a roll or register] The practice of preventing pregnancy by chemical, mechanical, or other means, which are called contraceptives; to be distinguished from **birth control** which correctly speaking includes both conception control and prevention of birth after conception has occurred. See **birth control.**

"Birth control" is misleading. It is a translation of the German *Geburt-Regelung* and is now a permanent addition to our language. . . . And the term is intrinsically wrong because it is not the *birth* of offspring that we control, it is the *conception* that we prevent. Prevention of conception, prevenception or conception control, are from every point of view better terms. William J. Robinson, *Birth control*, pt. ii (5th ed. New York 1933) 6–7.

* **conditioned response** [conditioned: L. *conditio*, *condicio*, a compact, stimulation, fr. *con* with + *dicere* to say, show; response: L. *responsum* reply, LL. *responsus* answer, reply, fr. *respondere* to respond, *re* re + *spondere* to promise] Acquired uniform reaction to a given stimulus, occurring whenever the specific stimulus reappears.

Conditioned reflex, sometimes called conditioned response, is a term which forms the doctrinal keystone of the system of psychology known as behaviorism. It designates acquired or learned reactions to stimuli as contrasted with innate or instinctive ones, which are correspondingly called unconditioned reflexes or responses. Horace M. Kallen, "Conditioned reflex" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 4 (New York 1931) 175.

* **conflict** [L. *conflictus* a striking together, shock, fight, pp. of *confligere* to strike together, clash, *con* with, together + *fligere* to strike] Usually personal and conscious contest which aims at achieving an objective by the elimination or destruction of the rival. Conflict is seldom prolonged and cannot be continuous. See **competition, culture conflict.**

Conflict has for its immediate objective the elimination of one's opponent from the contest, either by getting rid of him entirely, or by reducing him to a status of subordination. . . . Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 293.

conformity [F. *conformité*, fr. LL. *conformitas*, fr. *conformis*, fr. *conformare* to conform, *con* together + *formare* to form, make similar, like] Conscious or unconscious acceptance of or acquiescence to the folkways, mores, and other usages.

Persons ordinarily conform to the prevailing customs of their group without protest and without effort. There is always a tendency toward conformity in order to avoid being conspicuous and so becoming an object of ridicule and other forms of persecution. Others conform as an easy means of securing the positive approval of the group. The adoption of the patterns of others is often unconscious, as in the acquisition of the language habits of the persons with whom the child is associated. E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1933) 148.

conquest [ML. *conquaestum*, *conquisitum* search, pp. of *conquirere* to seek or search for, to bring together, *con* together + *quaerere* to seek] The process, generally accompanied by force, of political subjection of one group, class, or nation by another.

A conquest may be succeeded by enslavement, which generally runs down into milder forms of subjection, such as exclusion from certain social privileges and benefits. . . . Conquest with enslavement creates the compounded group, and we have class-conflict rather than group-conflict. Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 107, 120.

consensus [L. *concensus* agreement, accord, sympathy, common feeling, *con* with, together + *sentire* to feel] State of general collective agreement, arrived at either consciously or unconsciously, by the resolution of conflict.

> A true consensus . . . means that the discussion has been the accurate and considerate expression of concerted thinking. . . . When A, B, and C are in conference, each with a different idea, they do not build up brickwise a group idea or plan of action by adding their ideas together. They mutually adjust their ideas, each bringing certain factors of his own idea into relation with factors of the others. Alfred Dwight Sheffield, *Joining in public discussion* (New York 1922) xi.

* **contact** [L. *contactus* touching, pp. of *contingere*, *con* with + *tingere* to touch one another] The coming into physical and mental relation of two or more individuals, groups, peoples, races, nations, or cultures.

> *Social contact* may be defined as the situation within which social interaction involving communication and the interchange of experience is operative. Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, *Introduction to sociology* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 205.

control [F. *contrôler* to take an inventory, fr. ML. *contrarotulus*, *contra* against + *rotulus* roll] (1) The process by which society guides or forces its members to conform to established modes of group behavior and by which it punishes departures from the regulations it establishes; (2) the attempt to subject the social processes to more conscious guidance. See **societal self-direction.**

> Social control is accomplished mainly through the processes of habit formation, especially through the processes of attitude formation. The individual is conditioned to respond in approved ways and is further filled with a desire for social approbation. These habits and this desire are supported by a scheme of ethical values, by the mutual obligations or reciprocal relationships obtaining among members of a group (gang, family, club, etc.), and by the associated constraint upon the individual exerted by group opinion. Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 388.

convention [L. *conventio* agreement, covenant, fr. *convenire*, *con* with + *venire* to come] A commonly accepted, relatively fixed and inflexible rule or usage, ordinarily followed unthinkingly.

> Conventions are generally upheld rather by opinion than by constituted authority. Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 151.

> Conventionality imitation is far more radical, essential, and controlling in our lives than mob mind or fashion. It is not a passing flare-up like mob mind.

It does not play over the mere surface of life like fashion. Often it supplies the governing beliefs, world-views, and ideals which determine our attitude toward the world and toward our fellow-man. Edward Alsworth Ross, *Social psychology* (New York 1908) 110.

convergence [L. *convergere*, *con* + *vergere* to turn, incline, F. *converger*] The process by which cultures or culture complexes, however generating, merge, blend, or assimilate, both by parallel and diffusional development. See **diffusion, parallelism.**

It is clearly more profitable to examine the associations and relations of diffusion and convergence, the conditions under which they supplement each other. Besides parallels springing up wholly independently, there are two ways in which their relations to diffusion may be conceived. An original single growth or wave of diffusion may differentiate into local or temporal modifications, which even after separation continue to develop along parallel lines or reconverge. Or, on the other hand, independent starts in similar direction may become merged in, or assimilated by, a subsequent diffusion. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 220.

* **coöperation** [L. *cooperatio* coöperation, fr. *cooperatus*, pp. of *cooperari* to work together, *co* (*con*) with + *operari* to work] A form of social action in which individuals and groups work or act together to achieve common objectives; coöperation may be formal as in associations, or it may be informal, as when two or more "small farmers" help one another in harvesting crops. See **association, social organization.**

Whatever we may believe concerning the origins of society, it is evident that men early discovered that they could accomplish much more by working and playing together than they could by proceeding alone. In fact there are many evidences of prehuman co-operation which point to a period of such mutual aid at an unconscious, almost instinctive level. Out of this mutual aid, comfort, and co-operation has grown the sense of belonging together, of unity, solidarity, and of loyalty, which is so characteristic of all we-groups. Kimball Young, *Source book for sociology* (New York 1935) 349.

* **crowd** [AS. *crūdan* to push; see D. *kruijen* to push in a wheelbarrow] A crowd is a large or small aggregate of human beings held together by some common though transient bond, desire, or emotion, without organization or organizational aim, ordinarily without past history, and usually acting nonrationally. See **aggregation, group.**

A crowd, for the most part, is a human aggregation without formal organization, without a name, without a ritual, without membership tests, without a permanent home, that appears and dissolves spontaneously, and that is capable of almost anything. Frederick E. Lumley, *Principles of sociology* (2d ed. New York 1935) 191.

* **cultural change.** See **change.**

* **cultural lag** [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or till; lag: of obscure origin, possibly fr. W. *llag*, or fr. I. and Ga. *lag* slack, weak, sluggish, or fr. MD. *lalske* to go slowly] The tendency of parts of a culture to remain comparatively stationary while related and dependent parts are changing, thereby producing strain and maladjustment. Cultural lag is said to be particularly evident in the nonmaterial culture complexes, as in religion or education, in contrast with the material complexes which advance rapidly, as in the adoption of machinery. See **persistence.**

> Where one part of culture changes first, through some discovery or invention, and occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it, there frequently is a delay in the changes occasioned in the dependent part of culture. The extent of this lag will vary according to the nature of the cultural material. . . . William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) 201.

* **culture** [L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, attend to or till] Culture consists of the accumulation or totality of sociated man's creations as manifested in a given time and place; all the systems of concepts, usages, associations, instruments, and skills, by which mankind satisfies its basic needs. See **civilization, social order, society.**

> [Culture contains] the following as its essential elements: (1) It is man-made, as distinguished from creations of nature, unmodified by the hand of man. (2) It includes the products of mind which are intangible and non-material as well as those material forms which are made by his hands. (3) It is preservable and accumulative, and increases in complexity and quantity through the building up of new accretions. (4) It is psychically transmissible; from person to person, from group to group; and from generation to generation. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 339.

culture accumulation [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, attend to, or till; accumulation: L. *accumulatio*, fr. *accumulatus*, pp. of *accumulare*, *ac* (*ad*) with + *cumulare* to heap] The process by which concepts, usages, associational forms, instruments and skills come to be deposited upon the existing culture base and form in their totality the social heritage.

> This cumulative aspect is due to two features of the cultural process, one is the persistence of cultural forms and the other is the addition of new forms. . . . In general a cultural object tends to persist because it has utility. The cultural object itself may wear out, be lost or destroyed, but the knowledge of how to create it continues and additional ones are made, because they possess utility. William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) 74–75.

* **culture area** [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or to till; area: L. *area* a broad piece of level ground] A geographical unit, not necessarily having definite boundaries, within which

relatively homogeneous culture patterns prevail, which are sufficiently unique to mark the area off from other areas.

> Romantic love, for example, is fairly well localized in what we may call western civilization; the Orient and the rest of the world do not thus idealize the sexual relation. There is, in fact, . . . a constellation of trait-complexes so definitely localized in western Europe and America as to justify the consideration of these regions as constituting one culture area. Charles Horton Cooley, Robert Cooley Angell, and Lowell Juillard Carr, *Introductory sociology* (New York 1933) 86.

> The *Kulturkreis* [culture area] is, then, a far-flung cultural district in which a number of culture elements, arbitrarily selected and adjudged similar by the criteria of quality and quantity, adhere in a characteristic *Kulturkomplex*. . . . In brief, the culture area is a classification of coexistential cultural data according to their objective and psychological resemblances and in terms of their regional distributions. Russell Gordon Smith, *Fugitive papers* (New York 1930) 94, 114.

culture base. See **culture deposit, social heritage.**

culture center [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or till; center: F. *centre*, fr. L. *centrum*, fr. Gr. *κέντρον* the point around which a circle is described] That locality where a culture complex originates, where it exists in its original, least modified, most developed, and intensive forms, and out of which the complex radiates its influence. See **marginal area.**

> It is at the culture center that traits originate, or begin their spread. From this center they tend to push outward in concentric circles like ripples on the surface of a pond when a pebble is dropped into it. Jerome Davis, Harry Elmer Barnes, *et al.*, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1927) 548.

* **culture complex** [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or to till; complex: L. *complexus* surrounding, encircling, encompassing, embracing, pp. of *complecti* to entwine, comprise, embrace, *com* (*con*) together + *plectere* to plait, twist, twine] A cluster of culture traits forming around and interwoven with a central trait and constituting a patterned, interrelated, and intertwined whole; for example, mechanized industry, monotheism, monogamy are culture complexes in the contemporary West. See **culture pattern, culture trait.**

> It has been discovered, however, that traits are as a rule joined to each other in larger systems which are now called *culture complexes*. Floyd N. House, *Range of social theory* (New York 1929) 290.

culture conflict [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or to till; conflict: L. *conflictus* conflict, fight, pp. of *confligere* to clash, *con* together + *fligere* to strike] That type of competition which is conscious and personal and which aims to destroy or actually destroys the competitor or rival. Cultural conflict usually follows upon the contact and interaction of cultures or culture groups which differ markedly in language, religion, political forms, and especially in economic ability and aim. See **competition, conflict.**

> . . . The conflict between the Orient and the Occident, which presents itself in one of its aspects as external and international, assumes, in another aspect, the character of an internal and moral conflict. It becomes a conflict of loyalty; a struggle to knit together the strands of a divided self, to find a place to live, and preserve one's moral integrity in a world in which one can hardly hope for understanding or recognition. Robert E. Park, "Behind our masks" in *Survey*, lvi (1926) 137.

culture contact [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or to till; contact: L. *contactus* touching, contact, *contingere*, *con* with + *tingere* to touch one another] The meeting and consequent interacting of peoples possessing different cultures. Culture contact may result from natural proximity, as with the French and the Germans in the Saar region, or from the migration of a group of one culture into the region of another culture, as in the migration of the Chinese into the United States, or from war, as in the meeting of various peoples during the World War. The process of culture contact proceeds slowly and imperceptibly, arises from the impingement of culture minorities and never from whole cultures; may produce harmonious or conflictive reactions; and always results in some measure of culture cross-fertilization, intensification, advance, and refinement.

> It is now generally admitted that the most important element in cultural progress is the contact of many cultures, while nothing breeds stagnation like isolation. Hence an environment which invites contact and provides easy access to and from other districts will promote psychic plasticity and cultural advancement, while one which produces isolation must of necessity lead to psychic stagnation and repetition. Franklin Thomas, *Environmental basis of society* (New York 1925) 7.

culture cross-fertilization [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or till; cross-fertilization: Pr. *cros*. fr. L. *crux* cross + L. *fertilitas* act of bearing or making fruitful, fr. *ferre* to bear] The process by which cultures, coming in contact, acquire traits from each other which produce elaborations of similar original elements existing in both cultures and which fructify and give rise to new combinations or culture complexes.

> War, migration, and commerce have been the great agencies in the cross-fertilization of cultures. Edward Cary Hayes, *Sociology* (New York 1930) 551.

culture deposit [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or to till; deposit: L. *depositum* something put aside, fr.

depositus, pp. of *deponere* to put aside or lay away, *de* aside + *ponere* to put, place] An addition made from time to time to the previously prevailing culture or the culture base; the totality of culture deposits constitutes the culture base. See **social heritage.**

> What does accumulate is the knowledge of the form, structure, and function of these objects and of the skills necessary to reproduce them. Likewise, in the nonmaterial phases of culture, it is not a specific family or a religious congregation that is passed on, but the form, the type, and the knowledge necessary for reproducing them that become the culture deposits. *Text above*, 113.

culture factor [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or till; factor: L. *factor* a maker, doer, fr. *facere* to make] The totality of culture acting as a dynamic entity, producing social phenomena and creating or conditioning sociation; ordinarily called "culture environment."

> In reality, culture is a living, dynamic entity, constantly in process of formation, always shaping man's actions and being reshaped by man, now more and now less active, but always and everywhere dynamic. *Text above*, 104.

* **culture pattern** [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or till; pattern: F. *patron* patron, anyone or anything to be imitated] A cluster of closely interwoven or interrelated culture traits constituting a distinctive manifestation or working of a culture complex; for example, the parliamentary and congressional systems are distinct culture patterns within the culture complex of political democracy. See **culture complex, culture trait.**

> On the surface, in public, and for popular consumption, there are the explicitly agreed-upon policies that are incorporated in the rules of the party organization, expressed in its platform and announced through the press. These are the manifest pattern of the political institution. F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American institutions* (New York 1935) 21.

* **culture trait** [culture: L. *cultura* cultivation, tending, fr. *colere* to tend, to attend to, or till; trait: F. *trait* a draught, strike, touch, line, L. *tractus* a dragging, drawing] A basic unit or element in culture, combined with other traits into a complex, such as the use of a particular food, the type of tools, or a religious belief. See **culture complex, culture pattern.**

> If, for example, we observe the use of snowshoes and record that as a culture trait, we must still seek the methods for their use, how they are made, social etiquette concerning them, beliefs and artistic emotions associated with them, property in, etc. The snowshoe thus stands for a complex of beliefs, techniques, and procedures that must, to some extent, be considered a unit. . . . It is this meshing of culture traits that has led to the use of the term, complex. . . . Clark Wissler, *Introduction to social anthropology* (New York 1929) 343.

* **custom** [OF. *custume*, fr. LL. *consuetumina* custom, habit, fr. *consuescere* to accustom, *con* with + *suere* to make one's own, fr. *suus* one's own, It. *costume* fashion, usage] A mass of detailed, overt behavior or ways of acting, long established and followed generally, automatically, and imitatively. Custom is to sociated man what habit is to the individual. See **folkways, habit, mores, tradition.**

> Custom regulates the whole of a man's actions,—his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston 1906) 4.

> . . . Traditional custom, taken the world over, is a mass of detailed behavior more astonishing than what any one person can ever evolve in individual actions no matter how aberrant. Yet that is a rather trivial aspect of the matter. The fact of first-rate importance is the predominant rôle that custom plays in experience and in belief, and the very great varieties it may manifest. Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of culture* (Boston 1934) 2.

Demography [Gr. *δῆμος* people + *γραφία* a writing, description] The statistical or other systematic study and analysis of human population, with respect to birth and death rates, rates of natural increase, marriage, size of family, health conditions, migration, and concentration, on the basis of the most accurate data available.

> Demography may thus be regarded as a kind of biosocial bookkeeping, a continuous inventory and analysis of the human population and its vital processes, collectively considered. A. B. Wolfe, "Demography" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 86.

determinism [fr. L. *determinare* to bound, limit, fix, *de* to + *terminare* to set bounds or limit, *terminus* limit] The theory of social causation which maintains that a specific factor or force, such as geography or race, is the sole or predominant cause of social origins, forms, structures, functions, processes, change. Hence, geographical, racial, economic determinism. See **geographic determinism.**

> *Social determinism, i.e.*, the doctrine that all social phenomena are conditioned, have causes from which they necessarily flow, must not be confused with *fatalism*, which is a belief in a blind, inevitable destiny, a "fate", weighing down upon everything, and to which everything is subjected. . . . This teaching denies the human will as a factor in evolution, which determinism does not. Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical materialism* (New York 1925) 51.

development [fr. L. *devolvere* unfolding, unrolling, *de* out + *volvere* to roll, roll out, unroll] The process by which society spontaneously unfolds concepts, usages, organizations, instruments and skills, its structures, forms, and functions, its maladjustments, readjustments, and its ideals, and through the subprocesses of variation, selection, and counter-selection, continually produces adaptation.

> Mere quantitative growth taken by itself hardly amounts to development, but taken in connection with efficiency of organization it has material importance. Increase of scale gives more scope for differentiation, and renders the task of integration more difficult. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social development* (New York 1924) 74.

* **diffusion** [L. *diffusio* a spreading out, fr. *diffundere* to pour out, spread wide, *dif* (*dis*) out, away + *fundere* pour] The process by which culture spreads from the center in which it originates to other areas. See **convergence, parallelism.**

> The mechanisms of diffusion are several: migration and colonization, that is, ethnic movements; conquest; missionization; commerce; revolution; and gradual infiltration ranging from the conscious to the unconscious or infiltration which comes into social consciousness only after it is an accomplished fact. A. L. Kroeber, "Diffusionism" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 5 (New York 1931) 140.

discovery [ML. *discooperire* to uncover, *dis* apart, asunder + *cooperire* to cover] The uncovering of a trait, skill, process previously existing but lying hidden or forgotten. See **invention.**

> The significant relation between discovery and invention is inadequately stressed in current discussion. After all, no one can invent *in vacuo*. A fact meaningless in the dullard who sees but does not observe, will strike the attentive eye. There is a discovery. The fertile mind, thus impregnated, is now heavy with an invention which, in due time, may issue forth. Alexander Goldenweiser, *Robots or gods* (New York 1931) 28, n. 1.

* **disorganization.** See **social disorganization.**

divorce [L. *divortium* separation, dissolution of marriage by consent, fr. *divortere* or *divertere* to turn different ways, to separate, *di* (*de*) from + *vertere* to turn] The formal dissolution of marriage by a recognized authority, in modern times usually the state.

> Divorce is an effect, not a cause. It is a symptom, not a disease. It is safe to assert, except in the most attenuated institutional sense, that divorce never broke up a single marriage. It is adultery, cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, incompatibility, the decay or transfer of affection, and the like, that destroy marriages. Divorce never occurs until after the marriage has been completely wrecked—sometimes not until many years after. J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce* (New York 1931) 16.

domestication [fr. ML. *domesticatus*, pp. of *domesticare* to tame, to dwell in a house, to accustom, fr. *domesticus* domestic] The process or condition by which man reduces animals and plants from a state of wildness, distance, and competition to one of relative tameness, proximity, intimacy, and coöperativeness with himself.

> Assuming that hunting was the earlier form of existence, we may suspect that the familiarity with animals and their habits gained by the hunters led to domestication. Clark Wissler, *Introduction to social anthropology* (New York 1929) 64.

domination [L. *dominatio*, fr. *dominatus*, pp. *dominari* to lord over, fr. *dominus* master, lord] The process by which individuals, groups, associations, or institutions consciously or unconsciously subject other individuals, groups, associations, or institutions to their own will or interests; also the condition or state resulting from the process. See **subjection, submission.**

> In the further evolution of the political fabric we can trace two principles at work which we may call the principle of domination and the principle of community. The former includes all varieties of subjection, that is to say, the use of individuals as means to ends, not of their own choosing. The latter includes all forms of co-operation in which the contributing individuals are ends and means to each other. Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 136.

Ecology [Gr. *οἶκος* house (akin to L. *vicus* village) + Gr. *λογία*, fr. *λόγος* word, discourse] Ecology is the science which studies the relation between physical or social environment and social or cultural patterns.

> Every city is . . . divided into segregated natural areas. Each has its financial and business center, its manufacturing district, its slums, its aristocratic residential sections, its workingmen's home section, and other specialized centers. It is a constellation, a grouping of interests and people, not a mere aggregation of human traits. At the central point of the transportation system is the center of congestion, the area of high rents, and the locus of retail trade. In other areas of low rents and nearness to sources of employment are the slums. The forces of competition operate to put each group and each industry in a definite relation to others, to give an internal organization and a definite pattern. This is what is meant by an ecological order. E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1933) 289.

education [L. *educatio*, fr. *educatus*, pp. of *educare* to rear, bring up children physically or mentally, related to *educere* to lead forth, *e* out + *ducere* to lead; see also L. *educatio* removal, emigration, fr. *educare*, *ex* out + *ducare* to lead] That institution by which society transmits from one generation to another the ideas, the forms, skills, and techniques which it has found or thinks it has found useful or indispensable. In the main, the purpose of education is to produce conformity. See **school.**

> Education in some measure opens to the public that heritage of accumulated knowledge which is the real wealth of the race. James Melvin Reinhardt and George R. Davies, *Principles and methods of sociology* (New York 1932) 582.

> The more or less systematic instruction of the individual in or through the home, the school, the church, books, magazines, newspapers, and, more recently, the radio is the most important agency in effecting the utilization of

> knowledge on the part of the individual and the group. A vast deal of education also comes through play, work, and associations with friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. Of these agencies the school is most subject to popular control, being in fact maintained by society to supply deficiencies in other educational agencies. Jerome Davis and Harry Elmer Barnes, *et al.*, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1927) 613–614.

emergence [L. *emergo*, *e* out + *mergo* dip] The process by which human collective activities took the initial steps toward the systematization and regulation which in time developed into the social institutions.

> Now "emergence" . . . signifies neither the manifestation or unveiling of something hidden and already existing, as in the common and the entomological denotations of the word, nor some miraculous change . . . , but a *novelty of behavior* arising from the specific interaction or organization of a number of elements, whether inorganic, organic or mental, which thereby constitute a whole, as distinguished from their mere sum, or "resultant". William Morton Wheeler, *Emergent evolution* (New York 1928) 14.

> The doctrine of emergence differs from the more orthodox view of evolution in several important respects. In the first place, it lays less emphasis upon the principles of gradation and continuity in the evolutionary process. Proper recognition is given to the saltatory and novel character of certain systems which come into being from time to time. Carl J. Warden, *Emergence of human culture* (New York 1936) 23.

endogamy [Gr. ἔνδον in, within + γαμία, fr. γάμος marriage] The societal rule requiring marriage to be contracted inside certain specified classes, groups, or areas. See **exogamy.**

> The only three possibilities in the line of marriage relations are: indifference (the two tribes marry indiscriminately), exogamous tendency (each tribe tends to marry into the other rather than within itself), or endogamous tendency (each tribe tends to marry within its own limits). Alexander Goldenweiser, *History, psychology, and culture* (New York 1933) 286, n. 4.

* **ethnocentrism** [Gr. ἔθνος nation, people; centrism: L. *centrum* center, fr. Gr. κέντρον sharp point, goad, stab] The practice which tends to make one's own race, culture, or nation the center of all interests and activities, to attribute to it stock purity and superiority, to build intensive loyalties with reference to it, and which, on the other hand, tends to depreciate, at least by implication, all others.

> **Ethnocentrism** is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston 1906) 13.

exogamy [Gr. ἔξω out of, outside, from + γαμία, fr. γάμος marriage] The societal rule that marriage must be contracted outside of certain familial, racial, cultural, local, or political groups. See **endogamy.**

> To-day we inflict severe punishment on mutually consenting incestuous adults who have taken care that their union shall be sterile, while at the same time we illogically permit grossly unfit couples, who happen to be unrelated, to marry and produce as many unfit children as they desire. Norman Haire, *Hymen* (New York 1928) 28.

experience deposit [experience: L. *experientia* a trial, effort, endeavor, fr. *experiens*, + *entis*, pp. of *experiri* to put to the test, to try, *ex* out + root of *peritus* experienced; deposit: L. *depositum* something put aside, from *depositus*, pp. of *deponere* to put aside or lay away, *de* away or aside + *ponere* to put or lay] The process by which individuals and groups, in dealing with nature and human nature, acquire group concepts, modes of actions, and skills which become parts of the fund of human culture. Not to be confused with individual experience.

> The most reasonable explanation of the origin of social institutions is found in the idea of experience deposits. By experience deposits we do not mean individual experience, but the accumulation of ideas, customs, and habits of mankind as these become deposited in the totality of group behavior and in culture as a whole. *Text above*, 144.

Factor [L. *factor* a maker, doer, fr. *facere* to make or do] Any element which originates, affects, or influences a given phenomenon or situation; for example, physical, biological, or mental nature and culture constitute the principal factors of sociated life.

> Now the scientist does not concern himself with problems of the beginnings of things nor whether there is a purpose or ultimate meaning to them. He seeks rather to understand in them in their more immediate relationships. . . . His "explanation" is only a *description* of the way things occur in nature, and his "causes" or "factors" are only the accompanying *conditions* of the events which are thus explained. Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 155.

family [L. *familia* household, fr. *famulus* servant] (1) The formal, legal union of the persons united by marriage, their offspring by birth or adoption, and all other persons immediately related to them, who are in intimate contact, who share a common table and a common roof, and who have specific rights and duties with reference to each other and the whole group. (2) The concepts, usages, organizations, and instruments associated with such unions, which in their totality constitute the familial institution. See **marriage.**

> And since the family is the first group in which the individual finds himself, it is not surprising that the core of human nature should develop in the family circle. Nor is it any more surprising that, having had his nature so indelibly molded in the family, the individual should find that type of relations an almost indispensable phase of his entire life. Thus the family performs the dual function of providing a milieu in which human nature may be developed and in

which many of the impulses of human nature may be realized. Ernest R. Mowrer, *The family* (Chicago 1932) 41–42.

fecundity [L. *fecunditas* fruitfulness, fr. *fecundus*, from root of *fetus*, *foetus* fruitful, a bringing forth, fructified, filled with young] The capacity (in the female) to produce mature fertilizable ova, and (in the male) spermatazoa capable of fertilization. See **fertility rate.**

> The potential fecundity of man is certainly not less than two or three times that of the present fertility, in civilized countries. Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 267.

fertility rate [fertility: L. *fertilitas* fruitfulness, abundance, fr. *fertilis* bearing, fr. *ferre* to bear, produce; rate: L. *rata*, fr. *ratus* reckoned, fixed by calculation] The actual number of births per female of child-bearing age. See **fecundity.**

> It has long been customary in studies of population increase to distinguish between fecundity, or the *potential* power of reproduction, and fertility, or the *actual* rate. Among plants and animals in nature the fecundity is closely approximated by the fertility, through the fact that nature provides for the fertilization of nearly every egg. In man, however, the reproductive relationships are so extensively surrounded by conventional control and regulation that the full fecundity is far from utilized. Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 266.

* **folkways** [folk: AS. *folc*, D. *folk*, possibly related to L. *vulgus* people, public; way: T. as OE. *wez;* L. *via* way or place to carry away, L. *vehere* to carry] Modes of behavior or action that, arising out of life conditions, compulsions, and experience, have become repetitive and more or less compulsory, and usually carry the connotation of propriety. See **custom, habit, mores, tradition.**

> The operation by which folkways are produced consists in the frequent repetition of petty acts, often by great numbers acting in concert or, at least, acting in the same way when face to face with the same need. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston 1906) 3.

function [L. *functio*, fr. *fungi* to perform, execute] That aspect of human activity which is directed consciously or unconsciously toward definite objectives or ends, in contrast to purposeless or random activity; for example, the regulation of traffic by a traffic officer.

> *Functional* action is . . . that which tends toward the attainment of some thing, condition, or response, which it is specifically set to accomplish. The performer of the action need not plan, nor even perceive, the result that comes. It may be accomplished without his intent, and even without his knowledge, so long as it leads toward a result toward which it is logically addressed. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 286.

Generality [L. *generalitas* universality] A condition, process, or other phenomena existing commonly in time, space, classes, and stages of culture.

> Social institutions, therefore, have a wide generality. That is to say, they are systems of concepts, usages, associations, and instruments, which in varying degrees and extent have prevailed from early times to this, among all peoples and classes of people, and have existed among the most primitive as well as among the most advanced of peoples. *Text above*, 21.

* **geographic determinism** [geographic: L. *geographicus*, Gr. γεωγραφικός fr. γαῖα, γῆ the earth + γραφή description; determinism: fr. L. *determinare* to bound, limit, fix, *de* to + *terminare* to set bounds] The theory which holds that physiconatural factors are at the basis of or have a greater influence than any other factors in causing social and cultural phenomena. See **determinism.**

> This geographic determinism takes many forms according as the emphasis falls on climatic conditions, natural resources, surface configuration, or other features of the environment and as the purpose is to explain culture forms, historic civilizations, or personal behavior. E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1933) 90.

* **geographic environment** [geographic: Gr. γεωγραφικός fr. γαῖα, γῆ the earth + γραφή description: environment: F. *environnement*, fr. *environner*, *environ* round about] The sum of the physiconatural, inorganic substances and forces that surround and act upon man.

> In other words, if we take the total environment of a man or that of a social group, and subtract from it all environmental agencies directly or indirectly created or changed through man's existence and activity, we will have left approximately what is known as geographical environment. "Natural" climate, temperature, soil, relief of surface, distribution of water and water courses, natural flora and fauna, natural changes of seasons and geophysical processes, the phenomena of gravitation, storms, earthquakes, sea-currents and so on, as far as they exist and change regardless of man's existence and activity, are examples of geographical agencies in the above sense of the word. Pitirim Sorokin, *Contemporary sociological theories* (New York 1928) 101–102.

government [F. *gouvernement*, fr. L. *gubernare*, Gr. κυβερνᾶν to pilot, steer] That institution which systematizes, regulates, and gives coherence to interinstitutional activity. It operates through the legalization and the coercive enforcement of the mores, thereby producing or aiming to produce enforced adjustment. See **state.**

> It can easily be seen that, in the development and control of social institutions and forces, the key institution is that of . . . government. Howard W. Odum, *Man's quest for social guidance* (New York 1927) 380.

* **group** [F. *groupe* cluster, bunch, packet, or possibly fr. T. *kroppo* probably lump, mass] A human aggregation, large or small, organized or unorganized, having common characteristics or interests, which bring the component members into physical or mental contact and communication. See **aggregation, crowd.**

The term "group" serves as a convenient sociological designation for any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together. Albion W. Small, *General sociology* (Chicago 1905) 495.

Groups are masses of people in regular contact or communication, and possessing a recognizable structure. Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 40.

Habit [L. *habitus* state, appearance, dress, fr. *habere* to have, be in a condition or state] Learned modes of individual behavior which, through repetition, become fixed and relatively automatic, that is, they operate involuntarily. See **custom, folkways.**

Habits, in their totality, make up the character of the individual; that is, they *are* the individual, as he appears to other people. Knight Dunlap, *Habits* (New York 1932) 3.

* **human nature** [human: F. *humain*, L. *humanus* pertaining to man, akin to *homo* man; nature: F. *nature*, L. *natura* birth, constitution, character, fr. *natus*, pp. of *nasci* to be born] The qualities, characteristics, and tendencies innate in individual human beings.

The conception of a fixed and enumerable equipment of tendencies which constitutes human nature thus represents at the best but a convenient intellectual device, a bench mark useful for studying some particular period of development. Taking a long enough time span, it is fruitless to try to distinguish between the native and the acquired, the original and the derived. The acquired may moreover become so deeply ingrained as to be for all intents and purposes native, a fact recognized in the common saying, "habit is second nature." And, on the other hand, taking a long biological evolution into account, that which is now given and original is the outcome of long processes of past growth. John Dewey, "Human nature" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 7 (New York 1932) 533.

* **Imitation** [L. *imitatio*, fr. *imitatus*, pp. of *imitari* to imitate, of unknown origin] The process by which individuals or groups copy or emulate the commonly prevailing modes of action and the overtly expressed sentiments and ideals of a social group or of a whole society.

Humans imitate when this type of behavior enables them to arrive at certain goals in the psychological field. The underlying dynamic situation creates the imitation, rather than a force called imitation creating these goals. Whenever a shopgirl cuts her hair in a Garbo bob, she does this, not because imitation as a force causes her to do it, but rather because she perceives it as means towards arriving at the type of life that either Garbo or one of the heroines she portrays lives. . . . Imitation hangs together with the problem of the prestige of leadership. . . . J. F. Brown, *Psychology and the social order* (New York 1936) 92.

in-group [in: T. cognate with L. *in* in; group: F. *groupe* cluster, bunch, packet, possibly fr. T. *kroppo* lump, mass] A kinship, cultural, territorial or other group, whose members evince loyalty, solidarity, and coöperation toward each other, and, on the other hand, express exclusiveness, and sometimes even repulsion and enmity, toward all other individuals and groups. Also called "we-group." See **out-group.**

Thus a differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston 1906) 12.

* **instinct** [L. *instinctus*, pp. of *instinguere* to instigate, incite, impel, pick up, stick, *in* in + root akin to G. *stechen* to prick] Instincts are the inborn and biologically transmitted tendencies which, within ranges, produce more or less uniform responses to given stimuli. At present more commonly called "drives." See **intelligence.**

It is important for the sociologist to remember that the instincts are at the basis of the social as well as the mental life. Charles A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its psychological aspects* (New York 1915) 106.

In its simplest precise form this definition of an instinct may be stated as a specific and definite inherited or unlearned response which follows or accompanies a specific and definite sensory stimulus or organic condition that serves as a release to the inherited mechanism. L. L. Bernard, "Instinct" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 8 (New York 1932) 83.

* **institution** [L. *institutio* arrangement, custom, manner, fr. *institutus*, pp. *instituere* to place in, originate, establish, *in* in + *statuere* to cause to stand, set, establish] A system of concepts, usages, associations, instruments and skills which systematizes and regulates sociated living in the satisfaction of basic human needs.

A social institution is a complex of concepts and attitudes [usages, organizations, and instrumental objects] regarding the ordering of a particular class of unavoidable or indispensable human relationships that are involved in satisfying certain elemental individual wants, certain compelling social needs, or other eminently desirable social ends. Joyce O. Hertzler, *Social institutions* (New York 1929) 67.

institutional process [institutional: L. *institutio* arrangement, custom, manner, fr. *institutus*, pp. of *instituere* to place or establish in, originate, *in* + *statuere* to cause to stand, set, establish; process: L. *processus* a going forward, advance, pp. of *procedere* to move forward, *pro* forward + *cedere* move, yield] The act or mode of proceeding or operation by which the institutions grow, take form, perform their functions, contest, enter into conflict with each other, or otherwise act. See **interaction, social process.**

The major institutional processes include emergence, development, change, struggle, maladjustment, control, persistence, and teleology or the pursuit of goals. *Text above*, 392.

intelligence [L. *intelligentia* power of discerning, or understanding, fr. *intelligens*, pp. of *intelligere* to see into, perceive, fr. *inter* between + *legere* to bring together, choose, discriminate] The higher aspects of mind or the more complicated mental processes, including the power to acquire and retain knowledge, to reflect and reason, to discover and invent, to carry on adjustment; in contrast with reflex, instinct, emotion, or the simpler aspects of mind, ordinarily regarded as below intelligence. See **instinct.**

In its most important, and most generally accepted use, intelligence means *capacity to learn.* Knight Dunlap, *Civilized life* (Baltimore 1934) 267.

interaction [interaction: fr. L. *inter* between, among, amid + L. *actio* action, act, fr. *actus*, fr. *agere* to do, to act] The process by which individuals, groups, associations, or whole institutions act reciprocally, modifying each other's direction, form, or function in a more or less enduring manner; for example, the impact between young and old, church and state, religion and science. See **institutional process.**

The idea of interaction follows immediately and inevitably once the concept of social forces is understood. Any natural process involves not only the elements but also the ways in which these elements influence one another. The reciprocal influence of the social factors that result in human nature and in human culture is what is meant by social interaction. E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1933) 256.

* **invention** [L. *inventio*, fr. *inventus*, pp. of *invenire* come into, come upon, to find, *in* in, into + *venire* to come] The creation of a new concept, form, organization, instrument, trait, in contrast with mere repetition or imitation. See **discovery.**

Origination is the only way by which totally new traits can come into existence. Usually this is spoken of as *invention.* This, however, is so closely coupled with the idea of *discovery* that they may be said to go hand in hand. The difference between them is that discovery is a finding of some thing or principle previously existent but unknown or unnoted, whereas invention refers to the creation by man of some new thing or process. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 361.

* **isolation** [F. *isolation*, fr. It. *isolato*, pp. of *isolare* to be placed on an island, fr. *isola* island, fr. L. *insula* island, fr. *solus* alone] The process or

condition in which individuals, groups, or communities, physically, mentally, or culturally distant, have relatively little contact, communication or free and harmonious coöperation, and therefore often develop egocentric or ethnocentric modes of action; for example, the isolation of a son from his family, of a labor union from a general federation of labor, or of a racial or national group from its kin or compatriots. See **social distance.**

> *Isolation* is the absence of social process, or at least, of interaction. The examination of any group at work, even of a committee, shows that some persons are not taking part, that some are holding aloof, that some are absent, or perhaps are present but are not paying attention. As a result they are isolated, and the group is isolated from them. The loss is mutual. . . . Isolation is absence of a sympathy and understanding. It involves an inability or unwillingness to put one's self or one's group in the position of the other fellow or group, and to consider problems in the light of mutual and larger situations. Emory S. Bogardus, *Sociology* (New York 1934) 74–75.

> In sociology, the essential characteristic of isolation is found in exclusion from communication. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology* (2d ed. Chicago 1924) 228.

* **Leadership** [OE. *laedan*, fr. *ledan* to go on a journey, travel, fr. *laida* road or journey] The ability or activity of guiding or conducting others toward definite objectives.

> Leadership is the process of influencing large numbers of people in important ways . . . , of changing the attitudes and values of many persons . . . , solving problems for a group . . . , directing the activities of many individuals in significant particulars. Emory S. Bogardus, *Sociology* (New York 1934) 364.

Maladjustment [L. *male*, fr. *malus* ill, bad, evil + F. *adjustement*, fr. *ajuster*, *à* to + *juste*, fr. L. *adjustare* to make fit, *a* (*ad*) to + *justus* just, right, fit] The process or condition by which individuals, groups, or whole institutions come to be poorly related to one another or to the total culture and by which they come to function inadequately or to produce strains, hardships, or other widespread difficulties. See **social problem.**

> The problem of crime and the criminal, centering in these more serious types of anti-social behavior, is basically a problem involving maladjustment of the individual to existing social institutions. The adjusted individual is not a criminal; the maladjusted person may readily become one. Wilson D. Wallis and Malcolm M. Willey (eds.), *Readings in sociology* (New York 1930) 536.

marginal area [L. *margo*, *-inis* border, edge; area: L. *area* a broad piece of level ground] That territory where two cultures meet, but where the cultures still remain more or less separate or incompletely fused. See **culture center.**

> Traits from adjacent areas . . . [spread toward one another]. Eventually the two waves meet, and the mixed type of culture at the margins appears. . . .

> Marginal regions are often areas that are removed from the culture centers, so that in consequence typical patterns have not yet permeated into them. Jerome Davis, Harry Elmer Barnes, *et al.*, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1927) 548.

marriage [F. *mariage*, fr. *mari*, fr. L. *maritus* husband, or belonging to marriage, nuptials, possibly fr. *mas*, *maris* a male] (1) The formal, legal union of man and woman as husband and wife. (2) The system of concepts, usages, associations, and instruments employed in or dealing with the systematization and regulation of human sex mating. See **family.**

> Marriage is generally used as a term for a social institution. As such it may be defined as a relation of one or more men to one or more women which is recognized by custom or law and involves certain rights and duties both in the case of the parties entering the union and in the case of the children born of it. Edward Westermarck, *History of human marriage*, i (5th ed., London 1925) 26.

mobility (social) [L. *mobilitas* movableness, quickness, fr. *mobilis*, pp. of *movere* to move] The process by which individuals or groups, social objects or values pass horizontally, that is, from one position or locality to another on the same plane, or vertically, that is, from one plane to another in the social scale.

> Transitions of individuals, as from the Baptist to the Methodist religious group, from one citizenship to another, from one family (as a husband or wife) to another by divorce and remarriage, from one factory to another in the same occupational status, are all instances of social mobility. So too are transitions of social objects, the radio, automobile, fashion, Communism, Darwin's theory, within the same social stratum, as from Iowa to California, . . . By *vertical* social mobility is meant the relations involved in a transition of an individual (or a social object) from one social stratum to another. Pitirim Sorokin, *Social mobility* (New York 1927) 133.

monogamy [L. *monogamia*, Gr. μόνος one, alone, single, + Gr. γαμία fr. γάμος marriage] The set of mores and laws which permit a person to have only one husband or wife at a time; the marriage of one man to one woman. See **polyandry, polygamy, polygyny.**

> Monogamic marriage, the product of the transition from primitive to agricultural society without any intervening pastoral stage, is . . . rooted in the special conditions which have led to European [culture]. It stands in profound contrast with the marriage institutions of pastoral societies or of societies which have passed through a prolonged pastoral stage, and which are all, without an exception, in the highest degree polygamous. Robert Briffault, *The mothers*, ii (New York 1927) 256.

monogenism [Gr. μόνος alone, one, single + Gr. γένεια origin, origination, creation, fr. γέν to bear, produce, give birth, γένος root, kind] The theory which holds that the human race sprang from a single stock and in a single place, from which groups split off and migrated in various directions and into different geographic settings, where they acquired peculiar biological traits, which became fixed and eventually transmissible, thus giving rise to the subraces. See **polygenism.**

[G. L. Buffon] was a monogenist, believing that man was originally one type, and that all observed differences are due to the effect of the environment. Otto Klineberg, *Race differences* (New York 1935) 3.

morals [L. *moralis*, fr. *mos*, *moris* manner, conduct, way of life] Rules of conduct, which affect accommodation among human beings without recourse to coercive means. Morals do not rest upon the mandates of the gods, as does religion, nor upon the collective will, as do the mores, nor upon coercion, as does the law; rather, morals rest upon the individual's awareness of his common humanity with his fellows and upon his "conscience" or voluntary choice to deal with his fellows as he would have his fellows deal with him. See **mores, religion.**

Morals so largely overlap manners, folkways, mores, law, ethics and public opinion that only convention or fiat decides where these others leave off and morals begin. Contemporary opinion tends to confirm William Graham Sumner in distinguishing folkways and customs as group habits; law as such habits found or ordained, but enforced by police power; ethics as a corpus of rules derived by reflection upon morals; and morals themselves as "the sum of taboos and prescriptions in the folkways by which right conduct is defined." Horace M. Kallen, "Morals" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 10 (New York 1933) 643.

Thus we speak of observing a social rule of conduct punctiliously and yet of violating the spirit of humanity, of being legally free and yet of being morally bound, of scrupulously obeying the mandates of religion and yet of ignoring the voice of conscience. *Text above*, 11.

* **mores** [L. *mos*, *moris* manner, custom, way of life] The more important and rigid folkways, the rules or doctrines governing the life of society in respect to those activities which have to do with the more basic needs or which involve the giving, maintaining, or taking of life. See **custom, folkways, morals, tradition.**

The mores are the more explicitly defined and emphasized folkways, firmly underscored because regarded as positively essential to the welfare of society. A. G. Keller, *Man's rough road* (New York 1932) 28.

Neighborhood [neighbor + hood, fr. ME. *neighebour*, AS. *nēahgebūr*, *neah* nigh or near + *gebur* a dweller; hood: ME. *hood*, *hod*, AS. *hōd* hat] A territorial subdivision of a community or other geographical unit, in which the contacts between individuals and groups are more or less frequent, intimate, and personal, though not immediately face-to-face, and which is marked by some distinguishing characteristic or common interest, such as a particular economic status, racial background, or religious belief. See **community.**

> The automobile, street car, telephone, and press, together with increased leisure time, have all contributed greatly to the break-down of neighborhood ties. Maurice R. Davie, *Problems of city life* (New York 1932) 44.

Neolithic [Gr. νέος new, youthful + λιθικός of or belonging to stone, fr. λίθος stone] The New Stone Age, roughly from 10,000 to 3,000 B.C., or the era during which polished stone was used in the making of tools. See **Paleolithic.**

> The Early Neolithic, which lasted half the total Neolithic duration, continued to work stone by fracture. What marked the beginning of the Neolithic was certain inventions having nothing to do with stone: notably pottery and the bow. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 143.

Out-group [out: cognate with L. *ex* and the Gr. εξ or ἐκ out; group: fr. F. *groupe* cluster, bunch, packet, or possibly fr. T. *kroppo* probably lump or mass] All individuals or groups who do not form part of an in-group, who are regarded as different or inferior, and toward whom the in-group practices exclusiveness, sometimes repulsion and antagonism. Sometimes called "they-group" or "others-group." See **in-group.**

> Therefore each in-group forms its own ways, and looks with contempt and abhorrence upon the ways of any out-group. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston 1906) 116.

Paleolithic [Gr. παλαιός old, ancient + Gr. λιθικός of or belonging to stone, fr. λίθος stone] The Old Stone Age or the era during which rough stone was used in tool making; probably lasting from 100,000 to 10,000 B.C. See **Neolithic.**

> But in spite of the enormous gaps remaining to be filled in the Neolithic and in the historic period, it does seem fair to say that many of the outlines of what civilization was ultimately to be had been substantially blocked out during the Upper Palaeolithic. Most of the framework was there, even though but a small fraction of its content had yet been entered. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York 1923) 179.

parallelism [Gr. παραλληλισμός fr. παρα beside + ἀλλήλων of one another, fr. ἄλλος other, akin] The theory that cultures or culture elements originate and develop independently of each other, due to the basic similarities among all peoples of those physical and biological elements in nature which give rise to and develop culture. See **convergence, diffusion.**

> Parallelism holds that culture levels . . . developed independently in America, and resembled Old World cultures because human organisms, . . . confronted with similar problems in environments essentially similar to those of the Old World, tended naturally to reach similar solutions. Hornell Hart, *Technique of social progress* (New York 1931) 115.

persistence [persistence: F. *persistance*, fr. L. *persistere*, *per* by, through + *sistere* to stand or be fixed] The process by which institutions, once established, tend to acquire relative permanence, rigidity, unchangeableness, and to project themselves into the future. See **change, cultural lag.**

> The persistence of a custom may be due to its meeting weak resistance, but it may also be due to its having found support in a force superior to any opposing force, considerable though this latter may have been. So the Christian Church certainly fought might and main against pagan "superstitions," but with varying success. Vilfredo Pareto, *Mind and society*, ii (New York 1935) 602.

* **personality** [OF. *personalite*, LL. *personalitas*, *personalis* belonging or pertaining to a person, fr. L. *personalis*, fr. *persona* a mask worn by an actor, a personage] The totality of qualities and characteristics of a given person, ordinarily attributed to original nature, expressing themselves in modes of carriage, language, manner, clothes, ways of speaking, interests, attitudes, aptitudes, and other reactions to the social milieu.

> The genesis of personality is in all probability determined largely by the anatomical and physiological makeup of the individual but cannot be entirely so explained. Conditioning factors, which may roughly be lumped together as the social psychological determinants of childhood, must be considered as at least as important in the development of personality as innate biological factors. Edward Sapir, "Personality" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 12 (New York 1934) 86.

philanthropy [Gr. φιλανθρωπία humane, fr. φίλος loving + ἄνθρωπος man] Public or semipublic aiding of the needy; providing food, clothing, shelter, health and other facilities to the poor without necessarily considering or attempting to eliminate causes. See **reform, social work.**

> The tragedy of competing, isolated, unorganized philanthropy has been apparent from earliest times to discriminating observers. Edward T. Devine, *Social work* (New York 1922) 249.

polyandry [Gr. πολύς many + ἀνήρ, ἀνδρός man, male] A primitive form of marriage in which one woman has two or more husbands at the same time. See **monogamy, polygamy, polygyny.**

> It is obvious that poverty and paucity of women easily may be a combined cause of polyandry; where women are scarce the difficulty in procuring a single wife must be particularly great for the poor. Edward Westermarck, *Short history of marriage* (New York 1926) 260.

polygamy [Gr. πολυγαμία, fr. πολυς many + γαμία fr. γάμος marriage] The socially recognized marital system in which plurality of wives or husbands obtains. See **monogamy, polyandry, polygyny, promiscuity.**

> Polygamy is equally extensive in its distributions in the lowest and in the highest phases of primitive culture. . . . On approaching the border of . . . civilisation, there is a sudden drop in the extent to which polygyny is practised. The complex conditions of civilisation establish everywhere a sharp distinction between the rich and the poor. The latter form the bulk of the population; simultaneous polygyny is seldom possible for them. Robert Briffault, *The mothers*, ii (New York 1927) 304.

polygenism [Gr. πολύς much, many + γένια origin, birth] The theory which holds that originally the human races arose from several stocks and in different places and were marked by different characteristics. See **monogenism.**

> Simar points out that the Spanish *conquistadores* felt the need of justifying their enslavement of the Indians; their apologists, Sepulveda, Quevedo, and others, did so on the ground that the Indians were an absolutely different race, not human in the same sense as were the Spaniards, and therefore not requiring to be treated in the same way. These writers, says Simar, were the first "polygenists"; the first who believed in the multiple origin of the human races. Otto Klineberg, *Race differences* (New York 1935) 2.

polygyny [Gr. πολύς many + γυνή woman, wife] A primitive form of marriage in which one man has two or more wives at the same time. See **monogamy, polyandry, polygamy.**

> Unquestionably the causes leading to polygynous marriage are economic and social as well as personal. Willystine Goodsell, *History of marriage and the family* (rev. ed. New York 1934) 21.

prejudice [L. *praejudicium* judgment, decision, fr. *prae* before + *judicium* judgment, decision] An attitude toward any object, person, or group formed before acquiring a knowledge of the same or without regard for the actual facts. There are five main types of prejudice: racial, religious, class, political, scientific.

> Whenever a pre-existing attitude is so strong and inflexible that it seriously distorts perception and judgment, rendering them inappropriate to the demands of the objective situation, the social psychologist usually designates this tenacious attitude as a *stereotype*, a *prejudice*, or sometimes, more loosely, as a *logic-tight compartment*. Gordon W. Allport, "Attitudes" in Carl Murchison (ed.), *Handbook of social psychology* (Worcester 1935) 814.

* **primary group** [primary: L. *primarius* of the first rank, chief, fr. *primus* first, principal; group: F. *groupe* cluster, bunch, packet, or possibly fr. T. *kroppo* probably lump, mass] A small number of persons in face-to-face, repetitive, more or less intensive, intimate, and coöperative contact and interaction; for example, a family, a play-group. See **secondary group, social, societal.**

> By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and coöperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that

they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. Charles Horton Cooley, *Social organization* (New York 1909) 23.

* **progress** [L. *progressus*, pp. of *progredi* to go forward, *pro* forward or ahead + *gradi* to step, go, move] The doctrine or philosophy that society is advancing or can advance by human effort or as a result of natural processes, toward goals which are regarded as desirable. The concept "social progress" constitutes the principal, if not the sole, animating drive in contemporary Western society. See **teleology, telesis.**

> But in order to judge that we are moving in a desirable direction we should have to know precisely what the destination is. To the minds of most people the desirable outcome of human development would be a condition of society in which all the inhabitants of the planet would enjoy a perfectly happy existence. But it is impossible to be sure that civilisation is moving in the right direction to realise this aim. Certain features of our "progress" may be urged as presumptions in its favour, but there are always offsets, and it has always been easy to make out a case that, from the point of view of increasing happiness, the tendencies of our progressive civilisation are far from desirable. J. B. Bury, *Idea of progress* (New York 1928) 2.

promiscuity [L. *promiscuus* mixed, indiscriminate, fr. *pro* before, in place of, for + *miscere* to mix] That form of human mating, believed by some authorities to have prevailed in primitive times, in which the mating of the sexes was not regulated by social rules. See **monogamy, polygamy.**

> Morgan . . . regarded marriage as having been preceded by a state of no marriage, which he designated as a state of promiscuity. Clark Wissler, *Introduction to social anthropology* (New York 1929) 187.

punishment system [punishment: OF. *punissement*, fr. F. *punir*, fr. L. *punire* to punish, *poena* indemnification, punishment, penalty, Gr. ποινή fine, penalty, punishment; system: L. *systema*, Gr. σύστημα an organized whole, fr. συνιστάναι to place together, σύν with + ἱστάναι to place or put] The totality of those methods and techniques by which society inflicts physical or mental pain, or takes life, freedom, or wealth from individuals or groups for violation of societal norms, mores, laws. See **reward system.**

> Four principal methods of punishment have appeared during the history of mankind: financial loss, physical torture, social degradation, and removal from the group; removal from the group has been secured by death, exile, imprisonment, and by more subtle means such as branding, mutilating, and other methods of degrading the person. Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of criminology* (Chicago 1934) 302–303.

* **Race** [F. *race*, fr. It. *razza* of uncertain origin] A biological division of the *genus homo* possessing permanently established physical traits which are sufficiently marked to distinguish it from all other similar divisions and which are biologically transmissible.

> Whatever else the term "race" may be found to include, it must at least refer to the presence in a population of certain *physical* characteristics. Otto Klineberg, *Race differences* (New York 1935) 17.

race contact [race: F. *race*, fr. It. *razza* of uncertain origin; contact: L. *contactus* touching, pp. of *contingere* to touch each other, *con* with + *tingere* touch] The process or state by which relatively small groups of persons belonging to two or more races meet and establish more or less permanent relationships. It usually occurs through population expansion or migration, and in marginal areas, such as that between Asia and Europe.

> [Race contact] brings to the forefront the dissimilarity of group mores, a fact of which a society is never conscious until its mores are brought in conflict with those of others. . . . But the very presence of foreign race groups alters the conditions of life and necessitates adjustment on the part of one, or of both ethnic groups. Earl Edward Muntz, *Race contact* (New York 1927) x.

> We cannot longer avoid considering these problems of race contact if we would plan for a future in which such contacts will not be a fruitful source of misunderstanding and war. Warren S. Thompson, *Population problems* (2d ed. New York 1935) 420.

race mixture [F. *race*, fr. It. *razza* of uncertain origin; mixture: L. *mixtura* a mingling, pp. of *miscere* to stir] The biological union, resulting from interbreeding, of distinct or relatively distinct racial stocks. See **amalgamation.**

> With reference to race mixture in general, it may be concluded that there are no proved advantages or disadvantages, as far as the hereditary make-up of the hybrids is concerned. The results of race crossing would appear to depend entirely upon the nature of the particular individuals who are concerned, and the social acceptability of the hybrids. Otto Klineberg, *Race differences* (New York 1935) 222.

raciation [F. *race*, fr. It. *razza* of uncertain origin] The process by which human groups, possibly as a result of physiconatural conditions, gland functioning, and race mixture, come to possess distinct hereditary characteristics which differentiate them into races.

> The phenomenon of *raciation*, i.e. of differentiation into races, is common to all living organisms. It is an important, and in higher organic forms probably necessary, step towards *speciation*, or the formation of species. Aleš Hrdlička, "Human races" in Edmund V. Cowdry (ed.), *Human biology and racial welfare* (New York 1930) 157.

recreation [L. *recreatio* reproduction, refreshment, fr. *recreatus*, pp. of *recreare* to remake, refresh, create anew, *re* again + *creare* to create] (1) The process by which the individual recuperates physical and mental energies, ordinarily by relaxing from usual contacts or activities and by substituting unusual interests such as music, literature, drama, motion pictures, and sports. (2) The system or institution embodying this process and function.

> The genius of recreation lies in the liberation it effects, in the freedom it produces from cares and compulsions. . . . *Text above,* 277.

reform [L. *reformare* to remould, transform, *re* again + *formare* to give form] Societal activity which aims to mitigate or eliminate maladjustments, such as poverty or crime, by legislative means. See **philanthropy, revolution, social work.**

> The preventive character of reform is to be found in its agreement on, and achievement of, the major goals of social reconstruction. These general or approximate goals are identical to the criteria employed in the measurement of social problems, and hence are stated in terms of: (1) the elimination of needless waste and poverty; (2) the prevention of physical and mental disease; (3) eradication of cultural sources of suffering; and (4) the extension of personal rights. Harold A. Phelps, *Contemporary social problems* (rev. ed. New York 1938) 747–748.

religion [F. fr. L. *religio, religens* pious, revering the gods, Gr. ἀλγεῖν to heed, have a care—of uncertain origin] That system of concepts, usages, associations, instruments, and skills by which men indicate their belief in, fear and awe of, and love for supernatural beings, who are thought to have power over human destiny and whose favor is thought to be won through obedience, honor, and worship; the system of worship, rites, and rules of conduct by which the favor of the god is thought to be won. See **church, morals.**

> Religion is a belief in and a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being, on whom man feels himself dependent, and to whose will he makes an appeal in his worship. . . . Edward Westermarck, *Early beliefs and their social influence* (London 1932) 13–14.

> *A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.* Émile Durkheim, *Elementary forms of the religious life* (New York 1915) 47.

revolution [L. *revolutio* a revolving, fr. *revolvere* to revolve, *re* re, over + *volvere* to roll, turn round] Radical, society-wide, sudden, violent, bloody action by which an established order, usually the political, is overthrown or its overthrow is attempted, and a new order is established or is attempted. See **reform.**

> The immediate cause of revolution is always the growth of "repression" of the main instincts of the majority of society, and the impossibility of obtaining for those instincts the necessary minimum of satisfaction. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Sociology of revolution* (Philadelphia 1925) 367.

reward system [reward: ME. *reward* regard, reward, F. *reg(u)ard* regard; system: L. *systema*, Gr. *σύστημα* an organized whole, fr. *συνιστάναι* to place together, *σύν* with + *ἱστάναι* to place or put] The totality of those techniques by which society approves and recompenses social acts which are in conformity with prevailing thought, standards, and usages, by means of material benefits, emoluments, or honors, which in turn enhance the prestige or position of the recipient. See **punishment system.**

> A reward is something from a limited supply, or hard to obtain, not contracted for, and that may fail, coming to us in addition to the usual and expected compensations of life. . . . To keep them at the level of rewards, the extra gifts of life must be regarded as unusual and exceptional, as something really given, never as a wholly deserved compensation. Frederick Elmore Lumley, *Means of social control* (New York 1925) 31–32.

ritual [L. *rītualis* relating to religious rites, fr. *ritus* a rite] A ceremony or set of acts, usually traditional and sacerdotal, which gives expression to some fundamental belief, for example, the ritual of the Roman Catholic Mass or the initiation formalities of a fraternal order.

> The beliefs and ideals of different civilizations are often formulated in their general ritual more explicitly than in other cultural traits, and this fact gives to the study of ritual a significance that has as yet scarcely been touched upon. Ruth Benedict, "Ritual" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 13 (New York 1934) 397.

School [L. *schola*, Gr. *σχολή* leisure, that which employs leisure or the manner in which leisure is employed, debate, lecture] The associational phase of the educational institution; organized for the purpose of transmitting to the young the accumulated knowledge and the prevailing concepts, usages, procedures, and skills which a given society deems indispensable and essential to its well-being and self-perpetuation. See **education.**

> The Athenian boy was trained by his pedagogue but instructed by his teachers and first he was taken to the school of the *γραμματιστής*· The meeting place of this school was provided by the teacher; sometimes the master taught in the open air, but usually in a room or building set apart for the use of his class. Ernest Carroll Moore, *Story of instruction: the beginnings* (New York 1936) 134.

science of society [L. *scientia*, fr. *sciens*, *scientis*, pp. of *scire* to know, Gr. *σχεῖν* to know; society: L. *societas* fellowship, sociated group, fr. *socius* companion, fellow, associate] The science or discipline which deals with the collective unspecialized aspects of human behavior, such as the origins of human groups, their structures, functions, changes, adjustments and maladjustments, and the purposes or aims of collective human endeavor. See **sociology.**

> It is to be emphasized, time and again, that no science of society can ever be developed unless the eye be removed from the all-enthralling individual and fixed upon that which it is proposed to study, namely, society. To set out to study society by concentrating on the individual is like trying to study physiology by ignoring all the organs and paying attention only to the cell. Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 265.

* **secondary group** [secondary: L. *secundarius* of the second class or quality, fr. *secundus* second; group: F. *groupe* cluster, bunch, packet, or possibly fr. T. *kroppo* probably a lump or mass] A body of people held together by some characteristic or interest, and in which contacts are comparatively infrequent, formal, and nonrepetitive. See **primary group, social, societal.**

> *Secondary groups*, [are those groups in which] acquaintance is still personal, with direct contact prevailing, but where the association is so casual, formal, infrequent, or slight as to be outside the range of intimacy. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 147.

selection [L. *selectio* choice, fr. *selectus*, pp. of *seligere* to choose or select, *se* aside + *legere* to gather] The process by which culture traits, patterns, or complexes are chosen for retention and others are eliminated. On the social plane selection is both rational and automatic; on the societal plane selection is usually, but not always, an automatic process.

> If we seek to focus what light we have upon selection in the mores, we find that dissatisfaction leads to an effort to secure change, and that the effort is directed in a more or less blind way toward the better realization of local and personal interests. The latter type of interest, almost always at the bottom, can appear legitimately only as a group or class (societal) interest. Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 181.

social [F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, or pertaining to a friend or fellow, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate] The adjective used to describe interhuman relationships that are face-to-face, relatively continuous and repetitive, and involving vital interests and ties, which terminate at death or with the separation of the component members. See **primary group, secondary group, societal.**

> The social interest is not to be derived from any one single tendency, such as gregariousness, or sex, or the tender impulse of the parental instincts. The fundamental drive seems to be a much more general need. This may be described as a need to go outside of ourselves, and to enter into relationship with others. It is not necessarily a desire to co-operate in the service of common ends, nor is it as such benevolent. Rather is it the need of some kind of response from others, and the tendency to respond to them. Morris Ginsberg, *Sociology* (London 1934) 108.

* **social class.** See **class.**

* **social control.** See **control.**

social disorganization [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; disorganization: F. *désorganisation*, fr. *dis* denoting separation or parting from + *organiser* to arrange, systematize, L. *organizare*, Gr. *ὄργανον* to arrange] The process by which associations or organizations are thrown into disorder, or cease to exist or function; a process which goes on at all times, but which is accentuated by change or by natural or societal catastrophes; for example, increase in rates of divorce, business failure, closing of schools, recreational centers, churches, changes in government. Part of the deeper processes of degeneration and decadence, which affect the structure of society as a whole, as when a whole civilization falls apart and ceases to exist.

The closing and failure of a business enterprise of several years' duration is followed by a train of individual and social disorganization as well as by economic waste. Unemployment is increased, with all its dislocation of personal relationships among the families concerned. F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary American institutions* (New York 1935) 70.

* **social distance** [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* fellow, companion, associate; distance: F. *distance*, fr. L. *distantia*, fr. *distans*, pp. of *distare* to stand apart, be separate, *dis* apart, from + *stare* to stand] The degree to which interaction and coöperation do or do not obtain between individuals, groups, nations, or cultures. See **isolation.**

Between every two human beings that are in association at all there is a psychological "distance" that intervenes. We speak of some of our companions as "close" friends; a few we speak of as belonging to the "inner circle", whereas others are outside. . . . Again, distances are often expressed in terms of elevation. The master is "above" his servant, the workman is "under" the foreman. . . . Likes and dislikes, group prejudices, the distinctive "consciousness" which a race or class or caste has with reference to another—all these are expressible as altitudinal intervals-between. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 325–326.

* **social environment.** See **culture factor.**

* **social evolution.** See **development.**

* **social heritage** [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; heritage: OF. *eritage*, *heritage*, fr. F. *hériter* to inherit, LL. *hereditare* to inherit, fr. L. *heres* heir] That complex whole of concepts, usages, associations, techniques, and skills which accumulates through the ages, from many sources, which prevails at a given time and in a given place as the culture base, and which is handed down from generation to generation. See **culture deposit.**

That part of the culture total which is transmitted to us from the past we are accustomed to speak of as the *social heritage*. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1931) 360.

> It is also called social heritage because it is the product of human society, the results of many social achievements during the ages that man has been on the earth. William Fielding Ogburn, *Social change* (New York 1922) 3.

* **social interaction.** See **interaction.**

social order [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; order: fr. ME. *ordre*, L. *ordo*, *ordinis* order] The entire complex of social organizations in their more immediate interrelationships and interfunctioning. See **culture, society.**

> The picture . . . of the social order at any given time and in any given place, . . . is that of a structure composed of people and their routines related in more or less reliable ways. . . . Frederick E. Lumley, *Principles of sociology* (New York 1928) 488–489.

* **social organization** [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; organization: F. *organisation*, fr. *organiser* to arrange, systematize, from L. *organizare*, Gr. *ὄργανον* to arrange] (1) The grouping of any number of persons in direct relationships. (2) The federating or consolidating of small territorial, occupational, or other groups having common interests into larger and larger purposive units. See **association, coöperation.**

> The direct and simple type of social organization arises spontaneously whereever the life activities of a small number of persons bring them into frequent and regular contact, and into association in which the various members come to know each other as persons. E. B. Reuter and C. W. Hart, *Introduction to sociology* (New York 1933) 163.

> All social organization is of two great forms. . . . One . . . which may be called a social composition is the mere federating or consolidating of small groups of similar kind. . . . The other form of social organization is specialization in the division of labor. People engage in particular activities and as they become more and more in demand the various occupations and professions grow up. Franklin Henry Giddings, *Civilization and society* (New York 1932) 36.

social problem [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; problem: L. *problema* problem, riddle, puzzle, fr. Gr. *πρόβλημα* a thing thrown or put forward, fr. *πρό* forward + *βάλλειν* to throw] A social situation which, arising from recurring and widely prevalent maladjustments, thrusts itself upon the attention of the community, evokes agitation, calls for reform, and usually leads to attempts at solution. See **maladjustment.**

> A social problem may be envisaged as a phenomenon, or situation, for the appearance of which no one individual or a few individuals are responsible, which threatens injurious results for many persons, and the removal or control of which is completely beyond the ability of one person or a few individuals. . . . We thus have at least three well-defined marks of a social problem; (1)

> It is largely social in origin, that is, has a group bearing. (2) It is social in its results. (3) The responsibility for it is social. John M. Gillette and James M. Reinhardt, *Current social problems* (New York 1933) 4.

* **social process** [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; process: L. *processus* a going forward, advance, pp. of *procedere* to move forward, *pro* forward + *cedere* move, yield] The mode or way by which social groups proceed: arise, take form, perform their functions, or otherwise act. See **institutional process.**

> The characteristics of social processes . . . are (1) their *social* nature, as activities *prevalent* in a human group; (2) their *recurrent* character; (3) their sequential character, as cause and effect, producing some sort of *becoming;* (4) their universal character, i.e. their presence in *every* social group, no matter how small or large, how young or old. Clarence Marsh Case, *Social process and human progress* (New York 1931) 31.

social work [social: F. *social*, L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; work: T. *werkom*, *ἔργον* work] The technical activity and the profession dealing with the diagnosis, prevention, and correction of social maladjustments. See **philanthropy, reform.**

> Social work, then, is distinguished from the socially beneficial undertakings prompted by self-interest, on behalf of oneself, one's family, or one's associates in a trade or a profession or a social group; and it is distinguished from the socially beneficial institutions which serve all members of society alike, in that it is undertaken by the stronger and more fortunate members of society in behalf of the weaker and less fortunate. Edward T. Devine, *Social work* (New York 1922) 27.

* **socialization** [L. *socializatio*, fr. L. *socialis* companionable, sociable, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate] (1) The process whereby individuals and groups spontaneously, and yet often awaringly, maintain reciprocal, relatively harmonious, and mutually advantageous relationships in the conduct of basic activities. (2) The process of coming to conform to group standards, mores, and traditions, and becoming imbued with a sense of oneness, intercommunication, and coöperation.

> In many instances, artificial efforts to engender socialization are the very reasons why it does not develop; "good-will campaigns" sponsored by house-organs in factories, as well as some kinds of community organization and neighborhood revivification, afford instances. Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker, *Systematic sociology* (New York 1932) 365.

sociation [L. *sociare* to unite, combine, fr. *socius* fellow or companion] The process or mode of procedure by which human beings come to live and work together, to develop group concepts, usages, and organizations, to bind them together and contribute to group life and effort, in the satisfaction of basic needs; in contrast with dissociation, by which human beings, in the satisfaction of their basic needs, come to live and work apart, to develop divisive thought, usages, and organizations which detract from the wholeness of life and effort.

> Hence it may be said that nothing more and nothing less than the total positive and negative process of sociation must be observed both in its entirety and in its minutest parts, and all its effects upon human affairs must be determined—this is the task of sociology. Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker, *Systematic sociology* (New York 1932) 14.

societal [OF. *societe*, fr. L. *societas* fellowship, association, community, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate] The adjective employed to describe large-scale intergroup relationships that are large-scale, more or less distant and nonrepetitive and which survive over long periods, exceeding that of their component members. See **primary group, secondary group, social.**

> This adjective will be frequently used in what follows. I do not wish to apologize for it in any way, for I think an adjectival form corresponding to the noun "society," and signifying something much more definite than "social," is a present necessity in the development of a science of society. Some of the vagueness chargeable to sociological writing is undoubtedly due to the use of "socius" where "societas" is or should be the real conception in mind. Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 18, n. 1.

societal process. See **institutional process, interaction.**

societal self-direction [societal: L. *societas* fellowship, association, community, fr. *socius* friend, companion, associate; self-direction: self OE. *self*, *selfa* self + direction, L. *directio*, fr. *directus*, pp. of *dirigere* to guide, direct] The relatively long-time and deliberate effort on the part of a society to alleviate, ameliorate, or prevent the recurrence of untoward conditions or maladjustments, and to reconstruct the societal order. See **control, progress, teleology, telesis.**

> Legislation, considered as a means of societal self-direction, although it offers a short cut in many instances, does not in fact carry a community beyond the goal toward which it is already moving. Clarence Marsh Case, *Social process and human progress* (New York 1931) 198.

* **society** [L. *societas* fellowship, association, community, fr. L. *socius* friend, companion, fellow] The complex whole of amicable and inimical relationships or juxtapositions, of human beings in interaction. Often used synonymously with community or culture area, as American society or Western society. See **community, culture, social order.**

> The idea that "society" is an "organization of activities" is not new. . . . Much material concerning them will be found in descriptions of customs and mores, in studies of specific social relations (erotic, conjugal, comradeship,

neighborhood, parent and child, teacher and pupil, master and slave, employer and employee, leader and follower, ruler and subject), of personal rôles (maid, matron, warrior, king, shaman, priest, workman, etc.), and especially of social groups. Florian Znaniecki, *Social actions* (New York 1936) 633.

sociology [F. *sociologie* as originated by Comte, fr. L. *socius* friend, companion, associate + Gr. λόγος word, discourse] The science or discipline which deals with the collective, unspecialized aspects of human behavior; particularly with the phenomena of the origins, structures, changes, functions, adjustments, maladjustments, and similar phases of human society. See **science of society.**

Sociology . . . is only three-quarters of a century old, and has scarcely come of age even today. It is the most ambitious of all the social sciences, because in a sense the most comprehensive. As its very name signifies, it is an endeavor to lay bare the foundations of all living together, to elucidate the laws which lie at the basis of social intercourse. Far deeper than the economic or the legal or the political relations are those which govern human association in general. Sociology is the social science *par excellence.* It is also the most difficult of the cultural sciences. Edwin R. A. Seligman, "What are the social sciences?" in *Encyclopaedia of the social sciences*, 1 (New York 1930) 5.

Sociology is one of the manifestations of the mood I have described as scientific. It is a science, and shares the problems and difficulties of all science. It is a general science, combining the conclusions and laws of the special social sciences into generalizations of universal validity. Its subject matter is human behavior, in its collective aspects, which it attempts to describe and factorize by analytical and statistical methods. Russell Gordon Smith, *Fugitive papers* (New York 1930) 15.

state [OF. *estat*, fr. L. *status* manner of standing, condition, pp. of *stare* to stand] The associational aspect of government; the regulative organization having a specific territory, ruler or rulers, and subjects or citizens and, in modern times, exercising sovereignty over all other associations. See **government.**

The most important public association is the state. This is the comprehensive association of an integral society organized for all purposes deemed by it of sufficient importance to require the united action of the group as a whole. Frank Hamilton Hankins, *Introduction to the study of society* (rev. ed. New York 1935) 472.

* **status** [L. *status* posture, position, pp. of *stare* to stand] The rating or position of a person or group with reference to others or to the entire social order. See **caste, class, stratification.**

Status is not an active process, as competition is; it is simply a rule of conservation, a makeshift to avoid the inconveniences of continual readjustment in the social structure. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology* (2d ed. Chicago 1924) 710.

* **stratification** [F. *stratification*, fr. L. *stratificare*, *stratum* spread out, lay out streets] The division of society into grades, ranks, or positions, otherwise known as castes and classes. See **caste, class, status.**

> Social stratification means the differentiation of a given population into hierarchically superposed classes. It is manifested in the existence of upper and lower social layers. Its basis and very essence consist in an unequal distribution of rights and privileges, duties and responsibilities, social values and privations, social power and influences among the members of a society. Pitirim Sorokin, *Social mobility* (New York 1927) 11.

> Social classes emerge through competition for favored occupations and the cumulative advantages of prestige and capital. Overt conflict helps to draw the lines more sharply, as is true, for example, in the case of wage earners and employers during strikes and lockouts. Cleavages may also be forced, as is apparent from the violent changes in social alignments resulting from civil wars and revolutions. In such upheavals, new stratifications are formed and old ones acquire a new personnel, for some individuals are elevated and others are debased in the social scale. E. T. Hiller, *Principles of sociology* (New York 1933) 326.

struggle [D. *struikelen* stumble] A contest, aggressive or obstructive, competitive or conflictive, between man and nature, between individuals, social groups, associations, classes, institutions, or cultures; the ends of struggle, whether consciously recognized or not, are survival, improvement, domination or freedom from domination. See **competition, conflict.**

> Life is battle. It is an ancient truth. Christianity has always known it. Its validity as an essential principle of culture is already implied in our premise that all culture includes an element of striving. Striving is always battle—struggle, that is—the exercise of will and strength to overcome resistances which stand in the way of the attainment of an aim. Almost all action of the human soul is expressed in terms of combat. One of the most essential characteristics of the living organism is that it is more or less equipped for the attitude of battle. The identification of life and battle is just as adequate in the purely biological as in the spiritual sense. J. Huizinga, *In the shadow of tomorrow* (trans. from the Dutch by J. H. Huizinga, New York 1936) 113.

subjection [L. *subjectio*, fr. *subjicio*, *sub* under + *jacio* throw] The process by which individuals, groups, associations, or institutions consciously enforce their will upon other individuals, groups, associations, or institutions; also the condition or state resulting from the process. See **domination, submission.**

> Subjection is not of a single type. . . . A conquest may be succeeded by enslavement, which generally runs down into milder forms of subjection, such as exclusion from certain social privileges and benefits. Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 107.

submission [L. *submissio*, fr. *submissus*, fr. *submittere*, *sub* under + *mittere* to send, put] Process by which individuals, groups, associations, or institutions voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously or unconsciously, submit or pay deference to other individuals, groups, associations, or institutions which occupy a superior position with reference to them; also the condition or state resulting from the process. See **domination, subjection.**

> At first the slave must choose between submission and death, and later the fear of the lash becomes a deterrent to insubordination. E. T. Hiller, *Principles of sociology* (New York 1933) 334.

symbol [L. *symbolus*, *symbolum* token, fr. Gr. *σύμβολον* mark or sign by which one knows or infers a thing, fr. *σύν* with + *βάλλειν* to throw] An easily recognizable object or act which represents something other than itself and which ordinarily evokes a uniform group response; for example, a national flag, a national emblem, such as the American Eagle, or a representation of a nation, as "Uncle Sam," or "John Bull," a national hero, such as George Washington; the cross, the crescent, or the seven-branched candlestick in religion; in marriage, the engagement or wedding ring. See **collective representation, ritual.**

> The *symbol* has played a leading rôle in conjuring up national spirit. . . . As a rallying point, like the queen bee for the swarm, royalty is retained by democratic peoples who have no intention whatever of being governed by a monarch. Edward Alsworth Ross, *Principles of sociology* (New York 1920) 408–409.

> Religion relies heavily on symbols, figures of speech, forms, and ritual in making its impress on its followers. . . . These . . . are to be interpreted symbolically, and are meant merely to stimulate the faithful to courage and energy in struggling for a good cause. But the very nature of a symbol or figure is to make the meaning clearer and to avoid the necessity of an explanation or interpretation. Henry Pratt Fairchild, *General sociology* (New York 1934) 511–512.

Technique [F. *technique*, fr. Gr. *τέχνη* art, skill, craft] (1) The rules and modes of acting in the performance of social acts, as in voting. (2) Specialized skills employed in the execution of specific tasks, for example, the technique of the surgeon, the carpenter, the penologist, or the social statistician.

> When, in order to obtain a result which is precious to him—the prosperity of a harvest, the solidity of an edifice, the health of a child—man invokes the aid of invisible forces, . . . he follows rules, he employs traditional processes. Their ensemble . . . constitutes a technique. C. Bouglé, *Evolution of values* (New York 1926) 152.

teleology [Gr. *τέλος*, *τέλεος*, the end or issue + *λόγος* word or idea] The fact or quality of possessing final cause; the process by which whole peoples conceive of long-time societal goals or objectives, which animate their activities and which they strive to attain by epochal movements. See **progress, societal self-direction, telesis.**

> Between the earliest conceptions of a Deity external to the world and the new teachings of his immanence human thought has furnished teleologies of such protean forms as to make classification of them well-nigh impossible. Some of these take Deity for granted, others posit a "world soul"; all seek to interpret the appearances of "design in nature." Edmund Noble, *Purposive evolution* (New York 1926) 506–507.

telesis [Gr. τέλεσις, fr. τελεῖν to complete, finish, perform, fr. τέλος end] The process of attaining desired social ends by the application of intelligent means as, for example, through education. See **progress, societal self-direction, teleology.**

> The conscious method remains to be considered. It is the telic method or social telesis. Lester F. Ward, *Pure sociology* (New York 1903) 463.

> The visualized ends of . . . social telesis are the amelioration of the human lot; the survival of variates from a standardized human type in whom lie our hope of discovery, of invention, and of experimentation; the socialization of entire populations, with the elimination of the anti-social; and the individuation which is an evolution of intelligent, responsible, self-determining personality. . . . These visual ends are attained through telic form patterns in which individuals, families, neighborhoods, villages, cities and sovereign states exert effort bearing upon various pervasive conditions, such as sickness, injury, illiteracy, ignorance, deficiency, inadequacy, insanity, vice and crime, misery, degeneration and so on. Franklin Henry Giddings, *Civilization and society* (New York 1932) 261–262.

tradition [L. *traditio*, fr. *tradere* to deliver, to pass on, to transmit] The transmission from generation to generation, usually orally or by means of ceremonies, of those beliefs, concepts, and usages which are so firmly established by prolonged usage that they are regarded as indispensable or inviolable. See **custom, folkways, mores.**

> Tradition is the rationalized portion of social benavior, as custom is its objective behavioristic side. People not merely do things in a fixed fashion, they find reasons for doing them. The reasons which they discover are their traditions. The traditions take on a historical background, being thrust back into the beginning of the group life or into some other portion of its past. Many of these we call myths. . . . Wilson D. Wallis, *Introduction to anthropology* (New York 1926) 352.

transmission [L. *transmissio* a giving or handing over, fr. *transmittere*, *trans* across, over + *mittere* to send] The process by which the accumulated culture is passed on from one generation to the next, chiefly through traditional acts, imitation, suggestion, and education.

> We must accept all the implications of our human inheritance, one of the most important of which is the small scope of biologically transmitted behaviour, and the enormous rôle of the cultural process of the transmission of tradition. Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of culture* (Boston 1934) 15.

trend [ME. *trenden* to roll, turn] The more or less persistent, long-term movement of phenomena in a particular direction; hence *epochal trends*, covering a whole era such as the Middle Ages; *secular trends*, occurring within the span of a century or more, such as the mechanization trends following the Industrial Revolution; *decadal trends*, lasting for about ten-year periods, as for example, the upward and downward trends within the business cycle.

> The economic history of a family, or a corporation, or any economic organization shows that there scarcely has been one among such groups which has been permanently rising economically. After a short or long period, within one or several generations, the rising trend has been superseded by the sinking one. Pitirim Sorokin, *Social mobility* (New York 1927) 26–27.

type [L. *typus* figure or image, fr. Gr. *τύπος* mark, model, impression, fr. *τύπτειν* to beat, strike] A class or group of cultures or culture objects which are marked by similar or closely resembling traits and trait complexes. The totality of types constitutes the essence of a given culture.

> Clearly, so far as present day civilization is concerned, the important matter for analysis is not where people are situated geographically, but rather what is their particular culture setting in terms of *type*. Earle Edward Eubank, *Concepts of sociology* (New York 1932) 380.

Urbanization [L. *urbanitas*, fr. *urbanus* belonging to a city, *urbs*, *urbis* a city] The concentration of population and culture traits in cities, a movement particularly active since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. See **civilization, culture.**

> Before the eighties, we [in America] were largely a simple, homogeneous, agricultural population living in sparsely settled communities. We are now a complex, heterogeneous, urban population crowded together in a modern industrial society. Even rural life has been transformed; it has in a sense been urbanized. The more significant factors in this social change [include] . . . the expansion of industry and commerce, the growth of manufacturing, increasing use of machinery, improvement in the means of communication and transportation. . . . Maurice R. Davie, *Problems of city life* (New York 1932) 410.

* **Values** [OF. *value*, fr. F. *valu*, pp. of *valoir* to be of worth, fr. L. *valere* to be strong, to have worth] Those objects, acts, or modes of action which have meaning for society, which it regards highly, considers particularly worthy to emulate or to guide the thought, aim, and activity of its component members.

> For sociology, values are in a very real sense objective and persistent. The investigator finds that values remain fairly constant during one period and are challenged and largely transvalued the next. Roy Wood Sellars, "Introduction" to C. Bouglé, *Evolution of values* (New York 1926) xxvii.

By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity. Thus, a foodstuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social values. William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *Polish peasant in Europe and America*, i (Boston 1918) 21.

We shall thus define values as social objects which have a meaning for us, which we consider important in our life schemes, while attitudes are the way we feel about these values, and our tendency to act in a particular overt way with reference to them. Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social disorganization* (New York 1934) 25.

variation [L. *variatio* variant, fr. *variare* to differ] The process or the state in which major cultural alterations occur, come to be fixed, and to produce permanent departures in the configuration of a given culture. Variations usually occur by changes in physical or biological nature, or as a result of historical accident, interfertilization of cultures, or "experimentation."

Nevertheless, variation is not seldom as clumsy and floundering, and as unconscious of the previous history of the race, as are those wild gropings and wallowings of the savage to which we would deny the name of experimentation. Albert Galloway Keller, *Societal evolution* (rev. ed. New York 1931) 71.

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INDEXES

INDEX OF NAMES

Abel, J. F., 250
Abel, T., 425
Abelard, 246, 316
Abraham, 169
Addams, J., 275
Aeschylus, 439
Aesop, 416
Allen, P. W., 45
Allport, F. H., 27, 74
Allport, G. W., 553, 569
Alverdes, F., 394
Alves, H. F., 250, 254
Ambrosios, 464
Ames, E. S., 303
Anaxagoras, 45, 327, 439
Anderson, N., 121
Angell, J. R., 398
Angell, N., 381, 389
Angell, R. C., 535, 569
Aquinas, 290, 328, 483
Archimedes, 326
Ariosto, 439
Aristophanes, 416, 439
Aristotle, 45, 85, 135, 331, 333, 342, 364
Arnold, M., 243
Asch, S., 372
Ashley, R. L., 499, 510
Aspasia, 439
Atkins, G. G., 303, 319
Augustine, 290
Augustus, 177, 415

Babeuf, 484
Bacon, F., 246, 329, 484
Bacon, R., 246, 316, 328–329, 483
Bailey, C., 245, 263
Baitsell, G. A., 52, 132, 138, 398
Baker, E. F., 224, 240
Bakunin, M., 371, 385
Bancroft, H. H., 173
Barker, E., 303
Barnes, H. E., 413, 510, 518, 535, 540–541, 548–549, 569
Barrett, E., 151
Bartlett, G. A., 166
Barzun, J., 85, 86, 101
Batista, 359
Beach, W. G., 441
Beaglehole, E., 215, 217, 221
Beard, C. A., 227, 258, 274, 280, 285. 363, 490, 511
Beard, M. R., 60, 68
Becker, F. B., 371
Becker, H., 46, 146, 295, 413, 440, 442, 518, 561, 562, 573
Beer, M., 387, 389
Benedict, R., 288, 303, 326, 339, 538, 557, 566, 569
Bentham, J., 246, 501
Berle, A. A., Jr., 213, 228
Bernard, C., 46
Bernard, J., 166, 181
Bernard, L. L., 31, 78, 116, 266, 287, 546, 569
Bernier, 85
Bertholet, A., 296, 303
Best, H., 447
Bews, J. W., 31, 43, 47
Bigelow, M. A., 293
Birnie, A., 237, 240
Bismark, 417, 466
Blackmar, F. W., 24, 27, 198, 221, 282, 315, 316, 518, 527, 529, 570
Bland, P. B., 159
Bliss, W. O. P., 519
Blose, D. T., 250, 254
Blumenbach, 85
Boas, F., 101, 113, 114, 116, 394, 395, 525, 569
Bodart, G., 173
Bodin, J., 403, 483
Boehm, M. H., 450
Bogardus, E. S., 38, 548, 569
Bohn, F., 414, 424
Bonaventura, 290, 328
Bond, N. J., 250
Bongiorno, A., 414
Bonn, M. J., 487
Book, H. M., 58, 68
Borgese, G. A., 482, 490
Bosanquet, B., 479
Bossard, J. H. S., 159, 165, 181
Bouglé, C., 400, 529, 565, 567, 569
Brace, C. L., 318, 319
Brailsford, H. N., 381, 389, 409, 488
Branch, M. S., 162
Branford, V., 339
Breasted, J. H., 303, 326

Briffault, R., 293, 303, 549, 553, 569
Bright, J., 234
Brinkmann, C., 122, 129, 199, 221
Brinton, C., 373, 389
Brockman, W., 144
Brooke, R., 378
Brooke, Z. N., 360
Brooks, J., 176, 181
Brown, J. F., 545–546, 569
Brown, W. A., 319
Brown, W. O., 107, 114, 398
Browne, F. W. S., 148
Browning, R., 151
Brownlee, A., 446
Bruce, G. M., 165
Bruno, G., 316
Bryce, J., 308, 347, 364, 366, 367, 369, 374, 381, 389
Bryson, L., 253, 263
Bücher, K., 282
Buffon, G. L., 550
Bukharin, N., 538, 569
Burgess, E. W., 121, 195, 428, 466, 492, 519, 530, 548, 563, 572
Burns, A. E., 349, 364
Burns, A. R., 212
Burns, C. D., 495
Burton, W. H., 243
Bury, J. B., 482, 483, 490, 554, 569
Bushee, F. A., 282
Butler, S. D., 376
Byrd, R. E., 144
Byron, 265

Cabot, R. C., 266, 281, 284, 303
Calixtus, 315
Callicrates, 439
Calverton, V. F., 148
Calvin, J., 375, 439
Calvo, 76
Cardozo, B. N., 351
Carlyle, A. J., 346, 367
Carlyle, R. W., 346, 367
Carnera, 278
Carolingians, 419
Carpenter, N., 152, 181
Carr, L. J., 535, 569
Carr-Saunders, A. M., 55, 106, 165, 226, 254, 263
Carrell, A., 60, 72, 74, 78, 125, 129, 168, 235, 262, 280, 505
Carruth, W. H., 289
Carver, T. N., 76, 114, 122, 466
Case, C. M., 102, 281, 284, 456, 466, 490, 518, 561, 562, 569
Caudel, M., 499
Cavour, 417
Celsus, 327
Chamberlain, 487
Chapin, F. S., 370, 412, 418, 419, 424, 469, 475, 477, 518, 537, 559, 569
Charlemagne, 301
Charles V, 375
Chase, S., 224, 230, 234, 240, 274, 277, 284, 495, 511
Chayton, J. H., 457
Cheney, S., 272
Chesterfield, 192
Child, C. M., 145, 369
Childs, M. W., 415, 510
Christ, 245, 287, 297, 301, 307, 311, 315, 319, 385, 415, 432, 481
Christie, O. F., 367, 381
Cicero, 327
Clement IV, 316
Cleveland, F. A., 56, 68, 78, 116, 518
Cobban, A., 342
Coghlan, T. A., 189–190
Cogni, G., 319
Cohen, F. S., 283
Coker, F. W., 450, 486
Colby, E., 354
Colcord, J. C., 178, 182, 456
Cole, F.-C., 221
Collins, A., 82
Colm, G., 224
Comenius, 246
Commons, J. R., 13, 214, 232, 237, 238, 516
Comte, 484, 501
Condorcet, 484
Conklin, E. G., 138, 289
Constantine the Great, 298, 347
Cooley, C. H., 211, 275, 401, 535, 553–554, 569
Copernicus, 329
Cornhill, 314
Correggio, 439
Cortez, H., 375
Counts, G. S., 398
Cournos, J., 296
Cowdry, E. V., 48, 50, 85, 98, 101, 102, 165, 182, 555, 571
Crile, G., 34
Cyprian, 315

Da Vinci, L., 210, 269, 439
Dampier-Whetham, W. C. D., 325, 327, 339
Dante Alighieri, 380, 416
Darmstaedter, L., 335
Darsie, M. L., 263
Darwin, C., 98, 246, 316, 484
Davenport, C. B., 98, 101
David, 479, 481
David, H., 510, 518

Davie, M. R., 389, 551, 567, 569
Davies, G. R., 107, 120, 540, 572
Davis, H. W. C., 457
Davis, J., 511, 535, 540–541, 548–549, 569
Davis, W. M., 303, 316, 338, 339
Dawson, C. A., 527, 529, 532, 569
Day, C., 182
Day, G. M., 411
de Gobineau, A. J., 81, 487
de Pomerai, R., 162
de Quatrefages, 171
de Réamur, 46
de Voto, B., 219
Deffenbaugh, W. S., 248, 249, 250, 253
Demosthenes, 416
Dempsey, J., 278
Dennison, H. S., 333
Descartes, 329, 484
Devine, E. T., 552, 561, 570
Dewey, J., 243, 282, 343, 493, 501, 545, 570
Dickinson, J., 349, 364
Diocletian, 298
Dioscorides, 327
Diserens, C. M., 282
Dixon, R. B., 116, 120
Dodge, T. A., 173
Dodson, L., 376
Dorcus, R. M., 54
Dorsey, G. A., 182
Douglas, P. H., 199, 221
Douglass, H. P., 313, 320
Dowd, J., 460, 461, 467
Dublin, L. I., 56, 68
Dugdale, E. T. S., 487
Duncan, O. D., 165, 182
Dunham, A., 467
Dunlap, K., 78, 287, 518, 545, 547, 570
Duns Scotus, 246, 328
Duranty, W., 116
Durkheim, É., 527, 529, 556, 570
Dutt, R. P., 225

Edwards, L. A., 389, 475
Elliott, M. A., 568, 570
Ellis, H., 282, 284
Ellwood, C. A., 24n, 27, 103, 114, 131, 138, 202, 205, 207, 219, 321, 400, 410, 508, 546, 570
Elmer, M. C., 183, 197
Ely, R. T., 213, 221, 240, 414, 424
Emerson, H., 48, 50
Engels, 371
Englemann, G., 342, 364
Erasistratus, 45
Eubank, E. E., 103, 409, 519, 523, 524, 531, 534, 543, 547, 558, 559, 567, 570
Euclid, 326
Euripides, 416, 439
Evans, J. H., 173
Evans, W., 530, 571
Everett, H., 467
Ewen, D., 66
Eyre, E., 70, 79

Fairchild, H. P., 565, 570
Fairchild, M., 210, 221
Fairgrieve, J., 34
Farris, E., 258
Ferdinand, 439
Ferrero, G., 129, 457
Ferry, J., 487
Fichte, 484, 486
Flint, R., 486
Foligno, C., 245
Folsom, J. K., 114, 122
Fontanelle, 484
Ford, J., 457
Fosdick, H. E., 311, 320
Foster, E. M., 253
Fourier, 484
France, A., 296
Francis, 415
Francis I, 375
Franco, 359
Frank, T., 400
Franz, S. I., 74
Frary, D. P., 355
Frazer, J. G., 303
Frederick the Great, 247
Frederick II, 360
Friess, H. L., 173
Fry, C. L., 310, 311, 312, 320, 432
Furnas, C. C., 49, 50

Galbraith, A. M., 165
Galen, 45
Galileo, 113, 316, 330, 439
Gandhi, 427, 460
Garrison, W. E., 315
Gauss, C., 262, 263, 498, 506, 511
Geiser, K. F., 342, 364
George, H., 219, 240
Gerbert, 246
Gettell, R. G., 343, 345, 348
Gettys, W. E., 527, 529, 532, 569
Gibbon, E., 291, 298, 303
Giddings, F. H., 24, 27, 145, 259, 263, 560, 566, 570
Gide, C., 201, 219, 221
Gilfillan, S. C., 78, 339, 414, 424
Gill, C. A., 48, 447
Gillette, J. M., 560–561, 570
Gillin, J. L., 24, 27, 180, 198, 221, 282, 315, 316, 518, 527, 529, 570
Gindely, A., 174

Gini, C., 62, 68, 86, 88, 97, 101, 158, 159, 186, 193, 197
Ginsberg, M., 38, 43, 63, 68, 78, 122, 216, 222, 343, 351, 352, 364, 400, 410, 416, 519, 526, 528, 532, 540, 545, 558, 570
Ginzburg, B., 321, 322, 339
Gist, N. P., 502
Godwin, 484
Goldenweiser, A., 104, 114, 394, 398, 539, 541, 570
Goodsell, W., 154, 182, 553, 570
Gordon, K., 74
Gosnell, H. F., 355
Gosse, A. B., 133, 138
Graves, R. A., 226
Greenidge, A. H. J., 361
Gregory I, 300, 301
Gregory VII, 346, 434
Grotius, 380
Guérard, A., 348
Gumplowicz, L., 82
Guyau, M., 282

Haddon, A C., 83
Haines, B. M., 342, 364
Haines, C. G., 342, 364, 386
Haire, N., 542, 570
Hakewill, G., 484
Halbert, L. A., 502
Haldane, J. B. S., 96, 97, 99, 102
Hales, S., 46
Hall, F. S., 467
Hall, H. B., 76
Hamilton, M. A., 490
Hamilton, W. H., 295
Hammurabi, 481
Haney, L. H., 342
Hankins, F. H., 33, 43, 99, 103, 107, 122, 477, 504, 518, 532, 542, 543, 563, 570
Hart, C W., 519, 523, 524, 531, 540, 544, 547, 560, 572
Hart, H., 164, 165, 182, 210, 221, 424, 551, 570
Hart, J. K., 243, 263
Harvey, W., 46
Hastings, J., 245, 481
Hayes, C. J. H., 348, 364, 485, 486
Hayes, E. C., 38, 536, 570
Heape, W., 103
Hearnshaw, F. J. C., 306, 320
Hedger, G. A., 107, 114, 330, 398, 511, 518, 526, 572
Heidbreder, E., 70, 74
Heidel, W. A., 136, 138, 330, 339
Hegel, 484
Heller, H., 359
Héloise, 316
Henderson, L. J., 519
Henry VI, 360
Herbert, 290
Herder, 348, 484
Herford, H. T., 315
Herlihy, L. B., 253
Herodotus, 416, 439
Herrick, C. J., 79
Herring, E. P., 363
Hertzler, J. O., 146, 196, 475, 477, 518, 546, 570
Hesiod, 482
Hess, R. H., 213, 221, 240
Hiller, E. T., 519, 564, 565, 570
Hilton, J., 377
Himes, N. E., 55
Hitler, A., 196, 379, 432, 460, 487, 506
Hobbes, T., 342
Hobhouse, L. T., 318, 320, 343, 364, 396, 398, 410, 539, 570
Hocking, W. E., 60
Hoetzsch, O., 358
Hogben, L., 75
Holcombe, A. N., 360
Holland, T. E., 351
Holmes, S. J., 48, 50
Hook, S., 441
Hooton, E. A., 79, 394, 395, 396
Hopkins, E. W., 295, 296, 303
Houf, H. T., 304
House, F. N., 524, 535, 570
Howard, G. E., 165, 182
Hrdlička, A., 85, 87, 90, 91, 92, 95, 98, 99, 102, 555, 571
Hudson, M. O., 381, 389
Huizinga, J., 96, 101, 338, 519, 564, 571
Huizinga, J. H., 338, 564, 571
Hunt, T. F., 36
Huntington, E., 38, 43, 110
Huxley, J. S., 49, 50
Huxley, T., 246, 290, 316

Ictinus, 439
Imms, A. D., 48
Irving, W., 150
Isaacs, S., 243
Isabella, 439

Jackman, W. T., 433
Jacob, E. F., 302
James, W., 501
Jarrett, B., 301, 304, 346, 364
Jászi, O., 240, 384, 385, 387, 389
Jeans, J., 96, 102
Jefferson, T., 290, 371
Jenner, E., 46
Jensen, D. O., 261, 262, 263
Jespersen, O., 131, 138
Jessup, M. F., 310, 311, 320, 432

Jesus, *see* Christ
Joad, C. E. M., 238, 320
Job, 287
Johnson, A., 389, 438, 441, 519
Johnson, E. A. J., 212, 213, 222
Johnson, P. E., 117
Jones, B., 49
Jones, H. S., 285
Jones, L. W., 49
Jonson, B., 439
Joseph, 221
Josephson, M., 234
Josephus, 327
Jowett, B., 104
Judd, C. H., 146, 254, 255, 263, 518
Jukes, 168
Justinian, 137

Kahn, H. D., 389
Kallen, H. M., 454, 457, 467, 531, 550, 571
Kallikaks, 168
Kandel, I. L., 253, 264
Kant, 484
Keane, A. H., 83
Keesecker, W. W., 249, 250
Keith, A., 102
Keller, A. G., 11, 24, 27, 58, 131, 148, 175, 183, 185, 217, 222, 244, 265, 281, 282, 285, 294, 315, 316, 346, 365, 400, 409, 410, 425, 441, 442, 518, 526, 531–532, 550, 558, 562, 564, 568, 571
Kellett, E. E., 304
Kendall, A. I., 45
Kepler, 113
Keyser, C. J., 75
King, J. C., 349
King, W. I., 230
Kinney, B., 173
Kipling, R., 487
Kirof, 115
Klein, P., 453, 457
Klineberg, O., 84, 86, 88, 98, 102, 550, 553, 555, 571
Knight, M. M., 485
Knopf, O., 57, 60
Knox, J., 439
Koch, 46
Kocourek, A., 343, 345
Kohn, H., 450, 481, 486, 490, 491
Kohut, R , 195
Koffka, K., 72, 79
Kolnai, A., 487, 488
Krabbe, H., 348, 364
Krey, A. C., 302
Kroeber, A. L., 88, 89, 97, 107, 114, 208, 413, 470, 533, 539, 551, 571
Kropotkin, P., 385, 448, 457
Krueger, E. T., 260
Kuczynski, R. R., 187, 197, 309

La Fayette, 66
Laertius, 327
Lamb, C., 214
Lancaster, L. W., 407
Landis, P. H., 467
Langland, 368
Laski, H. J., 240, 343, 389
Lasswell, H. D., 428, 441
Lawrence, M., 61
Lehman, H. C., 277, 285
Leibnitz, 484
Leicht, P. S., 212
Lenin, 371, 460
Leo XIII, 312
Leon, M., 129, 344
Leon, P., 129, 344
Lestschinsky, J., 450
Leven, M., 225, 240
Levi, A., 319
Levy, H., 339
Lewisohn, L., 261
Lichtenberger, J. P., 180, 182, 539, 571
Lincoln, A., 460
Lindeman, E. C., 121
Lindsay, A. D., 386
Lindsay, V., 231
Lindsey, B. B., 530, 571
Linnaeus, 85
Livingston, A., 389, 414
Locke, J., 342
Lot, F., 129, 344, 354
Lotka, A. J., 56, 68
Lovett, R. M., 416
Lowie, R. H., 42, 113, 114, 174, 175, 182, 217, 220, 304, 400, 405, 406, 410, 423
Lucasse, W. W., 324
Luce, R., 351
Lucretius, 327, 483
Ludwig, E., 60, 69
Lull, R. S., 52, 69
Lumley, F. E., 461, 463, 467, 533, 557, 560, 571
Luther, M., 307, 315, 375, 415, 439
Lynch, D. T., 370
Lynd, H. M., 162, 182, 188, 197, 275, 279, 424
Lynd, R. S., 162, 182, 188, 197, 275, 279, 424
Lytton, E. B., 205

Maccabeans, 169
Machiavelli, 380, 439, 483
MacCurdy, G. G., 79, 398
MacIlwain, C. H., 364

MacIver, R. M., 27, 106, 122, 129, 342, 349, 350, 364, 381, 389, 396, 398, 399, 400, 409, 457, 462, 467, 469, 471, 518, 525, 528, 529–530, 571
MacKenzie, C., 464
MacLeod, W. C., 342, 364, 398, 405
McDermott, J. F., 261, 262, 263
McGoldrick, J., 361
McKean, D. D., 363
Magnus, A., 328
Malinowski, B., 19, 27, 104, 105, 108, 114, 231, 378
Markham, S. F., 511
Marriott, J. A. R., 389
Marsh, A. W., 272, 274, 275, 285
Marshall, T. H., 193
Marsilius of Padua, 380
Martin, E. D., 261, 263
Marvin, F. S., 299, 300, 303, 304, 366, 373, 390, 441, 457, 485, 487, 490, 518
Marx, K., 371, 440, 505
Maspéro, G., 132, 138
Mathews, S., 304, 481
Maxwell, C. R., 252
Mayow, J., 46
Mead, M., 69, 395, 429, 441
Means, G. C., 213, 228, 230, 240
Meinecke, F., 348
Meland, B. E., 320
Mendelssohn, F., 66
Mencken, H. L., 316
Merovingians, 419
Merriam, C. E., 357, 358, 363, 499
Merrill, F. E., 568, 570
Meusel, A., 373, 389, 441
Michelangelo, 269, 360, 439
Michels, R., 476, 478
Middleton, J. H., 285
Mill, J. S., 239–240, 501, 506
Miller, H. A., 238, 441, 528, 571
Millis, W. B., 376
Milton, J., 416
Mirabeau, 371
Mnesicles, 439
Mohammed, 415
Monroe, P., 243
Montaigne, 9, 439
Moon, P. T., 37, 457
Moore, Edward C., 304
Moore, Ernest C., 263, 557, 571
Moore, H. H., 56
Montesquieu, 484
Morelli, C., 212
Morgan, L. H., 122, 343, 345, 554
Morrow, F., 315
Morton, A. P., 132, 138
Mosca, G., 389
Moses, 213, 287
Moulton, H. G., 240
Mower, E. C., 381
Mowrer, E. R., 178, 194, 197, 542–543, 571
Muir, E., 372
Muir, W., 372
Mulhall, M. G., 167
Müller-Lyer, F. C., 148, 182
Mumford, L., 129, 223, 280, 285, 494
Munro, W. B., 121, 358, 362
Muntz, E. E., 129, 555, 571
Murchison, C., 243, 553, 569
Murphy, G., 58, 69
Murphy, L. B., 58
Murry, J. M., 165
Mussolini, B., 196, 371, 379, 389, 432, 460
Myres, J. L., 38

Napoleon, 417, 461, 486
Nearing, S., 511
Needham, J., 400, 410
Newton, I., 113, 129
Nicholas V, 318
Niebuhr, H. R., 361, 441
Nietzsche, 432
Nikephoros, 464
Nimkoff, M. F., 152, 197
Noble, E., 566, 571
Nordau, M., 490
North, C. C., 349
Notestein, F. W., 161, 182
Nourse, E. G., 211
Novikov, Y. A., 425, 441

Occam, W. of, 246, 316, 329
Odum, H. W., 195, 337, 544, 571
Ogburn, W. F., 107, 113, 188, 197, 281, 349, 350, 400, 410, 415, 417, 422, 424, 449, 469, 471, 527, 534, 560, 571
Ogden, R. M., 72, 79
Orani, P., 319
Orsi, P., 305
Owen, R., 484

Paine, T., 371
Panunzio, C., 76, 101, 537, 542, 544, 547, 550, 556, 571
Pareto, V., 144, 146, 291, 292, 414, 462, 466, 474, 476, 478, 489, 519, 552, 572
Park, R. E., 100, 102, 119, 120, 195, 428, 467, 492, 519, 525, 528–529, 530, 536, 548, 563, 572
Pasteur, L., 46
Patrick, G. T. W., 70, 71
Patterson, E. M., 37, 43, 507, 519
Paul, 297
Pavlov, I. P., 332
Pepin, 346, 347

Pericles, 46, 439
Peter, 299
Petrie, C., 364
Petrie, W. M. F., 128, 129
Phelps, E. B., 48, 50
Phelps, H. A., 556, 572
Phidias, 278, 439
Piganiol, A., 212
Pintner, R., 75
Pirenne, H., 357, 363
Pius XI, 316
Pizzaro, 375
Plato, 104, 135, 374, 416, 419, 473
Pliny the Elder, 327
Plutarch, 46, 327, 416
Polakov, W. N., 237, 283
Polygnotus, 439
Poole, A. L., 360
Popenoe, P., 165, 182, 189
Praxiteles, 278
Pray, K. L. M., 317, 320
Previté-Orton, C. W., 360
Pribram, K., 457
Protagoras, 439
Proudhon, 385
Pumpelly, R., 38
Pupin, M., 224, 240

Quevedo, 553
Quiggin, A. H., 271
Quinn, J. A., 526, 572

Raglan, 168
Randall, J. H., Jr., 298, 301, 304, 494, 511
Ratzel, F., 31, 41
Raymont, T., 399
Reckless, W. C., 260
Reinhardt, J. M., 107, 120, 540, 560–561, 570, 572
Reissman, R., 36
Remarque, E. M., 376
Requin, E., 228
Reuter, E. B., 98, 102, 519, 523, 524, 531, 540, 544, 547, 560, 572
Rice, S., 339
Rice, W. N., 316
Richardson-Robinson, F., 79
Riegel, O. W., 495
Ripley, W. Z., 98
Rivers, W. H. R., 148
Roberts, C., 485, 490
Roberts, S. H., 487
Robinson, E. S., 79, 273, 285
Robinson, J. H., 75, 79
Robinson, W. J., 530–531, 572
Rohden, P. R., 438, 442
Romer, A. S., 52, 53
Romier, L., 234
Roosevelt, F. D., 418
Ross, E. A., 55, 187, 188, 282, 305, 430, 459, 467, 519, 532–533, 565, 572
Rossman, J., 324, 332
Rostovtzeff, M., 212
Rousseau, J. J., 246, 342, 484
Row, E. F., 201, 221
Rubinow, I. M., 188, 457
Rudlin, W. A., 360
Rumney, J., 519
Russell, B., 238, 240, 387, 390, 414
Ryan, W. C., Jr., 247, 248

Sabine, G. H., 364
Saint Pierre, 484
Saint-Simon, 484
Sait, U. B., 197, 497
Salomon, G., 82
Samuel, H., 433
San Nicolò, M., 212
Sapir, E., 395, 552, 572
Sarton, G., 325, 339
Saunders-Johnson, A., 263
Savonarola, 439
Sayce, A. H., 132, 135, 138
Schelling, 484
Schipa, M., 360
Schmidt, W., 70, 72, 79
Schneider, H. W., 173
Schuman, F. L., 488
Scopes, 435
Seely, J. R., 487
Seligman, B. Z., 167, 168
Seligman, E. R. A., 231, 453, 519, 563, 572
Sellars, H. S., 400, 567
Sellars, R. W., 567
Sellery, G. C., 302
Sellin, T., 457
Seltzer, T., 441
Semple, E. C., 33, 39, 40
Senturia, J. J., 450
Sepulveda, 553
Seymour, C., 355
Shaffer, G. W., 54
Shaftesbury, 290
Shakespeare, W., 95, 416, 439
Shaler, N. S., 99, 102
Shaw, G. B., 287
Sheffield, A. D., 532, 572
Shepard, W. J., 364, 370, 499
Shields, W., 164, 165, 182
Shostokovitch, D., 66
Simar, 553
Simmel, G., 472
Simons, S. E., 524
Slichter, S. H., 224, 226, 230, 233, 234, 236, 240, 261

Small, A. W., 24, 545, 572
Smart, H. R., 339, 493
Smith, A., 484
Smith, A. T., 248
Smith, G. E., 108, 129, 133, 139
Smith, J. R., 41
Smith, P., 368, 518
Smith, R. G., 535, 563, 572
Smith, W. A., 263
Socrates, 439
Soddy, F., 230
Solomon, 245, 300
Sombart, W., 400
Soothill, W. E., 457
Sophocles, 439
Sorel, 371
Sorokin, P. A., 9, 14, 15, 32, 33, 39, 40, 41, 43, 60, 81, 102, 111, 154, 334–335, 376, 390, 405, 413, 416, 419, 423, 424, 457, 481, 489, 490, 500, 504, 508, 509, 518, 519, 526, 544, 549, 556, 564, 567, 572
Soule, G., 494
Southard, F. A., Jr., 226
Spallanzani, L., 46
Spaulding, O. L., 173
Speck, F. G., 218
Spencer, H., 162, 246, 484, 501
Spengler, O., 509
Spenser, E., 439
Spykman, N. J., 472, 474
Stalin, 371, 463, 465
Steiner, J. F., 274, 275, 276, 279, 281, 282, 285
Stephenson, C , 137, 139
Stern, B. J., 69, 107, 429
Storck, J., 494, 511
Storr, F., 272, 285, 400
Story, H. H., 82
Strachey, J., 128, 229
Strauch, D., 144
Strong, J., 125
Sullivan, H., 251, 257, 264
Sullivan, M., 104
Sumner, F. B., 338
Sumner, W. G., 9, 10, 27, 58, 131, 146, 148, 175, 183, 185, 244, 252, 261, 294, 315, 346, 365, 425, 442, 478, 518, 538, 541, 543, 546, 551, 572
Sutherland, E. H., 554, 572
Sutton, E., 376
Sweet, W. W., 310, 320
Swift, A. L., Jr., 319, 320
Swinny, S. H., 487, 490
Sydenstricker, E., 447

Taft, K. B., 261, 262
Tanner, J. R., 360
Tasso, 439
Tawney, R. H., 232, 241, 423
Taylor, H., 353
Teggart, F. J., 124, 490
Ten Brook, A., 174
Tennyson, 289, 378
Theodosius, 298, 299
Thomas, F., 81, 120, 536, 573
Thomas, O. J., 32, 33, 35, 38
Thomas, W. I., 146, 400, 410, 568, 573
Thompson, W. S., 64, 65, 125, 186, 188, 226, 312, 313, 519, 555, 573
Thomson, J. A., 71, 79, 143, 146, 524, 573
Thorndike, E. L., 56, 256
Thorndike, L., 329
Thucydides, 416, 439
Tibbitts, C., 188, 197, 422
Titian, 439
Titus, C. H., 355
Todd, A. J., 227
Tolman, E. C., 73
Tolstoy, L., 371, 385
Tomlison, H. M., 376
Tovey, D. F., 66
Toynbee, A. J., 38, 43, 518
Tozzer, A. M., 72, 79, 97, 98, 102, 109, 120, 128, 396, 478
Trevelyan, G. M., 173
Trotsky, 371, 465
Trotter, W., 73
Tufts, J. H., 165, 182
Tugwell, R. G., 199, 221
Tunis, J. R., 150, 262
Tylor, E. B., 86, 104, 105, 131, 132, 205, 525, 573

Ullmann, E. V., 408

van de Velde, T. H., 165
van Kleek, M., 61, 69
Veblen, T., 457
Venizelos, 464
Vergil, 416
Villari, P., 437, 442
Vogt, von O., 282
Voltaire, 484
von Haller, A., 46
von Hindenburg, 460, 461
von Humboldt, A., 382
von Metzsch, Lieut.-Gen., 228
von Wiese, L., 146, 295, 442, 518, 561, 562, 573

Wagner, D. O., 372
Wallace, H. A., 338, 504, 505
Wallas, G., 368, 409, 511, 518
Wallis, W. D., 131, 132, 139, 481, 482, 490, 548, 566, 573
Walsh, 165

Warburton, C., 240
Ward, H. F., 232, 241
Ward, L. F., 259, 481, 490, 566, 573
Warden, C. J., 103, 114, 398, 511, 541, 573
Washington, G., 460, 565
Watkins, F. M., 359
Watkins, G. S., 213
Watson, J. B., 74
Watson, T. J., 377
Webb, B., 163, 227, 229, 233, 234, 241, 476, 488
Webb, S., 163, 227, 229, 233, 234, 241, 476, 488
Weber, H. C., 312, 313
Webster, F. A. M., 400
Weinberg, A. K., 486, 490
Wells, G. P., 49, 50
Wells, H. G., 49, 50, 136, 139, 235
Wenz, G., 354
Westermarck, E. A., 137, 147, 148, 154, 157, 162, 163, 166, 167, 169, 171, 175, 177, 181, 182, 194, 197, 394, 497, 511, 549, 552, 556, 573
Wheeler, G. C., 343
Wheeler, W. M., 541, 573
Wheen, A. W., 376
Whewell, W., 325
Whitbeck, R. H., 32, 33, 35, 38, 41, 43
White, A. D., 316
White, L. D., 357
Whitehead, A. N., 116, 120, 135, 325, 339, 424, 500
Wieman, H. N., 320
Wigglesworth, I. C., 182
Wigmore, J. H., 343, 345
Willcox, W. F., 121
Willey, M. M., 474, 478, 548, 573
William II, 466
William III, 375
Williams, F. E., 167
Willoughby, W. W., 348
Wilm, E. C., 73
Wilson, L. M., 253, 264
Wilson, P. A., 106, 254, 263
Winter, E., 488
Wissler, C., 20, 27, 108, 109, 120, 127, 128, 131, 139, 146, 165, 182, 217, 218, 222, 288, 493, 508, 511, 537, 540, 554, 573
Witty, P. A., 277
Wolf, A., 339
Wolfe, A. B., 538, 573
Wood, H. G., 390
Wooddy, C. H., 424
Woodworth, R. S., 72
Woolsey, T. D., 363
Wright, H. R., 457
Wright, J. K., 37, 38
Würzburger, E., 175
Wycliffe, 361
Wylie, I. A. R., 377

Young, G., 487
Young, G. F., 347
Young, J. C., 165
Young, K., 43, 100, 102, 467, 519, 525–526, 533, 573

Zeno, 439
Zimmerman, C. C., 438
Zimmern, A. E., 457
Zinsser, H., 48, 50
Znaniecki, F., 420, 424, 460, 461, 462, 463, 466, 562–563, 568, 573
Zoroaster, 481
Zweig, A., 376
Zwingli, 375

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Accident, and culture variation, 111–112
Accommodation, 199, 453
  defined, 523
Acculturation, 117, 119
  defined, 523
Adaptation, 77, 340, 399, 401, *see also* Accommodation
  defined, 523
Adjustment, 77, 99, 340, *see also* Accommodation
  defined, 524
Adult education, 253
Adultery, 174
Age-groups, 63–67
  and population fluctuation, 65
  classification, census, 64, table; sociological, 64–65, table
  middle-age, 64–66
  old-age, 64–67
  social functions, 65–67
  struggle between, 67, 430–431
  youth, 64–66
Aggregation, defined, 524
Agriculture, 202–203
  ancient, 131–133
  and food supply, 133
  and property, 218–219
Alexandria, 38, 122, 124, 257, 296, 326, 528
Alpines, 85, figure; 92–94, table
Amalgamation, 97–99, *see also* Race mixture
  defined, 524
  effects, 98–99
American Association for the Advancement of Science, 23
American Federation of Labor, 23, 362
American Sociological Society, 4, 519
Americanization, 452
Anarchism, 384–385, 387
Ancient times, *see* Assyria, Babylonia, Crete, Egypt, Hebrews, Phoenicia
  agriculture, 132–133
  cities, 122, 124
Anderson and Lindeman, on city, 121
Animals
  as companions, 46
  as food, 131–132, 203
  as power, 45, 210
  domestication, 131–132, 201–203, 539
Animals—*Continued*
  experiments on, 45–46
Animism, 288
  defined, 525
Anthropomorphism, 288
  defined, 525
Anti-semitism, 449, 450
Apostles' Creed, 9, 290, 291
Arabs, 92, 94
  invasion, 413
  religion, 41
  science, 328
Aristotle, on government, 342
Art
  as recreation, 269
  Greek, 135
Aryans, 487
Assimilation, 100, 119, 452, 458
  defined, 525
Associations, 12–18
  activities, 17–18
  bonds in, 15–16
  centralization, 299–300, 344, 405, 527
  change, 417–419
  classification, 13–15
  compulsory, 14
  contractual, 14
  defined, 525
  distinguished from institutions, 12–13, 23
  distinguished from society, 24–25
  economic, 211–214, 219–220, 228, 362, 405
  educational, 252–256, 557
  familial, *see* Family
  familistic, 14
  governmental, 17–18, 245, 356–363, 563
  guidance by, 459–460
  life-cycle of, 16–17
  marital, *see* Marriage
  mixed types, 15
  mortality, 419
  recreational, 275–276
  religious, 245–246, 294–302, 309–310, 312–313, 527
  scientific, 333–334
  struggle between, 359–362, 374–379, 431–432
Assyria
  cities, 124

Assyria—*Continued*
  economic life, 205
  government, 344, 345, 347
  religion, 286, 288
  written language, 132
Athens
  as civilization center, 38, 113, 122, 124, 528
  education, 252, 257
  government, 360, 361
  recreation, 271
Attitudes, 100
  defined, 525
Austria, 62, 155, 158, 186, 248
Authority, 191–193, 345–347
Aversion drives, social meaning, 73

Babylonia
  as civilization center, 122, 124, 528
  cultural contributions, 133, 134
  economic life, 205, 211, 212, 219
  government, 344, 345, 347
  religion, 136, 286, 288
  science, 136, 325
  teleology, 481
  written language, 132
Bacteria, *see* Microörganism
Barnes and Becker, on change, 413
Barzun, J., on race as political material, 101
Beaglehole, E., on property, 215
Beard, C. A., on textbook evil, 258
Behavior pattern, defined, 526
Belief, defined, 526, *see also* Concepts
Benedict, R., on
  custom, 538
  magic, 326
  ritual, 557
  transmission, 566
Berle and Means, on corporations, 213, 228
Bernard, L. L., on
  instinct, 266, 546
  religion, 287
Bible, cited, 51, 169, 289, 297, 299
Bigamy, 174
Biological nature
  and maladjustment, 47–48, 447
  and man's activity, 48–50
  animals, 45–46, 131–132, 201–203
  as basis of life, 44
  as power, 45, 210
  control of, 49, 116
  food-attacking organisms, 48
  inimical aspects, 47–48
  microörganisms as contributors, 44–45
  plants, 46–47, 131–132
  social services, 46–47
Birth ceremonies, 293
Birth control, *see also* Conception control
  adaptive fertility, 55
  defined, 526
  religious opposition to, 316
Birth-rate, *see* Fertility rate
Bisexuality, *see* Sex
Black race, *see* Negroids
Bland, P. B., on marriage age, 159
Boas, F., on
  anthropomorphism, 525
  culture accumulation, 113
Bogardus, E., on
  isolation, 548
  leadership, 548
Bohn and Ely, on change, 414
Bosanquet, B., on teleology, 479
Bossard, J. H. S., on marriage age, 159, 165
Bouglé, C., on
  collective representation, 529
  technique, 565
  values, 567
Brain, and culture, 53
Breasted, J. H., on Egyptian science, 326
Briffault, R., on
  birth ceremonies, 293
  monogamy, 549
  polygamy, 553
British Empire, 344, 354, 356
Bryce, J., on
  democracy, 347, 366
  war, 374
Bukharin, N., on determinism, 538
Bury, J. B., on
  cosmic cycle, 482
  progress, 483, 490, 554
Business, *see* Commerce, Economic system
Butler, S. D., on war, 376

Calvarial index, 88–89, table, figure
Capitalism, 228–231, 406, 498
  and socialism, 505–506
  contributions, 228–229
  corporation control, 230
  dilemma, 505–506
  problems, 229–231
Carpenter, N., on mate-choosing, 152
Carr-Saunders, A. M., on
  fecundity, 55
  marriage age, 165
Carr-Saunders and Wilson, on professions, 106
Carrel, A., on
  city, 125
  exogamy, 168
  science, 505
Case, C. M., on
  social process, 561
  societal self-direction, 562

Caste, defined, 526
Catholicism
  Greek Orthodox, 315, 400, 464, 470
  Roman, 20, 40, 112, 136, 166, 169, 177, 194, 211, 299 ff., 302, 305, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312, 314, 315–316, 328, 375, 400, 406, 422, 426, 432, 437, 461, 470, 474
Caucasoids, 39, 97, 98, 169, 487
  calvarial index, 88–89, table, figure
  cephalic index, 86, figure; 88, table
  external traits, 87, table
  location, 92–94, 97
  mental characteristics, 91, table
  number, 97, table
  skeletal traits, 90, table
  subraces, 85, figure; 92–94, table
Centralization
  associational, 405
  economic, 230
  defined, 527
  governmental, 344
  religious, 299–300
  urban, 121–128
Cephalic index, 86, figure; 88, table
Ceremony
  defined, 527
  religious, 291–294, 471
Chambers of Commerce, 212, 362, 405
Change
  and maladjustment, 449
  and struggle, 439
  causes, 412–417
  defined, 411, 527
  distinguished from persistence, 468–469
  in associations, 417–419
  in concepts, 420
  in folkways, 10, 421
  in locus of functions, 419–420
  in material objects, 417
  in mores, 12
  in usages, 420–421
  morphology, 417–421
  variations, 421–423
Chapin, F. S., on
  change, 412, 418
  culture pattern, 537
  persistence, 469
  social disorganization, 559
Chase, S., on commercialism, 495
Children
  as marriage right and duty, 177
  care of, 190
  divorces with and without, 193–194, table
  number in family, 183, 185–188, tables
Christianity, 20, 296 ff., 305 ff., 499
  and change, 415
Christianity—*Continued*
  and clothing, 207
  and education, 247
  and government, 346–347
  and marriage, 154, 169, 175
  and profit-making, 232
  and recreation, 271, 272
  and science, 328
  and sex, 149
  and struggle, 437, 552
  and teleology, 481
  concepts, 8, 51, 288, 289, 461, 470
  in Middle Ages, 137
  in Rome, 136, 346, 465, 466
  instruments, 291
  migration, 111
  origin, 41
  rituals, 293 n
Christmas, 294, 471
Church, *see also* Religion
  education for, 245–246
  defined, 527
  Greek Orthodox, *see* Catholicism
  membership, 309–310, table; 312–313, table
  Roman Catholic, *see* Catholicism
  union movement in U. S., 313
Cinema, *see* Motion pictures
City, *see also* Civilization, Urbanization
  characteristics, 406–408, 502–504
  defined, 121
  government, 358
  growth, 502
Civil Works Administration, 377
Civilization, *see also* City, Culture, Urbanization
  ancient, 122, 124
  and maladjustment, 451–452
  cataclysmic meaning, 509–510
  characteristics, 122–123
  classical, 122, 124
  cycle, 123–128, 451–452, 507–508, 509–510
  defined, 121–122, 527–528
  distinguished from culture, 121–122, 128, 510
  fall, 126–128, 510
  medieval, 124
  modern, 124–125
  physical nature and, 123–124
  rise, 123–124
Class
  change, 421–422
  endogamy, 170, 406
  defined, 528
  family size, 422
  institutional generality, 20
  marriage age, 160–161, table

Class—*Continued*
  struggle between, 431
  teleology, 488
  variations, 160–161, table; 406, 421–422
Classical times, *see also* Greece, Rome
  cities, 122, 124
  cultural contributions, 134–137
Climate, and marriage age, 154 n, 159
Clothing, 207
Coercion, 462–463, *see also* Control
  defined, 528
  governmental, 464–466
Coghlan, T. A., on age of mother, 189–190
Cohabitation, as marriage right and duty, 177
Cohesion
  and development, 409
  and struggle, 439–440
  religious, 319
  sex and, 62–63
Collective behavior, defined, 528
Collective representation
  defined, 529
  symbols, 19
Collectivism, 350, 368
Columbia College Associates, 518, on
  coercion, 353
  monasticism, 301
  Reformation, 308
  religion, 303
  science, 331
Commerce, 203, 495
  and recreation, 280–281
  associations, 211–212, 362, 405
Commercial Revolution, 203, 232, 306
Commission on the Social Studies, cited, 259
Committee on Recent Economic Changes, cited, 333
Commons, J. R., on
  associations, 13 n
  economic organization, 214
  individualism, 238
  profit, 232
  solutions of economic problems, 237
  students as helpers, 516
Communication, 500
  and intelligence, 76–77
  defined, 529
Communism, 237, 239, 247, 386–387, 388, 406, 419, 426, 436, 440, 465, 476, 485, 510
Community, 409
  defined, 529
  educational organization, 252–256
  recreation, 274–275
Companionate marriage, defined, 530
Competition, 427–428, *see also* Conflict, Struggle
  defined, 530
  economic, 233
Compulsory attendance, in
  education, 247–250, tables
  recreation, 278
  religion, 291–292
Compulsory relationships, 14
Conception control, *see also* Birth control
  adaptive fertility, 55
  and family size, 188
  defined, 530
Concepts, 8–9
  and associated living, 9
  and change, 415–416
  and usages, 8–9
  belief, 526
  change in, 420
  economic, 237–240
  educational, 244–247, 259–262
  governmental, 384–387
  guidance by, 460–461
  magical, 325–326
  metaphysical, 326–327
  mystical, 327–328
  religious, 288–291, 298–299, 327
  scientific, 324–331
  struggle between, 432–433
  teleological, 479–488
Conditioned response, 72
  defined, 531
Conflict, 428, *see also* Competition, Struggle
  culture, 117–119, 437–439, 449–450, 535–536
  defined, 531
  race, 100–101, 450
Conformity, 340, 458 ff.
  defined, 531
Conquest, 487
  defined, 531
Consensus, defined, 532
Conservatism, 476, *see also* Persistence
  religious, 314–315
  vs. liberalism, 438
Constantinople, 38, 124, 126, 299
Contact
  culture, 117–120
  defined, 532
  race, 97–99
Contact-hunger, 73
Contraception, *see* Conception control
Contractual relationships, 14, 503–504
Control, *see also* Guidance
  defined, 532
  effectiveness, 465–466
  governmental, 464–466

Control—*Continued*
  institutional, 463–466
  means, 462–463
  nature of, 458–459
  of governmental power, 365 ff.
  religious, 318, 464
Convention, defined, 532
Convergence, 108, *see also* Diffusion, Parallelism
  defined, 533
Cooley, C. H., on
  adaptation, 401
  power (physical), 211
  primary group, 553–554
Cooley, Angell, and Carr, on culture area, 535
Coöperation, 510
  defined, 533
Coöperative League, 234
Corporations, 213, 219–220, 228
Cosmic cycle, Greek, 482
Cosmotheism, 288–289
Creeds, religious, 290–291
Crete
  as civilization center, 40, 123, 508
  economic life, 205
  government, 347
Crowd, defined, 533
Crusades, 353, 375, 413, 449
Cultural change, *see* Change
Cultural inertia, and persistence, 475–476
Cultural lag
  and maladjustment, 449
  defined, 534
  distinguished from persistence, 469
Cultural struggle, *see* Culture conflict
Culture
  and physical nature, 39–43
  and race, 108–109
  and struggle, 439
  as conditioner, 115–120
  defined, 103, 106, 534
  distinguished from civilization, 121–122, 128, 510
  distinguished from institutions, 25–27
  "material," 113
  modern, *see* Western culture
  nature of, 103–106
  nonmaterial, 113
  origin, 106–109
  spatial arrangement, 109–110
  types, 112–113, 567
  urbanization, *see* City, Civilization
  variation, 110–112, 405–408, 568
  Western, *see* Western culture
Culture accumulation, 112–114
  defined, 534
  rate, 113, 116–117
Culture area, 109–110
  defined, 534–535
Culture base, 114
  and persistence, 473
  influence, 115–117
Culture center, 109–110
  defined, 535
Culture complex, 111
  defined, 535
  established vs. nascent, 437
Culture conflict, 117–119, 437–439
  and maladjustment, 449–450
  defined, 535–536
  path, 118–119
Culture contact
  contributive, 117
  defined, 536
  result, 119–120
Culture cross-fertilization, defined, 536
Culture deposit, 113
  defined, 536–537
Culture factor, 104
  defined, 537
Culture focus, 109–110
Culture heritage, *see* Social heritage
Culture pattern, 104–105
  and physical nature, 40–41
  defined, 537
Culture stages
  and change, 422–423
  and marriage age, 162
Culture trait, 109
  defined, 537
Custom, *see also* Folkways, Mores, Usages
  defined, 538
  guidance by, 459
Cyclical theory of culture, 123–128, 451–452, 507–508, 509–510
Czechoslovakia, 117, 155, 251, 274, 361, 431

Dampier-Whetham, W. C. D., on
  magic, 325
  science-religion conflict, 327 n
Davie, M. R., on
  neighborhood, 551
  urbanization, 567
Davis, Barnes, *et al.*, on
  culture center, 535
  education, 540–541
  marginal area, 548–549
Davis, W. M., on science's amorality, 338
Dawson and Gettys, on
  centralization, 527
  collective representation, 529
  contact, 532
Day, G. M., on change in Soviet Russia, 411

Death ceremonies, 294
Decadence, religious, 305–307
De Gobineau, on polygenism, 81
Democracy, 388, 400, 406, 419, 437, 471, 485, 499
  adequacy, 367–369
  as societal struggle, 365–366
  development, 345–347, 366–367
  educational, 253–254
  familial, 192–193, 496–497
  Greek, 134–135
  in Rome, 135, 366
  inadequacy, 369–370
  recreational, 273–274
  rural vs. urban, 407
Demography, defined, 538, *see also* Population
Depressions, and capitalism, 231
Determinism, 110–111
  cultural, chap. 8
  defined, 538
  economic, 198
  geographic, 31–32, 110–111, 544
Development
  and cohesion, 409
  and culture contact, 119–120
  and maladjustment, 450–451
  aspects, 402–405
  associational spread, 405
  autonomy, 403–404
  centralization, 405
  defined, 200–201, 399, 538
  distinguished from evolution, 399–400
  economic, 200–214, 401–402, 403, 408
  educational, 244–247, 252–254, 256–258, 409
  familial, 191–193, 405
  governmental, 343–350, 379–381
  internal elaboration, 111, 404
  international, 379–382
  marital, 148, 154–155, 172–176, 405
  recreational, 270–272, 409–410
  religious, 288–291, 294–302, 305–307, 402–403, 404–406, 408
  results, 405–410
  scientific, 321–322, 324–331
  separate institutions, 402–403
Devine, E. T., on
  philanthropy, 552
  social work, 561
Dewey, J., on
  human nature, 545
  state, 343 n
Dictatorship, 360, 366, 367, 388, 500, 506
Diffusion, 107
  defined, 539
Direct appropriation economy, 201
Discovery
  and change, 413–414
  defined, 539
Disease, and maladjustment, 47–48, 49, 447
Disorganization, *see* Social disorganization
Divine Right, 136, 138, 346, 347
Divorce, 178–180, tables; 193–194, table
  and children, 193–194, table
  defined, 539
  factors, 178
  future, 497
  legal grounds, 178–179, table
  rates, 180, table
Dogmatism
  religious, 314–316
  scientific, 337–338
Domestication, 131–132, 201–202, 203
  defined, 539
Domination
  and maladjustment, 448
  and struggle, 440
  defined, 540
  economic, 448, 451
  religious, 303, 305–306
  results, 440
Douglass, H. P., on church union in U. S., 313
Dowd, J., on guidance, 460
Drama, as recreation, 270
Drives, social function of, 72–73
Dunlap, K., on
  habit, 545
  intelligence, 547
  religion, 287
Duranty, W., on family in Soviet Russia, 116
Durkheim, É., on
  church, 527
  religion, 556

Easter, 35, 268, 294
Ecology, defined, 540
Economic determinism, 198
Economic endogamy, 170
Economic system
  agriculture, 202–203
  ancient, 202
  associations, 211–214, 219–220, 228, 362, 405
  capitalism, 228–231, 406, 498, 505–506
  centralization, 230
  clothing, 207
  commerce, 203, 211–212, 280–281, 362, 405, 495
  communism, 237, 239, 247, 386–387, 388, 406, 419, 426, 436, 440, 465, 476, 485, 510

Economic system—*Continued*
  competition, 223
  development, 200–214, 401–402, 403, 408
  direct appropriation, 201
  familial interdependence, 214–215
  folkways, 214–215
  functions, 198–200
  future, 494–496
  hunting and fishing, 201
  ideology, 237–240, *see also* Teleology
  individualism, 237–238
  industrialism, 204
  instruments, 200–211, 223–228
  machine, 223–228, tables; 279–280, 493 ff.
  marriage rights and duties, 177
  medieval, 211–213
  mores, 215–220
  nature of, 198–200
  pastoral method, 201–202
  production procedures, 200–204
  profit-making pattern, 232–235
  property, 215–220
  shelter, 204–207
  socialism, 238–239
  standardization, 227
  struggle, 433, 436
  syndicalism, 238
  wage system, 229
  wealth, 215, 230
Education
  adult, 253
  ancient, 135, 244–245
  associations, 252–256, 557
  compulsory attendance, 247–250, tables
  concepts, 244–247, 259–262
  defined, 540
  development, 244–247, 252–254, 256–258, 409
  distinguished from science, 242, 323
  functions, 243–244
  folkways, 247, 250–252
  future, 497–498
  Greek, 135, 245
  Hebrew, 245
  humanistic, 246
  ideals, 259–262
  instruments, 256–258
  literacy pattern, 250–252, table
  medieval, 245–246
  mores, 247–250
  nationalistic, 247
  nature of, 242
  origin, 242–244
  purpose, 244–247
  primitive, 244
  printed page, 257–258
Education—*Continued*
  religious, 245–246
  Renaissance, 246
  Roman, 245
  school year, 250
  standardization, 255–256
  struggle, 435–436
  teachers, 254–256
  textbook evil, 258
  utilitarian, 246–247
  writing, 256–257
Edwards, L. P., on persistence, 475
Emergence, *see also* Origin
  defined, 541
  factors, 394
  place of, 130, 396
  semi-instinctive, 394–395
  time of, 130, 395–396
  transmission ability, 395
  unitary, 397–398
Emotion, social meaning of, 73–74
Endogamy, 168–172
  defined, 541
Egypt
  agriculture, 132
  as civilization center, 40, 123, 479
  cities in, 124
  cultural contributions, 133–134
  economic life, 205, 212, 213, 219, 221
  education, 135, 244–245
  government, 302, 344, 345, 347, 434
  recreation, 271
  religion, 41, 112, 134, 136, 286, 405
  science, 136, 325, 326
  slavery, 133, 219
  teleology, 481
  women, 429
  written language, 132
Elliott and Merrill, on values, 568
Ellwood, C. A., on
  future of Western culture, 508
  instinct, 546
  science, 321
Elmer, M. C., on the family, 183
Engagement (marital), 152–153
England, *see* Great Britain
Environment, as dynamic order, 31–32
Eolithic Age, 208
Erect position, and culture, 53
Ethnic epithets, 118–119
Ethnocentrism, 112
  defined, 541
Eubank, E. E., on
  acculturation, 523
  aggregation, 524
  conflict, 531
  culture, 534
  function, 543

Eubank—*Continued*
  invention, 547
  secondary group, 558
  social distance, 559
  social heritage, 559
  type, 567
Evolution, *see also* Development
  human, 51–52
  mental, 71–72
  racial, 80–84
Exogamy, 166–168
  defined, 541
Experience deposits, 144
  defined, 542
Eyes, and culture building, 53

Factor
  age, 63–67, 430–431
  biological, chap. 3, 116, 131–132, 201–203, 210, 447, 539
  cultural, chaps. 7–10
  defined, 542
  human, chap. 4
  mental, chap. 5
  physiconatural, chap. 2, 116, 131, 210–211
  racial, chap. 6
  sex, 56–63
Fairchild, H. P., on symbol, 565
Fairchild and Hart, on tool-making, 210
Fairgrieve, J., on sun's heat, 34
Family
  age of mothers, 189–190
  authority in, 191–192
  child care by, 190
  defined, 147, 183–184, 542
  democratic, 192–193, 496–497
  development, 191–193, 405
  distinguished from marriage, 147–148, 183
  divorce, 193–194, table
  economic functions, 190–191, 214–215
  experience deposits, 144–145
  folkways, 185–190
  functions, 185, 190–191, 194–197, 214–215
  future, 496–497
  matriarchal, 191
  mores, 190–193
  nature of, 183–184
  origin, 184–185
  patriarchal, 192
  property, 219
  size, 185–189, tables
  struggle, 436
  unitary original institution, 497–498
Fascism, 239, 247, 372, 419, 426, 436, 444, 465, 485
Fecundity, 55, *see also* Fertility rate
  defined, 543
Federal Art Projects, 280
Federal Council of Churches, 312
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, 420
Fertility, and culture, 55
Fertility rate, defined, 543, *see also* Fecundity
Feudalism, 137, 219, 347
Fingers, and culture, 53–54
Fire, controlled, 131
Folkways, *see also* Usages
  change in, 10, 421
  defined, 10–12, 543
  economic, 214–215
  educational, 247, 250–252
  familial, 185–190
  marital, 149–153, 155–156
  recreational, 277–279
  religious, *see items under* Religion
Food-hunger, 73
Food supply, 48, 131–133, 201–202, 203
France, 48, 470, 483, 487
  cities in, 124
  culture conflict, 117
  culture contact, 536
  economic life, 225, 506
  education, 247, 248, 251, 254
  family, 186, 187, 193, 496
  government, 37, 354, 356, 357, 358, 361, 373
  marriage, 155, 158, 169
  recreation, 274
  sex distribution, 62
  subraces in, 94, 98
French Revolution, 273, 348, 354, 372, 373
Fry and Jessup, on religion, 310, 311, 432
Function
  change in locus of, 419–420
  continuity, 473–474
  defined, 543
  of age-groups, 65–67
  of institutions, 21–22
  of sex divisions, 56–63
Fundamentalism, 311, 432, 435
Furnas, C. C., on plague, 49

Gauss, C., on religion, 498
Generality
  defined, 544
  of institutions, 19–21
  of struggle, 425–426
Geographic determinism, 31–32, 110–111, *see also* Determinism
  defined, 544
Geographic environment, defined, 544

Geography, *see* Physical nature
Germany, 423, 447, 461, 507
  cities in, 124
  culture conflict, 117, 437, 449, 466
  culture contact, 536
  class struggle, 431
  economic life, 225, 448, 506
  education, 248, 254, 436
  family, 189
  government, 37, 214, 348, 357, 360, 361, 372, 378, 387, 408, 427
  marriage, 155, 158, 172, 175, 487–488
  recreation, 266, 273, 274
  religion, 419, 435
  sex distribution, 62
  subraces in, 94
  teleology, 486, 489
Gibbon, E., on
  Apostles' Creed, 291
  Christianity, 298
Giddings, F. H., on
  educational ideals, 259
  societal organization, 560
  society, 24
  telesis, 566
Gide, C., on
  hunting and fishing economy, 201
  property, 219
Gilfillan, S. C., on invention, 414 n
Gillette and Reinhardt, on social problem, 560–561
Gillin and Blackmar, on
  ceremony, 527
  communication, 529
  hunger as economic factor, 198
  recreation, 282
  religion, 315
  society, 24
Gillin, J. L., on marriage, 180
Gini, C., on
  cephalic index, 88, table
  divorce, 193, table
  family size, 186, table
  marriage age, 158, table
  racial numbers, 97, table
  sex distribution, 62, table
Ginsberg, M., on
  caste, 526
  coercion, 528
  convention, 532
  domination, 540
  government, 352
  group, 545
  ideals, 416 n
  morality, 78
  property, 216
  social cohesion, 63
  social plane, 558
Ginzburg, B., on science, 321, 322
Gist and Halbert, on urbanization, 502
Goals, *see* Teleology
God
  animistic, 288, 525
  anthropomorphic, 288, 525
  Christian, 288
  cosmotheistic, 288–289
  nature of, 288–289, table
  number of Gods, 289
  relation to man, 289–290, table
Goldenweiser, A., on
  discovery, 539
  emergence, 394
  endogamy, 541
Goodsell, W., on
  marriage age, 154
  polygyny, 553
Gothic invasions, 470
Government
  anarchism, 384–385, 387
  ancient, 342–343, 344–345
  and education, 247–250, 340
  and family, 196, 340, 349, 351
  and recreation, 279
  associations, 17–18, 245, 356–363, 563
  authority, 345–347
  centralization, 344
  communism, 386–387
  compulsions, 352–355
  compulsory military service, 353–354
  control by, 464–466
  defined, 544
  democracy, 366–367
  development, 343–350, 379–381
  functions, 340–341
  future, 499
  Greek, 134–135
  ideology, 384–387, *see also* Teleology
  individualism, 237–238, 385–386
  internationalism, 379–384
  kinship, 344–345
  medieval, 346–347, 357, 360, 363, 368, 374–375, 379–380
  nationalism, 347–348
  nature of, 340–341
  origin, 341–343
  persistence, 471, 473, 476–477
  power, 365 ff.
  problems, chap. 22
  race as political material, 101
  revolution, 370–373
  rural-urban, 358
  socialism, 387
  sovereignty, *see* Authority
  state, 356–363, 563
  struggle, 432–433, 434–435
  taxation, 353

Government—*Continued*
  trends, 387–389
  usages, 351–355
  voting, 355
  war, 374–379
Great Britain, 48, 470, 486
  cities in, 124
  culture conflict, 449
  economic life, 109, 212, 225, 415, 506, 510
  education, 247, 248, 251, 253, 254
  family, 186, 194, 496
  government, 37, 348, 358, 359, 360, 361, 367, 435
  longevity, 56
  marriage, 150, 155, 158
  recreation, 273
  religion, 435
  science, 110
  sex distribution, 62
  subraces in, 94
  teleology, 485, 487
Greece, 49, 302, 376, 402, 440
  art, 135
  as civilization center, 40, 123, 479
  cultural contributions, 134–136, 493
  economic life, 203, 205, 211, 212, 219, 221
  education, 135, 245, 252, 257
  government, 112, 134, 344, 345, 347, 348, 366, 400, 405, 434
  marriage, 155
  philanthropy, 452
  philosophy, 135
  recreation, 271–272, 400
  religion, 41, 286, 289, 400
  science, 136, 326–327
  sex distribution, 62
  subraces in, 94
  teleology, 482, 488
  women, 429
Greek Orthodox Church, *see* Catholicism
Group
  defined, 545
  functions, 282
Guidance
  in mate-choosing, 151–152
  means of, 459–462
Gumplowicz, L., on polygenism, 82

Habit
  defined, 545
  distinguished from usages, 105
Haddon, A. C., on
  caucasoid subracial traits, 93
  culture genesis, 83
Hague, 381
Haines, C. G., on natural law, 386 n
Haire, N., on exogamy, 542
Haldane, J. B. S., on
  amalgamation, 99
  race differences, 96
Hamilton, W. H., on priesthood, 295 n
Hamites, 92–93, table
Hankins, F. H., on
  amalgamation, 99
  control, 532
  factor, 542
  fecundity, 543
  fertility rate, 543
  physical nature, 33
  science, 504
  state, 563
Hart, H., on parallelism, 551
Hart and Shields, on marriage age, 164–165, figure, table
Hayes, C. J. H., on nationalism, 348, 485, 486
Hayes, E. C., on culture cross-fertilization, 536
Hebrews, 422
  cultural contributions, 134–135
  culture conflict, 119, 319, 437, 449, 465
  economic life, 213
  education, 135, 245
  family, 196
  government, 196, 346, 366, 400
  marriage, 169, 487–488
  racial characteristics, 92, 95
  recreation, 271
  religion, 20, 41, 51, 112, 134, 286, 288, 296, 297, 298, 310, 314, 319, 405, 434, 461, 470, 493, *see also* Judaism
  teleology, 112, 479, 481
Heidel, W. A., on Greek science, 330
Hertzler, J. O., on
  familial functions, 196
  institution, 546
  persistence, 477
Hiller, E. T., on
  stratification, 564
  submission, 565
Himes, N. E., on contraception, 55
Hitler, on
  racial teleology, 487
  war, 432
Hobhouse, L. T., on
  development, 539
  emergence, 398
  reform, 318
Hocking, W. E., on familial private order, 60
Home, *see* Family
Hooton, E. A., on emergence, 396

House, F. N., on
  amalgamation, 524
  culture complex, 535
Housing, *see* Shelter
Hrdlička, A., on
  amalgamation, 98, 99
  miscibility, 95
  race, 85, figure; 87, table; 90–92, tables; 95, 98–99
  raciation, 83, 555
Huizinga, J., on
  race "superiority," 96
  struggle, 564
Humanism, 501
  Renaissance, 137–138
Human nature
  and persistence, 472–473
  defined, 545
Huns, 97
Hunt, T. F., on fertile portion of the earth, 36
Hunting and fishing economy, 201
  property in, 217–218
Huntington, E., on geographic determinism, 110

Ideals, 416 n
Ideas, *see* Concepts
Ideologies, *see* Concepts, Teleology
Illiteracy, *see* Literacy pattern
Imitation, defined, 545
Imperialism, 136, 437
Inbreeding, and exogamy, 167–168
Incest, *see* Exogamy
Index Librorum Prohibitorum, 316
Individual functions of
  economic system, 199
  education, 243, 259–261
  family, 194–195
  institutions in general, 21–22
  recreation, 281
  religion, 316–317
Individualism, 237–238, 385–386, 387–388, 510
Industrialism, 204, *see also* Machine
Industrial Revolution, 150, 204, 212, 254, 307, 310, 367, 396, 413, 417, 433, 445, 446, 499, 567
In-group, 112, 118–119
  defined, 546
Inheritance, 220
Inorganic order, *see* Physical nature
Insects, 47–48
Instincts as factors, 143, 184–185, 215–216, 243, 286–287, 323–324, 341
  defined, 546
Institute of Family Relations, Los Angeles, 152
Institutional process, defined, 392, 546–547
  distinguished from social process, 392
Institutions, 7–8
  control by, 463–466
  defined, 3, 546
  distinguished from associations, 12–13, 23
  distinguished from culture, 25–27
  distinguished from society, 23–25
  functions, 21–22
  generality, 19–21
  origin, 143–146
  persistence, 469
  struggle between, 433–436
  struggle within, 431–433
  subsystems, 8–19
  unitary origin, 397–398
  variability, 20
Instruments, 18–19
  change in, 417
  economic, 200–211, 223–228, tables; 279–280, 493 ff.
  educational, 256–258
  kinds, 19
  recreational, 268–270, 274
  religious, 290–294
  struggle centering about, 433
Intelligence
  and adjustability, 77
  and origin of institutions, 144
  communicativeness, 76–77
  defined, 74–75, 547
  morality, 77–78
  space-binding, 76
  time-binding, 75–76
Interaction
  age-group, 65–67, 430–431
  associational, 431–432
  class, 431
  cultural, 117–123
  defined, 547
  governing-governed, chap. 22
  ideological, 432–433
  institutional, 433–436
  international, 379–384
  liberalism-conservatism, 438
  male-female, 56–63, 429–430
  racial, 94–100
  rural-urban, 438–439
Interdependence in Western culture, 235–236, 501
  advantages, 235–236
  disadvantages, 236
  nature of, 235
International Labor Office, 377, 381, 520
International yearbook, 519

Internationalism
  development, 379–382
  dilemma of, 506–507
  "interpeople" movement, 382–384
  League of Nations, 381–382
  nature of, 379
Invention, *see also* Discovery
  and change, 414–415
  defined, 547
Iron Age, tool-making, 209–210
Isolation, 144
  defined, 547–548
Italy, 111, 387, 431, 437, 447, 476, 507
  as civilization center, 40
  cities in, 124
  culture conflict, 117, 450
  economic life, 211, 214, 448, 506
  education, 250, 251, 436
  family, 186, 189
  government, 37, 40, 356, 357, 358, 361, 372, 378, 403, 408, 465
  longevity, 56
  marriage, 155, 158, 159, 171, 180
  recreation, 266, 273, 274, 275
  religion, 305, 318, 419, 425, 435
  sex distribution, 62
  subraces in, 94, 98, 101
  teleology, 486, 487

Japan, 22, 62, 101, 117, 119, 214, 273, 356, 387, 431, 437, 447, 448, 486, 506, 507
Jászi, O., on
  anarchism, 384
  socialism, 387
Jews, *see* Hebrews
Johnson, A., on ruralism vs. urbanism, 438
Johnson, E. A. J., on economic associations, 212
Judaism, *see* Hebrews

Kallen, H., on
  conditioned response, 531
  morals, 550
Keane, A. H., on culture genesis, 83
Keller, A. G., on
  birth control, 526
  conquest, 531–532
  education, 244
  mores, 11, 550
  recreation, 265, 282
  religion, 316
  science of society, 558
  selection, 558
  "societal," 562
  society, 24
  subjection, 564
  variation, 568
Kendall, A. I., on microörganisms, 45
King, W. I., on wealth distribution in U. S., 230
Kiwanis Clubs, 274
Klineberg, O., on
  cephalic index, 88
  monogenism, 550
  polygenism, 553
  race, 555
  race mixture, 555
  raciation, 84 n
Kroeber, A. L., on
  calvarial index, 88–89, table, figure
  cephalic index, 86, 88, table
  change, 413
  convergence, 533
  Cro-Magnon man, 97
  diffusion, 539
  Neolithic, 551
  Paleolithic, 551
  persistence, 470
  skull of modern and fossil man, 88, table
  Stone Ages, 208 n
Krueger and Reckless, on inferiority feeling, 260
Kuczynski, R. R., on
  family size, 187
  population of Western world, 309, table
Kultur, 486, *see also* Teleology

Labor organizations, 213–214
Laissez-faire, 11, 239, 349, 433, 436, *see also* Individualism
Lancaster, L. W., on rural-urban democracy, 407
Land ownership, 217–218
Language, 19
  and mental development, 53
  persistence, 470
  spoken, 130–131
  written, 132, 256–258
Lasswell, H. D., on conflict, 428
Laws, 137, 154–157, 166, 169, 172, 173, 176, 178–179, 191, 193, 247–250, 351–352, 404, 418
Leadership,
  as aim of education, 262
  defined, 548
  recreational, 272
  religious, 294–296, 300, 306
League of Nations, 356, 377, 381–382, 507
  cited, 155, 156, 354
Liberalism, struggle against conservatism, 438
Lichtenberger, J. P., on divorce, 539
Lindsey and Evans, on companionate marriage, 530
Linear theory of culture, 508

Lions Clubs, 274
Literacy pattern, 250–252, table
Literature
  and physical nature, 41
  as recreation, 269–270
London, 38, 109, 124, 358, 361
Longevity, and culture building, 55–56
Lord's Prayer, 292, 294
Los Angeles, 152
Lot, F., on Rome, 344, 354
Lowie, R. H., on
  change, 423
  culture, 113
  inheritance, 220
  polygamy, 174
Lumley, F. E., on
  crowd, 533
  guidance, 461
  reward system, 461, 557
  social order, 560
Lynd and Lynd, on
  family size, 188, table
  marriage age, 162
  recreation, 279

Machine
  advantages, 224–226
  and recreation, 279–280
  as factor in Western culture, 493 ff.
  disadvantages, 226–228
  dominance, 223–228
  growth of, 224–225, tables
  nature of, 223–224
MacIver, R. M., on
  association, 525
  civilization, 528
  community, 529–530
  development, 399, 409
  emergence, 396
  government, 349, 350
Magic, 325–326
Maintenance system, 142
Maladjustment
  capitalism and, 229–231
  cause, 47–48, 440, 445–451
  culture conflict and, 449–450
  defined, 548
  elimination, 452–456
  familial, 188, 193–194
  increase in our times, 451–452
  interdependence and, 236
  machine and, 226–228
  marital, 178–180, 193–194, 494–497
  nature of, 443–445
  profit-making and, 232–235
  recreational, 279–281
  religious, 314–316
  scientific, 337–338
Maladjustment—*Continued*
  struggle and, 440, 447–448, 449–450
Malinowski, B., on
  convergence, 108
  institutions, 19
  natural and social sciences, 231
  war, 378
Man
  age-groups, *see* Age-groups
  anatomical traits, 52–54
  biological diversity, 68
  biological unity, 67–68
  distinguishing traits, 51–52
  fecundity, 55
  fertility, 55
  longevity, 55–56
  mind, *see* Mind
  physiological traits, 54–56
  plasticity, 56
  sex, *see* Sex
Manifest destiny, 112, 485–486, 506, *see also* Teleology
Marginal area, 110
  defined, 548
Marriage
  adultery, 174
  age, 154–166
  betrothal, 152
  bigamy, 174
  ceremonies, 293–294
  child-bearing as duty, 177
  cohabitation as right, 177
  defined, 549
  development, 148, 154–155, 172–176, 405
  distinguished from family, 147–148, 183
  divorce, 178–180, 193–194
  folkways, 149–153, 155–166
  foregoing marriage, 162–163
  functions, 177–178, 180
  future, 180–181, 496–497
  legal steps, 176–177
  mate choosing, 149–152
  mores, 153–178
  origin, 148
  postponing, 162–163
  prenuptial folkways, 152–153
  promiscuity theory, 148
  rights and duties, 177–178
  sex instruction, 149
  social obligations, 177–178
  Webbs, S. and B., as example of success in marriage, 163 n
Marriage age
  actual, 157–158, tables
  and success in marriage, 163–166, figure, table
  early, 162

Marriage age—*Continued*
  factors, 158–162
  increase, 162–163
  permissible, 154–156, tables
  variations, 157–162, tables
Marvin, F. S., on
  Christianity, 299, 300
  democracy, 366
  revolution, 373
Marxism, 8, 415, 427, 488, *see also* Teleology
Masonic Order, 300
Mass mind, 500
Mate choosing
  guided, 151–152
  parental, 149–150
  possible solution, 151–152
  problem, 150
  spontaneous, 150–151
Matriarchy, 191, 429
Mechanization, *see* Machine
Medical cost in United States, 49
Mediterranean subrace, 92–94, table
Memory, *see* Time-binding
Merriam, C. E., on government, 357, 363
Messianism, *see also* Teleology
  Hebraic, 481
  national, 485
  racial, 487–488
Mestizo, 84, 98, 111
Metal Age, tool-making, 209
Metaphysical concepts, 326–327
Mexico, 32, 37, 84, 98, 111, 251, 375, 403, 419, 435
Microörganisms, 44–45, 47
Middle-age group
  characteristics, 64–65
  social functions, 66
Middle Ages, 344, 402, 479, 567
  and clothing, 207
  cities in, 126
  Crusades, 375
  economic life, 211–212, 235, 363, 403, 413, 423
  education, 245–246, 252, 256, 257
  government, 345, 346, 353, 357, 360, 361, 368, 403, 434–435
  philanthropy, 452
  recreation, 269, 272
  religion, 286, 296, 298–302, 303, 308, 309, 317, 319, 403, 426, 462, 498
  science, 325, 327–330
  teleology, 480, 482–483, 488–489
"Middletown," 162, 279
Migration, 413
  and physical nature, 37–38
Mill, J. S., on socialism, 239–240
Miller, H. A., on class, 528
Mind
  evolution, 71–72
  intelligence, 74–78, 144, 547
  nature of, 70–71
  origin, 71
  simpler aspects, 72–74
Miscibility, 81, 95
Mobility, 499–500
  defined, 549
Mohammedanism, 41, 291, 449, 470
Monarchy, 406, 471
Monasticism, societal functions, 301–302
Monogamy, 174–176, 405
  defined, 549
Monogenism, 80–81
  defined, 549–550
Mongoloids, 39, 169
  cephalic index, 88
  external traits, 87, table
  location, 97
  mental traits, 91, table
  number, 97, table
  skeletal traits, 90, table
  subraces, 85, figure
Monovariance of race origin, 82–83
  Haddon on, 83
  Keane on, 83
Monotheism, 414
  and physical nature, 41
  Hebraic, 133–134
  persistence, 470
Moore, Ernest C., on school, 557
Moors, 97, 136
Morals
  amorality of science, 338
  and intelligence, 77–78
  defined, 550
  distinguished from mores, 11
Mores, *see also* Folkways, Usages
  change in, 12, 420–421
  defined, 10–12, 550
  economic, 215–220
  educational, 247–250
  familial, 190–193
  guidance by, 459
  marital, 153–178
  persistence, 12
  recreational, 279
  religious, *see items under* Religion
Mormons, 310, 311
  and polygyny, 173
Moslem invasion, 306
Motion pictures, 270
Mowrer, E. R., on
  divorce, 178 n
  family, 542–543
Mulatto, 98
Mumford, L. M., on machine, 223

Municipal yearbook, 358
Munro, W. B., on
  city, 121
  civic associations, 362
Muntz, E. E., on race contact, 555
Murphy, G., on sex differences, 58
Murphy and Murphy, on sex and performance, 58
Music, as recreation, 269
Mussolini, on
  democracy, 389
  war, 432
Mystical concepts, 327–328

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 16
National Bureau of Economic Research, cited, 230, 240
National Research Council, 333
National Resource Committee, 424, 502, on
  old age, 446
  rural-urban fertility, 407
  urbanization, 358
Nationalism, 306, 367, 449, 498, *see also* Teleology
  and recreation, 273
  development, 347–348
  nationality endogamy, 169–170
Naturalism, 330–331
Nature
  as factor in persistence, 472
  biological, *see* Biological nature
  physical, *see* Physical nature
Nazism, 237, 247, 372, 419, 436, 465, 487–488, 504, *see also* Teleology
Negroids, 39, 169, 273
  cephalic index, 88
  external traits, 87, table
  location, 97
  mental traits, 91, table
  number, 97
  skeletal traits, 90, table
  subraces, 85, figure
Neighborhood, 300
  defined, 550
Neolithic Age, 401, 402, *see also* Prehistoric times, Primitive culture
  defined, 551
  cultural contributions, 131–132, 132–133
  tool-making, 208, 209
Nervous system, and culture, 70–71
New Year's festivals, 294
New York, 38, 49, 109, 110, 124, 268, 283, 361
Newspapers, as media of recreation, 270
Niebuhr, R. H., on political parties, 361
Nietzsche, on war, 432
Nile Valley, 37
Noble, E., on teleology, 566
Nordic subrace, 93, table; 94, 112, 451, 487
Notestein, F. W., on marriage age, 161, table
Novokov, Y. A., on struggle, 425–426

Obscurantism, 477, *see also* Persistence
  religious, 314–315
  scientific, 337–338
Odum, H. W., on
  familial functions, 195
  government, 544
Ogburn, W. F., on
  change, 415, 417, 527
  cultural lag, 469, 534
  culture accumulation, 534
  parallelism, 107
  persistence, 471
  social heritage, 560
Ogburn and Tibbitts, on family size, 188, 422
Old-age group
  characteristics, 64–65
  social functions, 66–67
Olympic games, 272, 278, 283, 400
Organic order, *see* Biological nature, Man, Mind
Organizations, *see* Associations
Origin, *see also* Emergence
  culture, 106–109
  economic system, 198–199
  education, 242–244
  "experience deposits," 144–145
  family, 184–185
  government, 341–343
  institutions, 143–146
  marriage, 148
  problem of, 393
  property, 215–217
  race, 80–84
  recreation, 266–267
  religion, 286–288
  science, 323–324
  theories regarding, 143–146
Ornaments, as recreation, 268–269
Out-group, 118–119
  defined, 551

Paleolithic Age, 396, 401, *see also* Prehistoric times, Primitive culture
  cultural contributions, 208
  defined, 551
Pan movements, 348
Pantheism, *see* Cosmotheism
Papacy, 137, 435, 488

Parallelism, 107–108
  defined, 551
Pareto, V., on
  coercion, 466
  conservatism, 476
  invention, 414
  persistence, 552
  persistence of aggregates, 474
  religion, 292
  residues, 144
  teleology, 489
Paris, 124, 329, 476
Park, R. E., on
  assimilation, 525
  collective behavior, 528–529
  culture conflict, 536
  competition, 428, 530
  conflict, 428
  isolation, 548
  sociology, 492
  status, 563
Passover, 9, 35, 294, 296
Pastoral economy, 201–202, 218
Patriarchy, 192
Patrick, G. T. W., on mind, 70, 71
Patterson, E. M., on internationalism, 507
Pavlov, I. P., on characteristics of scientist, 332
Pax Romana, 374
Permanent Court of International Justice, 351, 377, 381, 507
Persia, 271, 344, 481
Persistence
  defined, 552
  distinguished from change, 468–469
  distinguished from cultural lag, 469
  factors, 472–475
  governmental, 471, 473, 476–477
  institutional, 469
  limits, 471–472
  minutiae, 470–471
  mores, 12
  nature of, 468–469
  phases, 469–472
  products, 475–477
  religious, 314–315, 470, 474, 476
  subphases, 470
  vestigial, 471
Personality, defined, 552
Pet population, 46
Petrie, W. M. F., on civilization fall, 128
Phelps, H. A., on reform, 556
Philanthropy, 317, 452–453
  defined, 552
Philosophy, Greek, 135
Phoenicia, 124, 132–133, 203
Physical nature
  and change, 412
Physical nature—*Continued*
  and continuity of human activity, 35
  and civilization, 123–124
  and culture, 39–41, 110–111
  and maladjustment, 446
  and migration, 37–38
  and persistence, 472
  and population concentration, 38
  and race, 39
  and religion, 41
  anthropogeographic theory, 31–32
  as conditioner, 32–33
  character, 31–33
  control, 116
  cultural modifications, 42
  determinant, 31–36
  hostility, 41–42
  spatial delimitation, 36–38
Pius XI, on science, 316 n
Plant domestication, 131–132, 203, 539
Plasticity of man, and culture, 56
Plato, on education, 245
Polyandry, 173, *see also* Polygamy
  defined, 552
Polygamy, 172–174, *see also* Polyandry, Polygyny
  defined, 552
  distinguished from other plural relationships, 174
Polygenism, 81–82
  defined, 553
  de Gobineau, on, 81
  Gumplowicz, on, 82
Polygyny, 172–173, *see* Polygamy
  defined, 553
Polytheism, 289, 471
Popenoe, P., on
  age of mothers, 189
  marriage age, 165
Population
  age divisions, 64–67
  and change, 412
  and maladjustment, 447
  concentration, 38
  fluctuation, 65
  increase, 185–188
  sex distribution, 61–63
Power (governmental), *see* chap. 22
Power (physical), 45, 210–211
Prehistoric times, cultural contributions, 130–132, 345, *see also* Primitive culture
Prejudice
  defined, 553
  ethnic, 170–171
  race, 100
President's Research Committee on Social Trends, cited, 188, 197, 254, 263, 274,

285, 310, 320, 357, 421, 422, 424, 432, 499, 518
Priesthood
  decadence, 308
  development, 294–296
  medieval, 300–301, 305–306
Primary group, defined, 553, *see* Social
Primitive culture, 217–218, 270–271, 325, 480–481, *see also* Prehistoric times
Printing, 137, 257–258
Private familial order, 60
Professionalization, 106, in
  education, 254–255
  recreation, 276, 280
  religion, 294–296, 300–301, 305–306
Profit-making pattern, 232–235
  advantages, 232
  definition, 232
  problems, 232–235
Progress, 483–484, *see also* Teleology
  defined, 554
  distinguished from development, 400
Promiscuity, defined, 554, *see also* Polygamy
Propaganda, guidance by, 462, *see also* "Mass mind"
Property, 215–220
  corporate, 219–220
  familial, 219
  group, 218–219
  inheritance, 220
  land, 217–218
  origin, 215–217
  personal, 219
  private, 219
Protestantism (various denominations), 17, 20, 40, 112, 169, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312, 314, 318, 375, 400, 406, 422, 432, 433, 435, 437, 449, 461, 470
Providential Plan, 480, 482–483, 488, *see also* Teleology
Puberty ceremonies, 293
Public order, 60
Public Works Administration, 317
Punishment system, 462–463, *see also* Reward system
  defined, 554

Quinn, J. A., on behavior pattern, 526

Race
  Alpine, 85, figure; 92–94, table
  amalgamation, 97–99, 524
  and culture, 108–109, 111
  and physical nature, 39
  and politics, 101
  Caucasoid, 39, 85–94, figure, tables; 97, 98, 169, 487
Race—*Continued*
  classification, 84–86, figure
  defined, 80, 554
  dissimilarities, 94–96, 100
  divisions, 84–92, figure and tables
  external traits, 87, table
  Hamitic, 85, figure; 92–93, table
  location, 92–94, 97
  Mediterranean, 85, figure; 92–94, table
  mental characteristics, 89–92, table
  Mongoloid, 85–92, figure, tables
  Negroid, 85–92, figure, tables
  Nordic, 85, figure; 92–94, table
  numerical strength, 97, table
  origins, 80–84
  Semitic, 85, figure; 92–94, table; *see also* Arabs, Jews
  similarities, 95–96
  skeletal traits, 86–90, figures, tables
  subraces, 85, figure; 92–94, table
  "superiority," 96–97, 487–488
  teleology, 487–488
Race conflict, 100–101
Race contact, 97–99
  defined, 555
Race mixture, defined, 555, *see also* Amalgamation
Race prejudice, 100, *see also* Prejudice
Racial determinism, 111, *see also* Determinism
Raciation
  defined, 555
  factors, 83–84
Randall, J. H., Jr., on
  Christianity, 298
  monasticism, 301
Ratzel, F., on
  anthropogeography, 31
  monotheism, 41
Raymont, T., on development, 399
Reconstruction, 454–455
Recreation
  administration, 279
  ancient, 271
  associations, 275–276
  commercialization, 280–281
  community direction, 274–275
  defined, 555–556
  democratization, 273–274
  development, 270–272
  financing, 279
  folkways, 277–279
  functions, 265–266, 281–284
  future, 498
  Greek, 271–272
  Hebrew, 271
  instruments, 268–270, 274
  media, 267–270

Recreation—*Continued*
  medieval, 272
  mores, 279
  nature of, 265–267
  origin, 266–267
  patterns, 273–279
  primitive, 270–271
  problems, 279–281
  professionalization, 276–280
  relaxation-substitution theory, 266–267
  Roman, 272
  standardization, 276–277, 279–280
  trends, 298
  types, 267–268
Red Cross Society, 382
" Red Peril," 260
Reflex, social function of, 72
Reform, 317–318, 453–454
  defined, 556
Reformation, 253, 257, 375, 498
  divided Christendom, 307–308
  humanism, 308–309
  religious freedom, 309
  weakened religious authority, 308
Reinhardt and Davies, on education, 540
Religion
  animism, 288, 525
  anthropomorphism, 288, 525
  associations, 245–246, 294–302, 309–310, 312–313, 527
  Catholicism, *see* Catholicism
  centralization, 299–300
  ceremonies, 291–294
  Christianity, *see* Christianity
  church, 245–246, 527
  church membership, 309–310, table; 312–313, table
  church union in U. S., 313
  concepts, 288–291, 298–299
  conservatism, 314–315, 476
  contemporary, 307–313
  control by, 318, 464
  creeds, 290–291
  decadence, 305–307
  defined, 556
  development, 288–291, 294–302, 305–307, 402–403, 404–406, 408
  functions, 316–319
  fundamentalism, 311, 435
  future, 498–499
  God, *see* God
  heterodoxy in U. S., 311
  heterogeneity in U. S., 310–311
  human objective, 292
  maladjustments, 314–316
  medieval, 298–302
  membership in U. S., 312–313, table
  monasticism, 301–302
Religion—*Continued*
  nature of, 286
  obscurantism, 314–315, 477
  origin, 286–288
  persistence, 314–315, 470, 474, 476
  priesthood, 294–296, 300–301, 305–306
  Protestantism, *see* Protestantism
  Reformation, 253–257, 307 ff., 375, 498
  religious endogamy, 169
  Renaissance, 306
  Roman, 41, 136, 286, 289, 296–298, 299, 434, 465, 466
  social gospel in U. S., 312
  struggle, 315–316, 432, 434
  teleology, 302, 481, 482–483
  usages in U. S., 311–312
Renaissance, cultural contribution, 137–138, 253, 306, 322, 396, 483
Reuter and Hart, on
  accommodation, 523
  adaptation, 524
  conformity, 531
  ecology, 540
  geographic determinism, 544
  interaction, 547
  social organization, 560
Revolution, 415
  and change, 416–417
  course, 370–375
  defined, 556
  elimination of maladjustment, 454–455
  nature of, 370
  results, 373, 454–455
Reward system, 461, *see also* Punishment system
  defined, 557
Ritual, defined, 557, *see also* Religious ceremonials
Robinson, W. J., on conception control, 530–531
Rohden, P. R., on conservatism vs. liberalism, 438
Roman Catholic Church, *see* Catholicism
Roman Catholic Mass, 557
Rome, 206, 302, 402, 416, 421, 473
  as civilization center, 122, 123, 124, 479, 528
  cultural contributions, 136–137, 493
  economic life, 203, 205, 211, 212, 213, 219, 221
  education, 245, 252, 257
  fall, 126, 127, 128, 376, 412, 415, 480
  family, 196
  government, 40, 112, 136, 196, 344, 345, 347, 348–349, 353, 354, 359, 360, 366, 374, 379, 400, 406
  marriage, 170
  philanthropy, 348–349, 452

Rome—*Continued*
  recreation, 272
  religion, 41, 136, 286, 289, 296–298, 299, 434, 465, 466
  science, 327
  slavery, 137
  teleology, 488
  women, 429
Romer, A. S., on changes in man, 52–53
Romier, L., on profit-making, 234
Ross, E. A., on
  convention, 532–533
  family size, 187, table
  fecundity, 55
  guidance, 459
  religion, 305
  struggle between sexes, 430
  symbol, 565
Rossman, J., on inventors, 324, 332 n
Rotary Club, 274
Rubinow, I. M., on fear of conception, 188
Rules, *see* Usages
Rural-urban
  democracy, 407
  marriage age, 159–160
  recreation, 276–277
  struggle, 438–439
  variations, 406–408
Russell Sage Foundation, on social work, 453
Russia, 110
  cities in, 124
  culture conflict, 117, 466
  economic life, 454, 506
  education, 115, 251, 436
  family, 115–116, 187, 497
  government, 37, 40, 356, 357–358, 360, 403, 408
  marriage, 115–116, 172, 497
  recreation, 266, 274
  religion, 419, 435
  revolutionary, 8, 115–116, 372, 386–387, 411, 416–417, 440, 465
  sex distribution, 62
  teleology, 489
Russian Revolution, 372, 415, 440

Samuel, H., on ideological struggle, 432–433
San Francisco, 38
Sapir, E., on personality, 552
Schmidt, W., on mind, 70
School, 252–256, *see also* Education
  defined, 557
Schuman, F. L., on racial teleology, 488
Science
  achievements, 334–335, table
Science—*Continued*
  and change, 415
  as factor in Western culture, 493 ff., 498
  associations, 333–334
  concepts, 324–331
  conflict with religion, 315–316, 327 n, 328, 435
  development, 321–322, 324–331
  dilemma, 504–505
  distinguished from education, 242, 323
  dogmatism, 337–338
  functions, 336–338
  Greek, 136
  heroic age, 328–330
  magical concepts, 325–326
  maladjustment, 337–338
  medieval, 327–328
  modern, 330–331
  nature of, 321–323
  obscurantism, 337–338
  origin, 323–324
  Renaissance, 329–330
  Roman, 327
  social meaning, 336–338
  struggle, 315–316, 435
  usages, 331–333
Science of society, defined, 557, *see also* Sociology
Scientific method, 332–333
Scientific technology, *see* Machine
Scientist, characteristics, 331–332
Secondary group, defined, 558, *see also* Societal
Selection, defined, 558
Seligman, B. Z., on exogamy, 167, 168
Seligman, E. R. A., on
  capitalism, 231 n
  sociology, 563
Sellars, R. W., on values, 567
Semites, 92, 94, table, *see also* Arabs, Hebrews
Semple, E. C., on physical nature
  and race, 39
  as conditioner, 33
Sensation, social function of, 72
Sentiment, and persistence, 474–475
Sex
  and achievement, 59
  and division of labor, 59
  and marriage, 148
  and performance, 58–59
  and social cohesion, 62–63
  and society, 56–67
  differences, 57–61
  struggle, 429–430
Sex distribution, 61–63, tables
Sex drive, and culture, 54–55, 73
Sex instruction, 149, 293

Shakespeare, on racial similarities, 95
Sheffield, A. D., on consensus, 532
Shelter, 204–207
Shepard, W. J., on democracy, 370
Simmel, G., on persistence, 472, 474
Slavery, 133, 137, 471–472
Slavs, 486
Slichter, S. H., on
  capitalism, 230
  competitive waste, 233
  human exploitation, 234
  machine, 224
  profit-making, 234
Small, A. W., on
  group, 545
  society, 24
Smith, G. E., on agriculture, 133
Smith, P., on democracy, 368
Smith, R. G., on
  culture area, 535
  sociology, 563
Social, *see also* Societal
  defined, 558
  functions of, economic system, 199, education, 243, family, 195, institutions, 22, marriage, 177–178, recreation, 265, 282, religion, 316–317, science, 336–339
Social class, *see* Classes
Social control, *see* Control
Social disorganization, defined, 559
Social distance, 503–504
  defined, 559
Social environment, *see* Culture
Social evolution, *see* Development
Social gospel in U. S., 312
Social heritage, 130–139, 493
  defined, 559
Social institutional order, distinguished from society, 23–25
Social institutional process, *see* Institutional process
Social institutions, *see* Institutions
Social interaction, *see* Interaction
Social order, defined, 560
Social organization, defined, 560, *see also* Associations
Social pathology, *see* Maladjustment
Social planning, *see* Societal engineering
Social problem, defined, 560, *see also* Maladjustment
Social process, 392, *see also* Institutional process
  defined, 561
"Social service," 452
Social work, 453
  defined, 561
Social work yearbook, 519
Socialism, 238–239, 387, 388, 510
  dilemma, 505–506
Socialization
  as function of family, 195
  defined, 561
Sociation, defined, 561–562
Societal, *see also* Social
  defined, 562
  functions of, economic system, 199–200, education, 243–244, 260–262, family, 196–197, government, 340–341, institutions, 22, marriage, 180, recreation, 265–266, 282, religion, 317–319, science, 336–338
Societal control, *see* Control
Societal engineering, 455
Societal institutions, *see* Institutions
Societal process, *see* Institutional process
Societal self-direction, defined, 562
Society
  defined, 562
  distinguished from associations, 24–25
  distinguished from institutions, 23–25
Sociology, 3–4, 492, 515
  defined, 563
Sorokin, P. A., on
  associations, 13–15
  belief, 526
  change, 419, 423
  family, 405
  future of Western culture, 508–509
  geographic determinism, 32, 41
  geographic environment, 544
  mobility, 500, 549
  monogenism, 81
  revolution, 556
  scientific achievements, 334–335, table
  stratification, 564
  teleology, 481, 489
  trend, 567
Sovereignty, *see* Authority
Space-binding, and culture, 76
Spain, 62, 94, 97, 98, 111, 124, 155, 251, 305, 359, 419, 431, 449, 470, 476, 553
Specialism, in Western culture, 500–501
Spiritualism, 289
Standardization, 494–495
  in education, 255–256
  in recreation, 276–277
State, 17–18, 356–363, *see also* Government
  defined, 563
  education for, 245
  functional associations, 358–359
  functions, 348–350
  nonpartisan associations, 362–363
  political associations, 359–362
  territorial subdivisions, 357–358

Statesman's year-book, 356, 519
Status, defined, 563
Stern, B. J., on struggle between sexes, 429
Steel Age, tool-making, 209
Steiner, J. F., on recreation, 274–276
Storck, J., on machine, 494
Stratification, defined, 564
Strong, J., on city growth, 125
Struggle
  aggressive, 427
  and change, 439
  and cohesion, 439–440
  and cultural stimulation, 439
  and domination, 440
  and maladjustment, 440, 447–448, 449–450
  associational, 359–362, 374, 379, 431–432
  between segments of society, 429–431
  competitive, 233, 427–428, 530
  conflictive, 100–101, 117–119, 370–379, 428, 531
  cultural, 117–119, 437–439
  defined, 564
  democracy as, 365–366
  economic, 433, 436
  educational, 435–436
  familial, 436
  forms, 426–428
  governmental, 365–379, 432, 434–435
  ideological, 432–433
  institutional, 431–436
  nature of, 425–426
  objectives, 426
  over instruments, 433
  "passive resistance," 427
  products, 439–441
  religious, 315–316, 432, 434
  revolution, 370–373
  scientific, 315–316, 435
  war, 374–379
Subjection, 136
  defined, 564
Submission, defined, 564–565
Sullivan, H., on literacy, 251, table; 257
Sumner, W. G., on
  custom, 538
  education, 261
  ethnocentrism, 541
  folkways, 9 n, 543
  in-group, 546
  literacy as panacea, 252
  mores, 9 n, 10
  out-group, 551
Sumner and Keller, on
  bodily intimacy theory, 185
  democracy, 365
  fire, 131
Sumner and Keller, on—*Continued*
  government, 346
  primitive education, 244
  religious conservatism, 315
  sex differences, 58
  struggle, 425
Superorganic order, 103, *see also* Culture
Sutherland, E. G., on punishment system, 554
Sweden, 56, 62, 155, 158, 186, 193, 248, 251, 254
Switzerland, 56, 62, 155, 158, 186, 193, 194, 248, 251, 368, 369, 378
Symbols, 19
  defined, 565
Syndicalism, 238

Tartar invasion, 306
Tawney, R. H., on change, 423
Teachers, 254–256
  women, 254–255, table
Techniques, defined, 565, *see also* Instruments
Technocracy, 455
Technology, *see* Machine
Teggart, F. J., on civilization, 124
Teleology
  ancient, 481
  class, 488
  concepts, 479–488
  cosmic cycle, 482
  defined, 565
  Greek, 482
  Kultur, 486
  manifest destiny, 485–486
  Marxian, 488
  medieval, 482–483
  Messianism, 481
  nationalism, 485–486
  nature of, 479–480
  Nazi, 487–488
  primitive, 480–481
  products of, 488–489
  progress, 483–484, *see also* Progress
  Providential Plan, 482–483
  racial, 487–488
  religious, 302, 481, 482–483
  white man's burden, 485
Telesis, defined, 566
Ten Commandments, 296
Textbook evil, 258
Thanksgiving, 35, 294
Theocracy, 136
Thomas, F., on culture contact, 120, 536
Thomas and Znaniecki, on values, 568
Thompson, W. S., on
  age distribution, 64–65, tables
  church membership in U. S., 312–313

Thompson, W. S., on—*Continued*
  city growth, 125
  family size, 188
  population increase, 186
  race contact, 555
Thomson, J. A., on
  adjustment, 524
  instinct, 143
  nervous system, 71
Thorndike, E. L., on learning, 56
Tillage, *see* Agriculture
Time-binding, and culture, 75–76
Titus, C. H., on voting, 355
Tool-making, 208–210, *see also* Machine
Totalitarianism, 239, 318, 349, 500
Tozzer, A. M., on
  culture and race, 109
  emergence, 396
  mind of primitive man, 72
  race "superiority," 96–97
Trade unions, *see* Labor organizations
Tradition, defined, 566
Transmission, defined, 566
Trend, 162, 344, 366–367, 387–389
  defined, 567
Tunis, J. R., on divorce in Harvard class of 1911, 150
Turks, 117, 328
Tylor, E. B., on
  animism, 525
  cephalic index, 86
  culture, 104, 105
Type, 112–113
  defined, 567

Ullmann, E. V., on poison in canned foods, 408
United Kingdom, *see* Great Britain
United States
  age distribution, 64–65, tables; 413
  cities in, 38
  culture conflict, 118–119
  culture contact, 536
  economic life, 109, 111, 211, 212, 213, 223–225, tables; 227, 230, 231, 232, 506
  education, 10, 248–250, table; 251, table; 253, 254–255, table
  family, 186–188, tables; 189, 194, 407, 422, 496
  government, 40, 352, 354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 460, 465
  health, 48, 49, 447
  longevity, 56
  marriage, 154–162, 169, 170, 178–180, tables; 406, 407
  physical nature, 38, 42, 412
  race conflict, 100, 101, 450
United States—*Continued*
  races in, 92, 111
  recreation, 270 n, 273–277
  religion, 310–313, table; 403
  science, 333, 334, 435
  sex distribution, 61–63, tables
  social work, 453
  teleology, 112, 485–486, 487
  urbanization, 125, 502
  war cost, 377
  women, 430
U. S. Bureau of Chemistry, 408
U. S. Bureau of Education, *see* United States Office of Education
U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 179
U. S. Bureau of the Census, cited, 63, 158, 160, 179, 180, 188, 224, 311, 312, 406, 407, 502
U. S. Department of Labor, cited, 227
U. S. Office of Education, cited, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 255
Urban-rural, *see* Rural-urban
Urbanization, 121–123, 502–504, *see also* City, Civilization, Culture
  defined, 567
  results, 125–126
Usages, 9–12, *see also* Folkways, Mores
  and concepts, 8–9
  change in, 420–421
  governmental, 351–355
  guidance by, 459
  scientific, 331–333
Utility, as factor in persistence, 475

Valleys, and culture, 37, 111, 123
Values, defined, 567
Variation, 110, 112
  accidental, 111–112
  change and, 111, 421–423
  class, 160–161, table; 406, 421–422
  cultural, 110–112, 405–408
  defined, 568
  geographic, 110–111
  internal elaboration as cause, 111
  race and, 111
Versailles Treaty, 487
Von Wiese and Becker, on
  domination, 440
  priesthood, 295
  socialization, 561
  sociation, 562

Wage system, 495
Wallace, H. A., on science, 338, 504–505
Wallas, G., on democracy, 368
Wallis, W. D., on tradition, 566
Wallis and Willey, on maladjustment, 548

War
  and change, 416
  benefits, 377–378
  detriments, 376–377
  historical periods, 374–376
  nature of, 374
  necessity, 378–379
Ward, L. F., on
  teleology, 481
  telesis, 566
Warden, C. J., on emergence, 541
Watson, T. J., on war cost, 377
Wealth
  distribution, 230
  obligations, 215
  prestige, 215
Webb, S. and B., on
  capitalism, 229
  marriage, 163 n
  profit-making, 233, 234
Weber, H. C., on religion in U. S., 312–313
Weinberg, A. K., on *Manifest destiny*, 486
Westermarck, E. A., on
  clothing, 207
  cohabitation, 177
  divorce, 194
  endogamy, 169, 171
  exogamy, 166, 167
  future of family and marriage, 497
  marriage, 147, 154, 157, 163, 497, 549
  monogamy, 175
  polyandry, 552
  religion, 556
Western culture, 3–4
  cities, 124–125
  communication, 500
  dilemmas, 504–507
  economic forms, 494–496
  education, 497–498
  factors, 493
  family, 496–497
  future, 507–510
  government, 499
  humanism, 501
  interdependence, 501
  machine, 493 ff.
  marriage, 496–497
  mass mind, 500
  mobility, 499–500
  recreation, 498
  religion, 498–499
  science, 493 ff.
  specialism, 500–501
  urbanization, 502–504
Wheeler, W. M., on emergence, 541
Whitbeck and Thomas, on
  physical nature, 32–33
  population concentration, 38
White man's burden, 112, 485, 506, *see also* Teleology
White race, *see* Caucasoids
Whitehead, A. N., on
  rate of culture accumulation, 116
  specialism, 500
Willcox, W. F., on city, 121
Wissler, C., on
  civilization fall, 127
  culture perpetuity, 128
  culture trait, 537
  diffusion, 108
  domestication, 540
  future of Western culture, 508
  machine as unique trait, 493
  promiscuity, 554
  universal culture pattern, 20 n
Wolfe, A. B., on demography, 538
Women
  achievement, 59–61
  struggle, 429–430
  teachers, 254–255, table
Works Progress Administration, 420
World Almanac, 519
  cited, 36, 309, 356, 519
World Court, *see* Permanent Court of International Justice
World War, 367, 372, 376, 383, 435, 440, 444, 449, 450, 484, 489, 536
  cost of, 377
Writing, 256–257
Würzburger, E., on war and marriage, 175

Yearbook of American Churches, cited, 309, 310, 312, 313
Yellow-brown race, *see* Mongoloids
"Yellow Peril," 260
Young, K., on
  attitude, 525, 526
  coöperation, 533
  race prejudice, 100
Youth
  characteristics, 64–65
  social functions, 65–66

Zimmerman, C. C., on ruralism vs. urbanism, 438
Znaniecki, F., on
  coercion, 463
  guidance, 460
  propaganda, 462
  society, 562–563

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